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Abstract 
 
Located at the point of intersection of Northern, Eastern and Central Europe, the Baltic Sea 
Region has historically been a setting of an, at times, vivid exchange between the shores of 
the small inland sea. Challenging the perception of the region as a merely peripheral 
borderland of the Cold War in Europe, the present study aims to investigate to what degree 
the Baltic waterways maintained their specific entangling function in an era largely 
characterised by demarcation and disintegration.   
In order to move beyond the bipolar pattern that still dominates Cold War historiography, this 
study focuses on networks and channels of communication that could develop underneath the 
level of the official political relations across the Baltic Sea. The neutral Nordic states are in 
this context seen as a so far underestimated but crucial element in the geopolitical 
constellation of Cold War Europe. The proximity of Sweden and Finland to their Polish and 
Soviet opposite coasts and the comparatively low level of political tensions in the region 
triggered an exceptionally dynamic field of interaction, which was fuelled by the vigorous 
anti-communist activism of the numerous Polish and Baltic exiles in neutral Sweden. In a 
chronological framework that covers half a century of resistance and opposition against the 
geopolitical status quo, the study will reconstruct a topography of uncontrolled 
communication between the societies around the Baltic rim that hitherto has received 
undeservedly little attention.  
Based on so far mostly unexplored archival sources and oral history interviews, the thesis 
aims to present the first synthesis of the Baltic Sea Region’s Cold War history. It is supposed 
to form a counter-narrative to the prevailing emphasis on disintegration and conflict and 
constitutes a first step towards a European Cold War history that efficiently challenges the 
topos of the Iron Curtain as an impermeable barrier.  
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I. Introduction: The Baltic Sea Region and the Cold War 
Almost entirely enclosed by the Scandinavian peninsula and the landmasses of the continent, 
the Baltic Sea constitutes a geographically concisely definable inland sea. Among its striking 
features is the disproportion between the long coastlines and the comparatively short distances 
that separate the territories and populations around the Baltic rim from their opposite coasts. 
However, in spite of the spatial proximity of the opposing shores, they are, in many respects, 
poles apart from each other. The mental gaps between the Baltic shores are only partly 
explicable with the exceptional linguistic and cultural diversity displayed in Europe’s north-
eastern corner. The disintegrative tendencies have their roots in the very different historical 
fates that the riparian states and peoples experienced, not at least in the twentieth century. 
Thus, the frequency with which the notion of the Baltic Sea Region is used sharply contrasts 
with the obvious lack of any kind of shared identities among its inhabitants.
1
  
However, due to its geographical location at the point of intersection of Northern, Eastern and 
Central Europe, the Baltic Sea Region has historically been one of the settings for the multi-
layered entangling processes that, as the German historian Matthias Middell put it, 
continuously re-established the “kinship between the eastern and western part of Europe”.2 
Not least due to the intricate pattern of interaction and exchange between the cities and ports 
around the Baltic rim, the rise of regional great powers was often accompanied with the 
projection of hegemonic ambitions onto the Baltic Sea Region as a whole. In line with its 
claims to great power status that emerged in the early seventeenth century, the Kingdom of 
Sweden followed the aim to unite the Baltic coastlines under the roof of a “Swedish dominium 
maris Baltici,”3 which would have turned the Baltic Sea into a Swedish inland sea. Similar 
rhetorical and military attempts to unite the riparian territories under a single banner also 
characterised the expansionist policies of tsarist Russia, which with the foundation of St. 
Petersburg had moved its political centre to the Baltic shores under the reign of Peter the 
Great. The Russian Empire’s fantasies of territorial expansion into the region could still be 
traced in the martial rhetoric of the Bolsheviks, who after the victorious successes of the 1917 
revolution dreamt of a “conquest of the Baltic Sea”, as Izvestia, the mouthpiece of the Soviet 
government, wrote in 1925.
4
 Yet, the plan to turn the small inland sea into a “sea of the social 
                                                          
1
 Alten, Jürgen von (1996): Weltgeschichte der Ostsee. Berlin: Siedler; p. 8. 
2
 Middell, Matthias (2000): “Kulturtransfer und historische Komparatistik – Thesen zu ihrem Verhältnis”. – In: 
Comparativ 10/1, pp. 7-41; p. 27. 
3
 Behre, Göran et al. (1985): Sveriges historia 1521-1809: Stormaktsdröm och småstadsrealiteter. Stockholm: 
Almqvist & Wiksell; p. 99. 
4
 Rei, August (1970): The Drama of the Baltic Peoples. Stockholm: Kirjastus Vaba Eesti; p. 52. 
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revolution”5 failed, as did Nikita Khrushchev’s foreign policy strategy in the region three 
decades later, launched under the motto of the ‘Sea of Peace’. Underneath the pacifist fig-leaf, 
many Western observers discerned Moscow’s determination to drive out the NATO forces of 
the Baltic Sea Region and to expand the Soviet sphere of influence to the Nordic states. Thus, 
the Kremlin’s efforts of turning the Baltic Sea into a “Soviet inland sea,”6 or, to use the 
vocabulary of the Cold War, a “red inland sea,”7 eventually came to nothing.  
Despite repeated attempts to impose hegemonic rule onto the territories along the Baltic 
shores, the most outstanding trait of the Baltic Sea Region’s history up to and, perhaps, 
particularly during the twentieth century has been the huge divergence between the political, 
social and economic orders around the Baltic rim. This applies especially to the era that began 
with the division of the region into occupied and non-occupied zones during World War II 
and the following demarcation between capitalist and Soviet-type communist states. During 
the half century between Nazi Germany’s attack on Poland in 1939 and the fall of 
communism at the end of the 1980s, the Baltic Sea Region’s history mirrored Europe’s 
dichotomy between democracy and dictatorship, market and planned economy, freedom of 
speech and suppression of oppositional voices. It was first in the euphoric 1990s that the 
transitional changes in the formerly communist states and the developing regional integration 
triggered a renaissance of the concept of a specific regional context, which was reinforced by 
numerous politically motivated attempts to create a common identity. With a variety of 
regularly recurring festivals and other symbolic political acts, the rediscovery of a “forgotten 
space”8 was celebrated. Against this background, the use of the term ‘Baltic Sea Region’ as a 
historiographical concept may lead to accusations of applying an ex-post perspective and 
using an anachronistic terminology. Nevertheless, the present study aims at investigating the 
Baltic Sea Region’s Cold War history from a pronouncedly spatially defined angle, which is 
supposed to shirk the limitations of nationally framed historiography by highlighting 
transnational processes entangling the Baltic shores. A closer look at the established 
definitions of the Baltic Sea Region as a historiographical category is thus indispensable.  
During the Cold War decades, the factual and, not at least, perceived bipolarity of divided 
Europe left little space for the imagination of any overriding regional unity across the Baltic 
                                                          
5
 Küng, Andres (1971): Estland – en studie i imperialism (= Aldus Aktuellt 75). Stockholm: Bokförlaget Aldus / 
Bonniers; p. 31. 
6
 Lund, Nils (1959): “Östersjön i brännpunkten”. – In: Ivo Iliste et al. (eds.), Friheten möter Chrusjtjov (= 
Brännande Östersjöproblem 6). Stockholm: Baltiska Kommittén, pp. 28-36; p. 28.  
7
 Troebst, Stefan (2006): Kulturstudien Ostmitteleuropas. Aufsätze und Essays. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang; 
p. 255. 
8
 Alten, Weltgeschichte der Ostsee; p. 7. 
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Sea, which at the time was perceived as a “heavily guarded no-man’s-land between the Cold 
War’s two main camps”.9 The moderately successful regional intergration efforts of the 
interbellum were a distant memory and the military fortification of the coastlines consolidated 
the incorporation of the region’s southern and south-eastern parts into the land-bound 
complex of the socialist bloc. As late as in the 1980s, any discourse about a historical region 
around the Baltic rim was considered to reflect either nostalgia or an outspokenly anti-Soviet 
attitude.
10
 Yet, it was during the Cold War that historical thinking in categories of space and 
the concept of the Baltic Sea Region were rediscovered and put back on the historians’ 
agenda. Already in 1977, the German historian Klaus Zernack introduced the notion of 
Nordosteuropa (‘North-Eastern Europe’).11 The term described one of the four historical 
Eastern European sub-regions that Zernack identified on the basis of patterns of mutual 
influences and exchange. He consciously kept a secure distance from the contaminated Raum-
terminology and, thus, to the older notion of Ostseeraum. In contrast to earlier concepts, he 
integrated the Arctic peripheries and north-western Russia into a transnationally defined 
historical pattern of interaction. With the establishment of a spatial analytical framework that 
integrated all riparian states and peoples, Zernack thus became a pioneer within the field that 
focuses on ‘common histories’ around the Baltic rim.  
The evident anachronism of the discourse about the Baltic Sea Region did not necessarily 
form a contradiction to the political realities of the time. Nordosteuropa was consciously 
designed as an artificial, strictly historiographical term, supposed to establish a conceptual 
framework for the research on cross-Baltic interaction in the period between the Viking raids 
and the decline of Sweden’s Baltic empire in 1809/1815.12 Locating the entangling processes 
across the Baltic waters in a distant past, the regional context itself was historicised and 
explicitly disconnected from the geopolitical realities of Cold War Europe. Yet, the concept 
and its chronological limitations were soon reframed. In 1983, Zernack transferred his vision 
of Nordosteuropa into the context of the twentieth century, claiming that the interwar period 
could be interpreted as a temporary resurgence of the historical regional context.
13
 Thus, it 
was the era of Russian predominance in the region, from the decline of Sweden as a regional 
                                                          
9
 Gerner, Kristian / Karlsson, Klas-Göran (2002): Nordens medelhav. Östersjöområdet som historia, myt och 
projekt. Stockholm: Natur och Kultur; p. 21. 
10
 Hackmann, Jörg (2006): “Nordosteuropa: Die baltischen Nationen und die Renaissance der Ostseeregion”. – 
In: Norbert Götz et al. (eds.): Die Ordnung des Raums. Mentale Landkarten in der Ostseeregion (= Die 
Ostseeregion: Nördliche Dimensionen – Europäische Perspektiven 6). Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, pp. 
189-224; p. 191. 
11
 Zernack, Klaus (1977): Osteuropa: Eine Einführung in seine Geschichte. München: Beck. 
12
 Zernack, Klaus (1993): Nordosteuropa. Skizzen und Beiträge zu einer Geschichte der Ostseeländer. Lüneburg: 
Verlag Nordostdeutsches Kulturwerk; p. 7. 
13
 Ibid. 
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great power to the end of World War I, and later the Soviet domination that, according to 
Zernack, led to a disintegration of the historical region as a whole.
14
 
Nordosteuropa was a concept that introduced a new perspective. The specific regional context 
was defined through space-bound interaction and mutual influences across the Baltic Sea 
throughout history. Thus, the concept went beyond national categories and highlighted the 
Baltic Sea as a European contact zone that, as an entangling geographical factor, to a large 
degree determined the history of the peoples at its shores. Yet, the proposed approach did not 
immediately stimulate a broader research activity on the topic. The situation changed first 
with the series of upheavals behind the Iron Curtain in 1989, which in many respects triggered 
not only a political, but also a “spatial revolution”.15 It was under the impact of the multi-
layered regional integration processes of the 1990s that the imagination of a Baltic Sea 
Region, which for decades had been perceived as an anachronism in any other context than 
geography, experienced a comeback. The lively entangling processes between the Baltic 
shores pointed to – and asked for – historical analogies. Hence, the notion of the Baltic Sea 
Region found its way back even into the scholarly discourse.  
The reanewed interest in historical and present forms of cross-Baltic interaction coincided 
with the so-called ‘spatial turn’. While space and spatial categories found their way back into 
the humanities,
16
 a parallel historiographical turn triggered the reframing of the older concept 
of Beziehungsgeschichte into entangled history approaches like the histoire croisée.
17
 Under 
the impact of these discourses and the large-scale political reconfiguration processes in 
Europe, Klaus Zernack declared the “comeback of the European region of Nordosteuropa into 
political reality” at the beginning of the 1990s.18 Nevertheless, the Cold War decades, which 
had significantly restricted the political, societal, cultural and economic exchange between the 
shores, were still explicitly excluded as an exceptional era, a ‘historical anomaly’. This 
corroborated the perception of the Baltic Sea Region as a merely peripheral borderland along 
the boundaries of Cold War Europe, a “northern sub-region of the East-West conflict.”19 
                                                          
14
 Troebst, Kulturstudien Ostmitteleuropas; p. 260. 
15
 Alten, Weltgeschichte der Ostsee; p. 94. 
16
 Götz, Norbert et al. (2006): “Die Karte im Kopf: Einleitung”. – In: Ibid., Die Ordnung des Raums; pp, 9-23; p. 
13. 
17
 Kocka, Jürgen (2003): “Comparison and beyond”. – In: History and Theory 42, pp. 39-44; p. 42. 
18
 Quoted in: Troebst, Kulturstudien Ostmitteleuropas; p. 255. 
19
 Lehti, Marko (2006): “Call for a Northern agenda: Mastering regions – training masters”. – In: Carsten 
Schymik et al. (eds.): Go North! Baltic Sea Region Studies: Past – Present – Future (= Die Ostseeregion: 
Nördliche Dimensionen – Europäische Perspektiven 5). Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, pp. 55-66; p. 65. 
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It was under the impact of the ‘spatial turn’ that Fernand Braudel’s epoch-making opus on the 
Mediterranean Sea, La Méditerranée,
20
 was rediscovered.
21
 Braudel’s structuralist approach 
defined the sea and its coasts as a historical entity that persisted in the longue durée 
perspective, despite temporary periods of disintegration. This perspective also affected the 
historiographical approach to the past of the Baltic Sea Region. It seemed as if a certain 
historical logic or justice had re-established the unity of the region after the, historically 
speaking, short intermezzo of the Cold War, which triggered the first attempts to write a 
synthesis of the Baltic Sea Region’s history as a histoire totale. This ambition did not comply 
with Zernack’s analytically justified chronological limitations, so that the periods that he had 
excluded from the regional narrative had to be integrated with the help of the longue durée. 
Two of the most prominent examples are the works of Matti Klinge and David Kirby, who 
both chose a title that was obviously inspired by Braudel.
22
 They cover a time frame that 
reaches from the beginnings of European history, in Kirby’s work from the early modern 
period onwards, to the 1990s, thus integrating the periods of Russian and later Soviet 
domination, which Zernack had excluded from his spatially defined concept, under the roof of 
a coherent narrative.  
Yet, both works turned out to be “more traditional” than the titles made the reader expect.23 
The authors apply a ‘bird’s eye perspective’, focusing on the impact of European or global 
developments on the societies around the Baltic rim, obviously aiming at integrating the 
national and sub-regional histories of Europe’s north-eastern peripheries into the broader 
framework of European history. Interaction between the opposing shores, however, which 
would form the basis for a study of transnational regional entanglements, does not form the 
common thread for the studies. Instead, they strengthen the image of the Baltic Sea Region as 
a European periphery, whose inhabitants do not have much more in common than their 
backwardness. Both Klinge and Kirby emphasise the continuous influences of Western 
European culture throughout the centuries, which, as Klinge claims, formed the unique “unity 
and identity”24 of the Baltic Sea Region. The regional context is thus reduced to a series of 
one-way cultural transfers from West to East, while Zernack’s ‘entangled history’ approach 
                                                          
20
 Braudel, Fernand (1949): La Méditerranée et le monde méditerréen à l’époque de Philippe II. Paris: Armand 
Colin. 
21
 Hackmann, “Nordosteuropa”; p. 193. 
22
 Kirby, David (1990): Northern Europe in the Early Modern Period. The Baltic World, 1492-1772. London: 
Longman; Ibid. (1995): The Baltic World 1772-1993. Europe’s Northern Periphery in an Age of Change. 
London: Longman; Klinge, Matti (1994): The Baltic World. Helsinki: Otava. 
23
 Troebst, Kulturstudien Ostmitteleuropas; p. 244. 
24
 Klinge, Matti (1998): Bałtycki Świat. Helsinki: Otava (Polish edition of The Baltic World); p 174.  
6 
 
unfortunately remains unconsidered.
25
 This methodological weakness becomes apparent 
especially in the chapters on the Cold War, which slide back into nationally framed 
historiographical patterns. The narrative is reduced to the depiction of the very different fates 
that the Scandinavians and their Central and Eastern European neighbours faced after World 
War II, which reaffirms the image of the Cold War decades as a period of disintegration. In 
Klinge’s work, the dimension of cross-Baltic communication is reduced to some general 
remarks on the contacts between Swedish leftist circles and the German Democratic Republic 
or Estonian attempts to re-orientate the national identity towards the traditional bonds with 
Sweden and Finland in the 1980s.
26
 Kirby’s analysis of the Cold War era is even weaker, as 
he suddenly decides to throw the whole southern part of the region overboard, limiting 
himself to a description of the contrasting post-war development in Scandinavia and the 
formerly independent Baltic states.
27
 Russians and Poles are left out by Kirby, who states that 
both nations cannot be defined as Northern European and, therefore, not as Baltic: “it is on 
these grounds that I have left their national [sic!] history to others to tell”.28 The post-war 
decades up to the fall of communism are thus in both Kirby’s and Klinge’s books reduced to 
disintegration and disentanglement. It is only due to the Braudelian bracket of the longue 
durée that the ‘anomaly’ of the Cold War can be integrated into a coherent narrative.  
The abovementioned examples reflect the analytical problem of investigating the Cold War 
decades from a regional perspective. Due to the strong topos of the Iron Curtain, the narrative 
is subordinated to a strict bipolar pattern, which still to a large degree characterises the 
historiography of Cold War Europe in general. Thus, the decades of the East-West conflict are 
reduced to being an “exception in a millennial process of integration”.29 However, there is 
also another problematic issue that strikes the reader of Klinge’s Baltic World, a problem that 
is symptomatic for the decade that followed the geopolitical changes of 1989. By identifying 
the close historical links between the peoples around the Baltic rim with (Western) European 
culture as the root of a ‘regional identity’, Klinge overshoots the mark. Indeed, the 
catchphrase of a “Baltic identity” was a common element of the political discourses of the 
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time, as was the term of a “Baltic culture.”30 These notions resulted from the various attempts 
to propagate the “reinvention” of the region, which was supposed to contribute to the 
unification of Europe.
31
 The danger of intermixing historiographical and political discourses 
soon raised criticism of the concept of a histoire totale on the Baltic Sea Region. In view of 
the overlapping of the scholarly approaches with the ongoing “region-building” process,32 the 
need to draw a distinct demarcation line between historiography and regional politics became 
obvious. 
 
The Swedish historian Bo Stråth represented an outspokenly critical stance towards the 
historiographical discourses on the Baltic Sea Region as a rediscovered setting of ‘entangled 
histories’ due to their intertwining with, as he called it, the “politics of the day”. Without an 
awareness of the politicisation of the notion as a contemporary identity-forming concept, the 
historian would, as Stråth warned, run the risk of becoming a “politican of the day” himself. 
In line with his critique against the constructivist elements in the recent publications about the 
Baltic Sea Region’s history, Stråth was opposed to the idea of writing a histoire totale in 
general, urging the scholarly community to avoid producing “false and retouched images of 
continuity”. Although he admitted that there had been periods of integration across the Baltic 
Sea that could be investigated as ‘common histories’ in a regional framework, he doubted that 
a coherent historical synthesis could be written without distorting the past.
33
 According to 
Stråth, the history of the Baltic Sea Region was a history of disintegration and demarcation 
rather than of integration and entanglements. In this context, even the Cold War era was only 
one example in a succession of wars and conflicts that had made any kind of regional 
integration impossible. On these grounds, he categorically rejected the implementation of a 
Braudelian approach to the history of the states and peoples around the Baltic rim.
34
 
The historical synthesis of Stråth’s compatriots Kristian Gerner and Klas-Göran Karlsson tries 
to bring the ambition of presenting a histoire totale of the Baltic Sea Region into line with an 
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approach that successfully avoids the dangers of constructivism. Although already the title of 
the book, Nordens medelhav (‘The Mediterranean of the North’), is obviously a tribute to 
Braudel, the authors succeed in surmounting the difficulties of the structuralist approach that 
were at the root of Stråth’s objections. Gerner and Karlsson focus on the Baltic Sea itself as 
an entangling factor that established a historical continuity through the constant interplay 
between the sea, the coastlines and the territories outside the Baltic context. Due to the focus 
on highly flexible categories such as networks and communication patterns, the authors avoid 
the need to limit their envisioned regional context to a set of geographically fixed boundaries. 
Instead, they present their spatially defined analytical framework along the lines of networks 
that gravitated towards certain centres, which, in turn, were closely interconnected.
35
 The 
focus on cross-Baltic communication and interaction in the broadest sense enabled the authors 
to integrate even periods of conflicts and demarcation into a longue durée perspective. By 
recognising the fact that the history of the region was largely characterised by rivalry and 
conflict,
36
 the dilemma of the earlier ambitions to reconstruct a continuity of integration is 
successfully surmounted. Instead, the continuity of communication and encounters is stressed. 
Zernack’s chronological limitations can thus be bridged by mapping various forms of contact, 
cooperation and communication even in periods of disintegration and conflict. This approach 
allows even the inclusion of the Cold War era into a regionally defined historical overview in 
spite of the undeniably divisive effect of the demarcation line between the blocs.
37
 
Hence, the vision of the Baltic Sea Region as a “total and exclusive unit” was replaced by the 
interpretation of the regional context through the lens of the Baltic Sea as a “meeting place” 
that triggered the development of networks between families, communities and cities around 
the Baltic rim.
38
 This approach revealed similarities to the parallel tendencies in the social 
sciences to focus on regions as “areas of communication”, spaces constituted by specific 
patterns of interaction.
39
 It also resembled the angle from which Neal Ascherson investigated 
the multi-layered web of entanglements between the highly heterogeneous peoples and 
territories around the Black Sea, which nevertheless unite into a regional context due to 
thousands of years of migration, communication and exchange between the shores.
40
 This 
reframed way of interpreting the Baltic Sea Region’s history has not revised the vision of the 
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Baltic Sea as the decisive “historical bracket” that connects the shores, despite Stråth’s 
objections. Thus, the general assumptions of Zernack, Klinge and Kirby remain uncontested.
41
  
 
The current debates among Cold War historians have resulted in the first innovative 
approaches that support the spatial perspective on the Baltic Sea Region’s Cold War history. 
Until recently, Cold War historiography was an uncontested domain of political and 
diplomatic history, which stressed and reinforced the dichotomy between the two social and 
economic systems and the front lines that limited interaction and exchange.
42
 The angle from 
which the systemic conflict was approached by scholars on both sides of Iron Curtain from 
the 1950s onwards was in itself a product and element of the Cold War. Yet, this limiting 
perspective survived the end of the East-West conflict and found its continuation in the so-
called “new Cold War history”43, which emerged after the opening up of the archives in the 
post-communist states. John Lewis Gaddis’s account of the Cold War era, for instance, which 
counts among the major works of the 1990s on the topic, continued the narrative of 
confrontation, redrawing the lines of the superpower struggle for political and military 
hegemony from a clearly Western, U.S.-centred perspective.
44
 Hence, the Cold War tradition 
of stressing the dividing effect of the Iron Curtain and focusing on the political and military 
aspects of the struggle between the competing systems was preserved, which cemented the 
image of the Iron Curtain “as an impermeable barrier dividing two monolithic blocs.”45  
With the onset of the 2000s, the focus of Cold War research gradually shifted away from the 
level of high politics and international relations towards cultural and social aspects of the 
systemic conflict, which shed light on various social strata and dimensions.
46
 This change of 
perspective opened up the narrow focus on top decision makers and political front figures as 
main actors on the stage of Cold War history. The conceptual debates triggered the rethinking 
of established approaches, which resulted in the integration of the “social, intellectual and 
economic history of the twentieth century” as fields that were crucial for the understanding of 
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Cold War politics.
47
 Thus, Cold War research has developed into a highly interdisciplinary 
field, which is continuously broadened by the inclusion of further historiographical subfields, 
such as “media history [and] the history of ideas, utopias and mentalities”.48 ‘Cold War 
culture’ has become a catchphrase that inspired a range of transnationally framed studies on 
popular culture and mentalities as well as their political roots and implications, especially in 
their transatlantic dimension.
49
 This increasing focus on the ‘soft issues’ of the Cold War has 
had an important impact on the general approach to the East-West conflict. The elements of 
conflict and confrontation have been toned down in favour of an angle which takes a peek 
beyond the Iron Curtain. This turn fostered the development of a “comparative approach to 
the cultural and social history of the Cold War”, which consciously took developments in both 
East and West into account.
50
 An example that illustrates the fruitfulness of such a wider 
perspective, which questions the dominant focus on divergence and disintegration between 
the blocs, is the work of Jeremi Suri. In his research on the rebelling youth’s “counter-
cultures” of protest that developed both in capitalist and communist societies from the mid-
1960s onwards, he not only succeeded in proving the importance of the social and cultural 
context for the understanding of Cold War politics.
51
 His work also marked a step towards a 
discourse that increasingly challenged and questioned the topos of the Iron Curtain as an 
impermeable dividing line. 
The research interest of Cold War historians has been widened not only vertically towards a 
broader range of agents on both the macro and micro level, but also horizontally. In view of 
the revised approaches to the East-West conflict that have been developing during the past 
few years, a more nuanced picture of the Cold War era emerges. Events and developments on 
both sides of the Iron Curtain are taken into account and interrelated from a transnational 
perspective. The current interest in communication, interaction and exchange beyond the bloc 
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border has of course to be seen in the context of the recent career of transnational approaches. 
Focusing on processes instead of structures, they highlight flows, dynamics and movements in 
history. Seen from this angle, Cold War research has the potential to uncover, underneath the 
topos of the Iron Curtain as an unsurmountable barrier, a “wide space of interaction”, which 
engaged “different types of actors, [...] people, institutions and states”.52 The scholarly 
discourse on the use of transnational perspectives in Cold War research, especially in the 
context of studies on East-West interaction, is only developing. However, these innovative 
approaches promise a fruitful outcome, as has been reflected by several ambitious 
conferences
53
 and first publications on the topic. The volume with the programmatic title 
Perforating the Iron Curtain, edited by Poul Villaume and Odd Arne Westad
54
, focuses 
especially on the impact of détente and the Helsinki process on the East-West relations in 
divided Europe. Yet, apart from two contributions on transnational grassroots-level networks, 
most of the published essays concentrate on the relations between states. The anthology 
Reassessing Cold War Europe, by contrast, edited by Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin 
Miklóssy, is dedicated to the social and economic dimension of East-West contacts that 
emerged with the onset of détente. Besides illustrating some examples of officially sanctioned 
societal exchange, the contributors highlight especially the transfer of technological know-
how across the blocs and the role of economic forces in general which, as Juhana Aunesluoma 
already stated in an earlier publication, successfully “penetrated” the Iron Curtain during 
détente.
55
 The near future will certainly yield a number of further empirical studies on the 
“variety of contacts in such fields as economics, culture, media or tourism”56, which all 
belong the so-called ‘soft issues’ of the Cold War. Due to the evolution of new concepts and 
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perspectives during the past few years, the agenda is now set for the empirical implementation 
of the new approaches. 
The dominant interpretation of the Cold War in Europe as an era of disintegration and 
disentanglement is increasingly challenged, while the permeability of the borders between the 
capitalist and the communist world are highlighted. At the same time, the image of the strict 
bipolarity of the Cold War world, as it shaped perceptions and thinking after the end of World 
War II, is historicised. The topos of the Iron Curtain, which for two generations clearly 
divided the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’, appears as a mental barrier that for a long time has 
impeded research on phenomena that exceeded the bloc border, but now becomes a part of 
past ‘Cold War thinking’ itself. Due to the new paradigms that are currently developed in the 
field, the intertwined complexity of the Cold War era becomes visible.  
However, the academic void that has been outlined in the review of historiographical studies 
on the Baltic Sea Region’s past is mirrored by the gaps in the research conducted so far on the 
impact of the systemic conflict on the states around the Baltic rim. Although transnational 
perspectives on interaction between societies, groups and individuals on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain have already reached Cold War historiography, they have so far not been applied to 
the context of the Baltic Sea Region. Of course, it has to be taken into account that the debates 
on transnational Cold War histories have hitherto mainly taken place on a theoretical level. 
On the other hand, there is, as Bernd Hennigsen pointed out, a “history of the peripherisation 
of the Baltic Sea Region”57, which certainly plays a certain role in this context as well. In 
contrast to the continental borderlands, especially the front line between the two Germanies, 
the Baltic Sea Region did not count among the ‘hot spots’ of the Cold War, which led to its 
degradation as a “backwater of international politics.”58 Moreover, most of the research on the 
Cold War that has been conducted in the countries around the Baltic rim has been 
overwhelmingly nationally framed. Historians in Poland and the Baltic states, for example, 
have, as their colleagues in other post-socialist countries during the past two decades, been 
busy with the historical revision of communist narratives of the interwar period and the 
communist heritage itself, which has led to a preoccupation with domestic policy issues. 
Similar tendencies can be observed in the case of the Scandinavian Cold War research. Even 
Nordic scholars have predominantly focused on domestic issues rather than on contacts with 
the communist neighbours, although Finland forms a certain exception. Hence, transnational 
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studies from a European and even Nordic perspective are still lacking.
59
 Nevertheless, there is 
an articulated interest for the regional dimension of Cold War history, as the title of the 
volume edited by Olaf Mertelsmann and Kaarel Piirimäe, The Baltic Sea Region and the Cold 
War, suggests. Yet, although the editors explicitly aim at highlighting “transnational aspects 
of the Cold War in the region”60, this ambition is only partly realised. Indeed, the volume 
presents various examples of interaction between neighbouring states around the Baltic 
shores, but hardly reveals new insights about the exchange that took place across the Baltic 
Sea. This striking lack of attention for the interaction between the opposing shores during the 
Cold War era defines the academic void that the present study, at least partly, intends to fill.  
 
Instead of concentrating on the political division of the region and the rigid structural 
boundaries set by the East-West dichotomy, the study follows an actor-centred approach that 
mirrors the perspective offered by Gerner and Karlsson. By focusing on the historical 
evolution of networks that interconnected the Baltic shores and thus continuously re-
established the regional context, the authors of Nordens medelhav proposed a possible way of 
investigating even periods that were marked by political conflicts and disintegration from a 
transnational perspective. The investigation of grassroots-level networks has, as Philipp Ther 
claims, “a potential to create a radically different mapping of Europe.”61 In the following 
pages, it shall be proven that this approach also offers an alternative to the standard narratives 
of Cold War history, especially as far as the topography of communication between the 
societies around the Baltic rim is concerned. 
Migration movements across the Baltic Sea have throughout history formed an important 
entangling factor. The population’s ethnic composition in the main trade centres and seaports 
along the Baltic shores mirrored the variety of languages and cultures in the region, be it in 
medieval Stockholm, Tsarist Saint Petersburg or Riga in the early twentieth century. The 
“triangular social structure”62 of the country of origin, the country of settlement and the 
migrant himself, with which one of the models of transnationalism describes the entangling 
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effects of migration, was in the case of the multiethnic metropoles on the Baltic shores 
maintained via the frequently trafficked waterways. The migratory movements and the 
exchange they fostered between the shores constituted a constant pattern of interaction and 
communication, which persisted beyond the ruptures of political history. It is, as the study 
will illustrate, from this angle that the regional context prevailed even during the Cold War.  
The turmoil of World War II unleashed an unprecedented wave of escape across the Baltic 
Sea, mainly to Sweden, which as a neutral and non-warring country offered shelter in the eye 
of the storm. Tens of thousands of Balts, but to a certain extent even Poles risked their lives 
on their escape from the German and Soviet occupying forces in small boats in order to reach 
Sweden, whose overall attitude towards the refugees was liberal.
63
 At the end of the war, 
approximately 30,000 Balts, among them around 25,000 refugees from Estonia alone, and 
8,000 Poles made use of the Swedish right of asylum in order to settle down in permanent 
political exile.
64
 As neighbouring Finland was forced to adjust its neutrality policy to the 
geopolitical reality and thus had to extradite all refugees from the Soviet sphere of influence
65
, 
Sweden developed into the riparian state with the largest concentration of political refugees 
from the region. The mere scale of the escape of Balts and Poles to Sweden was a historically 
unique entangling factor, which heralded Sweden’s transition from a highly homogeneous 
country into a state with considerable national and ethnic minorities. However, due to 
Sweden’s geographical proximity and the gradual transformation of the Baltic Sea into a zone 
of interaction between the communist orbit and the Nordic neutrals, the formation of exile 
communities had significant repercussions also on Sweden’s opposite coasts. 
During the Cold War, the Baltic Sea was one of the most heavily controlled waters in Europe. 
Large sections of the southern and south-eastern coasts were turned into restricted military 
zones, where admission was refused to both visitors and the local population.
66
 Yet, the 
militarisation and systematic surveillance of the Baltic shores was to a certain degree 
counterbalanced by the neutrality of Sweden and Finland, whose vast coastlines faced the 
Polish and Soviet sea borders. The North constituted an, as the present study will show, often 
underestimated ‘third element’ in the East-West dichotomy of Cold War Europe. This 
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prevented the People’s Republic of Poland and the Soviet Baltic republics from becoming 
frontier regions towards NATO Europe. Due to this specific political constellation, the level 
of tensions was generally lower in the Baltic Sea Region than in Central Europe.  
Especially the Polish community in Sweden proved to be able to use the ‘loopholes’ in the 
communist orbit’s sea borders in order to establish links on various levels with the home 
country.
67
 The Baltic republics of the Soviet Union, by contrast, formed in many respects a 
counterpart to the relatively liberal Polish satellite, both regarding the rigidity of the regime 
and the degree of national freedom and openness towards the outside world. However, after 
Stalin’s death, even the Balts could profit from the special relations between Moscow and its 
neutral Scandinavian neighbours. In this context, Estonia formed an exception from the Soviet 
standards. The port of Tallinn was a major commercial hub for the trade between the Soviet 
Union and the West, which gave the Estonians a good idea of Western standards and ways of 
life
68
, as did the possibility of receiving Finnish television in the northern parts of the 
Estonian SSR. With the establishment of a direct ferry connection to Helsinki and the 
development of a touristic infrastructure, Tallinn developed into the Soviet Union’s “window 
to the West,”69 which triggered even the diaspora community’s interest in interacting with the 
home country. In view of the facilitated cross-border communication that Estonia’s 
exceptional status implied and the considerable size of the political emigration in nearby 
Sweden, the connection between Estonia and its Scandinavian neighbours constitutes an 
interesting potential level of East-West interaction in the region. Together with the study’s 
focus on the networks between Sweden and Poland and the role of the Polish exiles for their 
establishment, this perspective opens up a multi-layered field of research on cross-Baltic 
interaction during the Cold War era.  
Sweden had already in earlier periods provided shelter for political refugees from the region, 
which at times turned the neutral country into a sanctuary for oppositional thinking and 
activities that were directed against the political order on the opposite coasts. During the late 
nineteenth century and up to the end of World War I, Stockholm was the main base of 
nationalist Finnish activists who fought for liberation from Russian rule. They played a 
crucial role for Finland, where non-Russian political activity had ceased to exist, and its future 
as an independent republic.
70
 During World War I, the Swedish capital turned into an 
                                                          
67
 Gerner / Karlsson, Nordens medelhav; p. 248.  
68
 Judt, Tony (2006): Die Geschichte Europas seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (= Schriftenreihe 548, Bundeszentrale 
für politische Bildung). München / Wien: Carl Hanser Verlag; p. 740. 
69
 Kirby, The Baltic World 1772-1993; pp. 378, 380. 
70
 Kirby, The Baltic World 1772-1993; pp. 197, 244. 
16 
 
“international centre of information” not only for the Finns, but also for refugees from other 
parts of the region. Poles and Lithuanians, but also Belarusians
71
 used Sweden as a forum for 
the propagation of secession from Russia and national sovereignty.
72
 With the rise of National 
Socialism a decade and a half later, German communists and socialists formed a small but 
politically very active exile community in Sweden. The neutral country soon became a switch 
point for the secret channels of communication between Leningrad and Berlin. Communist 
propaganda material from the Soviet Union was regularly smuggled via Sweden on cargo 
vessels to Germany. The secret transports were organised and carried out by a network of 
exiles, German intermediaries in the Swedish ports who worked for Swedish trade companies 
and the representatives of the antifascist underground in Nazi Germany. The same channels 
were used for the channelling of uncensored documentation to Sweden, where the material 
was collected and transmitted to international organisations.
73
 As will be shown, Sweden 
maintained its status as a major toehold for oppositional forces from the opposite coasts even 
during World War II and the Cold War, this time only for Polish and Estonian exiles. 
Both the Polish and the Baltic exile communities in Sweden developed a distinct political 
profile that was openly opposed to the communist regimes in their home countries. Taking 
advantage of Sweden’s comparatively liberal policy in spite of the neutrality doctrine, they 
were, as their compatriots in other Western countries, able to develop an alternative political 
culture in exile. Thus, they preserved some elements of the political plurality that was 
suppressed in the party dictatorships on Sweden’s opposite coasts. Throughout the Cold War 
era, the Polish and Baltic diaspora communities in the West formed a noticeable element of 
opposition to the geopolitical post-war order in Europe, which emerged into a widely ramified 
network of exiles and their Western supporters with major hubs in both Western Europe and 
North America. However, the potential of the well-organised Central and Eastern European 
exile communities to act as driving forces for processes that transcended the Iron Curtain have 
so far triggered surprisingly little attention among Cold War historians. Yet, as will be shown, 
the protagonists of the anti-communist exile struggle had both the potential and a vital interest 
in establishing direct contacts to their home countries. This led to a second, more subversive 
and less visible aspect of political exile activity during the Cold War.  
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In this context, the Swedish branch of the transnational communities of Poles and Estonians in 
the West played a specific role. Firstly, the exiles in Sweden could act in the immediate 
geographical neighbourhood of their home countries, which compensated the occasional 
conflicts with the authorities that the outspokenly anti-communist agenda provoked on neutral 
Swedish soil. Secondly, the Swedish connection offered a much broader variety of 
opportunities to interact with the societies on the opposite coasts than other Western European 
countries. The Baltic Sea as a specific transition zone between East and West was often easier 
to surmount than the barbed wired frontiers between NATO and Warsaw Pact states. These 
structural advantages triggered exile activists in Sweden to look for direct contacts with the 
opposite coasts. Due to their integration in Swedish society and their interconnectedness with 
potential Western allies, they functioned also as intermediaries between the societies around 
the Baltic rim. Thus, their activities during the Cold War deserve a closer look.  
This leads to the constitutive hypothesis, which argues that the Baltic Sea maintained its 
traditional bridging function even during the Cold War, in spite of the structural peculiarities 
of the era. With its focus on interaction and communication, the present study aims to shed 
light on the “low politics-areas”74 of the Cold War, approaching the topic from an angle that is 
not centred on the topoi of conflict and demarcation. The reconstruction of the networks of 
political opposition across the Baltic Sea forms a counter-narrative to the history of official 
political contacts between the riparian states, which during the Cold War were reduced to a 
minimum. The overriding aim is to prove that these entangling processes underneath the 
official level formed a unique and spatially defined set of entanglements, which challenges 
the dominant perception of the Cold War era as an ‘ice age’ for the communication between 
the peoples and states around the Baltic rim. In this context, the underlying general conditions 
for interaction between the Baltic shores will have to be examined. Hence, the study has to 
keep a broad perspective on the development in the region throughout the Cold War. Taking 
into account the continuities and ruptures in the diplomatic communication across the Baltic 
Sea and closely following the evolution of trade, tourism and officially controlled societal 
exchange, the study thus offers a first attempt of writing a more broadly defined synthesis of 
the Baltic Sea Region’s Cold War history, which so far is lacking. Yet, the focus always turns 
back on the oppositional exile-homeland networks and their impact on the societies in East 
and West, as this level of communication and cooperation was crucial for the understanding 
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of the dynamics that led to the constant re-establishment of the regional context throughout 
the Cold War.   
 
The specific angle from which the research object will be approached has been discussed 
against the background of the current state of the art, which proposes different possible ways 
of writing a transnational Cold War history with a special focus on the Baltic Sea Region. The 
study thus partly builds on the lively historiographical discourses that during the past two 
decades have been exploring the meaning, function and usefulness of transnational history in 
opposition to a predominantly nationally defined scope. Transnational history has sometimes 
been presented as a fundamental challenge and even ‘alternative’ to history writing framed by 
national categories, especially the nation state.
75
 However, although the present study focuses 
on networking processes whose characteristics make it impossible to confine them to a single 
national ‘container’, nation states and national boundaries still have a structural relevance. 
Transnational approaches do not necessarily deny the significance of the nation state, but can 
also stress “its central role in controlling and channelling movements across borders.”76 This 
is especially true for the Baltic Sea Region during the Cold War. In the framework of the 
specific political constellation in the region, national borders coincided not only with the 
boundaries between capitalist and communist states, but also between NATO Europe, the 
Warsaw Pact and the neutral countries.  
Another controversial element of the discourses on the localisation of the transnational 
approach in relation to key concepts of historical research is the question of the compatibility 
of transnationalism with the notion of space. The understanding of the term ‘network’ in this 
study closely follows the definition of the sociologist Manuel Castells, who described the 
structure of networks as a “set of interconnected nodes”.77 This understanding of the nature of 
networks highlights their flexibility and volatility, which is “based on temporary 
consolidation and a minimal level of institutionalization”.78 Thus, the present study is focused 
more on the dynamics of opposition itself than on concretely outlined groups of actors. This 
explains the frequent shifts in agency throughout the analysis, which covers half a century of 
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oppositional activity in the region. The continuity is thus rooted in the interaction across the 
Baltic Sea itself more than on the entangling function of specific individuals or organisations. 
Yet, Castells’ understanding of networks as transnational phenomena implies at the same time 
a certain ‘non-spatiality’, which doubtlessly also forms one of its innovative features and 
qualities. In the case of this study, by contrast, spatiality is interpreted as a formative element 
that to a large degree determined the specificity of the communication between the Polish and 
Estonian exile communities in Sweden and the societies on the opposite coasts. The 
understanding of the Baltic Sea Region is, as opposed to the constructivist approach, clearly 
defined as an analytical historiographical concept that is used to set and define the spatial 
framework of the investigation. This does not per se constitute a contradiction to the 
transnational approach, as it indeed encompasses regions as examples of spatial entities that 
constitute “key sites in sets of flows and networks.”79 The geographical setting, however, is 
still considered to be essential, as it contributed to the development of the Baltic coastlines 
into a common “space of condensed interaction.”80 Nevertheless, in view of recent debates 
that call for an integration of spatialities into the investigation of transnational practices, even 
this discrepancy can be surmounted. Geography is, as Barney Warf and Santa Arias stated, 
“intimately involved” in the construction of social relations81, while, at the same time, social 
action is structuring space.
82
 According to this point of view, transnational processes and 
phenomena “are constituted through (and in fact constitute) particular sites and places”83, 
which provides the needed backing for the present study’s interpretation of the close 
correlation of space and supposedly ‘de-spatialised’ transnational activities and processes.  
There is a consensus that transnational history constitutes an approach rather than a method, 
an “umbrella perspective that encompasses a number of well-established tools”, among them 
the comparative method and the focus on transfers and circulations.
84
 Transfer history deals 
mainly with “moving ideas” and the involved agents that function as mediators of the transfer 
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process between two societies.
85
 With its focus on the Polish and Estonian exiles in Sweden 
and their strategies of undermining the geopolitical status quo by introducing an oppositional 
level of political discourses, the present study can be seen as an example of classic transfer 
analysis. Even the reception of this alternative dialogue and its impact on the societies on both 
sides of the Iron Curtain will be investigated, which reflects the attention of transfer history 
not only for the transfer process itself, but also for its repercussions.
86
  
The investigation of transfer processes already implies that the different stages of the process 
itself cannot be explored without applying a comparative perspective.
87
 However, the present 
study is also laid out as a comparison itself, based on two case studies that are supposed to test 
the hypotheses of the bridging function of the Baltic Sea and the specificity of the Baltic Sea 
Region as an exceptional transition zone between the blocs during the Cold War. The Polish 
and Estonian exile communities shared a number of common traits. They had similar political 
agendas, comparable organisational structures and shared the strategies of establishing 
communication with the oppositional circles behind the Iron Curtain via the Baltic waterways. 
However, the comparison is at its core asymmetrical. Not only did the Estonian and Polish 
communities in Sweden considerably differ in size, they also represented very different 
positions within the wider framework of the Polish and Estonian transatlantic diaspora 
communities. While the Estonians in Sweden formed, next to their compatriots in Canada, the 
centre of the Estonian diaspora in the West, the Poles constituted a rather small faction of the 
transatlantic Polish diaspora with its centres in London, Paris and the United States. The 
Estonians in Sweden, on the other hand, faced difficulties that the Poles did not have to cope 
with in their political struggle. While the Poles in exile agitated for the democratisation of 
their home country, the Estonians tried to promote an open discourse on a country that de 
facto had ceased to exist. Especially in Sweden, this issue was a political taboo in view of the 
Swedish government’s compliant policy towards the Soviet Union over the Baltic question. 
Moreover, the Soviet Union was almost hermetically isolated for the most part of the Cold 
War, which considerably hampered the establishment of interaction beneath the official level. 
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Thus, in spite of their structural disadvantages, the Polish activists in Sweden were able to 
establish and maintain networks that in their intensity could not be established between 
Estonia and the West. Comparable patterns of oppositional interaction developed relatively 
late, which nevertheless makes a diachronic comparison with the Polish case necessary and 
interesting.  
The terminology used here is adjusted to the historical context and the need to apply broadly 
defined umbrella terms for the kind of contacts that form the main interest of the study. As the 
title suggests, the term ‘resistance’ plays a role, especially in the context of World War II, 
which, as will be explained in more detail in the following chapter, constituted a formative 
period for the post-war struggle of Polish and Estonian exiles in Sweden. With the onset of 
the war, first refugee communities were formed on Swedish soil, while their compatriots on 
the home front formed underground resistance movements in order to fight the German and 
Soviet occupiers. However, with the gradual dissolution of the partisan structures that 
followed the transformation of the ‘liberated’ territories into Soviet-type dictatorships, the 
term ‘opposition’ seems to be more suitable than ‘resistance’. The networks that will be 
examined in the following pages involved a large variety of political and societal actors, 
groups and institutions on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Although their unifying element was 
a critical stance towards communism in general or, at least, against the political practices of 
the communist regimes, the term ‘anticommunism’ applies only to certain factions among the 
political and societal forces involved in the cross-Baltic networking activities. Moreover, the 
term is still largely coined by the rhetoric of the Cold War, which allows for its use only in the 
context of ‘cold warfare’ itself. For similar reasons, even the term ‘dissent’, often applied as a 
general notion that covers various forms of societal resistance that the communist regimes 
faced on the home front, is used rather carefully. The widespread and frequent use of the term 
in the Western media of the time was contested not least by the so-called dissidents 
themselves, who considered it to be “a coinage of American and West European 
journalists.”88 However, as the term has been adopted into the standard language, it will still 
be applied, at least in the context of the rising national resistance in Soviet Estonia, which 
developed from the 1970s onwards.
89
 Nevertheless, the notion is still highly selective and 
does not integrate groups such as the equally important nonconformist Soviet intelligentsia or 
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non-governmental political actors in communist Poland.
90
 Thus, ‘opposition’ is used as a 
comprehensive umbrella term, interpreted in the widest possible meaning and set into a 
context that exceeds the field of domestic politics, to which it usually is confined.  
 
The years of research for this study have required quite an amount of spadework, as the topic 
constitutes a so far almost un-investigated field of Cold War history. The poor state of the art 
has generated a pragmatic approach to the choice of sources. A wide range of secondary 
literature on the Cold War and the post-war history of the nations around the Baltic rim made 
it possible to extract fragments of relevant information, which put together have set the 
ground for the mosaic that the study aims to reconstruct. The main body of sources is, 
however, composed of a large variety of written documentation. It derives from the archives 
of state authorities, non-governmental organisations and private collections, the international 
press on both sides of the Iron Curtain and works of political journalism published during the 
time period under investigation, which in this context serves a double function as primary and 
secondary sources. Moreover, a number of oral history interviews conducted with Polish and 
Estonian exile activists and opposition leaders have served as valuable complementary 
sources that helped to put the archival findings into perspective and, at times, pointed out 
crucial, so far undetected contexts. Due to the broadly defined field of research, which covers 
half a century of underresearched aspects of the Baltic Sea Region’s history, the study does 
not claim to present an exhaustive analysis of the available documentation. By contrast, it 
aims rather at opening up a fruitful field of study for Cold War historians, offering a first 
synthesis based on a selected range of sources. Especially the state archives of Sweden, 
Finland, Poland and the Estonian SSR certainly still hide a treasury of unrevealed 
information. This very time-consuming aspect of archival research is clearly underrepresented 
in this study. To a certain extent, research in state archives has compensated the lack of 
documentation of certain periods in the collections of exile organisations and activists. 
However, most discoveries are still to be made.  
The present study has been able to profit from the previous achievements of a number of 
historical works on the Polish and Estonian communities in Sweden. In this context, the 
research of the Swedish-Polish historian Andrzej Nils Uggla has to be mentioned, which 
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focused on the history of the Polish diaspora in Sweden and the cultural contacts between the 
countries, especially during World War II and the following decade.
91
 The specific expertise 
of a number of historians at the University of Gdańsk in the field of Swedish-Polish relations 
has resulted in several interesting publications, among them the volumes edited by Jan 
Szymański on the history of Swedish-Polish entanglements during the twentieth century92 and 
Arnold Kłonczyński’s account on the reconfiguration of the bilateral relations after World 
War II.
93
 In the course of the past few years, especially the various connections of the 
independent trade union Solidarność to Sweden in the 1980s have received considerable 
attention among scholars in both Sweden and Poland. The publications on the topic constitute 
a major support for the present study’s approach to the networks of opposition and have 
provided valuable empirical information on the multi-layered communication and cooperation 
that developed across the Baltic Sea from 1980s onwards.
94
 
Concerning the Estonian case study, it was especially the exile activists themselves that 
displayed a lively publication activity on the topic of the Estonian community’s history in 
Sweden during the post-war decades, which resulted in publications that, however, have more 
the documentary character of chronicles.
95
 As far as the more scholarly works are concerned, 
the publications of the Swedish historians Wilhelm Carlgren and Carl Göran Andræ have to 
be mentioned, who, however, limit their research interest to the key moment of Sweden and 
Estonia’s shared history, the mass escape of Estonians across the Baltic Sea in 1944 and its 
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repercussions.
96
 Estonian historiography has so far yielded more publications on the Estonian 
diaspora in Siberia and other parts of Russia than on the political emigration in the West after 
World War II.
97
 Research on the Estonians in the West has predominantly focused rather on 
the cultural than the political aspects of life in exile. However, the first works have emerged 
that also touch upon the anti-communist struggle of the political emigration and the contacts 
with the home country. Indrek Jürjo’s analysis of the archival collections of the Estonian 
Communist Party, the Estonian KGB and VEKSA, the Society for the Development of 
Cultural Ties with Estonians Abroad, was an early attempt to write a Cold War history of 
interactions between exile and homeland, from which also the present study has benefited.
98
 
Moreover, a number of historians from the Centre of Migration and Diaspora Studies at the 
University of Tartu have edited a first promising volume, which sheds light on the political 
emigration’s role in the Estonian independence struggle against the Soviet hegemony.99 
There is a so far unexplored, vast amount of unregistered documentation on the exile 
communities’ history, stored in the offices of still existing diaspora organisations and in the 
cellars and on the attics of the private homes of exiles and their families. Only gradually, 
collections of this type are being transferred to public archives, where they can be made 
available for continued research. Some of these archives still require even basic cataloguing, 
which additionally delays and impedes progress in the field. Many collections of this kind 
have found their way from Sweden to the Opposition Archive of the KARTA Centre in 
Warsaw, which turned out to be a treasure chest for the present study. In Estonia, it is mainly 
the Estonian State Archives and the Personal archives of the Estonian National Library in 
Tallinn that host the collections of organisations and individual exile activists from Sweden, 
which formed the main basis for the research on the Estonian case study. The first chapters of 
the present study build partly on documentation that is stored in the National Archive of 
Sweden, located in Stockholm. In this context, especially the Foreign Ministry’s, but also the 
archives of the Swedish security police have revealed valuable information on the war years 
and the period up to the mid-1950s, as have the archives of the Polish Foreign Ministry. The 
archive of the Warsaw-based Institute of National Remembrance hosts the collections of the 
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Polish Ministry of the Interior and the intelligence service, which have contributed with useful 
information about the Polish community in Sweden and the communist regime’s surveillance 
system abroad. A research trip to Hungary made it possible to integrate the findings 
discovered in Radio Free Europe’s archive and the large collection of newspaper articles of 
the Open Society Archives in Budapest into the present study. Even the Labour Movement’s 
Archive and Library in Stockholm, the Archive of the National Commission of Solidarity in 
Gdańsk and the Estonian Cultural History Archives of the Estonian Literary Museum in Tartu 
hold documents from which the present study has profited. Several volumes of published 
primary sources from the state archives in Tallinn, Warsaw and Stockholm have revealed 
further interesting findings that have considerably enriched the research results. 
The present study is a rather traditional historical analysis, based predominantly on written 
primary sources. But although it was not conceptualised as an oral history project, the 
relevance of oral sources cannot be denied, as oral history constitutes an “invaluable and 
compelling research method for twentieth-century history.”100 The conduction of fifteen semi-
structured interviews with former key actors of opposition on both sides of the Iron Curtain 
has to a large degree contributed to structure the narrative and to put the archival findings into 
perspective.
101
 As the research project is focused on networking processes that required a high 
level of conspiracy, the preserved written documentation is often fragmented and uses a 
language and codes that are unfamiliar to the outsider. It has proved to be helpful to talk with 
agents who were politically active during the last two decades of the Cold War, not only due 
to the many opportunities to clarify doubts concerning the research findings, but also in view 
of the possibility of getting the “story underneath the story,” as Linda Shopes put it.102  
In the context of the present study, the oral history interviews functioned mainly as 
complementary primary sources.
103
 Of course, the use of oral sources as equivalents to written 
documentation is not uncontested, especially in view of the concerns about the validity of the 
information extracted from the interviews.
104
 However, by juxtaposing the oral reports with 
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further written and oral documentation as well as earlier interviews that many of the 
interviewees had given before on similar topics, the conformity between the different sources 
could easily be tested in most of the cases.
105
 At times, the oral reports delivered information 
that played a decisive explanatory role for the understanding of the investigated phenomena, 
but could not be tested against the background of comparable written and oral sources. Yet, in 
case a comparison with other evidence suggested a certain logic and meaning of the 
information,
106
 it has nevertheless been included with the corresponding references to the 
informant.  
 
The present study’s focus on forced migration processes and political refugees as key factors 
of entanglement for the Baltic Sea Region’s post-war history requires a longer introduction, 
which follows in Chapter II. Against the background of the wider historical context, which 
takes a look back over cross-Baltic contacts and the perception of the regional context during 
the interbellum, the chapter investigates the caesura of 1939 and the ethnical remixing 
processes it heralded. Every country around the Baltic rim was affected by the resettlement 
campaigns and waves of fleeing civilians that characterised the years of World War II and 
eventually resulted in the post-war constellation of ethnically homogenised states in the 
Soviet bloc and considerable minorities of political refugees on the Swedish opposite coast. 
The significance of these migratory processes for the development of entangled histories 
between the Baltic shores will be discussed, as well as this perspective’s repercussions on the 
chronological framework of the study, which is wider than in most publications on the Cold 
War. The main empirical part is chronologically structured and basically divided into two 
parts that follow the general lines of the Cold War narrative. Even in the present study of the 
oppositional networks between the Baltic shores, the onset of détente in the late 1960s is 
interpreted as a decisive rupture, which is reinforced by the fact that the major generational 
shift among the exile communities started around the same time. Chapters III and IV focus 
mainly on the web of relations between the exiles and their new host society, their impact on 
Swedish politics and the diplomatic relations between Sweden and its communist neighbours 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Warsaw, Poland, on 8 December 2011: “I always trusted my memory [...]. I thought that I always would 
remember what happened [...]. Now I see huge gaps, not so much concerning the events, but the surnames of 
people, there were hundreds of people turning up [...]. I don’t even remember people who stayed overnight at my 
house. [...] Now I regret that I didn’t make even short notes.” 
105
 Hoffman, Alice (1996): “Reliability and validity in oral history”. – In: David K. Dunaway and Willa B. Baum 
(eds.): Oral History. An Interdisciplinary Anthology, 2
nd
 ed. Walnut Creek et al.: Altamira Press, pp. 87-93; p. 
92. 
106
 Shopes, “Making sense of oral history”; p. 6. 
27 
 
and on the exile communities’ positioning vis-à-vis their home countries. Chapter III covers 
the ‘formative decade’ between 1939 and 1949, which redraws the evolution of the political 
agenda of the Poles and Estonians in Sweden, who during this period developed from war 
refugees to political exiles. Chapter IV maps the communicational pattern between the Baltic 
shores during the high tide of the Cold War, taking into the account the exiles as key agents 
with an ambition and potential to surmount the informational blockade that characterised the 
demarcation processes of the 1950s. The following chapter is an excursion dedicated to the 
pathbreaking changes of the late 1960s and early 1970s. It explores the significance of the far-
going changes in the superpower relations, their repercussions on the diplomatic relations in 
divided Europe and the changing political mentalities of its inhabitants for the development of 
new attitudes among the exile communities towards their home countries, which were closely 
interconnected with the generational shift. Chapters VI and VII form the second main part of 
the present study. As the analysis focuses more on the dynamics of opposition around the 
Baltic rim than on concretely outlined groups of actors, the attention shifts much more than 
before to the development in the communist states, which from the mid-1970s onwards had a 
decisive impact on the networks of opposition between East and West. Moreover, the political 
emigration gradually develops into a political factor also behind the Iron Curtain, which leads 
to a major shift in exile politics in general. However, while the study in these two last chapters 
highlights the impacts of the oppositional networking on the development in the communist 
riparian states, the repercussions of these processes on the opposite coasts are not ignored.  
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II. Entangling the Baltic shores: The caesura of 1939 and its 
repercussions in a historical perspective  
As with many Cold War phenomena and even the conflict itself, the political struggle of the 
Polish and Estonian emigration cannot be understood without a closer investigation of the 
formative experiences that lie behind it. Approaching Cold War interaction across the Baltic 
Sea from the perspective of the exiles, it is therefore necessary and appropriate to challenge 
chronologies and historical milestones imposed by the traditional Cold War narrative. As 
many studies with a social and cultural history approach have shown, historical processes do 
not always fit into the pattern set out by the watersheds defined by political history, which 
challenges the strict division of European history in terms of international relations and 
conflicts.
107
 Hence, even the “most drastic rupture”108 in international politics does not 
necessarily constitute an obligatory paradigm for setting the time frame of historical studies, 
which, in this context, will affect the chronological definition of the Cold War in the Baltic 
Sea Region.  
The year 1945 marked the beginning of the stalemate that preserved Europe in its ‘liberated’ – 
respectively occupied – state at the moment of cease-fire for the following decades. The 
highly symbolical value of this turning point has induced many historians to interpret it as the 
evident watershed that decided over the transition from World to Cold War.
109
 However, the 
systemic conflict evolved gradually, merely expressing itself in a “growing sense of insecurity 
at the highest levels”110 of political power. The traditional master narrative of the Cold War 
usually identifies the year of 1947 as the irreversible culmination of the latent crisis into an 
open conflict. The failure of the Moscow Conference in spring 1947,
111
 the consolidation of 
the East-West dichotomy caused by the preparations for the Marshall Plan
112
 and, not least, 
the popularisation of the term ‘Cold War’ itself113 are often mentioned as significant 
landmarks that indicate the definite outbreak of the systemic conflict as a ‘diplomatic war’.  
                                                          
107
 Judt, Tony (2000): “Preface”. – In: István Deák et al. (eds.): The Politics of Restribution in Europe. World 
War II and its Aftermaths. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. vii-xii; p. ix. 
108
 Gross, Jan T. (2000): “Themes for a social history of war experience and collaboration”. – In: Deák et al., The 
Politics of Restribution in Europe, pp. 15-35; p. 23. 
109
 Ottosson, Sten (2000): Den (o)moraliska neutraliteten. Tre politikers och tre tidningars moraliska värdering 
av svensk utrikespolitik (= Sverige under kalla kriget 7). Stockholm: Santérus Förlag; p. 13. 
110
 Gaddis, John Lewis (2005): The Cold War. A New History. New York: The Penguin Press; p. 27. 
111
 Judt, Die Geschichte Europas; pp. 151, 153. 
112
 Gaddis, The Cold War; p. 32. 
113
 Stöver, Bernd (2007): Der Kalte Krieg. Geschichte eines radikalen Zeitalters. München: Verlag C. H. Beck; 
pp. 11-15. 
30 
 
Seen from a Central and Eastern European perspective, the development of the conflict along 
ideological dividing lines proceeded very differently. Eastern Poland and the Baltic states 
were among the first foreign territories to experience the consequences of Stalin’s geopolitical 
ambitions, settled in the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939 and 
implemented shortly after the outbreak of World War II. The annexation of the Baltic states to 
the Soviet Union in 1940 turned into a diplomatic bone of contention in the relations between 
Moscow and the West, which has been interpreted as a “prelude to the Cold War”.114 Seen 
from this perspective, it was thus only the forced alliance with Stalin in the war against Nazi 
Germany that temporarily neutralised the conflict potential of the communication between the 
Soviet Union and the Western Allies. At least in the context of the Baltic Sea Region, as Olaf 
Mertelsmann and Kaarel Piirimäe argue, the Cold War thus started years before the 
Sovietisation of large parts of Central and Eastern Europe and the contentious issue of the 
Marshall Plan fostered the division of Europe.
115
 This hypothesis is strengthened by the 
present study’s perspective on the war refugees especially from the Baltic territories, but also 
from the eastern parts of Poland, who had witnessed the export of Soviet-style terror to the 
newly acquired lands. The experience of Soviet occupation turned out to be formative for the 
development of an oppositional political agenda among Poles and Balts. Anti-Soviet attitudes 
developed not only in the subversive cells of underground resistance on the occupied 
territories, but also among the representatives of the political elites who had managed to 
escape westwards in the turmoil of the ongoing war. The aversion towards the Soviet Union 
characterised the oppositional agenda of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, whose home 
countries had been occupied and incorporated by the Soviet Union in summer 1940. However, 
even Polish oppositional politics displayed similar tendencies, in spite of the fact that Nazi 
Germany for the most part of the war constituted a much more imminent threat to Poland.  
The settlement of Baltic and Polish war refugees in Sweden did not develop on a mass scale 
until summer 1944, but nevertheless, the first small refugee communities developed on 
Swedish soil immediately after the involvement of their home countries in the beginning of 
the conflict. These first refugees set the ground for a temporary, as it was then still perceived, 
but well-organised life in exile and constituted the core around which the masses of refugees 
that came to Sweden from 1944 onwards gathered. Although the refugees’ self-organisation 
officially was limited to the field of social and cultural activities, they proved to be able to set 
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the ground for a discrete political activism on neutral Swedish soil at an early point.
116
 This 
included both lobbying for the occupied countries’ cause in Sweden and the establishment of 
clandestine communication channels across the sea. Due to the possibilities that Sweden’s 
geographical position and neutral status offered, the resistance movements on the opposite 
coasts could be directly supported from abroad. As the temporariness of exile turned out to be 
an illusion after the end of the war, the strong anti-Soviet stance of the war years determined 
the refugees’ post-war policy in view of the lasting Soviet hegemony over their home 
countries. Thus, the refugees of the first hour and their war-time experiences were formative 
elements, constituting the ideological bedrock from which the aims and strategies of the anti-
communist exile struggle derived.  
The experiences of the forced expatriates with Soviet rule are thus not to be understood as a 
mere prelude, but as an integral element and the proper beginning of a process during which 
their specific line of oppositional thinking and action was developed. In many respects, the 
formation of anti-Soviet communities of war refugees and, at the same time, eyewitnesses of 
Soviet terror outside Moscow’s sphere of influence anticipated the Cold War conflict between 
the superpowers. The escalation of the East-West tensions into an open conflict during the 
second half of the 1940s had of course an impact on the exiles’ political strategies, but the 
anti-Soviet agenda itself had existed long before.  
The eagerly awaited cease-fire and the victory over fascism was doubtlessly a key turning 
point for the majority of Europeans who had survived the most destructive war in history. Yet, 
it might be argued that the symbolism of 1945 is a result of history written from a clearly 
Western perspective. For the Central and Eastern European societies that had been under 
Soviet occupation since 1944 or early 1945, the reality looked somewhat different.
117
 Thus, 
also for the Polish and Estonian refugees in Sweden and elsewhere in the West, the watershed 
of 1945 did not have the significance that its symbolism implies.
118
 For the Estonian refugee 
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community and their compatriots at home, the dramatic loss of their homeland’s sovereignty 
was an unaltered fact since the supposedly voluntary, but in fact forced incorporation of the 
Estonian Republic into the Soviet Union in 1940. The years of German occupation from 1941 
to 1944 were seen as nothing but an interlude upon similar terms. A considerable number of 
Polish war refugees in the West, on the other hand, shared the interpretation of the leading 
émigré circles around the London-based government in exile,
119
 which had a deep mistrust of 
the Soviet Union and the ambitions of the Polish communists.
120
 They did not perceive the 
international recognition of the Moscow-sponsored Warsaw government in July 1945 as an 
act of liberation, but as a sanctioned continuity of totalitarian repression upon other terms. 
Thus, a perceived continuity of exile experience can be observed, which was not particularly 
affected or altered by the rising level of East-West tensions that, from a Western perspective, 
symbolises a major watershed in European history.  
In the history of the Polish and Estonian refugees in Sweden, a turning point can be spotted 
initially at the turn of the decade. This results partly from Sweden’s neutrality policy, whose 
peculiarities complicate the transfer of the pattern of the evolution of the Cold War in 
continental Europe to the context of the Baltic Sea Region. In Europe’s north-eastern corner, 
the development proceeded slightly differently. Until the turn of the decade, the Swedish 
government held on to its ‘bridge building policy’, which based on the conviction that 
peaceful cooperation with the neighbouring countries under communist rule could balance the 
international East-West tensions, or at least keep them out of and secure stability in the Baltic 
Sea Region.
121
 First the increasing self-isolation of the communist states and Norway’s and 
Denmark’s accession to NATO induced the Swedish government to rethink its policy and to 
adopt a course of armed neutrality. There was no doubt that the armament was exclusively 
directed against the communist neighbours on the opposite coasts. In line with Swedish 
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society’s clear commitment to the moral, ideological and economic values of the West,122 
Sweden de facto aligned with the Western bloc. Thus, the country became part of the bipolar 
world, which widened the sphere of activity of the anti-communist exiles considerably. 
Up to then, the People’s Republic of Poland had remained astonishingly open towards its 
Scandinavian neighbours, in contrast to the Soviet Union, which had started to fortify its 
borders to the outside world immediately as soon as the Baltic coastal areas had been retaken. 
Nevertheless, at least during the second half of the 1940s, there were still a few loopholes in 
the Soviet surveillance net on the Baltic Sea’s eastern coastlines. Thus, a minimum level of 
interaction across the Baltic Sea was still maintained, from which the political activists among 
the Poles and even the Estonians in Sweden could benefit. Moreover, migratory movements 
between the shores still continued, both in the form of repatriation of war refugees and of 
illegal escape to the West, which to a limited extent still could take place, until the Iron 
Curtain finally went down also across the Baltic Sea. From 1949 onwards, the illegal 
immigration from Poland dropped considerably,
123
 whereas the last Estonian refugee for years 
to come reached Sweden in March 1950. Thereafter, an escape from Soviet Estonia was 
considered to be “practically impossible”.124 By then, the migratory processes either further 
westwards or, to a much smaller degree, back to the countries of origin, had ebbed away and 
the refugee communities reached a stable composition. This facilitated the transformation of 
the provisory refugee communities into exile societies headed by institutionally well-
organised anti-communist elites. Against this background, the time frame of 1939-1949 as a 
temporal guideline for the following chapter has its own logic and justification. It marks a 
period of coherent transition, a ‘formative decade’ for Polish and Estonian exiles in Sweden.  
 
Seen in a broader historical perspective, this decade of war, cross-Baltic migration processes 
and political reconfiguration of the societies around the Baltic rim along the lines of the 
upcoming superpower conflict opened up a new chapter of entanglements in the region’s 
history. The sweeping changes that followed the cataclysm of World War II fundamentally 
altered the nature, strategies, infrastructure and especially the motives of interaction between 
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the shores. In view of the specific dynamics that characterised the new set of cross-Baltic 
relations, it is difficult to support the seemingly obvious distinction between the supposedly 
lively net of entanglements during the interbellum and the ‘ice age’ of the Cold War. As this 
study will illustrate, a new type of regional entanglements emerged that paradoxically 
strengthened the regional context from 1939 onwards, in spite of the clear signs of political 
disintegration. This hypothesis is contrary to Zernack’s model of regional interaction, in 
which especially the interwar period is highlighted as the last resonance of a vibrant regional 
context that could shortly blossom, before the communication lines were finally cut off by the 
outbreak of World War II.
125
 As will be shown, the establishment of refugee communities 
from Poland and the Baltic states in Sweden during the initial phase of the war constituted a 
key factor for the development of a specific set of communication on different levels between 
Sweden and its war-torn and, eventually, communist-ruled opposite coasts.  
The transnational, regionally defined perspective on the Baltic Sea Region during the 
interbellum has its justifications. For the first time in modern history, the societies around the 
Baltic rim could, to apply national categories, be considered as free and self-determined, as 
the era of imperial power expansion in the region had irrevocably ended. The Baltic Sea was a 
natural reference point for most of the old and even the recently founded nation states around 
the Baltic rim, which influenced the mutual perception and led to the birth of the Baltic Sea 
Region as a concept and identity-building element. Nevertheless, the question remains 
whether the entanglements between the continental and Scandinavian coastlines were vital 
enough to justify the claim of a revival of pre-imperial patterns in the region, as the fragility 
of the cross-Baltic bonds became visible years before the war and the following East-West 
conflict sealed the division of the region into two concurring systems. 
However, the attempts of the Baltic nations, especially of the Estonians, to consolidate their 
fragile existence as independent states by (re)discovering historical connections with their 
opposite coasts were a remarkable feature of the interwar period. A Nordic Union between the 
three Baltic states and Scandinavia, including Finland, built on the vision of the Baltic Sea as 
the unifying link, was under consideration during the early 1920s and mainly favoured by the 
Balts, who saw a closer cooperation with the Scandinavian neighbour states as a possible 
counterweight to their vicinity to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the project failed. Finland’s 
interest in the Union decreased as the country’s domestic political situation started to 
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stabilise,
126
 while Sweden’s determination to stick to its neutrality policy led to the rejection 
of any political obligations by the Swedish government.
127
 Moreover, the Swedish 
government was well aware of the fact that it was Finland that played the role of the 
strategically most important bulwark towards the Soviet Union and that any further 
involvement in the uncertain political situation of the Baltic states was incompatible with 
Sweden’s national interests. Thus, a special treatment of the Baltic states on the basis of any 
kind of shared historical memory, referred to especially by the Estonians in the interwar 
period, cannot be traced.
128
 After all, the former Swedish imperial possessions at the Baltic 
Sea’s eastern coastline had been forced to cut off many of their ties westwards already in 
1721, when the Baltic lands became part of the Russian Empire. An appeal to supposedly 
common traditions was apparently wishful thinking rather than a realistic option for the 
establishment of not only political, but even cultural ties during the interwar period.
129
  
A certain exception constituted the networks between scholars and their institutions that 
developed during the interbellum. Especially the old university of Tartu, formerly Dorpat, 
turned into a meeting place for academics from Sweden, Finland and the Baltic states and 
triggered the emergence of durable personal networks.
130
 Yet, apart from that, interaction on 
the non-governmental level was rather sporadic. Trade between Sweden and the Baltic states 
occurred, but to an almost insignificant extent, while even the cultural ties were too loose to 
succeed in establishing more permanent patterns.
131
 In this respect, Finland certainly played a 
more important role, especially for the Estonians, with whom the Finns shared a larger 
number of common traits and interests and maintained closer bonds.   
The infrastructural system across the Baltic Sea, by contrast, developed rapidly during the 
interwar decades. Regional tourism launched the first regular ferry connections and also 
private sailing ships from the respective opposite coasts were a common sight in the ports 
around the Baltic Sea during the summer months. At the same time, the smuggling of alcohol 
especially from Estonia to the Swedish and Finnish archipelagos certainly generated networks 
of their own kind.
132
 However, in spite of these new communication lines, interaction between 
the Baltic states and especially the western half of the Baltic Sea Region remained rather 
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sporadic and weak. This applied in an even larger degree to Poland. The country’s political 
and cultural centres were far from the Baltic coastlines and the controversial Polish Corridor 
provided an only limited access to the sea, so that Warsaw never engaged in the Baltic Sea 
Region to a greater extent. Initial plans of establishing a Baltic League including Finland and 
the Baltic states had failed, mainly due to the Polish claims of regional leadership and the 
conflict with Lithuania, which set an end to the political vision of cooperation among the 
young nation states in the region. Poland’s relations with Scandinavia, on the other hand, were 
restricted mainly to the export of coal. A certain level of mutual interest on the cultural level 
is indeed referred to in the literature,
133
 but it cannot be denied that cultural contacts remained 
restricted to very small groups of actors with an articulated interest in the respective 
neighbouring countries.
134
 Consequently, Poland did not become an integral part of the Baltic 
Sea Region during the interwar period, neither regarding Polish presence in the regional 
context in any field nor in Polish society’s self-perception, which was mirrored by the general 
attitudes of the other societies around the Baltic rim towards the country.
135
  
Another factor that stresses the relative weakness of the regional entanglements during the 
two decades between the World Wars was the temporariness of the integrative efforts of 
bridging the Baltic Sea. The perspectives of a new era of cross-Baltic cooperation, which 
opened up from around 1920 onwards, were to a large extent contingent on imperial Germany 
and Tsarist Russia’s collapse after World War I and the temporary weakness of their 
successor states. But in view of the two reinvigorated dictatorships on each flank of the Baltic 
Sea Region, the situation changed very quickly, which is illustrated by the short life span of 
the spirit that initially stressed solidarity and common responsibilities and traditions in the 
region after the end of World War I.  
Already at an early stage, the disintegrative tendencies in the region became noticeable in 
view of the riparian states’ very different positions in the geopolitical setting of interwar 
Europe. With the appearance of authoritarian manifestations on the part of the charismatic 
political leaders of the Baltic states, Antanas Smetona in Lithuania, Kārlis Ulmanis in Latvia 
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and Konstantin Päts in Estonia, the gap widened considerably. Lithuania had at an early stage 
wandered off the originally intended democratic course with the coup d’état in 1926, while 
the utterly weak and short-lived coalition governments in Estonia and Latvia clearly marked 
the shortcomings of parliamentary democracy in the Baltic states. Eventually, all three 
countries were ruled by strong presidents with a shifting degree of authoritarianism by the 
mid-1930s. Thus, Denmark, Sweden and, in spite of its political crises that to a large degree 
resembled the situation in the Baltic states, also Finland remained the only states around the 
Baltic rim that succeeded in defending and maintaining democratic standards.  
The development in the Baltic states sets the small republics on the Baltic Sea’s eastern coasts 
in the context of the general Central and Eastern European political crises of the 1930s, which 
emerged as a result of the radicalisation of the two increasingly powerful dictatorships that 
flanked what was then consequently perceived as Zwischeneuropa. This weakened the already 
rather poorly developed bonds across the sea to Sweden, but partly also to Finland. Swedish 
media reported about the political development on the opposite coast more and more 
frequently in a negative tone, which did not leave public opinion and especially the ruling 
social democratic elites unaffected.
136
 A similar tendency could be observed in the case of 
Poland. The country had at an early stage of its independence been criticised even by former 
prominent Swedish supporters of Polish sovereignty because of its adamant policy towards 
neighbour states and minorities.
137
 Its precarious position between Germany and the Soviet 
Union in the harsh political climate of the mid-1930s induced many Swedes to adopt the 
wide-spread opinion in Nazi Germany that stigmatised the country as a ‘seasonal state’.138 
With their choice to officially readopt a traditional neutrality policy in summer 1936, the 
Nordic states drew the decisive demarcation line towards their southern and eastern 
neighbours. The Baltic states, which on their part declared neutrality in 1938, maintained at 
least an elementary level of cooperation amongst themselves, while equally neutral Poland 
turned its back on the neighbours around the Baltic rim, hoping to find regional stability in a 
continental union within the concept of the ‘Third Europe’.139 Thus, already before the 
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outbreak of the war in September 1939, the failure of the regional integration process with the 
Baltic Sea as a unifying factor was obvious. Against this background, the discrepancy 
between Sweden’s unambiguous support for Finland during both the Winter War and the 
Continuation War on the one hand, and the Swedish government’s de facto recognition of the 
annexation of the Baltic states in 1940 on the other, appears to be quite plausible and even 
consistent.
140
 World War II thus merely manifested the fault lines that had emerged during the 
1930s. The demarcation process in the region had been accelerated by the close Swedish-
Finnish cooperation and the following detachment of Finland from the group of young nation 
states at its opposite coasts, while the events on the Baltic Sea’s southern and eastern coasts 
took a clearly ‘continental’ shape. These parallel ‘de-regionalisation’ and ‘continentalisation’ 
processes of the 1930s not only affected the cooperation between the Baltic shores. They also 
significantly decelerated the development of the imagination of the Baltic Sea Region as a 
social and mental construct, which at least leaves a question mark over Zernack’s chronology 
of regional coherence in a longue durée perspective. 
 
Yet, to claim that the interaction between the shores was intensified after the outbreak of 
World War II, which started in the Baltic Sea Region and affected almost all riparian states 
directly within a year, cutting off most of the cross-Baltic communication lines, would 
certainly distort the picture. Nevertheless, the war can be interpreted as a rupture that marked 
the emergence of a new regional context under changed conditions. The relationship between 
Sweden and its opposite coasts, which forms the main interest of the present study, was 
radically altered due to the on-going hostilities around the Baltic rim and on the sea itself. 
Although the Swedish government declared itself non-belligerent and succeeded in avoiding 
direct involvement in the war, the country was not able to disconnect from the region as a 
whole. The incoming masses of Norwegian, Danish and Finnish refugees involved Sweden 
and its inhabitants in the ongoing war, but also the dramatic events on the opposite coasts 
came inevitably closer with the rising number of Polish and Baltic refugees. Yet, the war not 
only dragged the Swedes into what happened outside their country’s borders, it also put 
Sweden on the map for the occupied neighbour countries in the region. Similar to Switzerland 
on the continent, Sweden was perceived as an island that guaranteed peace and shelter and not 
only the underground resistance movements in the war-torn countries sought for connections 
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across the Baltic Sea.
141
 For occupied Poland, Sweden constituted the only free harbour in the 
country’s immediate neighbourhood, and it is not surprising that many Poles tried to escape 
the atrocities of war at home across the Baltic Sea.
142
 At the same time, it was not meat or 
butter that counted among the most highly valued goods on the Estonian black market, but 
Swedish crowns and oil for boat engines.
143
 
Especially towards the end of the war, Sweden became the destination for thousands of 
refugees who in various ways tried to cross the Baltic Sea. The overwhelming majority of 
refugees arrived on Sweden’s eastern coast after their successful escape from Estonia and, to a 
lesser degree, Latvia. A smaller number of refugees came from the south, among them Poles 
and German army deserters from Courland, while a larger group of Polish escapees from 
German prison camps reached Swedish soil across the land frontier from Norway.
144
 Towards 
the end of 1944, the Swedish press estimated that already around 182,000 refugees remained 
in Sweden.
145
 While evacuated Finns and Norwegian refugees constituted the two largest 
groups, the Balts came third with a number of over 32,000, as much as eighty-eight per cent 
of them from Estonia.
146
 Almost all of them had reached Sweden from Estonia or Finland 
across the autumnal Baltic waters, many times on small fishing boats, and their flight is until 
today remembered as an especially dramatic episode of both Swedish and Estonian history.  
The number of Poles, on the other hand, was still low in 1944 and did not exceed 1,000.
147
 
First in spring 1945, their percentage rose considerably due to the rescue programme of the 
‘White Busses’, a joint project of the Danish government and the Swedish Red Cross under 
the leadership of the Swedish count Folke Bernadotte. Initially, the busses were supposed to 
evacuate only Scandinavian concentration camp prisoners from Germany. Soon, however, the 
initiative was extended to foreigners, which by critical voices has been named an attempt to 
cleanse Sweden’s reputation in view of earlier, far-going concessions to Nazi Germany.148 
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During late April and early May, almost 7,000 Polish concentration camp prisoners reached 
southern Sweden. They were joined by additional 9,000 Poles coming with the transport 
coordinated by the Red Cross and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration.
149
   
Having been a typical country of emigration like many of its neighbours in Northern and 
Eastern Europe during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Sweden had thus gone 
through an unprecedented transnationalisation process with the mass influx of refugees during 
the last phase of World War II. Although the city had never been at the crossroads of the most 
important currents of migration, trade and cultural exchange in the region as imperial St. 
Petersburg or Riga, Stockholm now turned into a metropolis whose temporary inhabitants 
represented every corner of the lands around the Baltic rim.
150
 The emergence of new regional 
entanglements was mirrored by the variety of nationalities that the Swedes could now 
encounter on the streets, among them not only Germans, Norwegians, Danes and Finns, but 
also Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Russians, Poles and Ingrians. While the days of the old 
cosmopolitan centres on the southern and eastern shores were counted in an age of ethnic 
cleansing, organised mass murder and deportations, the refugee capital in the North became a 
truly “Baltic metropolis”.151 In spite of the previous two decades of cross-Baltic exchange and 
coexistence, there might never have been closer interaction between Swedes and their 
neighbours than towards the end of the war, when thousands of exhausted refugees were 
received on the eastern coastlines and the busloads of concentration camp victims arrived at 
the docks of Malmö.  
In autumn 1944, when the German hegemony over the Baltic states crumbled at the sight of 
the approaching Red Army and the local population started to escape across the sea on a huge 
scale, the Swedish Navy cruised the coastal areas in order to rescue the Baltic refugees from 
the stormy waters and to provide them with fuel and food.
152
 The first encounters ashore 
between Swedes and the Balts that had survived the crossing of the Baltic Sea despite bad 
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weather conditions and hostile military forces were cordial and the coastal population 
displayed an unconditional willingness to give immediate humanitarian assistance.
153
 The 
warmth and compassion of the Swedish helpers is well documented and clearly reflected also 
in the few media reports that were published in spite of the self-censorship of the press at the 
time. In particular, the stunning contrast between the wretched fishing boats and the 
determination and ‘proud bearing’ of the Estonians arriving on the Swedish shores was 
depicted with deep respect, which revealed the profound sympathy that many Baltic refugees 
experienced as they reached the opposite coast.
154
 The arrival of the freed concentration camp 
prisoners from Germany, on the other hand, in their majority Poles and mostly in an 
incomparably worse physical condition than most of the evacuated Norwegians and Danes, 
constituted a similar confrontation with eyewitnesses, who carried the visual evidences of the 
atrocities on the continent to peaceful Sweden. The immediate reactions of the medical 
personnel, the members of the Swedish Women’s Volunteer Defense Service and the 
journalists in the southern Swedish ports, who were the first to receive the survivors, were 
also documented and disseminated with the help of the print media. They gave evidence of 
the deep impression that these Swedish-Polish encounters would leave in the collective 
memory of the involved, both Swedes and Poles.
155
  
As elsewhere in Europe, Swedish authorities also considered the refugee problem to be a 
temporary concern that would be solved by state-organised repatriation as soon as the 
hostilities had come to an end.
156
 Especially the last two years of war, during which Germany 
had ceased to constitute a major threat to Sweden, had been characterised by an increasingly 
uncontrolled influx of refugees. Although the need to deliver humanitarian aid was obvious, 
the economic burden that the refugees constituted for the Swedish state turned into a major 
problem. This was one of the reasons why the Polish concentration camp prisoners initially 
were not titled as refugees by the Swedish bureaucracy, but as ‘repatriates’ who were 
supposed to return to Poland after their recovery.
157
 Moreover, this also explains why Sweden 
was one of the first countries to allow the new pro-Soviet government in Warsaw to start and 
organise repatriation activities on its territory with the support of Swedish mass media.
158
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The political leadership in Warsaw aimed at repatriating a maximum number of Polish war 
refugees scattered across Western Europe in order to compensate the severe human losses of 
the war and to avoid the establishment of anti-communist Polish communities abroad.
159
 
However, Warsaw did not insist on forced repatriation in the negotiations with Western 
governments.
160
 The Soviet Union, by contrast, uncompromisingly claimed the return of all 
Soviet citizens in the West, by force if necessary. Seen from the Soviet perspective, this of 
course included the citizens of the Baltic states, as the Moscow government was also very 
interested in preventing the development of exile communities in the West.
161
 One reason was 
of course the propagandistic damage that the development of anti-communist exile groups and 
the revelations of Baltic eyewitnesses about the Soviet rogue regime which could prove 
damaging. Moreover, the wish to punish the ‘traitors’ and to save the prestige of the Soviet 
Union as a victorious state with a superior political and social system had a large impact for 
the vigorous and utterly aggressive Soviet repatriation programme.
162
 
The U.S. government ostentatiously rejected the Soviet view and excluded citizens of the 
formerly independent Baltic states from the forced repatriation from its occupation zones in 
defeated Germany to the Soviet Union. Refugees were considered as Soviet citizens only if 
they had been residents of the Soviet Union prior to the outbreak of World War II, which 
implied the non-recognition of the annexation of the Baltic States.
163
 The legal situation of the 
Balts in Sweden, by contrast, was different. Sweden was a neutral state and not bound by any 
agreement between the Allies, but as a relatively weak, small neighbour state of the Soviet 
Union certainly vulnerable and potentially compliant to Soviet pressure. Additionally, 
Sweden had been the only country besides Nazi Germany and Mussolini’s Italy to, at least de 
facto, recognise the Baltic states’ annexation to the Soviet Union by closing their legations in 
Stockholm and putting their holdings of gold at the disposal of the Soviets in July 1940.
164
 
Nevertheless, the Baltic refugees possessed a special status as political refugees, which 
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protected the Balts in Sweden from direct contacts with representatives of Soviet authorities 
on Swedish soil and the pressure they exerted on Soviet citizens in order to force them to 
repatriate. At the same time, this stance severely strained Swedish-Soviet relations, as the 
Swedish government thus implicitly claimed that political persecution occurred in the Soviet 
Union.
165
 But in spite of the pressure on the part of Soviet diplomacy, the new post-war 
government under Tage Erlander continued the policy of the Swedish war-time National 
Union Government, samlingsregeringen, whose guiding principle had been to refuse the 
expulsion and deportation of any refugee seeking asylum for political reasons in Sweden.
166
 
Repatriation was thus mainly a question of voluntary choice on the part of the war refugees, 
although the Swedish authorities did not hide the fact that it was of vital interest for Sweden 
to see the refugees leave for their home countries after the hostilities had ended.
167
 While the 
Finnish evacuees had started to return to Finland even before the end of the war and 
Norwegians and Danes quickly followed their example, it soon became obvious that the 
majority of the refugees from Sweden’s opposite coasts would refuse to repatriate. Especially 
the Estonian and Latvian refugee communities displayed a unified stance towards the political 
status quo in their home country. Despite Moscow’s aggressive propaganda activity in 
Sweden
168
, the outcome was insignificant. According to the planning of the Soviet Estonian 
Repatriation Committee, 29,000 repatriated Estonians from Sweden were supposed to be 
relocated as a labour force to the industrial centres in the north-eastern part of the republic, far 
                                                          
165
 Berge, Flyktingpolitik i stormakts skugga; pp. 21, 64. 
166
 Nevertheless, the recurring pattern of neutral Sweden’s manoeuvring under first German and subsequently 
Soviet pressure during World War II had shown that a firm stance in one issue usually required concessions in 
another. Although the civilian Baltic refugees were subject to special protection, the boats on which the majority 
of them had escaped to Sweden were not. Even the boats that had been built during the German occupation after 
July 1941 and thus did not make part of the nationalised goods over which the Soviet Union claimed ownership, 
were committed to Soviet authorities and returned empty back across the Baltic Sea; Andræ, Sverige och den 
stora flykten från Estland; pp. 137-144, 146. A much more controversial and far-going concession, though, was 
the extradition of a group of 146 Baltic soldiers in January 1946, mainly Latvians, but also a small number of 
Estonians, who had fought in German uniforms during the war. In spite of lively protests on the part of a huge 
variety of political and societal actors in Sweden, the government decided to extradite them together with several 
thousand German military internees, who had arrived to the Swedish coast mainly from Courland, immediately 
after Germany’s capitulation. This topic has been covered by a relatively large variety of publications, among 
them the detailed reconstructions compiled by Latvian exiles in Sweden; cf. Freivalds, Osvalds (1967): De 
internerade balternas tragedi i Sverige år 1945-1946. Stockholm: Lettiska föreningen Daugavas Vanagi; 
Zalcmanis, Janis (1983): Baltutlämningen 1946 i document ur svenska utrikesdepartementets arkiv. Stockholm: 
Militärhistoriska förlaget.  
167
 Berge, Flyktingpolitik i stormakts skugga; p. 27.  
168
 Soviet repatriation officers, who arrived to Sweden in March 1945, were not allowed to contact the Balts in 
Sweden directly, but could use the Swedish press for the dissemination of proclamations and distribute 
information material in the transition camps for Baltic refugees; Carlgren, Sverige och Baltikum; pp. 74-75. The 
Swedish authorities refused to reveal the private addresses of Baltic refugees in Sweden, but the repatriation 
officers did not refrain from personally visiting individuals whose place of residence they had gained knowledge 
of throughout the country in order to pressure them to return to the Soviet Union; Berge, Flyktingpolitik i 
stormakts skugga; pp. 60, 68. 
44 
 
away from the capital and the western shores that faced the Swedish opposite coast. 
Nevertheless, until May 1950, when the Soviet Estonian repatriation activity was officially 
dissolved, only 182 Estonians had voluntarily repatriated.
169
 This constitutes a contrast to the 
case of the Polish community in Sweden, where the number of repatriates was incomparably 
higher. Nevertheless, it has to be taken into account that the majority of Poles had reached the 
country due to the rescue programmes that evacuated concentration camp victims from 
Germany to Sweden and not on their own volition as political refugees.
170
 The exact number 
of repatriates is hard to estimate, but it is probable between, roughly speaking, 5,500 and 
6,700 Poles, which equates to around one third of the country’s Polish community, returned to 
Poland between 1945 and 1950.
171
 However, the majority of refugees, especially those from 
the former eastern territories annexed to the Soviet Union,
172
 chose to remain in exile, not at 
least under the influence of the strong counterpropaganda, with which the supporters of the 
government in exile noticeably curbed the success of the Polish Repatriation Mission.
173
 
 
Thus, the war-time interlude of unexpectedly close interaction between Swedes and the 
refugees from the opposite coasts, one of the consequences of the enormous flow of refugees 
across Europe that had been sparked off by the World War’s centrifugal forces, did not 
remain a footnote in the region’s history. With the development of permanent exile 
communities in Sweden, the formerly culturally and nationally homogenous society went 
through a decisive and non-transient change. In particular the Estonians and Poles, 
representing the largest exile communities on Swedish soil, influenced Sweden’s post-war 
history significantly. The émigrés’ engagement in the current events in their home countries 
not only prevented the definitive mental and physical detachment of Sweden from its 
communist-ruled opposite coasts. It also turned Sweden into the geographically closest 
outpost of anti-communist, national opposition and a bridge to the West for their compatriots 
at home. This made the émigrés a key factor due to which cross-Baltic entanglements 
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outlasted the Cold War and developed into an intertwined set of histories of both conflict and 
cooperation.  
This entangled history approach to the regional dimension of the Cold War era in the north-
eastern part of Europe opens up a vast research field that touches upon various levels of 
transnational linkages across the Baltic Sea. Of course, the mere existence of the exile 
communities had an entangling function in itself, which resulted in specific interweaving 
processes between Sweden and its opposite coasts, also on the level of diplomatic contacts. 
The fact that political refugees could develop into explicitly anti-communist exile 
communities in a neutral state and make use of the possibilities that the democratic freedoms 
in their host country offered formed a delicate political question throughout the post-war era. 
It clearly marked and also intensified the official relations between Sweden and its communist 
neighbour states, although mostly in terms of conflicts. Direct verbal attacks and 
propagandistic exploitation of the tensions that arose from the differing viewpoints on asylum 
policy and freedom of opinion and expression were mostly left to the press on both sides of 
the Iron Curtain, which in view of the problem that the émigrés constituted for the bilateral 
relations considerably increased their coverage on the respective opposite coast. The main 
organs of communist propaganda in Poland and the Soviet Union delighted in depicting 
Sweden as a safe haven for exiled reactionary figures and traitors from their own rows, which 
was usually almost literally echoed by the Moscow-sponsored communist press in Sweden. 
But the negative publicity may doubtlessly have turned into the opposite as well, 
consolidating Sweden’s reputation behind the Iron Curtain as a country supportive of the 
suppressed nation’s cause and as a destination with a very liberal asylum policy for political 
refugees. 
On the semi-official level, the impact of the exile communities’ existence was not limited to 
rising attention for the opposite coast and an intensification of mutual perception and 
observation on both sides of the Iron Curtain. With the emergence of numerically strong exile 
communities in Sweden, the struggle of the communist regimes with domestic opposition and 
resistance had been extended to a dimension that embraced the opposite coast as well. This 
added a transnational dimension to the history of communication between the government 
apparatus and population. The existence of considerable exile communities on the opposite 
coast triggered a parallel set of relations between regime and exile, with the embassies playing 
the role as the communist regimes’ most important outposts. First signs of a policy of 
rapprochement in the relations between exiles and the regimes became visible already after 
46 
 
the repatriation programmes had ended. Instead of threats, the refugees received propaganda 
material about the progress of communism via private mail and radio. These new tactics were 
intensified in the course of the changes that the Thaw brought along in the second half of the 
1950s. Now, direct interaction between the more apolitical refugees and the diplomatic staff 
replaced the mass dissemination of propaganda as a counterweight to the anti-communist 
activity of the émigré leadership. The non-conflictual cooperation between émigrés and 
regime representatives emerged into a wider cross-Baltic network of contacts on various 
levels, mostly in the field of culture and education, which over the course of time was 
institutionalised by the communist regimes and coordinated by allegedly non-political state 
organisations.
174
 
The list of examples of cross-Baltic entanglements and intertwined developments on both 
sides of the Iron Curtain that can be directly linked to the post-war émigré communities in 
Sweden could be substantially extended. Yet, the present study focuses on only one aspect, 
the Polish and Estonian émigrés’ oppositional networking activities across the Baltic Sea. 
This case study represents the so far least-explored level of cross-Baltic interaction in the 
Cold War era and highlights the role of small activist elites among the exile communities for 
the development of contacts beyond the Iron Curtain. The corresponding counterpart, the 
clandestine networks of communist spies, infiltrators and provocateurs that had its origin in 
the Eastern bloc and in turn penetrated the exile communities on behalf of communist 
authorities throughout the Cold War era, would be equally interesting to investigate, but can 
unfortunately not be taken into full account in the present study. 
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III. War, migration and the roots of the East-West conflict – The 
topography of resistance and opposition around the Baltic rim  
 
III.1 The war against the occupying powers: The transnational dimension 
of war-time resistance and the Swedish connection  
The transformation of the Baltic Sea Region into one of the main battlefields of World War II 
was a gradual one. While Poland was the conflict’s first victim, the Baltic states still managed 
to maintain their neutrality, as did several of their Scandinavian neighbours, until June 1940. 
The annexation of the three small states by Stalin was a tactical preventive measure to secure 
Soviet influence west of its borders and to establish a buffer zone against Hitler’s recent 
conquests in the East. However, despite the fact that it would take another year until the first 
battles in their native countries, the forced annexation of 1940 marked, for most Balts, the 
beginning of an era of foreign domination and suppression that would end only half a century 
later. 
Although neutral Sweden was not directly affected by the cataclysmic destruction of the states 
and statehood of its southeastern neighbours, the effects of the German attack on Poland and 
the Baltic coups d’état became nevertheless visible with the formation of first refugee 
communities on Swedish soil. At the time of the German attack on Poland on 1 September 
1939, several hundred Polish citizens resided in Sweden, to a large extent only temporarily. 
Their number rose from mid-September onwards, as additional refugees arrived from the last 
unconquered Polish outposts, the port of Gdynia and the peninsula of Hel. The Swedish law 
on foreigners did not explicitly comment on the issue of political refugees, but the 1937 
amendment, which had been adopted in view of the persecution of oppositional forces in the 
Third Reich, nevertheless enabled refugees from the war-torn territories to claim political 
asylum.
175
 Yet, the flow of refugees was still a rather transitory phenomenon, as most of the 
Poles who reached Sweden immediately continued their journey to Western Europe.
176
 It was 
thus not the uprooted refugees of war, whose escape across the Baltic waters had 
coincidentally brought them to Sweden, but the staff of the Polish legation in Stockholm that 
set the ground for organised Polish exile activity on Swedish soil. Immediately before the 
outbreak of the war, Sweden had taken over the role of a protecting power for Poland, which 
decisively influenced the official Swedish stance towards the Polish diplomats. Despite 
                                                          
175
 Andræ, Sverige och den stora flykten från Estland; p. 13. 
176
 Patek, Wiesław (1992): “Polacy w Szwecji w latach II wojny światowej”. – In: Polacy w Szwecji po II wojnie 
światowej (Materiały symposium). Stockholm: Kongres Polaków w Szwecji, pp. 9-12; p. 9.  
48 
 
German pressure and concerns about the credibility of Sweden’s neutrality policy, the Foreign 
Ministry did not request the Polish envoy, Gustaw Potworowski, to lay down his office, so 
that the legation could continue to function, thus symbolising the continuity of Polish 
statehood.
177
 After Poland’s surrender in early October 1939, the legation came under direct 
command of the Polish government in exile, at that time still residing in Paris. This did not 
raise objections on the part of the Swedish government, provided that the Polish diplomats 
would refrain from political activity.
178
  
In order to respond to the refugees’ instant needs, the Polish Relief Committee, Polski 
Komitet Pomocy, PKP, a pre-existing humanitarian aid organisation for Polish citizens in 
Sweden, was revived by the diplomatic corps with financial help from the Swedish Ministry 
of Social Affairs.
179
 But as the number of refugees rose, the activities of the PKP quickly 
expanded beyond the officially sanctioned framework. The outbreak of the Finnish-Soviet 
Winter War in November 1939 and the German occupation of Norway and Denmark in April 
1940 not only lead to the formation of significant Scandinavian refugee communities in 
Sweden. The events triggered even a larger number of Poles residing in these countries to 
seek shelter in Sweden. Especially large was the group of Polish military personnel who had 
fled to the neutral Baltic states after the Soviet attack on eastern Poland and started to escape 
across the Baltic Sea, as soon as Stalin’s pressure on the republics, which were at that time 
still sovereign, increased. The group around envoy Potworowski agreed on the need to limit 
the refugee community’s size in the country in view of Sweden’s tense relations with Nazi 
Germany. At the same time, the majority of Poles were eager to leave Sweden, as it was 
considered to be too close to the German and Soviet occupiers and many of them planned 
either to reunite with their families in France and Great Britain or to join the Polish Allied 
Forces. Thus, a large-scale smuggling of Polish refugees to Western Europe started under the 
joint command of the PKP and the diplomatic corps.
180
 The campaign was financed by the 
Polish government in exile
181
, which from June 1940 onwards resided in London, and solved 
the delicate refugee question. Sweden became merely a transit country for Polish refugees, 
which kept the community small and centred around the diplomatic corps.  
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The escape of Poles from the Baltic states to Sweden ended abruptly with the Soviet invasion. 
Already since autumn 1939, Soviet troops had been garrisoned on the Baltic states’ territory, 
but after Hitler’s conquests in Scandinavia in spring 1940, Stalin’s policy towards the Baltic 
neighbours tightened significantly, which was echoed by intensified agitation on the part of 
domestic communist groups.
182
 Eventually, the three Baltic governments surrendered to 
Moscow’s ultimatum and the Soviet-type staged elections of June 1940 swept the old political 
elite away, making room for communist-ruled governments that successfully applied for 
incorporation into the Soviet Union. But although the annexation was an only poorly 
camouflaged act of Soviet aggression, the Swedish stance in this question was decidedly less 
resolute than in the issue of Poland’s war-time fate, making Sweden the only sovereign and 
democratically ruled country to at least de facto acknowledge the incorporation.
183
 
In one of his last official acts, the Estonian envoy, Heinrich Laretei, sent a protest note to 
Sweden’s Foreign Ministry, informing them that the annexation was incompatible with 
Estonia’s constitution. But in spite of their protests, the Baltic diplomats were forced to leave 
their legations, which were handed over to Soviet disposal in August 1940.
184
 Thus, Swedish 
compliance towards the powerful Soviet neighbour was far-reaching, but it did not touch upon 
the principles of the country’s refugee policy. Laretei, whom the new regime sentenced to 
death in absence after his refusal to return to Tallinn, was offered shelter together with the rest 
of the diplomatic corps and their families.
185
 Hence, the former diplomats became the first 
Estonian political refugees in Sweden together with a number of sailors, whose ships were 
moored in Swedish ports at the time of the annexation and who refused to sail back after the 
communist coup d’état.186  Only a very small number of Baltic refugees managed to escape to 
Sweden after the forced annexation of their home countries. One of them was the Estonian 
envoy to the Soviet Union and former State Elder August Rei, who fled via Riga with one of 
the last planes.
187
 Together with Laretei, he became the uncontested leader of the Estonian 
community, which, in resemblance to the Polish case, gathered around the diplomatic corps.   
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Already within the first year of war, the numerically still small communities of Poles and 
Estonians in Sweden succeeded in developing a certain degree of self-organisation, which by 
necessity was limited to the field of humanitarian aid for compatriots on Swedish territory. 
Any activity that went beyond social and cultural issues was severely prohibited, as the 
government was eager to maintain a strict line of neutrality in view of the military advances 
of two aggressive dictatorships in the country’s immediate neighbourhood. Political refugees 
were obliged to refrain from engaging in political matters, which also applied to Estonia’s 
former diplomats, who had been deprived of their status after the Swedish de facto 
recognition of the annexation. The Polish legation, by contrast, could continue legally 
represent the exiled government, but its scope of action was considerably restricted. The 
official communication between the legation and the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm had been 
reduced to a minimum and the Polish diplomats were put under strict surveillance of the 
Swedish police. In view of Germany’s military advances on the continent, Eric Boheman, the 
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and former envoy to Poland, who was known for his pro-
Polish sympathies, strongly advised Potworowski not to endanger the Swedish government’s 
positive attitude towards the legation by engaging in political issues.
188
  
 
The war had begun with a naval attack at the Baltic Sea’s southern coastline and since then, 
the sea had more or less remained a war zone, where the military navy and refugee boats 
replaced the merchant fleet and passenger ships that had cruised on Baltic waters in the pre-
war years. Thus, the communication lines of uncontrolled traffic and free interaction between 
the Baltic shores were already cut years before the Iron Curtain went down.
189
 Consequently, 
the Polish and Baltic refugees in Sweden, who in the eye of the storm enjoyed the protection 
of the Swedish asylum policy, were largely isolated from their compatriots on the opposite 
coasts. In the case of the Balts, this isolation was almost complete, as the new regime had cut 
all communication with the outside world with the onset of the Sovietisation process. By July 
1940, the Soviet Baltic republics’ coastlines were under strict surveillance and only a very 
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limited number of Baltic refugees managed to escape to Sweden during the first Soviet 
occupation, the ‘Red Year’ between June 1940 and June 1941.190 
Occupied Poland was not as hermetically sealed off as Stalin’s newest territorial acquisitions. 
In contrast to the Baltic states, which were immediately and by the use of repressive violence 
transformed into closed Soviet-style societies, the General Government for the Occupied 
Polish Territories, the Polish heartland that had not been annexed to either Germany or the 
Soviet Union, remained comparatively open to foreign visitors, at least from the neutral 
states.
191
 Thus, not only Swedish diplomats, but also a number of trade representatives could 
regularly travel to Poland, as the export-dependent Swedish industries economic survival 
relied on the cooperation with Nazi Germany and the German-occupied territories after the 
trade ties with Western Europe had been cut off by the military front lines.
192
 The regular 
communication across the Baltic Sea turned Sweden into a favourably located potential basis 
for the establishment of channels to the occupied territories and the outside world. A small, 
conspiratorial circle of Poles in Stockholm was ready to use this exceptional constellation for 
their purposes. The willingness of a number of Swedes to function as couriers for the 
government in exile and its representatives in Sweden eventually enabled Polish activists to 
establish a cross-Baltic network of subversive cooperation. These channels ensured the flow 
of information between the resistance centres in Poland and abroad and became an important 
element in the transnational Polish struggle against the German occupier.  
Sweden’s legation in Warsaw turned into one of the earliest toeholds for the activities of the 
Polish exile government’s representatives in Stockholm. Sven Grafström, the Swedish envoy 
to Poland and one of the Swedish diplomats that continued to informally support the Polish 
diplomatic corps in Stockholm, agreed on accomplishing a number of missions for the Polish 
legation.
193
 On his travels between Stockholm and Warsaw, he not only transferred private 
letters and personally investigated the fate of Polish citizens whose names were on the lists 
that had been handed over to him by the Polish diplomats in Sweden. He was also responsible 
for the transfer of a larger sum of money, entrusted to him by the Polish legation, “into the 
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right hands”, as he noted in his diary.194 However, the operations conducted by Grafström 
ended quite abruptly already in the end of November 1939, when the Swedish legation in 
Warsaw was dissolved and its duties were undertaken by Sweden’s diplomatic representation 
in Berlin. At the same time, a conspiratorial circle of Polish liaison officers began to search 
for other, more durable solutions in order to break through the informational blockade. The 
task of these agents, who worked on behalf of the Polish government in exile, was to create 
the necessary prerequisites for the establishment of functioning smuggling channels between 
occupied Poland and London via neutral Sweden.  
The initiated circles in Stockholm were confined to persons who were directly involved with 
the exile government’s intelligence service, so that not even envoy Potworowski was fully 
informed about the dimension of the cross-Baltic interaction.
195
 The subversive activities were 
soon undertaken by Mieczysław Thugutt and Tadeusz Rudnicki,196 confidants and employees 
of the exile government’s Ministry of the Interior, who both had come to Sweden via the 
Baltic states.
197
 Initially, they used crew members on Swedish cargo vessels, which shipped 
iron ore to Danzig and coal from German-occupied Poland back to Sweden, as couriers. But 
the strategy changed as Polish refugees in Stockholm brought the Swedish commercial 
representatives, who still resided in Poland as agents of some of Sweden’s leading companies 
and regularly crossed the borders, to the liaison officers’ attention. The recruitment of couriers 
among the small community of Swedes that had returned to Warsaw after the outbreak of the 
war promised to be more effective and was finally crowned with success. Among the most 
active agents in service of the Polish exile government and its representatives in Stockholm 
were the Swedish consul, Carl Herslow, the bank manager Harald Axell and particularly the 
director of a Warsaw-based sub-company to the ASEA Corporation, Sven Norrman. Their 
courier activities between Sweden and occupied Poland created an important channel to the 
outside world that enabled the Polish resistance movement to communicate with the 
government in exile. Via this route, numerous microfilms containing documents on the 
current development in occupied Poland could be smuggled abroad. This uncensored 
information was usually published in the regularly edited informational brochures of the exile 
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government’s Ministry of the Interior in London. Moreover, the underground movement 
could be directly supplied with money via clearing due to the help of the Swedish 
intermediaries.
198
  
In July 1942, the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s chiffre officers revealed the activities by 
decoding secret radio signals between the London-based government in exile and its 
representatives in Sweden, but it was too late to warn the Swedish couriers involved.
199
 
Together with a larger number of Polish resistance activists, they fell into the hands of the 
German Gestapo. Thus, one of the few gaps in the otherwise efficient system of German 
surveillance had been discovered,
200
 so that, as Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler put it, the 
“most important courier route between the Polish resistance movement in the General 
Government and the Polish government in exile in London” was effectively jammed.201 
German pressure on Stockholm rose significantly after this incident, but the dissolution of the 
Polish legation could be avoided due to a compromise agreement. Envoy Potworowski had to 
resign and leave the country together with three legation members, among them liaison 
officers of the government in exile. Potworowski was replaced by Henryk Sokolnicki, the 
former Polish envoy to Finland, who had sought shelter in Sweden in June 1941 as Finland 
joined Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union. Yet, for the time being, he functioned only as a 
chargé d’affaires,202 which underlined the rather provisory state of Poland’s legation.  
Nevertheless, the communication between the exile government and the armed wing of the 
domestic resistance movement, which in February 1942 conflated into the Home Army, 
Armia Krajowa, was not entirely blocked after the revelation of the Swedish couriers’ 
activities. Especially radio contact, which formed the main channel of communication 
between home country and exiles throughout the war, ensured a certain level of transborder 
cooperation. However, a more substantial and systematic informational exchange still 
required the services of couriers. The southern route via Hungary, Yugoslavia and Italy had 
become almost impassable since the winter of 1941,
203
 so that Sweden remained an important 
potential transit country. The Polish community was indeed forced to maintain an especially 
low profile from mid-1942 onwards, but the situation gradually changed after the Battle of 
Stalingrad. In view of the following series of German surrenders in the East, antifascist 
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sentiments were set free in Sweden,
204
 which gradually put an end to the concessions in 
favour of Germany and considerably triggered the activity among political refugees in 
Sweden. Hence, a new branch of the exile government’s intelligence service was established 
under the command of the Polish legation’s military attaché, Colonel Feliks Brzeskwiński. It 
became one of the key nodes for the communication between London and occupied Poland 
and a bridgehead for the channelling of the Home Army’s couriers to Western Europe.205  
The establishment of secret channels between Sweden and occupied Poland not only required 
efficient communication between the shores, but also a reliable infrastructure. Sweden’s needs 
of coal from the occupied Polish territories secured a regular connection between Danzig and 
the Swedish ports, which lasted until autumn 1944. The coal ships became a crucial element 
in the Polish resistance activists’ communication with the world outside Germany’s sphere of 
influence. On board Swedish ships, further refugees reached Sweden, while the Home Army’s 
couriers used the trade route as a bridge on their way to London and back, which secured a 
permanent flow of information between resistance activists in- and outside the country.
206
 In 
the Swedish harbours, they could count on a network of reliable contact persons who were 
closely connected to representatives of the government in exile,
207
 among them the Polish 
lectors at the universities of Lund and Stockholm.
208
 The Swedish connection thus formed a 
major hub in the war-time network that connected the Polish resistance movement to the 
government in exile. Nevertheless, the route via neutral Sweden was only one of the secret 
channels that the Polish resistance managed to establish during the years of the German 
occupation. Seen in the broader context of the Polish resistance networks, the Polish 
community in Sweden played rather a supporting role,
209
 which marks a clear contrast to the 
subversive activities of the Estonian community in Sweden. 
During the first war years, the Estonian refugees gathered mainly around the diplomats who 
had resided abroad at the time of the forced annexation. The sovereign government had been 
                                                          
204
 Johansson, Alf W. (1995): Herbert Tingsten och det kalla kriget. Antikommunism och liberalism i Dagens 
Nyheter 1946-1952. Stockholm: Tidens förlag; p. 224. 
205
 Trzciński, Stefan (1992): “Polskie fale emigracyjne do Szwecji 1939-1986”. – In: Polacy w Szwecji po II 
wojnie światowej, pp. 59-70; p. 61.  
206
 Uggla, Polacy w Szwecji; pp. 28-29. The most famous agent involved in these activities was the Home Army 
fighter Zdzisław Jeziorański, better known under his war-time pseudonym Jan Nowak, which he continued to 
use as a director of Radio Free Europe’s Polish section in Munich after the war. In his book on his past as a 
courier, published in exile, he depicts his frequent travel between London and Warsaw via Sweden; cf. Nowak, 
Jan (1978): Kurier z Warszawy. London: Odnowa.  
207
 Kruszewski, Eugeniusz S. (2001): Polski Instytut Źródłowy w Lund (1939-1972). Zarys historii i dorobek. 
London / København: Polski Uniwersytet na Obczyźnie, Instytut Polsko-Skandynawski; p. 16. 
208
 Rudny, Paul (2007): “Zygmunt Łakociński och Polska Källinstitutets arkiv i Lund1939-87”. – In: Törnquist-
Plewa, Skandinavien och Polen, pp. 177-201; p. 181. 
209
 Szymański, “Szwecja w polityce zagranicznej Polski”; p. 110. 
55 
 
dissolved and most of its members deported to remote Soviet territories, so that Estonia, in 
contrast to many other occupied countries, did not have an exile government. Resistance 
outside the country, both against the ongoing Sovietisation and the following usurpation of 
Estonia by Germany, thus originated from the circles of former diplomats, the only 
representatives of sovereign Estonia that had escaped Soviet persecution. In spite of their 
isolation from the home country, the former envoys Rei and Laretei took the first step to 
coordinate all activities that served the restoration of Estonia’s independence. They closely 
cooperated with the former envoy in Helsinki, Aleksander Warma, who became the mediator 
between the Estonian refugee communities on both sides of the Gulf of Bothnia. As a first 
toehold of national resistance outside Estonia, they formed the Foreign Delegation of the 
Republic of Estonia, Eesti Vabariigi Välisdelegatsioon, in September 1940.
210
 After the 
German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Delegation ostentatiously voted for a 
close cooperation with the Western Allies. Already shortly after the occupation of Estonia by 
Nazi Germany, Rei and Laretei were recruited by the British intelligence service. At the same 
time, they started cooperating with the U.S. legation in Stockholm, which supplied them with 
the technical devices for the interception of the daily radio reports from occupied Estonia.
211
 
The exiles put their firm trust in the Atlantic Declaration as the major guarantee for the 
restoration of an independent Estonia after the end of the war. Thus, they clearly rejected the 
tactics adopted by Hjalmar Mäe’s German-sponsored puppet government in occupied Estonia, 
which after one year of Soviet terror clearly opted for collaboration with Nazi Germany.
212
  
However, passive resistance against the German occupiers, who initially had been welcomed 
by large parts of Estonian society as liberators from the Soviet yoke
213
, was still wide-spread 
in Estonia, especially as the German authorities soon tightened the reins. There were distinct 
sympathies for the Allies in the occupied country, which mirrored the stance of the Estonian 
activists in Helsinki and Stockholm. Already in November 1941, the economist Hans 
Ronimois from the University of Tartu succeeded in establishing direct communication with 
Aleksander Warma in Helsinki via an Estonian courier. A second channel to Finland was 
established in January 1942 by the journalist and editor Jaan Ots,
214
 who soon became a key 
figure for the coordination of national resistance and an important hub for the dissemination 
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of uncensored information in Estonia.
215
 Via Aleksander Warma in Helsinki, the Estonian 
representatives in Stockholm could directly interact with underground activists in the 
occupied home country, which allowed them to gain direct access to reliable first-hand 
information on the current events in Estonia. Rei, in turn, used Warma’s channels in order to 
regularly supply the Estonian resistance fighters with political reports and analysis and clips 
from the Western press. In late 1942, Hans Ronimois illegally crossed over the Gulf of 
Finland to Helsinki, from where he travelled to Stockholm in order to support the cross-Baltic 
networking activities of the Foreign Delegation. A few months later, he was followed by Jaan 
Ots,
216
 who reached the Swedish coast by boat in spring 1943. By then, the number of 
Estonian asylum seekers in Sweden had grown to several hundred. The refugees, mostly 
younger men from the coastal districts who had escaped the military mass mobilisation in 
German-occupied Estonia by water,
217
 significantly enlarged the Estonian community in 
Sweden, hitherto a refugee colony of merely a few dozen members.
218
  
After his arrival to Sweden, Ots succeeded in establishing a direct channel of communication 
that connected the Estonian underground to the outside world via radio contact.
219
 Moreover, 
he was responsible for creating the prerequisites for a regular traffic route between Sweden 
and Estonia. The Estonian community in Sweden had organised and financed a courier boat, 
whose first trip across the Baltic Sea took place in autumn 1943. On board were several 
hundred copies of an Estonian newspaper that the refugee representatives had printed in 
Sweden, supposed to spread uncensored information about the present political and military 
situation in Europe among the compatriots in occupied Estonia.
220
 The boat returned with the 
wives of several of the resistance fighters in Stockholm and a huge collection of printed 
documentation, which included both complete issues of Estonian newspapers and journals and 
items from the private libraries of Ronimois and Ots on Estonian matters.
221
 Clandestine 
operations of this kind did of course not remain unnoticed, and already at an early stage, the 
intelligence corps of the Swedish Armed Forces became aware of the illegal courier traffic. 
The intelligence officials, however, turned out to be willing to support the activities. The 
Estonian couriers were seen as potential allies in the establishment of a spy network on the 
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opposite coast that was to be created in view of the Red Army’s military advances westwards, 
which in Swedish military circles were perceived as a threat to national security.
222
 
The communication between intelligence officials and Estonian refugees was facilitated by 
the Baltic German countess Margareta Stenbock, who since her escape from Estonia in 1940 
worked for both the Swedish intelligence corps and the British embassy.
223
 Stenbock had 
excellent connections among the Estonian sailors who had sought shelter in Sweden in 
summer 1940. Thus, she played a crucial role in the recruitment of reliable couriers from their 
ranks,
224
 who were supposed to deliver information about Soviet military movements and the 
estimated strength of Red Army units via radio contact back to Sweden. The transit routes 
across the sea were organised by the refugees themselves, while the required technical devices 
and logistical support were provided by Swedish intelligence in cooperation with its British 
and U.S. counterparts.
225
 Thus, with the assistance of the Swedish Armed Forces’ intelligence 
corps and initiated agents who held key positions in Swedish authorities, the clandestine 
traffic between the shores could significantly expand. This secured a regular correspondence 
and informational exchange between the leaders of Estonian resistance outside the country, 
the former envoys Rei and Laretei, and the Estonian underground movement.
226
  
The efficiency of the cooperation between the Estonian activists in Stockholm and Helsinki 
and the national resistance movement in Estonia became visible with the formation of the 
Estonian National Committee, Eesti Vabariigi Rahvuskomitee, in Tallinn in March 1944. This 
clandestine organisation was an initiative of activists belonging to several Estonian 
democratic parties, which had been suppressed since 1934 but still proved to be willing to 
mobilise.
227
 Its aim was to prepare the restoration of the independent Republic of Estonia on 
the basis of parliamentary democracy as soon as the military situation allowed for it. Among 
the driving forces of the Committee were several activists who had maintained close 
communication with the Foreign Delegation members in Sweden and Finland.
228
 With the 
formation of the Tallinn-based organisation, this clandestine cooperation took increasingly 
institutionalised forms, as Rei and Laretei in Stockholm as well as Warma in Helsinki were 
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appointed representatives of the Committee abroad.
229
 Estonian national resistance against the 
German occupiers was thus partly based on transnational structures, which were rooted in an 
efficient communication system across the Baltic Sea. The formation of the Committee was 
echoed only three days later by the foundation of the Stockholm-based Eesti Komitee, the 
Estonian Committee, an organisation that aimed at institutionalising and facilitating the 
dissemination of uncensored information in both Sweden and Estonia.
230
  
Although a wave of arrests in German-occupied Estonia temporarily jammed the National 
Committee’s activities,231 the lively networking operations across the sea continued. By 
spring 1944, the development pointed increasingly to an imminent reoccupation of the Baltic 
states’ territories by the Red Army, which increased the Swedish interest in the clandestine 
traffic. While the need to communicate with the resistance movement had been the initial 
driving-force of the cross-Baltic connection, the courier boats now returned with more and 
more refugees onboard and the smuggling of Estonians citizens to Sweden was increasingly 
prioritised. By then, the secret evacuation of Estonia’s Swedish minority, which was 
organised by already ‘repatriated’ Estonian Swedes, was already in full swing.232 These 
activities had been approved by the Swedish government and were actively supported by the 
coastguard. The fact that the agents involved also smuggled huge numbers of ethnic Estonians 
to Sweden was greeted with silent consent by the Swedish authorities.
233
 This tolerance 
certainly had an impact on the authorities’ stance towards the Estonian refugees’ own rescue 
efforts. During an incident in the Stockholm Archipelago in May, which led to the arrest of a 
group of couriers who had organised a motorboat in order to evacuate further refugees from 
Estonia to Sweden, the direct intervention of a secretary of the Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs led to their immediate release. The coastguards were informed that the evacuation 
efforts had been planned with the explicit consent of Statens flyktingnämnd, the central 
governmental authority for refugee questions, and only the secret correspondence on board, 
aimed for the Estonian underground movement, was confiscated.
234
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It was not the first time that the abovementioned secretary, Sigfrid Sandberg, became 
involved in the organisation of the courier traffic,
235
 and he was not the only state official with 
inside knowledge about the Estonian refugees’ clandestine networks. Heinrich Laretei had 
earlier applied for a large ration of boat fuel from the National Planning Department for the 
evacuation of “a number of prominent Estonians” to Sweden, and also Foreign Minister 
Christian Günther was apprised of the request. Unlike the National Planning Department, the 
Foreign Ministry did not give its informal consent, but did not intervene either.
236
 This again 
illustrates the dissonance between the official stance towards the political refugees and the 
sympathy for their activities among decision makers at state authorities. However, the 
distinction between the informal and the formal level was crucial, as it turned out in late July 
1944, when Rei and Laretei attempted to inform the public about the development in Estonia. 
From June onwards, the refugee representatives’ communication with the Estonian National 
Committee was significantly facilitated,
237
 especially due to the resistance movement’s 
intelligence service, which had smuggled their own agents into Sweden with the task to re-
establish direct radio contact with Stockholm.
238
 Thus, the Committee’s appeal to the 
Estonian people, encouraging the fight against both the German and the anticipated Soviet 
occupants, reached even Stockholm. But the planned press conference was cancelled by an 
intervention of the Foreign Ministry after vehement protests of the Soviet legation.
239
 This 
episode heralded both the future Swedish attitude towards its powerful eastern neighbour and 
the dilemma that the anti-communist exile communities on Swedish soil would constitute in 
later years. 
As the Red Army, which had been standing at the gates of Narva for several months, finally 
broke through the front and surged westwards into the country in late July 1944, the mass 
escape across the Baltic Sea took off, while the German troops gradually retreated from 
Estonian territory. At the same time, the hitherto infrequent efforts of the Estonian refugees to 
flee developed into a well-organised evacuation programme. Laretei, Rei and their helpers 
had discretely turned to state institutions in this matter and contacted among others the 
Swedish Alien Commission, which upon approval by the government’s Cabinet Office agreed 
to raise the number of visas for Estonian refugees. Even the Foreign Ministry was privy to the 
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plans.
240
 A formal consent was never given, but at a meeting with Rei, Prime Minister Per 
Albin Hansson indicated that his government would not put any obstacles in the way.
241
 Thus, 
the waters between Sweden and Estonia turned into a heavily trafficked route between July 
and September 1944. While thousands of Estonians escaped westwards on their own account, 
the speedboats that the refugees in Stockholm had organised for evacuation purposes left 
Swedish ports for the embattled opposite coast. Thanks to the close cooperation between the 
circles around Laretei and Rei and the crews involved in the evacuation mission, the transit 
routes also ensured the regular communication with the resistance movement, which kept the 
agents in Stockholm informed about the current military situation in the home country.
242
  
The first large-scale evacuation measures were organised with the financial and logistic 
support of the U.S. War Refugee Board, which had expanded its activities to include 
Sweden.
243
 Soon afterwards, Rei and other members of the refugee community engaged in 
parallel operations. Their mission was mainly financed by donations that had been collected 
in close cooperation with religious organisations and church representatives, among them 
Bishop Sven Darnell, who had spent several years in Estonia as a pastor for the Swedish 
minority.
244
 Laretei and Ots, on the other hand, were responsible for the Stockholm-based 
Estonian Committee’s own rescue programme. The National Committee in Tallinn prepared 
the passenger lists and assigned the tasks of transporting the refugees to earlier arranged 
meeting places, while Aleksander Warma and his helpers in Helsinki coordinated the 
activities and ensured the continuous flow of information between the three capitals.
245
 Thus, 
a multifaceted cross-Baltic network developed during the late summer of 1944, thanks to 
which a large number of Estonians could be evacuated in a race against time, while the Red 
Army gradually occupied the eastern and southern parts of the country. However, the planned 
evacuation of the first independent Estonian government since 1940, which had been 
appointed during the short time slot between the Germans’ retreat from Tallinn and the 
occupation of the city by the Red Army,
246
 failed. The rescue of the government members, 
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who had left the capital only hours before the arrival of the first Soviet tanks, was supposed to 
be the last of the missions that the War Refugee Board supported. But as the courier boat from 
Sweden was delayed, almost the entire government fell into the hands of the Soviet secret 
police.
247
 
The final act of evacuation, though, took place on the waters of the Gulf of Bothnia and 
forced the speedboats to change their course. Already in spring, the Swedish envoy to Finland 
had reported back to Stockholm on the Finnish Foreign Ministry’s indications that a 
permanent transfer of the local Estonian refugee community to Sweden might become a 
necessity.
248
 After the armistice between Finland and the Soviet Union was signed in 
September 1944 on very unfavourable terms for Finland, the Finnish government could no 
longer guarantee being able to follow the legal principles that ensured the inviolability of 
political refugees. In order to avoid the moral dilemma of extraditing the Estonians, many of 
whom had fought in Finnish uniforms against the Red Army, the police and armed forces 
organised the secret transport of the refugees to the Finnish west coast in cooperation with 
Warma in Helsinki.
249
 The evacuation mission under Rei’s command now directed all its 
traffic towards Finland and conducted the evacuation of 7,200 Estonians across the Bothnian 
Sea in merely two weeks.
250
 A few hundred Estonians remained in Finland,
251
 but with the 
departure of Aleksander Warma and his entourage to Sweden, the Finnish toehold of the 
resistance movement had practically broken away. From autumn 1944 onwards, the remaining 
major representatives of Estonian resistance against the occupation abroad were concentrated 
in neutral Sweden. There, the number of Estonians had risen from merely 2,000 persons in 
August 1944 to estimated 24,500 in November, half of whom had reached Sweden on the 
boats of the Estonian community’s evacuation operations from Estonia and Finland.252  
 
The vivid political activity of refugees in Sweden and the multi-layered involvement of 
Swedish officials and authorities in the transborder networks of resistance shed an interesting 
light on the country’s neutrality policy during World War II. In spite of the principles of 
Sweden’s refugee policy, which prohibited any political activities among the war refugees, 
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Swedish authorities obviously not only tolerated the Polish and Baltic activists’ attempts to 
support the domestic resistance against the occupying forces, but tacitly approved them. 
Moreover, both the Polish and Estonian refugees could count on the support of individual 
helpers in Sweden, which sympathised with their mission. This gap between the formal and 
informal practices of Swedish neutrality was considerably widened by the engagement of the 
intelligence corps of the Swedish Armed Forces in Baltic issues, which formed a sharp 
contrast to the government’s passivity in view of the annexation of the Baltic states a few 
years earlier. The looming changes of the power balance on Sweden’s opposite coasts 
triggered a far-going subversive cooperation between the intelligence units and Baltic activists 
in Sweden, in which Swedish state authorities as well as the intelligence services of Britain 
and the United States were involved. This aspect of Sweden’s war-time violations of 
neutrality forms a certain contrast to the government’s numerous concessions to Nazi 
Germany, which had triggered “considerable resentment towards Sweden” among the 
Western Allies.
253
 Although the support of the Estonian resistance movement’s contact 
network mainly served the Swedish national security interests, it nevertheless enabled the 
Estonian underground fighters to establish an important toehold in a neutral, non-occupied 
country and eventually made the mass-evacuation of thousands of Estonians possible.  
The focus on the Swedish connection and its role for the underground movements on 
Sweden’s opposite coasts highlights the transnational dimension of resistance during the war 
years. The radio programmes, which regularly reached the embattled territories from various 
broadcasting stations west of Germany’s front lines, were certainly a major source of 
uncensored information on the political and military development in Europe for the resistance 
fighters in the occupied states. However, the direct association with the well-interconnected 
centres of exile activism, which constituted a crucial link between the Western Allies and the 
resistance movements in Central and Eastern Europe, still had to be maintained via couriers. 
In this context, Sweden gained a significant role as one of the few European states that were 
not directly involved in the hostilities and a strategically well-located bridging country. As 
both the Polish and the Estonian examples have illustrated, the Baltic waterways thus 
developed into an important lifeline for the national resistance movements on the southern 
and eastern shores.  
The transnational resistance networks across the Baltic Sea broke down more or less 
simultaneously. While the Soviet Navy, which had been trapped in the Gulf of Finland, broke 
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through the naval front line and advanced to the Baltic Sea’s central basin, the Red Army 
inexorably approached the coastlines from the interior. In September 1944, the 
communication by sea between the Poles in Sweden and the Home Army was interrupted,
254
 
and in early October also the last embattled bastions of Estonia, the islands of Saaremaa and 
Hiiumaa, fell, which put an end to the so far regular Estonian courier traffic.
255
 This marked a 
major turning point for the refugees in Sweden and their struggle from abroad, as both Poland 
and Estonia now were conquered by an army that represented the previous occupier and, what 
was much worse, an ally of the West and thus the anticipated winner of the war. Seen from 
the refugee perspective, the Iron Curtain had already started to go down in autumn 1944.  
 
 
III.2 From refugees to exiles: The reconfiguration and institutionalisation of 
Polish and Estonian opposition in Sweden  
The concerted action that had developed between the refugees in Sweden and the domestic 
underground had proved the possibility of supporting national resistance even from abroad, at 
least up to the Soviet Union’s huge territorial conquests from summer 1944 onwards. In 
contrast to what was claimed by the Stalinist propaganda, the ‘liberators’ were far from 
welcome. Most Estonians and Poles perceived the liberation as a new occupation, however 
disguised. The tight control of the Red Army over the countries’ coastlines limited the 
refugees’ scope of action to a minimum. By late 1944, the Estonian resistance fighters’ 
connections across the Baltic Sea had been almost entirely cut off,
256
 which radically altered 
the conditions for supporting occupied Estonia from abroad. The Polish territories were not 
sealed off as hermetically, although they had been ruled by a provisional government 
appointed and sponsored by the Soviet Union since July 1944. But in the winter of 1944/45, 
the armed wing of Polish resistance, with whom the exiled government and its representatives 
had closely cooperated, was disbanded.
257
 The defeat of the Home Army significantly 
diminished the possibilities of directly interfering in Poland from abroad. However, the 
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refugee communities’ leadership continued to support the cause of national resistance by 
transferring the principal activity to their host country. This constituted the starting shot for a 
propaganda war that was fought on Swedish soil between the representatives of the new order 
and the refugee activists, who sought to give their suppressed compatriots a voice.  
In spite of the ban on political activity, which was in force until July 1946,
258
 the refugees 
from Poland and the Baltic states had at an early stage prepared for an ideological warfare 
with an openly anti-Soviet agenda. Already in 1943, the Baltic Committee, Baltiska 
Kommittén, was founded as a joint initiative of Baltic refugee representatives and a number of 
Swedish intellectuals, whose common aim it was to disseminate uncensored information on 
the situation in the occupied Baltic states. Among the most prominent Swedish supporters 
were the archaeology Professor Birger Nerman and his colleague Sigurd Curman, the former 
director of Stockholm’s Baltic Institute. They not only shared the Baltic committee members’ 
fervent anti-Sovietism, but also a common past as members of the interwar networks between 
Swedish and Baltic scholars.
259
 In autumn 1943, the Baltic Committee edited a first volume 
on the war-time fate of the Baltic states. The publication left little doubts that the aim was not 
primarily to fuel anti-German sentiments in Sweden, but to draw attention to the threat that 
Stalin constituted for the small nations west of the Soviet borders.  
In his contribution to the volume, August Rei did not hide the fact that he strongly 
disapproved of the unprecedented pro-Soviet sympathies in Sweden that had developed along 
with the Red Army’s continuous series of victories on the eastern front. Thus, he reminded his 
Swedish readers of the considerable threat that the presence of the Red Army on the nearby 
opposite coasts would pose for the neutral country. The Baltic territories were, as he stated, 
“good gateways” for any hostile military power into Scandinavia, be it the Germans or the 
Soviets.
260
 Rei’s comparative argumentation was supported by Adolf Schück’s detailed 
analysis of the Baltic peoples’ war-time experiences with both dictatorships. With his 
comparison of the Soviet and the following German occupation, he delivered an early version 
of the hypothesis that Soviet-type communism and National Socialism were to a large degree 
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comparable phenomena
261
, which would gain considerable international attention first several 
years later.  
The Baltic refugees were among the first to draw the Swedish public’s attention to the Soviet 
threat. It was the Baltic states’ specificity as the only sovereign states that had experienced 
both dictatorships, the newly arrived Tartu economist Arvo Horm claimed in his publication, 
the first exhaustive overview on occupied Estonia in Swedish, that enabled the Balts to spread 
reliable information on both German and Soviet atrocities.
262
 Horm, who later became one of 
the Estonian exile’s front figures, had already immediately after his arrival to Sweden 
developed close contacts with the press in order to spread first-hand information on the 
situation in Estonia.
263
 As one of the main mediators between the refugee community’s 
leadership and the resistance movement in Estonia, he had direct access to reliable sources on 
both the Soviet and the German occupation, among them official decrees, newspapers, 
classified documents and witness reports that had been smuggled into Sweden. This evidence 
was also used as the empirical basis for his book, which illustrates the close links between the 
cross-Baltic networking and the refugees’ informational campaigns.264 Despite the strong 
antifascist turn, which significantly influenced the political discourses in Sweden from 1943 
onwards, the main representatives of the Estonian refugee community left little doubt that 
they rather considered the Soviet Union to be the most dangerous threat to their nation’s 
survival. Eventually, this counteracted the refugees’ efforts of promoting sympathies for the 
Estonian cause and gave rise to distrust not only within pronouncedly pro-Soviet circles, but 
also among members of the social democratic establishment. Especially leftist circles proved 
to be eager to accuse the Estonian war refugees of fascist tendencies and collaboration with 
the Nazis.  
Also among the Poles in Sweden, who represented a nation that by no means could be 
accused of pro-German sympathies, anti-Soviet tendencies became stronger from 1943 
onwards. The detection of the Polish officers’ mass graves in the Katyn woods had caused an 
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irrevocable schism between the government in exile and the Soviet leadership.
265
 Polish 
communists who had been evacuated to the Soviet Union soon formed an alternative centre of 
national resistance abroad on Moscow’s initiative, the Union of Polish Patriots, Związek 
Patriotów Polskich.
266
 This marked the end of the national unity of all Polish political camps 
in the struggle against the German occupiers, which also affected the relatively small refugee 
community in Sweden. The members of the pro-Soviet group, which started to operate on 
Swedish soil under the command of the Moscow-based Union, were recruited mainly from 
the rows of the Polish sailors who had spent the war years as internees in Swedish camps.
267
 
In view of this new level of communist agitation, the exile government’s local representatives 
and the Polish diplomats in Stockholm developed an increasingly distinct anti-Soviet policy. 
Nevertheless, it soon became clear that the supporters of the government in exile were 
fighting a losing battle. The Swedish government’s attitude towards the Polish diplomats 
cooled remarkably as it became obvious that the government they represented most probably 
would not return to Poland.
268
 Moreover, the Swedish communists did everything within their 
power to assist Moscow’s propaganda war against the London-based “puppet government”, as 
the communist newspaper Ny Dag named it,
269
 recalling that it represented a pre-war order 
whose democratic deficits had been heavily criticised in Sweden.
270
 Nevertheless, the 
domestic communist propaganda neither reflected nor influenced the factual sympathies for 
the so-called ‘London Poles’ in Sweden. Much more decisive for the marginalisation of the 
circles that remained loyal towards the government in exile was the Swedish government’s 
Realpolitik. In view of the Red Army’s considerable advances westwards, the Swedish 
leadership was convinced that a future sovereign Poland could not be anti-German and anti-
Soviet at the same time.
271
 This opinion, which already took the most probable post-war 
scenario of a significant westward extension of the Soviet orbit into account, was shared by 
the leading political circles. It set the ground for a certain kind of schizophrenia that 
characterised the Swedish perception of Poland’s political situation.  
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During the later war years, a steadily increasing number of reports on German atrocities on 
Polish soil reached the Swedish public, not at least due to the efforts of the Polish legation 
members to spread the information that reached them via refugees and the exile government’s 
couriers. Their efforts started to bear fruit first after the abolition of the strict war-time 
censorship, which until 1943 had prevented the publication of reports on German war 
crimes.
272
 One of the most influential and in many ways pioneering publications was Tadeusz 
Norwid-Nowacki’s drastic depiction of Polish suffering under German occupation. The 
delegate of the exile government, who closely cooperated with the circles around Sokolnicki, 
published his book under a pseudonym in 1944.
273
 The following public discourse on the 
actual nature of Germany’s war of conquest in the East mobilised a number of intellectuals, 
among them the writers Harry Martinsson and Ture Nerman,
274
 university professors, 
newspaper editors and even one of the icons of the welfare state, Alva Myrdal. In the annex to 
a publication on the ongoing Warsaw Uprising, they appealed to the Swedish public for open 
support for the fighting population of the Polish capital.
275
 Yet, while the appeal’s anti-
German peak was obvious, the controversial role of the Red Army, which passively observed 
the uprising from the opposite bank of the Vistula, was omitted. Only the book’s co-editor, 
the famous writer Eyvind Johnson, took a firm anti-Soviet stand. He criticised the sympathies 
for the Soviet ‘liberators’ and the provisional government that had followed in the Red 
Army’s wake as well as the growing tendency to reduce the exiled government’s role to an 
outdated symbol of pre-war Poland’s undemocratic legacy.276  
The denouement of the conflict between the exiled government in London and the Soviet-
sponsored provisional government was foreshadowed by several events. In December 1944, 
the Prime Minister in exile and President of the Polish Peasants’ Party, Stanisław 
Mikołajczyk, resigned and returned to Poland. His aim was to ensure the political plurality 
and representativeness of the new government, which, however, weakened the position of his 
successor in London significantly. The Western Allies’ support vanished gradually, which 
became manifest in the exclusion of the exiled government from the consultations that 
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preceded the Yalta Conference in February 1945.
277
 After the international diplomatic 
recognition of the Provisional Government of National Unity in Warsaw in early July 1945, 
the exiled government and the majority of the Polish Armed Forces in the West refused to 
return, expressing their vigorous protest against the territorial and political changes in Poland. 
This step marked the beginning of a national independence struggle abroad that was now 
directed against both the Soviet Union and the collaborating domestic forces.
278
 For the Polish 
diplomats in Stockholm, who en bloc shared the exiled government’s scepticism, the 
withdrawal of recognition meant the loss of the diplomatic status. Sokolnicki had to hand over 
the Polish legation in Stockholm to the representatives of the new order and thus experienced 
the same fate as his Estonian colleague Heinrich Laretei five years earlier. However, as in the 
case of the Estonian activists, the Polish diplomats continued their political activity as 
informal leaders of the already large Polish refugee community in Sweden.  
 
In view of the political status quo of the immediate post-war period and the pro-Soviet 
tendencies within Swedish society, the decisive anti-Sovietism of the Polish and Estonian 
political elites in Sweden was clearly opposed to the prevailing moods. This became 
especially obvious after the dissolution of the war-time grand coalition, which made way for a 
social democratic government in the end of July 1945. Swedish social democracy traditionally 
viewed the Soviet Union as a peaceful dictatorship and advocated a foreign policy that treated 
the Western democracies and their eastern neighbours on equal terms.
279
 In this spirit, the first 
post-war government aspired to pursue a ‘bridge building policy’, to a large degree designed 
by Foreign Minister Östen Undén, one of the most fervent advocates of Swedish 
rapprochement with Moscow. Undén as Foreign Minister and Gunnar Myrdal as Minister of 
Trade represented the left wing of the social democrats, which with Tage Erlander at its top 
dominated the government after Prime Minister Hansson’s death in October 1946.280 This 
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faction of the Swedish Social Democratic Party was the main driving force for the 
establishment of good relations and close trade ties not only with the Soviet Union, but also 
with Poland, the Swedish industries’ new main supplier of coal. 
However, the government’s swing to the left did not affect all levels of state administration. A 
certain discrepancy between the official neutrality policy and the actual sympathies of key 
actors on different levels of state administration, which had characterized Sweden’s neutrality 
policy of the war years, can also be observed in the post-war context. Especially in the case of 
the Foreign Ministry, the gap between Undén, one of the most prominent advocates of the 
government’s new course, and his subordinates was striking.281 This explains the generally 
reluctant attitude among many Foreign Ministry officials towards the new Polish 
government’s representatives. In spite of the formal dissolution of the exiled government’s 
diplomatic representation, the legation de facto continued to function for some time with the 
Foreign Ministry’s approval,282 although Warsaw already had appointed Jerzy Pański, one of 
the main war-time agitators of the communist Union of Polish Patriots in Sweden, as the 
official chargé d’affaires.283 Sokolnicki, who was one of the uncontested leaders of the Polish 
community, had excellent connections among Stockholm’s political elite, which might have 
played a certain role. Moreover, the Polish diplomats were allowed to temporarily keep their 
diplomatic passports,
284
 despite the Warsaw government’s harsh protests to the Swedish 
Foreign Ministry. This considerably facilitated their lobbying activities among the Poles in 
Sweden and consolidated their authority and leadership during the first post-war months, until 
the Warsaw government established its first diplomatic representation.  
The state authorities’ unofficial support had been a crucial prerequisite for the war-time 
courier traffic, but proved to be of significant importance even for the refugees’ lobbying 
activities, which turned into a downright propaganda war against the new masters in Warsaw 
and Tallinn. Already since autumn 1944, the Estonian community had published its own 
newspapers,
285
 which mirrored the refugees’ rigid anti-Sovietism and provoked regular 
attacks against them. The Soviet Union repeatedly demanded a categorical ban on the 
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articulation of anti-Soviet views and the immediate closure of all Baltic newspapers in 
Sweden.
286
 Yet, the Swedish government refused to intervene, despite the diplomatic 
pressure, which as usual was echoed by the Swedish communists, but also by voices from 
other political camps who were convinced of the Baltic refugees’ fascist sympathies.287  
This surprisingly explicit governmental stance in favour of the Balts can be explained by two 
factors. Firstly, the controversial extradition of the Baltic soldiers in German uniforms had 
triggered an unprecedented mass demonstration of public support, which in the long run 
turned the Swedish public opinion into a determinant of the official policy towards the 
refugees.
288
 Secondly, the Swedish decision makers had a conception of political propaganda 
that significantly differed from the Soviet point of view. On the initiative of a number of 
communist parliamentarians, who had accused the Balts of spreading “fascist and anti-
Russian propaganda”, an internal governmental investigation was initiated in order to 
examine this delicate question. Relating to the refugees’ publications on Soviet atrocities in 
Estonia, the author of the concluding report explicitly denied the accusations. The 
interpretation of the depicted memories and experiences from the Soviet occupation, he 
stated, was the task of the reader, and even if the refugees’ wish to return to a non-occupied 
country was clearly stated, the publications did not qualify as “political propaganda”.289 This 
implied an unofficial sanction of the refugees’ information campaigns, from which the circles 
around the former Polish diplomats also benefited. 
The newspaper Wiadomości Polskie, which had been published by the Polish Relief 
Committee since 1940,
290
 became the main weapon of Sokolnicki’s camp in its staunch 
resistance to the agitation of the new regime’s representatives in Sweden, who tried to induce 
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the Polish refugees and evacuees to register for the repatriation programme.
291
 In contrast to 
the Estonian community, which actively fostered the collective consciousness for the 
unlawfulness of Estonia’s occupation and developed an outspokenly anti-Soviet ideology, the 
majority of Poles in Sweden were considered to be politically rather passive, especially as the 
Polish community consisted mainly of evacuated concentration camp prisoners who had not 
left Poland voluntarily. Yet, their general sympathies tended towards the representatives of 
the pre-war order,
292
 so that the “intense and hostile propaganda” of the oppositional circles in 
Sweden fell on fertile ground, as the Polish envoy Ostrowski complained.
293
   
The repatriation question had turned into a sticking point in the Swedish-Polish relations, 
despite the Swedish government’s articulated support. More than once, the Polish envoy had 
insinuated that the authorities involved continued to cooperate with the representatives of the 
exiled government, while, at the same time, the efforts of the Polish legation to communicate 
with the refugees were deliberately hampered.
294
 In view of the official tolerance towards 
newspapers that questioned the Warsaw government’s legitimacy and appealed to boycott its 
repatriation programme, Ostrowski requested the government to intervene. He particularly 
pointed to the fact that the responsible editor of one of the leading oppositional newspapers 
was a Swedish pastor and, as an employee of the Swedish state church, a state official.
295
 As 
Warsaw also threatened that the coal trade would be affected if the question was not 
satisfactorily solved,
296
 the editors themselves voluntarily interrupted the publication for a 
short period. But soon, the publication could continue, not at least because of the British 
government’s financial support.297 According to the Polish legation, these campaigns had 
caused a considerable decline in the number of voluntary repatriates. The anti-Soviet circles 
among the refugee community, the Polish press attaché claimed, had succeeded in influencing 
the coverage of leading conservative newspapers in Sweden, which explicitly warned the 
                                                          
291
 Ćwirko-Godycka, Tysiącletnia polska emigracja; p. 25. 
292
 Report of the Polish consul general in Stockholm, Michał Jachnis, 30 July 1949. AMSZ, z. 20, w. 5, t. 68, s. 
14-15. 
293
 Letter from the Swedish envoy to Poland, Claës Westring, to the Swedish Foreign Ministry, 20 June 1946. 
RA, UD 1920, P 40, vol. 68 (microfilm F035-3-32253), f. 3; p. 1. 
294
 Pro Memoria, 6 March 1946. RA, UD 1920, P 40, vol. 68, f. 3; pp. 1-2. 
295
 Letter from the Polish envoy to Sweden, Adam Ostrowski, to Foreign Minister Östen Undén, 4 June 1946. 
RA, UD 1920, P 40, vol. 68, f. 3; pp 1-2. While Wiadomości Polskie was officially edited by a Swedish 
baroness, the Lund newspaper Polak was under the editorship of Daniel Cederberg, the former pastor of the 
Swedish Sailors’ Church in Gdynia, who already during the war had actively supported the secret networks of 
the Stockholm-based representatives of the government in exile. 
296
 Letter from the Swedish envoy to Poland, Claës Westring, to the Swedish Foreign Ministry (confidential), 20 
June 1946. RA, UD 1920, HP 1, vol. 488, f. 42; p. 1. 
297
 Letter from the Swedish envoy to Poland, Brynolf Eng, to the Swedish Foreign Ministry (strictly 
confidential), 3 January 1946. RA, UD 1920, HP 1, vol. 487, f. 41; p. 1. 
72 
 
Poles to return to their home country under “Russian occupation”.298 Thus, the repatriation 
question and the aggressive propaganda on the part of both the Polish and Soviet authorities in 
Sweden were, as was the oppositional camp’s lobbying activity, decisive triggers that 
deepened the gap between the refugees and the regimes in their home countries. At the same 
time, this gap was mirrored in the corresponding split of Swedish society and the official 
decision makers on the issue, which heralded the future front lines in the East-West conflict. 
This strengthens the hypothesis of Kim Salomon, who claims that the repatriation policy of 
the Soviet Union and the states in its sphere of influence played an important role in the 
deepening of the looming East-West dichotomy and considerably sharpened the contours of 
the ideological struggle.
299
  
 
With their articulated protests against repatriation and the regimes on the opposite coasts, the 
leading circles in the refugee communities had developed a clear political profile, which 
represented an ‘antithesis’ to the new communist order. Yet, the determination of the Soviet 
and Polish authorities to prevent the formation of anti-Soviet “propaganda headquarters” 
abroad was only partly motivated by the wish to limit the loss of prestige. Another major 
reason for the repeated diplomatic interventions was the concern that the refugees’ spirit of 
opposition may be transferred across the sea via “illegal channels”.300 Of course, the 
possibilities of establishing any kind of communication between the refugee activists in 
Stockholm and the homelands were limited. Estonia especially was, except from one or 
another letter that passed the censorship, hermetically sealed off and the effective surveillance 
of the shores turned into an almost insurmountable obstacle.
301
 Yet, the conspiratorial refugee 
circles in Stockholm did not abandon the strategy of supporting the domestic resistance 
movement from abroad, despite the growing risks that the couriers had to face. A number of 
representatives of the Estonian National Committee, who had managed to escape the Soviet 
invasion, maintained a link to Saaremaa, which together with some remaining connections via 
radio traffic constituted the Estonian partisans’ last contact with the outside world.302  
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However, the main incentive of the hazardous cross-Baltic passages, which were carried out 
on motorboats and often failed due to the dense net of border patrols off the Estonian coast, 
was not primarily the support of the resistance movement. The effectiveness of the Soviet 
secret police rendered the clandestine communication between Stockholm and the partisans 
virtually impossible. Thus, the attempts to smuggle weapons and radio equipment into Estonia 
ended with a last unsuccessful mission in December 1946. Instead, the evacuation of 
resistance fighters as well as relatives that had stayed behind was prioritised by both the 
activists in Stockholm, as well as other refugees who acted on their own account.
303
 The 
Swedish authorities were from the beginning onwards well informed about these activities 
due to the border guards’ regular reports on the arrival of further refugees. Moreover, 
Countess Stenbock had, on behalf of the resistance movement’s representatives in Sweden, 
openly solicited for support from the Foreign Ministry for a large-scale evacuation of leading 
partisans from Estonia, which was supposed to ensure the continuity of organised resistance 
against the occupier.
304
 As late as August 1947, the National Security Service, Statspolisen, 
stated that the beginning of the dark season doubtlessly once more heralded an intensification 
of the Estonians’ relentless efforts to break through the cordon around their home country.305 
Thus, there still existed loopholes that enabled a small number of refugees to reach Sweden in 
the immediate post-war period, which inclined the Soviet propaganda to label Stockholm as a 
“transshipment point for fleeing citizens of the Baltic states”.306  
The traffic between Poland and Sweden, by contrast, increased rather than decreased from 
1945 onwards. Both the booming trade ties that yearly brought tens of thousands of Swedish 
sailors to the Polish harbours
307
 and the large-scale Swedish aid programme for Poland, which 
had developed already before the end of the war,
308
 led to a significant dynamisation of cross-
Baltic interaction. Throughout the second half of the 1940s, Swedish visitors were a common 
sight in the cities and towns along the Polish coast. Moreover, the Swedish state issued return 
visas for the Polish citizens that had refused to repatriate, at least until early 1948, which 
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made legal visits in the home country possible.
309
 Yet, the vast majority never made use of 
this option due to the general distrust towards Warsaw and the persistent fear of repression 
that was wide-spread among the Polish community in Sweden.
310
  
In the case of the Poles in Sweden, it was rather an ideological than physical boundary that 
detached them from the political reality in their home country. Nevertheless, the relative 
permeability of the borders enabled the anti-Soviet Polish circles in Sweden to continue their 
war-time activities across the Baltic Sea, at least to a certain extent. After the dissolution of 
the armed resistance, the London government in exile sought to establish a system of 
‘correspondents’ in Poland, who were supposed to deliver and spread information. The 
Ministry of the Interior coordinated its own contact network. However, with the gradual 
marginalisation of the exiled government, which in the eyes of a large part of the diaspora and 
especially the Polish Armed Forces in the West was not able to present a credible concept for 
a permanent existence in exile, the circles around General Władysław Anders gained 
increasing importance.
311
 Under his command, several communication channels were 
established between Poland and the London headquarters, which, although the informational 
flow was mainly directed via France and Germany,
312
 also reactivated the Polish activists in 
Sweden and the cross-Baltic courier traffic.  
In summer 1946, the Polish government repeatedly protested to the Swedish legation in 
Warsaw, calling attention to an allegedly lively smuggling activity organised by members of 
the Anders Army. According to the complaints, a group of Polish officers from London had 
established a local headquarters in Södertälje, south of Stockholm, from where they 
coordinated the secret transport of propaganda pamphlets and money to Poland.
313
 The 
smuggling of the involved couriers was supposedly carried out on the Swedish coal ships that 
connected Sweden to the harbours of Gdynia and Gdańsk, which was, as the Polish envoy 
Ostrowski underlined, significantly facilitated by the willingness of the Swedish captains to 
support the illegal traffic.
314
 Eventually, Warsaw’s accusations were echoed publicly by 
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“Stalin’s mouthpiece”315 in Sweden, the communist newspaper Ny Dag. In a report on 
Sweden’s involvement in the clandestine networks between the London government in exile 
and Poland, the refugee circles around the anti-Soviet diaspora’s main organ Wiadomości 
Polskie were pointed out as the decisive key actors on Swedish soil, who facilitated the 
coordination of the traffic and the smuggling of propaganda across the Baltic Sea.
316
 
Although the influence of the Swedish communists remained marginal also after the end of 
the war, their propaganda against the anti-Soviet refugees is worth careful attention, as it 
conveyed at least some of the actual state of knowledge on the refugees’ secret activities in 
Moscow and the satellite capitals.
317
 Indeed, it seems as if the journalistic attacks of Ny Dag 
had not been unfounded. A report on the issue, prepared by the Polish counter-espionage 
service, identified two of the editors of Wiadomości Polskie, Tadeusz Norwid-Nowacki and 
Norbert Żaba,318 among the ‘pillars’ of the clandestine organisation. This organisation was, 
the report continued, very well informed, apparently also about sensitive issues concerning 
the secret police and intelligence service at the Ministry of Public Security. Apart from 
Colonel Brzeskwiński and further members of the former diplomatic corps, the British 
military attaché in Stockholm, Reginald Sutton-Pratt, was mentioned as one of the alleged 
heads of the conspiracy. The aim of the network was supposedly the establishment of 
permanent radio communication between Sweden and the Polish coastline in anticipation of 
an imminent war between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union.
319
 Further names and 
details on the instructions, the propaganda material and money that reached Poland on the 
Swedish coal ships were revealed during a military trial in Warsaw in late 1947, which was 
held against the members of a destroyed underground cell, among them a Polish employee of 
the British embassy.
320
 Yet, at the time, the underground structures were already paralysed for 
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the most part due to several waves of arrests conducted by the Polish and Soviet secret police 
in spring 1947. The clandestine transnational networks of General Anders’ supporters, which 
can be interpreted as the last incarnation of the oppositional cross-Baltic networks that had 
connected Poland and Sweden ever since the outbreak of the war, ceased to exist.
321
 
The coal trade was originally supposed to herald the start of good neighbourly relations 
between Stockholm and the post-war government in Warsaw to the mutual economic benefit 
of both countries. However, at an early stage, it turned into a controversial issue and a matter 
of dispute on the diplomatic level. The Swedish coal ships that cruised on Baltic waters 
constituted one of the few remaining channels between the democratic world and Polish 
society, which experienced an increasingly repressive political system especially from 1947 
onwards. This led to a series of incidents that negatively affected bilateral relations. Due to 
the regular presence of Swedish sailors in Polish harbours, a “flourishing illegal trade”322 had 
developed. Smuggling not only brought luxury goods to Poland and provided the Swedish 
crew members with cheap alcohol and an extra income, but created also a loophole that 
enabled solvent Polish citizens to leave the country.
323
 According to the official propaganda, 
the political refugees that had been helped by sailors and captains to leave the country on 
Swedish cargo ships were ordinary criminals.
324
 A decisive turning point, though, was the 
escape of Stefan Korboński, which caused considerable propagandistic damage to the regime. 
Korboński was one of the closest allies of Stanisław Mikołajczyk, the leader of the at that 
time still officially legal political opposition in Poland. In view of the manifest Stalinist turn 
in Polish policy in autumn 1947, Mikołajczyk himself had secretly left the country with the 
help of the U.S. embassy in Warsaw, only two weeks before Korboński was evacuated on a 
Swedish train ferry that left the harbour of Gdynia in early November.
325
 Hereinafter, the 
Warsaw government’s complaints turned into open attacks against the Swedish diplomats, 
especially the consul in Gdańsk, who was accused of having tacitly approved the smuggling 
activities.
326
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The Swedish press, which by then had adopted a critical tone towards the political 
development in Poland, not least due to the Swedish-Polish diplomatic tensions, gave 
extensive coverage of the stream of refugees that arrived on the coal ships. According to the 
speculations of the newspapers, the organised smuggling of political refugees across the 
Baltic Sea was coordinated by a clandestine underground organisation in Poland.
327
 This 
suspicion was confirmed by the government in Warsaw, which insinuated in its 
communication with the Swedish envoy that this organisation most probably had good 
connections to Sweden.
328
 The incidents in the Polish harbours increasingly strained the 
bilateral relations and constituted one of the factors that heralded their significant 
deterioration. Poland was stepwise transformed into a Soviet-style dictatorship that 
unconditionally followed Moscow’s foreign policy line. At the same time, the post-war 
pattern of East-West relations was already fully developed and there was little doubt that 
Sweden, despite of its neutrality, ideologically belonged to the Western camp.  
 
Towards the end of the decade, the traffic across the Baltic Sea between Sweden and Poland 
gradually came to a standstill. The tightening of the Polish visa policy considerably 
diminished the freedom of movement of foreigners inside the country.
329
 In view of the 
increasing bureaucratic obstacles, the Swedish industries reduced their trade with Poland and 
focused on more reliable trade partners in the West.
330
 At the same time, the surveillance of 
the Polish coastline was considerably expanded by additional police forces in reaction to the 
escape of Korboński and several other prominent politicians across the sea.331 The controls of 
Swedish ships by Polish custom officials were sharpened, which at times led to incidents that 
strained the diplomatic relations between Stockholm and Warsaw.
332
 Thus, it turned out to be 
virtually impossible to keep this specific Baltic “loophole in the Iron Curtain” between 
Sweden and Poland open, which, as the Swedish envoy to Poland, Gösta Engzell, expressed 
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it, had “appeared as a ray of hope for many Poles in today’s difficult situation”.333. 
Consequently, the number of Polish political refugees who succeeded in escaping to Sweden 
decreased considerably.
334
 
The dynamics of the demarcation process between East and West, which had accelerated from 
1947 onwards and whose contours were significantly sharpened in the aftermath of the 
Czechoslovak coup d’état in February 1948, had eventually reached the Baltic Sea Region. 
With the Soviet and Polish authorities’ increasingly successful efforts to seal off their 
coastlines, the Baltic Sea had developed into an area that was under equally strict military and 
electronic surveillance as the continental land borders.
335
 Eventually, this bipolarisation 
process put an end to Sweden’s ‘bridge building policy’ and significantly diminished the 
scope of action of the anti-Soviet activists among the refugee communities in Sweden. During 
the decade that followed the outbreak of the war, the circles around the Polish and Estonian 
pre-war diplomats had demonstrated how Sweden’s geographical location and the country’s 
neutrality policy could be used in order to establish communication with centres of resistance 
on the opposite coasts. However, this subversive cross-Baltic interplay, which initially served 
the coordination of armed resistance against the occupying forces and later enabled thousands 
of refugees to escape, found an end with the isolationist policy of the Eastern bloc. 
The isolation of the communist-ruled countries on Sweden’s opposite coast against foreign 
influences was mirrored by a similar process within the refugee communities. Apart from the 
physical boundaries, it was now increasingly also mental barriers that fortified the 
increasingly unsurmountable demarcation line between diaspora and homeland. The refugees’ 
ostentatious self-isolation towards their home country and alleged collaborators from the own 
ranks, however, marked an unambiguous answer to the ongoing political changes. Among the 
Estonians in Sweden, a certain ‘spy hysteria’ started to spread due to several incidents that 
indicated Soviet attempts to infiltrate the diaspora community.
336
 This induced the majority of 
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Estonians in Sweden to reject any contact with representatives of Soviet Estonia, including 
the relatively few refugees that had managed to escape after 1944, who were placed under 
general suspicion. The same phenomenon can be observed in the Polish case. At an early 
stage, the political refugees that had reached Sweden from the Polish coastlines had raised 
suspicion even among Swedish state authorities, who assumed the Warsaw government had 
spies and “provocateurs” disguised as political refugees.337 This latent mistrust was nourished 
by credible evidence that indicated that the Polish Ministry of Public Security secretly trained 
agents in Swedish, which allowed them to pretend to be war-time refugees after their arrival 
in Sweden in order to facilitate the infiltration of the oppositional circles within the local 
Polish community.
338
 As a result, the Poles in Sweden kept a distance from their compatriots 
claiming asylum in Sweden during the second half of the 1940s, who indeed in general were 
classified as rather economic than political refugees and not seldom viewed as 
‘communists’.339 Thus, the specific “Soviet phobia”340 of all foreign and external influences, 
which was characteristic of the post-war communist regimes in the Soviet orbit, had reversely 
encroached on the Polish and Estonian diaspora communities as well. Via a deliberate 
seclusion, the refugee societies aimed at preventing infiltration and penetration, which 
triggered a climate of suspicion that in many respects reflected the “surveillance 
societ[ies]”341 behind the Iron Curtain. This parallel pattern of isolation and self-isolation also 
sharpened the contours of the ideological dichotomy between the communist regimes and the 
refugee communities, which developed along the lines of the upcoming Cold War.  
 
The experiences of the aggravating East-West dichotomy had a significant impact on the 
transformation process, during which the refugees who had refused to repatriate turned into 
permanent exiles. Their gradual integration into Swedish society introduced a strongly anti-
Soviet accent to the national discourse. The refugees’ anti-Soviet manifestations of the war 
years had by the late 1940s developed into a wide-spread, ideologically based consensus in 
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the Western hemisphere, which again had a considerable influence on the institutionalisation 
of the exile activists’ political activities. After the lifting of the restrictions that so far had 
forbidden any involvement in political issues on the part of the war refugees in mid-1946, a 
number of various exile associations were established. As it became clear that the stalemate of 
1945 would not culminate in a Third World War,
342
 the exiles from behind the Iron Curtain 
prepared for an ideological war with a network of “political battle organisations”.343 
The first Polish organisations in Sweden, such as the Association of Former Polish Political 
Prisoners, Związek Byłych Więźniów Politycznych, and the Polish Refugee Council, Rada 
Uchodźstwa Polskiego, an umbrella organisation for all Polish refugee associations in 
Sweden
344
, were, in spite of their close bonds with the exiled government, largely 
apolitical.
345
 But already in autumn 1946, the London-based but trans- and internationally 
operating, outspokenly anti-Soviet Polish Ex-Combatants Association, Stowarzyszenie 
Polskich Kombatantów, established a Swedish branch on an initiative of the exiled 
government.
346
 Moreover, a number of smaller associations with a distinct political profile 
were formed, which all were united in the so-called Polish Union of Sweden, Zjednoczenie 
Polskie w Szwecji, in September 1948. Under the leadership of Sokolnicki, who together with 
other prominent figures, such as Tadeusz Norwid-Nowacki, formed the steering committee, 
the umbrella organisation declared a common ideological, i.e. anti-Soviet, line as a guiding 
principle. The Polish Consul General Michał Jachnis reported with justified concern back to 
Warsaw that the Union constituted a gateway “for the thoughts and propaganda of 
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‘London’”.347 Nevertheless, it appeared as if his wake-up call had come too late. Up to 1948, 
the Warsaw government had completely left the field to the anti-Soviet forces among the 
Poles in Sweden, which thus managed to conduct the institutional and organisational 
restructuring of the refugee community along their ideological conviction.
348
 The outcome of 
the ideological struggle over the hearts and minds of the Poles in Sweden constituted thus an 
unambiguous affirmation of the exiled government’s claim to represent the Polish diaspora. In 
contrast to France, for example, where considerable communist sympathies developed among 
the pre-war emigrants and their descendants, Warsaw’s efforts of spreading a positive image 
of the new order in Sweden went largely unheeded. 
In the case of the Estonians, by contrast, the question of loyalties and sympathies was much 
less controversial. Neither did the representatives of the new regime in Tallinn attempt to 
convert the Estonian refugees to loyal Soviet citizens, nor was the diaspora’s political 
conviction a matter of dispute. However, their situation was more complicated and delicate 
than that of the Polish émigrés, who nevertheless could relate to their ‘state in exile’ and the 
Polish Armed Forces in the West that outnumbered the military forces of many a small state. 
The majority of Estonian refugees dwelled in German DP camps, which made any political 
self-organisation impossible. In Sweden, where the only noteworthy refugee community that 
at least almost reached the dimensions of the Estonian community in occupied Germany 
resided, it was Sweden’s neutrality that imposed political passivity on the expatriates. 
However, already shortly after the war, a number of activists proved to be able to set the 
ground for a future political representation of the anti-Soviet diaspora.
349
 
A distinctive watershed was the foundation of the Estonian National Fund, Eesti Rahvusfond, 
ERF, whose major task was to coordinate political and informational campaigns, in 1946.
350
 
The organisation functioned both as a centre of information and a monetary fund for the 
political struggle, whose final aim was the resurrection of a sovereign Estonian state.
351
 Under 
the leadership of August Rei, Heinrich Laretei and Harald Perlitz,
352
 the ERF turned into the 
central organisation for political issues. The Estonian Committee, which so far had been 
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filling that void, now exclusively focused on the social and cultural aspects of life in exile.
353
 
The continuity of agency within the war-time and post-war organisations indicates that the 
circles of Estonian activists who had been active from 1940 onwards continued to play a 
leading role in the now already substantial Estonian community. With the arrival of numerous 
representatives of the rannarahvas, the coastal population that was generally known for its 
support for Päts’ authoritarian rule, during the mass escape of autumn 1944, the refugee 
community had been enriched by a large group of political opponents opposed to Rei and his 
supporters. But the ‘parliamentarians’, as they were called354, successfully defended their 
leadership of the Estonian community in Sweden and became the driving forces for the 
foundation of an organisation that developed into a substitute for an exile government abroad.  
The Estonian National Council, Eesti Rahvusnõukogu, ERN, was founded in May 1947 as a 
coalition of democratic political parties and their representatives in exile. The steering 
committee was constituted by the three ministerial officeholders of the 1944 Tief-government 
who at the time of its establishment had either been already outside of Estonia or managed to 
escape.
355
 Under the leadership of Rei, the ERN was designed to constitute the official 
representation of the Estonian cause in the West, supposed to defend the occupied country’s 
interest on a foreign policy level by disseminating information and appeals in an international 
forum.
356
 Together with the ERF, the ERN formed the political centre of the Estonian 
diaspora, which clearly differed from the flora of organisations that already had been 
established in order to satisfy the refugees’ social and cultural needs. The ERN was the first 
organised spearhead of Estonian opposition to Soviet rule. As it operated on an international 
level, it was an equal partner of other exile representations such as the Polish government in 
exile, with which it maintained close bonds.
357
 From 1948 onwards, the ERN Büroo, a 
coordinating office of the National Council, synchronised the collection of information on the 
situation in the Soviet Baltic republics. It was the main task of the ERF to finance and 
organise the publication of relevant information that could be used as a counterweight to 
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Soviet propaganda. In September 1948, Arvo Horm was elected as head of the ERN Büroo
358
, 
which thus was led by an activist with already substantial practice in collecting and 
disseminating information on Soviet atrocities on Estonian soil. Up to the beginning of the 
1950s, the small circle of Estonian activists in Stockholm, many of whom had been active 
ever since the first Soviet occupation in 1940, remained the most effectively organised 
Estonian exile representation, until the camp societies of the Estonian ‘Displaced Persons’ in 
Germany slowly transformed into organised exile communities overseas. 
 
Among the ERN’s objectives was not only the maintenance of close contacts with the 
representatives of other occupied nations in the West, but also with centres of resistance 
inside the Soviet Union and other states behind the Iron Curtain.
359
 The exiles were well 
aware of the fact that their voices would go unheard, unless they could prove to the 
international public that the political and ideological position they represented was shared and 
supported by their compatriots at home.
360
 The question of legitimisation was thus a decisive 
factor, which implied that the connection between home country and diaspora was a 
precondition for any political exile activity. This issue was also reflected in the charter of the 
Council of Polish Political Parties, Rada Polskich Stronnictw Politycznych, which emerged in 
1949 in opposition to the exiled government under President August Zaleski, leading to a 
durable split of ‘Polish London’.361 The London-based coalition of political parties in exile 
opposed to the European post-war order, which structurally resembled the ERN, stated 
explicitly that one of its main aims was to actively support the population in the home 
country.
362
 Thus, the political leadership of both the Polish and the Estonian exile 
communities stated implicitly that they were not only determined to defend their national 
cause in the West, but to challenge the boundary of the Iron Curtain in order to involve the 
domestic population in the fight against Soviet hegemony over Central and Eastern Europe. 
Against this background, it becomes obvious why the Estonian and Polish exile communities 
in nearby Sweden constituted a certain threat or, at least, a disturbing factor for the communist 
regimes in Warsaw and Tallinn. At the same time, their activities turned into a delicate issue 
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for the Swedish government, which was eager to stick to neutrality, especially in view of 
Sweden’s exposed position vis-à-vis a new regional – and global – superpower. The exiled 
elites had turned into well-organised centres of counterpropaganda, which now constituted 
spearheads of national opposition in considerable geographical proximity to their home 
countries. Indeed, Sweden’s neutrality doctrine still limited the exiles’ scope of action to a 
certain degree. Yet, the anti-Soviet activists had more than once provided proof of their ability 
to use the gap between the official policy and its practical implementation as well as the 
Baltic waterways to their advantage. In the context of the Baltic Sea Region, the exile 
communities in Sweden represented the only centres of anti-Soviet activity with the potential 
and determination to establish toeholds on the communist-ruled opposite coasts.  
During the war years, Finland had, at least in the Estonian case, functioned as an important 
bridge between the refugee activists and domestic resistance. However, after the signing of 
the armistice with Moscow, Finland’s specific position in the new geopolitical setting forced 
the government in Helsinki to extradite all political refugees from the Soviet sphere of 
influence.
363
 After the war, up to 55,000 Soviet citizens had been forcibly repatriated,
364
 
which included Estonians as well. In 1947, the culmination was reached with the extradition 
of almost two thousand Estonian refugees, organised and conducted by Valpo, the predecessor 
of the Finnish security intelligence service, which at the time was dominated by communist 
forces.
365
 This turned Finland into an unattractive destination for those who attempted to 
escape from communism even after the end of the war. The number of Poles in Finland, on 
the other hand, did not exceed a few hundred and was mainly constituted of already 
naturalised pre-war immigrants and their descendants
366
, which mirrored the situation on 
Sweden’s other flank.  
Due to its occupation by Nazi Germany, Denmark had never developed into a destiny for war 
refugees from Central and Eastern Europe. During the war years, a certain number of Poles 
were actually active within the Danish resistance movement, but this group was exclusively 
constituted of second-generation immigrants.
367
 Correspondingly, also the number of Balts in 
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Denmark was comparably small.
368
 The national committees of the Balts had been dissolved 
by the Danish government after repeated Soviet protests,
369
 which triggered a wave of escape 
among Balts across the sound to Sweden, both because of a growing fear of extradition to the 
Soviet Union
370
 and the lack of possibilities to further emigrate to third countries.
371
 Around 
the turn of the decade, there were only about 200 Estonians left in Denmark and even those 
were, as the former Estonian envoy to Denmark, August Koern, advised August Rei in 
Stockholm, to be evacuated on an “Estonian boat” to Sweden.372 Thus, Sweden remained the 
only noteworthy Scandinavian outpost of the transnationally operating Estonian and Polish 
diaspora communities along the Baltic shores. 
 
By the late 1940s, the transition of the Polish and Estonian refugee communities into 
organised exile societies with a distinct anti-Soviet profile had come to an end. The turn of 
international post-war politics into a state of permanent Cold War tensions radically changed 
the preconditions for exile politics in neutral Sweden. The official Swedish stance had, ever 
since the arrival of the first refugees from the opposite coasts, been ambiguous and the 
informal support of state officials had been decisive for the oppositional activities on Swedish 
soil.
373
 But, although the Erlander government once more reaffirmed its non-alignment policy 
after the failure of the negotiations with Denmark and Norway on a Scandinavian Defense 
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Union in early 1949,
374
 now also the “cultural climate” turned significantly against the 
officially proclaimed course.
375
 
With the 1948 coup d’état in Prague, an event that in Sweden led to severe concerns about the 
future fate of neighbouring Finland, which had been ‘invited’ by the Soviet Union to sign the 
Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance only weeks afterwards, the 
Cold War had finally reached the North.
376
 Already since autumn 1947, the values of liberal 
democracy, i.e. ‘freedom’, had been increasingly stressed in the societal political discourse on 
international politics. This marked the end of the relative tolerance towards the Soviet bloc 
that Foreign Minister Undén as one of the few remaining advocates of a Swedish 
rapprochement with the East still represented.
377
 The end of Sweden’s ‘bridge building 
policy’ was thus anticipated by a set of events and developments within Swedish society, 
which by the representatives of the communist regimes were perceived as an “anti-communist 
campaign”378 fuelled by the “Marshallised Swedish newspapers”.379 A clear signal of the 
changed political climate was the decision of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, which 
was closely linked to the Swedish Social Democratic Party, to exclude the delegates of 
Eastern European trade unions from the festivities on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary 
of its foundation.
380
 Indeed, during the late 1940s, Swedish Social Democrats drew a distinct 
demarcation line between the democratic grounds of social democracy and the antidemocratic 
tendencies of communism, which included the domestic communist movement. On the eve of 
the 1948 elections, Prime Minister Erlander himself stated in his radio speech that  
“[f]reedom of expression, freedom of thought, freedom of the press, the right to criticize a 
government, and equality before the law are for us priceless aspects for our future society. Our 
homegrown Communists have adopted a different position.”
381
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In view of the increasingly strained relations between the two camps in Europe, Sweden had, 
also in its own perception, developed into a strategic “border state towards the Soviet bloc of 
states”.382 For the following decade, the most openly anti-communist era of Swedish post-war 
history, Sweden became part of the bipolar world of the Cold War. This provided the Polish 
and Estonian exile activists with a political forum in their host society and guaranteed a 
certain level of Swedish societal support for their struggle. 
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IV. First leaks in the maritime bloc border – Channelling 
informational flows across the Baltic Sea in the 1950s 
 
IV.1 From anti-Sovietism to anticommunism: The internationalisation of 
the exiles’ political struggle in a bipolar world 
In spite of the dramatic rise of East-West tensions after the outbreak of the Korean War in 
June 1950 and the following massive armament efforts in the West,
383
 the Cold War conflict 
did not expand into Europe and remained a proxy war of the two superpower blocs. A 
transformation from a cold into a hot war, which a majority of émigrés from behind the Iron 
Curtain and many of their compatriots at home saw as the only path to liberation from the 
Soviet yoke, did not take place. Instead, the state of conflict went through a process of 
‘permanentisation’ and even normalisation as, as John Lewis Gaddis put it, “what was thought 
to be unendurable became endurable”.384 The ubiquity of the East-West dichotomy, which 
developed into a surprisingly stable post-war world order that “pervaded all aspects of life”385, 
had a restructuring impact that affected not only the societies in the Soviet orbit. A majority of 
Western opinion makers felt vindicated by the communist takeover in China and the 
subsequent war in Korea as a ‘conclusive proof’ of the aggressive, expansionist nature of 
communism, which went far beyond Moscow’s hegemonic ambitions in Eastern Europe. The 
totalitarianism discourse and literary works like George Orwell’s dystopian novel 1984 
considerably triggered the demonisation of Stalin and the Kremlin as allegories of an ideology 
that filled the shoes of fascism as a major threat to Western civilisation itself.
386
 Thus, 
anticommunism developed into a kind of a “prevailing fundamental agreement”387 of the 
Western hemisphere, which left lasting marks on the non-communist societies of the era and 
their self-perception.
388
  
The political struggle of the Central and Eastern European émigrés developed along the lines 
of this ideological reconfiguration and transformation of the Western societies. With the 
announcement of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, which developed from a declaration of 
support for Greece and Turkey in view of Stalin’s expansionism into the leading principle of 
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the 1950s containment policy,
389
 the United States appeared as a natural ally of the exile 
activists. Washington’s decisive stand against Moscow was a ray of hope for the diaspora 
communities from behind the Iron Curtain. Also for the Balts, whose natural right to “return 
to the community of free people” was publicly reasserted by General Dwight D. Eisenhower 
in 1952.
390
 Consequently, the majority of émigré circles crystallised with the support of the 
United States and lined up behind the ideological front line of the Cold War. Their strong 
anti-Sovietism of the war years converged with the traditional Western anti-Bolshevism of the 
pre-war era and the anti-Soviet peak of post-war politics into the anticommunism of the ‘cold 
warriors’. This led to close alliances between conservative forces and émigrés throughout the 
Cold War era, from which especially the exile activists highly benefited. 
From the early 1950s onwards, the émigré communities’ struggle for the liberation of their 
homelands from Soviet domination was integrated into the broader framework of Cold War 
opinion making and ‘cold warfare’. As a consequence, political exile activity was in many 
respects internationalised, which triggered the development of a pattern of concerted émigré 
activism beyond state borders and the limitations of the respective national causes. The 
coordination of political action now expanded beyond the cross-linking among activists 
within their own national communities in Western Europe and North America and added a 
transnational level of cooperation between the diaspora societies. Liberation from the Soviet 
yoke became an overriding ideal that united not only the émigrés from the East Central 
European satellite states, but also exiles of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian and even 
Ukrainian or Belarusian origin in a common struggle.
391
 This new level of cooperation was 
reflected in the foundation of a wide range of multinational associations that represented the 
various political and societal interests of the émigrés. Among them were, for example, 
associations like the Socialist Union of Central-Eastern Europe, the International Centre of 
Free Trade Unions in Exile, the Central and Eastern European Commission or the 
International Federation of Free Journalists of Central and Eastern Europe.
392
 A vibrant 
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internationalisation and transnationalisation process transformed the circles of exile activists 
into virtually globally interconnected centres of opposition against the Soviet and, de facto, 
Russian hegemony over their native countries. Their additional engagement in a vast range of 
multinational political organisations in the West contributed to widening the scope of action 
and provided them with an international forum which guaranteed that the fate of the nations 
behind the Iron Curtain did not sink into oblivion.
393
 
The shared political and ideological convictions and aims led to a closely intertwined set of 
mutual dependencies and benefits that consolidated the entanglements between the spearheads 
of anti-communist U.S. propaganda and the leading centres of Central and Eastern European 
exile activism. Émigrés constituted the backbone of organisations like the New York-based 
National Committee for a Free Europe, which was secretly financed by the U.S. intelligence 
agency the CIA,
394
 and the Assembly of Captive European Nations, the Committee’s offshoot 
that was founded five years later.
395
 By delivering first hand reports on the atrocities behind 
the Iron Curtain, the émigrés legitimised the offensive U.S. stand towards Moscow and 
effectively fuelled the vigour of a united Western front against communism in all its 
incarnations. The institutional framework of the U.S.-sponsored associations, on the other 
hand, provided the representatives of the Central and Eastern European independence struggle 
in the West with the nimbus of Washington’s support and consent. However, the distribution 
of power between the exile activists and the protagonists of anti-communist opinion-making 
in the West was obvious. The leading organisations of anticommunism, which de facto were 
flagships and mouthpieces of the U.S. government, made use of the émigré circles according 
to their own requirements and rules and did not always bother to coordinate their activities 
with the political leadership of the diaspora communities, whose interests they claimed to 
represent.
396
 At times, this resulted in ill-concealed reproaches on the part of émigré 
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representatives, who criticised the abuse of exile activists as mere ‘executors’ of actions that 
obviously served Washington’s own national interest in the first place.397  
 
An analogous pattern of symbiotic cooperation between conservative political forces and 
émigré activists developed also in Sweden from the early 1950s onwards, although the 
Swedish incarnation of anticommunism was relatively restrained in comparison to the 
strongholds of anti-Soviet opinion making in the West.
398
 But in spite of the more tempered 
nature of Swedish anticommunism, the political climate increasingly favoured the advocates 
of a more critical stance towards the Soviet Union. The gap between the predominantly pro-
Western leadership of the Social Democratic Party and the government, which especially 
under the aegis of Foreign Minister Undén held on to a strictly neutral policy in order to avoid 
potential conflicts with the communist neighbour states, was constantly growing.
399
 At the 
same time, it turned out that the wave of support for the Swedish Communist Party during the 
immediate post-war years had been nothing but a short-lived fad. Thus, a broad cross-party 
consensus on foreign policy issues and Sweden’s ideological and cultural belonging to the 
West prevailed.
400
 First the discourse on the country’s relation to the NATO triggered 
controversies and polemical debates that sharpened the profile of the more professed anti-
communist circles in Sweden. 
In contrast to the social democrats and their closest ally, the Farmers’ League, the leaders of 
the main political camps of opposition did not hesitate to publicly defend the vision of a 
‘flexible’ neutrality policy that allowed for stronger and much more straightforward 
commitments to the Western camp. Both Bertil Ohlin, the Liberal People’s Party’s chairman 
and Prime Minister Erlander’s most important political opponent, and the chairman of the 
Rightist Party, Jarl Hjalmarson
401
, demanded that neutrality should not exclude the possibility 
of establishing closer cooperation with the NATO and definitely not impede a critical public 
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discourse on the totalitarian Soviet system.
402
 This critical attitude towards Sweden’s 
neutrality policy was popularised and considerably amplified by Herbert Tingsten, the 
influential executive editor of the biggest national daily newspaper, Dagens Nyheter, who 
openly rejected neutrality as an option for Sweden. As Sweden’s “anti-communist number 
one”,403 he became one of the most influential opinion makers in the country during the early 
Cold War years. In his comments on the political and societal order behind the Iron Curtain, 
which he had described as a kind of “red Nazism” in one of his early editorials,404 he did not 
mince his words and fundamentally contributed to the increasingly negative tone of Swedish 
media reports on the development of communist Europe.
405
 
During the 1950s, Tingsten, Ohlin and Hjalmarson were the most outstanding oppositional 
voices in Cold War Sweden. They openly challenged the government’s interpretation of 
neutrality and established an anti-communist front line with considerable support on the part 
of Swedish society. In this respect, they paved the way for a certain ‘Westernisation’ of the 
political discourses of the era. The advocates of a conservative, pro-Western and anti-
communist foreign policy line thus shared a common ideological basis with the exiles from 
behind the Iron Curtain, who constituted the only other significant centre of anti-communist 
opinion making on the national scene. As elsewhere in the West, this triggered the 
development of political kinship alliances between émigrés and conservative political forces, 
which also had an impact on domestic politics. Even in the Swedish case, these networks 
relied on mutual benefits. While the cooperation with the prominent troika of Swedish 
anticommunism cemented the integration of the former refugees into the structures of 
Swedish society and domestic political discourses, the support of the émigré communities 
became a clear marker of opposition against the social democratic government on the part of 
the country’s leading oppositional protagonists. 
In particular the Balts profited from the support of the political opposition,
406
 not least due to 
their well-developed contacts among the intellectual elite and their significance as the largest 
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anti-communist diaspora community.
407
 Due to this new constellation, Estonian exile activists 
were able to gain a leading role in anti-communist opinion making in Sweden, albeit it could 
never develop into more than an echo of the trenchant ‘cold warfare’ in the NATO states. But 
although the anti-communist discourses in Sweden only constituted an auxiliary activity as 
seen from the perspective of the general transnational networking between émigrés and 
protagonists of Western anticommunism, they should not be underestimated, as they crucially 
determined the scope of action of the largest Estonian community in Western Europe. For the 
leaders of the Swedish opposition, on the other hand, the networking with émigré 
representatives sharpened their political profile. The Balts had, ever since the extradition of 
the Baltic soldiers to the Soviet Union in 1946, been a – certainly controversial – symbol of 
the Swedish dilemma between strict neutrality and appeasement towards their powerful Soviet 
neighbour. Open support for the Baltic exile activists was thus more than an affirmative 
approval of the émigrés’ independence struggle. It also implied a clear statement addressed to 
their Soviet neighbour, demonstrating a decisive stand in view of the repeated Soviet attacks 
on Sweden’s asylum policy, and to the Social Democratic Party, whose support for the Balts 
had been rather ambiguous and half-hearted.
408
 In other words, the Baltic refugees had 
become a symbol of Swedish society’s attitude towards the Soviet system in general, which 
turned the question of their support into a matter of political orientation.  
It is thus not surprising that the list of supporters of the Baltic Committee, which closely 
cooperated with the ERN and whose members so far had been mainly recruited from the 
Swedish-Baltic academic pre-war networks, was extended by the most prominent protagonists 
of anticommunism in Sweden. Apart from Herbert Tingsten and the two leaders of the 
political opposition, the group of official supporters of the Committee included not only 
prominent politicians and famous writers, such as Eyvind Johnson and Vilhelm Moberg, but 
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also some of Sweden’s leading journalists and even the Supreme Commander of the Swedish 
Armed Forces, Helge Jung.
409
 The latter had given proof of the considerable gap between the 
government policy and the prevailing attitude among the country’s military circles during a 
public speech in 1950. He caused a diplomatic scandal by declaring his support for Sweden’s 
participation in a Western-led preventive war against the Soviet Union in the case of an 
immediate military threat.
410
 Thus, the Baltic Committee, the joint representation of the Baltic 
émigré representatives and their Swedish allies, had turned into the meeting place of a 
kaleidoscope of prominent political and societal agents, whose unifying link was a decisive 
anti-communist and thus anti-Soviet stance. They mainly represented the bourgeoisie, military 
circles and conservative intellectuals, the segments of society that the Soviet envoy to Sweden 
had warned Foreign Minister Undén about as the most ‘untrustworthy’ part of the Swedish 
public already in 1946.
411
  
From the mid-1950s onwards, the support of the conservative wing turned the Baltic 
Committee, once a small-scale association of Baltic refugees and representatives of their pre-
war networks in Sweden, into a visible actor and element of Swedish political discourses.
412
 
The Committee became a platform of clearly anti-Soviet manifestations that, protected by the 
freedom of expression and opinion, could openly oppose the government’s efforts of 
neutralising the rising level of conflict in the bilateral relations with the Soviet Union.
413
 By 
organising public demonstrations and publishing campaigns, it turned into one of the crucial 
catalysts that provoked the rise of strong societal protests against the planned visit of Stalin’s 
successor Nikita Khrushchev in summer 1959. Eventually, the Kremlin cancelled the state 
visit.
414
 Informally, the Soviet government made sure to let Foreign Minister Undén know that 
it was the Swedish government’s passivity in view of the “poisoned atmosphere” of anti-
Soviet moods and the personal insults against the Soviet Communist Party’s First Secretary 
himself that had induced Khrushchev to call off the trip.
415
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The anti-Soviet émigré activists’ political struggle had thus by the beginning of the 1950s 
merged into the bipolar pattern of ‘cold warfare’. In view of the rapidly diminishing 
possibilities of reaching out to the Soviet orbit, the exiles now focused on forging alliances 
with the protagonists and advocates of Western power politics and its leading organisations. 
Thus, supporting the émigrés’ cause now implicitly expressed a strong political bias, which 
reflected the ubiquitous bipolarisation processes of the era. Also neutral Sweden was 
increasingly drawn into the all-pervasive reconfiguration of political and societal life along 
the two “gigantic magnet[s]”416 of global politics. Despite the government’s efforts to 
counteract the development, at least in the Baltic Sea Region, neutrality was gradually 
reduced to a formality and Sweden became de facto a part of the Western camp. Factors that 
characterised this process were the pro-Western sympathies of large parts of society, the 
support for the émigrés as ‘crown witnesses’ of communism’s totalitarian nature and, not 
least, by the introduction of Cold War rhetoric and practices into the official relations across 
the Baltic Sea. The gradual military fortification of the Baltic coastlines turned into the visual 
manifestation of the increasing bipolarisation of Europe, which now had reached even the 
Baltic Sea Region. An invisible, but all the more noticeable demarcation line divided the 
small inland sea, triggering a certain ‘de-spatialisation’ of the regional context, to which the 
émigré strategies of supporting their communist-ruled homelands had to adapt.  
In the perception of the communist neighbours, neutral Sweden had, as a Swedish diplomat 
put it, turned into an “American satellite”,417 which reflected the general turn in Soviet foreign 
policy in the second half of the 1940s. Moscow brought its satellite communists into line with 
the world view of the Kremlin, according to which the United States constituted the main 
enemy, Western European Social Democracy thus the “tool of ‘U.S. imperialism’.”418 
Consequently, also the social democratic Swedish government was reckoned to be among the 
representatives of the ‘imperialist camp’, which echoed the strong demarcation line that the 
leadership of the Swedish Social Democratic Party itself had drawn between social 
democracy and communism in view of the escalating East-West tensions. The communist 
propaganda machinery systematically defamed Swedish neutrality by drawing suggestive 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
which excluded Hjalmarson, the prominent flagship of the anti-Khrushchev campaign, from a Swedish 
delegation to the United Nations. This disputable manoeuvre became later known as the ‘Hjalmarson affair’; 
Ekecrantz, Hemlig utrikespolitik; p. 218. 
416
 Gaddis, We now know; p. 26. 
417
 Letter from the Swedish envoy to Poland, Gösta Engzell, to the Swedish Foreign Ministry, 2 January 1951. 
RA, UD 1920, HP 1, vol. 492, f. 54. 
418
 Berge, Det kalla kriget i Tidens spegel; p. 57. 
97 
 
parallels between the Swedish government’s appeasement policy towards Nazi Germany 
during the war and the current tendencies of an accentuated pro-Western orientation.
419
 This 
turn in the cross-Baltic relations marked a significant rupture. Sweden had transformed from a 
‘bridge’ between East and West into a gateway for and “centre of American war propaganda 
in Scandinavia”.420 Although the increasingly harsh tone that characterised the communist 
regimes’ diplomacy towards Sweden went in line with the general condemnation of all non-
communist states, the existence of institutionally well-organised émigré communities that 
raised their voices in Swedish national debates played a specific and regularly accentuated 
role in the propagandistic attacks. Especially in view of its liberal refugee policy, the country 
was vilified in the main organs of communist propaganda as a “promised land for the Fascist 
dregs”, i.e. for the political refugees especially from Poland and the Soviet Baltic republics, 
who lived in “servile prosperity”, nourished by the “alms of their Swedish protectors”.421 
The hostile tone of the media on both sides of the Iron Curtain turned into a propaganda war, 
a series of verbal attacks that eagerly cited and responded to the accusations of their 
counterpart. In the early 1950s, this was practically the only level of ‘communication’ 
between Sweden and its opposite coasts. In spite of the initial good-will that both sides had 
shown during the re-establishment of diplomatic relations after the end of the war, interaction 
rapidly decreased on all levels in view of the rising tensions in world politics. Also Sweden’s 
trade with the Eastern bloc, initially seen as the basis on which the future relations between 
Sweden and its communist neighbours were to be built, had stagnated.
422
 Among the reasons 
for the freezing of the commercial relations with the East was the gradual entrenchment of 
Swedish economy into the economic system of the Western hemisphere and the fact that the 
country’s exports at least informally lay under the control of the CoCom, the NATO states’ 
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategy Export Controls, which limited the transfer 
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of strategic goods to the East.
423
 Thus, the traffic between the Baltic shores was reduced to a 
minimum. 
 
The demarcation line across the Baltic Sea was not built of concrete and brick nor was it 
secured with barbed wire and minefields as along the continental bloc borders. Nevertheless, 
it materialised in the rapid fortification of the Baltic coasts both in Sweden and, of course to a 
much larger degree, on its opposite coasts. The Polish coastline, considerably extended since 
the incorporation of the German territories, was almost as densely monitored as the country’s 
western land border. A safety belt of ten metres secured the beaches, additionally protected by 
a dense chain of watchtowers.
424
 According to the reports of a Polish refugee, who escaped to 
Sweden in 1952, the monitoring had been expanded to the coastal forests, especially around 
Gdynia and Gdańsk. Warsaw was eager to unveil the conspiratorial movements of both 
potential refugees and Western spies, whose smuggling into Poland by sea the regime 
obviously feared. In comparison with the Polish coastal surveillance system, the refugee 
claimed, the Swedish coasts were an easy target for communist forces that aimed at 
infiltrating their own couriers and informants into the country,
425
 although the monitoring of 
the Swedish coasts had increased considerably since the turn of the decade.
426
  
The situation in the Soviet Baltic republics resembled the Polish case, although the 
fortification of their coastlines took on a dimension that mirrored both the paranoia of Stalin’s 
rule and the specific mistrust towards the assumedly disloyal Balts. In the case of Soviet 
Estonia, the local authorities finally managed to gain far-reaching control over the altogether 
3,000 kilometres of coastlines by 1950.
427
 Due to Estonia’s sensitive geographical location in 
considerable proximity to Sweden and Finland, the numerous islands and most of the coastal 
districts were transformed into restricted zones that were closed to civilians.
428
 A ten to fifty 
metres wide raked sand strip, additionally fenced off with barbed wire, was supposed to 
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prevent the escape of Soviet citizens by sea as well as the landing of spies, while the general 
coastal exclusion zone reached as far as five kilometres inland. A certain number of locals 
could indeed inhabit their native coastal villages with a special permit,
429
 but not even they 
were allowed to go near the sea itself.
430
 As an additional cordon, the Soviet national security 
agency, which from 1954 onwards was commonly known as the KGB, developed a network 
of informants that covered all groups that had access to the sea and, thus, the Soviet frontier. 
From the mid-1950s, the recruitment of agents was considerably intensified, so that, by the 
end of the decade, a dense net of several hundred covert informants, mainly of Russian origin, 
not only controlled Estonian sailors abroad, but also fishermen sailing the inshore waters on 
behalf of the fishing kolkhozes.
431
 Thus, in the course of a decade, Estonia and its inhabitants, 
for whose history and cultural identity the geographical location at the shoreline had been a 
crucial factor, had virtually been cut off from the Baltic Sea. The Estonians were compelled to 
turn their back on what had always been the bridge to the West, while their country turned 
into the political and economic “hinterland of Leningrad”.432  
 
In view of the extraordinary efforts that Soviet authorities invested into the hermetic closure 
of the Baltic maritime borders, it became virtually impossible to escape the Soviet Union by 
sea. Thus, the waterways towards Sweden and Finland completely lost their previous 
importance as potential escape routes.
433
 The few cases of attempted escape in which 
Estonians were involved took place in the wild and scarcely populated Karelian border areas, 
but even the successful refugees were categorically extradited from Finland before they 
managed to get to Sweden.
434
 Yet, others still managed to reach Sweden illegally across the 
Baltic Sea, mainly from Poland, but also from the German Democratic Republic. The number 
of Polish escapees had steadily decreased since the late 1940s and reached insignificant 
dimensions by the mid-1950s. While still 123 Poles made it to Sweden in 1951, the 1955 
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statistics mention merely three refugees.
435
 The enormous fortification efforts along the coasts 
were obviously successful. But behind the rapid decrease in refugee numbers lay also the 
regime’s dogged determination to hinder even those who had succeeded in surmounting the 
safety belt from arriving, which Dariusz Stola illustrated with an episode that took place in 
autumn 1953. The initially successful escape of two Poles heading on a float for Bornholm 
was eventually thwarted on the open sea in a manhunt that involved a small army of more 
than one hundred soldiers, eight military aircrafts, sixteen coast-guard cutters, four cars and 
two dogs.
436
 Thus, any successful escape of Polish citizens to Sweden was considered a 
sensation, which found expression in the Swedish media reports of the time and thus further 
widened the gap between Warsaw and Stockholm.
437
 
In the early 1950s, the Baltic Sea had, in order to use a frequent metaphor of the émigré 
discourses of the time, turned into a “moat behind [the] prison walls”438 of Stalin’s empire. 
More than that, it became one of Europe’s ‘Cold War zones’ and a setting for openly 
confrontational encounters between Sweden and its communist neighbours. After a series of 
incidents on Swedish ships in Soviet and Polish territorial waters and harbours or on vessels 
from the opposite coast in Sweden, usually involving sharp controls and raids on the part of 
the coastguards
439
, the tensions culminated in the only armed confrontation of the Cold War 
between two riparian states, known as the ‘Catalina affair’. Since the beginning of the 1950s, 
the radar monitoring systems along coastlines of the Baltic republics had been the target of 
signals intelligence gathering operations, conducted by the Swedish National Defense Radio 
Establishment, in cooperation with the Swedish Air Force.
440
 In June 1952, one of the 
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involved aircrafts was shot down by the Soviet military and disappeared, resulting in eight 
casualties. Also the Catalina flying boat that searched for the aircraft was shot down off the 
Estonian coast, but this time the crew could be rescued. The facts were publicly denied by 
both Swedish and Soviet authorities, but the incident cast long shadows over Swedish-Soviet 
relations and fuelled the anti-Soviet resentments of Swedish society for years to come.
441
 
 
From 1950 onwards, two parallel processes considerably influenced the political activities of 
the Polish and Estonian émigrés in Sweden. Firstly, the transnational diaspora communities’ 
anti-Soviet struggle had merged into a common Central and Eastern European front with their 
own international network of organisations and representations, which coordinated 
communication with the political centres and associations of the Western hemisphere. Neutral 
Sweden, however, was merely a peripheral outpost in the early Cold War anti-communist 
propaganda crusade, which diminished Stockholm’s role as a centre for political exile 
activities. Secondly, the Baltic Sea Region had eventually turned into one of the battlefields of 
the bipolar world, which considerably reduced its previous significance for the 
communication between exile and homeland. In view of these parallel ‘de-spatialisation’ 
processes, the émigrés scope of action in neutral Sweden was limited, as they were confronted 
with a demarcation line that increasingly seemed to be as impenetrable as the one on the 
continent. Thus, the 1950s marked a period of marginalisation of both Estonian and Polish 
exile activists in Sweden in the broader context of their respective national communities. Yet, 
although the impact on both exile communities was similar, the marginalisation processes 
were essentially different, corresponding to the incomparable positions that Estonians and 
Poles in Sweden held within their diaspora communities as a whole. 
In the case of the Poles, the general pattern remained relatively unaltered. The small circle of 
Polish activists in Sweden had been a strategic subordinate branch of the exiled government 
from the very beginning. Although some Stockholm-based activists had played a key role as 
mediators between the exile headquarters and the Polish resistance, all political action against 
the German occupiers and later the ruling communist phalanx was directed and coordinated 
from London. As Sweden gradually lost its previous importance as one of the central hubs of 
the oppositional networks, the majority of Poles in Swedish exile reaffirmed their solidarity 
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and loyalty with ‘Polish London’, the heart of the anti-communist Polish diaspora.442 Thus, 
the Stockholm Poles did not outgrow their merely supportive function within the exile 
struggle, whose relevant centres remained in London, Paris and Washington.
443
 Moreover, 
financial difficulties contributed to the decline of the Swedish branch of the diaspora network. 
The financial support of the British government, one of the reasons that lay behind the 
development of an active and strident core of Polish anti-communist opposition in Sweden, 
had dried up by the late 1940s. In view of the ‘permanentisation’ of the status quo behind the 
Iron Curtain, signs of fatigue spread among the exile activists, who first and foremost had to 
take care of their own financial survival in what seemed to develop into a permanent exile, a 
problem that in similar forms decelerated the vigour of all émigré activity in the West. 
Consequently, the already small circle of politically active Polish émigrés in Stockholm had 
dwindled to a handful in the early 1950s.
444
 
A decreasing commitment towards the independence struggle affected most of the exile 
communities in the West, as the liberation of Central and Eastern Europe any time soon 
appeared increasingly unrealistic. This phenomenon also affected the activities of the 
Estonians in Sweden.
445
 Nevertheless, the status of the Estonian community in Sweden within 
its own diaspora context was completely different from that of other exiles on Swedish soil. 
Not only was Sweden the country of residence of most of the outstanding personalities of the 
pre-war cultural elite who had fled Estonia.
446
 Also the circle of dedicated activists that stood 
behind the cross-Baltic cooperation of the war years had remained in Sweden, as had the few 
representatives of Estonia’s last non-communist government, who as members of the ERN’s 
steering committee represented the continuity of Estonian statehood. August Rei was firmly 
convinced that this institutional representation of the Tief-government members in exile made 
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the formation of an exile government redundant.
447
 However, this view was not uncontested, 
especially concerning two crucial points. Firstly, the Tief-government represented only the 
political forces that since the early 1930s had been prohibited in Päts’ Estonia and was thus a 
coalition of the former opposition. This contested its legitimacy as a legal successor of the 
government that was forced to resign in favour of Moscow’s puppet regime in 1940. 
Secondly, the supporters of Päts, who had seceded from the ERN due to political divergences, 
presented a competing interpretation of a crucial paragraph in the 1938 constitution, which 
regulated the installation of an interim presidency in times of crisis. According to their 
reading, the legal continuity of Estonian statehood could only be secured by an election 
council representing five high officials of the Päts government.
448
 The challenge to the 
legitimacy of the circles around Rei in Stockholm heralded a deep schism within the Estonian 
exile community, which, as in the case of the Polish emigration as well, considerably 
complicated the future relations between different branches of the Estonian diaspora in the 
West.  
From early 1952 onwards, especially Estonian exile representatives from overseas started to 
put pressure on Rei to find a solution to the legitimacy conflict. In an attempt to defend 
Stockholm’s role as the political core of the Estonian diaspora, an exile government was 
secretly set up in Oslo in January 1953, with Rei as acting President and Aleksander Warma 
as Foreign Minister.
449
 As expected, the Swedish government immediately declared that the 
exile government would not be recognised in Sweden and that it was not entitled to conduct 
political action on Swedish soil.
450
 Both Rei and his colleague Heinrich Mark were quick to 
assure that the exile government was supposed to merely exist “on paper in a bank deposit 
safe”.451 But it was not only the Swedish state that refused to recognise Rei’s Oslo coalition as 
the legal successor of sovereign Estonia’s lawful government. With the establishment of a 
competing exile government in Augustdorf in Germany only two months later under the 
leadership of Alfred Maurer, a former state official in Päts’ Estonia, the struggle for the 
“imaginary position of power”452 reached its point of culmination.453 
                                                          
447
 Nõu, Enn (2004): “Eesti pagulasvalitsus 1944-1988”. – In: Orav and Nõu, Tõotan ustavaks jääda.., pp. 92-
151; p. 109. 
448
 Rebas, “Sverigeesternas politiska verksamhet”; p. 101. 
449
 Nõu, “Eesti pagulasvalitsus”; pp. 123, 125-126. In view of Sweden’s de facto recognition of Estonia’s 
annexation in 1940 and in view of the country’s neutrality, the Estonian exile politicians considered it more 
appropriate to establish the exile government in the neighbouring NATO state Norway.  
450
 Made, Vahur (2008): “Eesti eksiilivalitsus: riigi järjepidevuse hoidmise vastuoluline projekt”. – In: Anniste et 
al., Sõna jõul, pp. 73-87; p. 84. 
451
 Rebas, “Sverigeesternas politiska verksamhet”; p. 101. 
452
 Rebas, “Sverigeesternas politiska verksamhet”; p. 101. 
104 
 
Although Rei’s camp was backed up by the majority of Estonians in Sweden, its gradual 
marginalisation within the transnational political network of exile Estonians continued. A 
crucial catalyst was the liquidation of the German DP camps. The following exodus of 
Estonians to Canada and the United States led to the dissolution of almost the entire Estonian 
refugee community in Germany and turned North America into the main stronghold of the 
Estonian diaspora in the West.
454
 Leading opinion makers overseas expressed their full 
solidarity with Maurer and deprived Rei of the right to represent the Estonian emigration as a 
whole in foreign policy activities.
455
 Despite the dissolution of the Augustdorf government 
after Maurer’s death in 1954, the balance of power within the Estonian community in the 
West had irreversibly shifted in favour of the North American activists, who now represented 
Estonia’s interests in Washington and thus had ousted the Stockholm circles from the most 
influential positions within the international anti-communist networks of the time. During 
August Rei’s first visit to the United States in 1957, local exile activists were eager to 
emphasise the marginal status of Rei and the ERN outside of Sweden. In their communication 
with U.S. officials, they stressed that Rei was not recognised as a leading exile politician and 
even insinuated that the story of his successful escape from Moscow via Riga in 1940, while 
the most part of the diplomatic corps already had been arrested, casted more than a shadow of 
a doubt on his credibility.
456
 Thus, the Stockholm-based exile government and the ERN were 
largely excluded from the networking between Estonian exile representatives and the 
protagonists of Western anticommunism. The Estonian World Council, Ülemaailmne Eesti 
Kesknõukogu, founded in the United States in 1954, claimed to form the central organ for the 
coordinated independence struggle of all Estonians in the free world. Within the World 
Council, the central organisations of the various exile communities were represented, such as 
the U.S.-based Estonian National Committee, Eesti Rahvuskomitee, and its Canadian 
counterpart, the Estonian Central Council, Eesti Kesknõukogu. From 1956 onwards, also the 
Swedish Estonian community was represented by the newly founded central organ of the anti-
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parliamentarian camp, the Estonian National Congress in Sweden, Rootsi Eestlaste Esindus, 
REE.
457
 The ERN and its leading figure August Rei, by contrast, remained in opposition.    
 
In the course of the reconfiguration of the Central and Eastern European émigrés’ political 
struggle, the marginalisation of Polish and Estonian activists in Sweden within their 
transnational diaspora communities grew. This development was closely correlated to the 
gradually peripheral position of Sweden on the map of Western ‘cold warfare’ and the 
transnational front of anti-communist coalitions. The importance of the country as a crucial 
hub for the transnational networks of refugees and resistance fighters, which had been 
obvious during the war years and the immediate post-war period, vanished as the freezing of 
almost all communication between the shores diminished the possibilities of interaction. In 
bipolar Europe, especially during the high tide of the Cold War, the advantages of geography 
and neutrality became considerably relative. The specific political constellation in the Baltic 
Sea Region had to a large degree lost its significance as the continental pattern of Cold War 
rhetoric and policies reached the North and reconfigured the émigrés’ life in Sweden into life 
on the edge of the Iron Curtain. However, even as the Cold War was at its coldest, the spatial 
dimension still played a certain role, whose significance for the various forms of anti-
communist opposition in the West should not be underestimated. 
 
 
IV.2 Reports from the crow’s nest: Émigré strategies at the edge of bipolar 
Europe’s demarcation line  
With the onset of Sweden’s ‘anti-communist decade’, the strategies of the exile activists from 
behind the Iron Curtain had to adapt to the challenges of the new geopolitical reality. Exile 
politics had been transformed into a large-scale lobbying activity for the sake of the ‘captive 
nations’, coordinated by a net of multilateral entanglements that linked émigré activists and 
‘cold warriors’ in the West in a common struggle against the Kremlin’s imperial ambitions. 
During the heyday of anti-communist opinion making, the receptiveness of Western societies 
for the strident anti-Soviet stand of the exiled Central and Eastern Europeans provided them 
with a forum on both a national and international level. As the gap between the blocs and thus 
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also between emigration and homelands widened, political exile activity now relied 
exclusively on the power of the word. With the help of informative public enlightenment 
campaigns, the exiles tried to unmask the official propaganda of the Soviet bloc and to expose 
the communist regimes as tyrants and usurpers of ‘enslaved’ peoples.  
The Estonian National Fund, ERF, was the most active exile organisation in this field on 
Swedish soil. Soon after its foundation, it developed into the Estonian diaspora’s most 
vigorous organ with branches in Denmark, West Germany and Great Britain as well as in the 
United States and Canada.
458
 Initially, the ERF’s publication strategies focused mainly on the 
‘Red Year’, addressing the whole array of questions concerning the period between June 1940 
and June 1941 and the events that led to Estonia’s annexation. This activity constituted one of 
the main tasks of the Estonian émigrés in Sweden
459
, as they possessed a rich collection of 
written documentation on the first Soviet occupation, which had crossed the Baltic Sea on the 
boats of couriers and refugees. Apart from reacting to the Kremlin’s official propaganda by 
disseminating a contradictory version of the beginning of Stalin’s rule in Estonia, the 
informational campaigns also highlighted the economic and social pre-war achievements of 
the small republic, stressing the small nations’ right to independence.460 Particularly in the 
Swedish context, this formed a challenge to the discourse on the Baltic states’ ‘political 
immaturity’, which during the interwar years had been the topic of numerous public debates 
and eventually contributed to the government’s de facto recognition of the annexation in 
1940.  
As Cold War tensions rose, the focus increasingly shifted to current events and developments, 
which manifested during a press conference of the ERN in June 1950. The Council’s leaders 
stated that they considered it to be their “duty to inform the world” and to share the 
information at their disposal on deportations, mass arrests and the impact of Soviet rule on the 
national economy and culture, however scarce the information on contemporary Estonia still 
was.
461
 Even from 1946 onwards, the ERF had been spreading information on current events 
for an international public via the bulletin Newsletter from behind the Iron Curtain and a 
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publication series titled East and West. But first the programmatic shift of 1950 lead to a 
significant “revitalisation of the ideological struggle”462, which now consciously used the 
term ‘anti-communist’ in order to adapt to contemporary discourses. This triggered a vibrant 
publishing activity: after one decade, the ERF could already look back on 394 published 
editions of the Newsletter as well as 27 books and brochures.
463
 A large part of this 
productivity was owed to the work of Aleksander Kaelas, chief editor of the ERF and 
chairman of the ERN’s Information Commission. According to Aleksander Warma, Kaelas 
held control over “the largest and profoundest collection of material on the situation in Soviet 
Estonia”.464 His book Human Rights and Genocide in the Baltic States, distributed among the 
delegates of the United Nations’ General Assembly in 1950, was considered as the Baltic 
exile publication that had gained the largest influence over leading politicians in the West.
465
 
 
In contrast to the Estonian community in Sweden, which despite the fast-growing influence of 
North American emigration had consolidated its position as the European centre of Estonian 
opposition, the political significance of the Polish community in Sweden constantly decreased 
on both the national and international level. The uncontested centres of anti-communist Polish 
counterpropaganda were London and increasingly Paris, the seat of Jerzy Giedroyć’s 
influential exile journal Kultura. The contributions of the Stockholm Poles played only a 
supporting role and seldom reached beyond the limits of the local exile press, with the 
exception of the engagement of a number of Polish journalists, who managed to give the 
Poles in Sweden a voice, at least on the national scene. 
Tadeusz Norwid-Nowacki, Norbert Żaba and Wiesław Patek466 formed a small, but influential 
group of actors who considerably shaped the Swedish perception of communist Poland during 
the 1950s.
467
 The three journalists ranked among the most prominent representatives of the 
Polish community in Sweden and were closely interconnected with the exile circles in 
London. Norwid-Nowacki was the officially accredited representative of the exile government 
and thus topped the Warsaw government’s list of regime enemies in Sweden, which earned 
him a variety of attributes in the Polish press, such as “the dark figure from Stockholm’s 
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demimonde”.468 Together with Żaba, he edited the Stockholm-based Polish newspaper 
Wiadomości Polskie, working at the same time as a correspondent for the most important 
newspaper of ‘Polish London’, Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, The Polish Daily and 
Soldier’s Daily. Patek, on the other hand, cooperated with the main organ of the group around 
General Anders, Orzeł Biały, the White Eagle,469 while Żaba worked as a Scandinavian 
correspondent for the British press.
470
 Their networks in Sweden expanded first towards the 
turn of the decade, when émigrés from behind the Iron Curtain received increasing attention 
as experts on the dangers emanating from the ‘Red Menace’. Due to the support by Sweden’s 
anti-communist elites, the trio’s reports on the development behind the Iron Curtain could 
reach out to the Swedish public. They were disseminated mainly via the press, sporadically 
also via other channels, such as the Swedish Institute for International Affairs, which 
regularly recruited émigrés, among them the Estonian Aleksander Kaelas, for its 
publications.
471
 Norwid-Nowacki and Żaba initiated a close cooperation with the liberal 
newspaper Stockholms-Tidningen
472
 as experts on Central and Eastern European issues, 
which, according to the Polish press attaché, triggered a distinct anti-communist turn in its 
news coverage.
473
 Patek’s view on communism, on the other hand, gained considerable 
influence in the countryside
474
 due to his work for the Malmö-based Sydsvenska Dagbladet 
and the third largest Swedish daily, the conservative Svenska Dagbladet.
475
  
The personal entanglements between Polish exile newspapers in Stockholm and London and 
the main organs of Swedish liberals and conservatives help to explain the émigré 
perspective’s large influence over the news coverage of the non-leftist wing of Sweden’s 
press.
476
 Due to the engagement of the exile activists, it developed into a counterweight to the 
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social democratic newspapers and their coverage on, especially communist Poland, which in 
large parts reflected Warsaw’s official information policy. Thus, the propagandistic struggle 
between the emigration and the regime was to a certain degree transferred to the level of 
Swedish media coverage.
477
 Although the Polish Foreign Ministry heavily protested against 
such an exertion of influence on the public opinion by political refugees,
478
 the Swedish 
authorities did not interfere, as usual referring to the traditions of freedom of speech and 
opinion. Yet, this assertive stance also reflected the firm conviction among many influential 
actors that the attacks of the ‘antidemocratic agitation’, which the Polish Foreign Ministry so 
vehemently decried, revealed “a whole lot of truth”.479  
As elsewhere in the West, exile activity in neutral Sweden increasingly left its marks in the 
public sphere in the form of ‘counterpropaganda offensives’ that considerably benefited from 
the anti-communist turn of the era. The systematic use of the term ‘anticommunism’ was not 
only a way to demonstrate ideological and value-based alliances with a powerful, 
transnational political camp, but also suggested the deep roots of both the émigrés and, 
implicitly, their home countries in the Western hemisphere.
480
 After having focused on the 
loss of political independence and self-determination as explicitly nationally framed tragedies, 
the émigrés now highlighted the wider context of the closely entangled transformation 
processes throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, exile activism yielded new forms of 
specialised expertise on what, in accordance with the terminology of the émigré activists, 
became widely known as ‘Sovietisation’ in the West.481 But this new line of anti-communist 
argumentation required a profound knowledge of the developments behind the Iron Curtain, 
on which the exile activists’ credibility could be based. The lively publication activities and 
public anti-communist campaigns were thus only the tip of the iceberg of exile activity during 
the 1950s. The main task and basis behind all publishing efforts was to challenge the hermetic 
cordon around the Soviet orbit and the increasingly manifested bipolarity of the world in 
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order to be able to collect as much accurate information as possible on what happened on the 
fortified and isolated opposite coasts. It was the surmounting of, if not the physical, then, at 
least, the informational Iron Curtain that remained the major challenge and incentive of all 
organised exile activity throughout the 1950s.  
 
The early 1950s marked a climax of East-West tensions and the Western offensives against 
communism and the late Stalinist regimes of the Soviet bloc, which held all their populations 
in a firm grip. The Iron Curtain, supposed to prevent both the escape of the population behind 
it and the infiltration from outside, formed an almost physically perceptible symbol of the 
paranoia and xenophobia that had formed Stalin’s imperial practices. Isolating the vast Soviet 
Empire from the free world, the ‘safety cordon’ proved to be effective enough to prevent even 
information from leaking out, which led to a considerable increase of Western signals 
intelligence operations with aircrafts and balloons.
482
 The Soviet Baltic republics were, as the 
most vulnerable borderlands of the communist superpower, of specific strategic value and 
thus especially strictly monitored,
483
 which almost completely isolated the Baltic émigrés 
from their compatriots at home. Although the isolation of the satellite states never reached the 
dimension of surveillance that ‘protected’ communism’s motherland, the situation was quite 
similar in neighbouring Poland. The flow of refugees that had delivered first-hand reports 
about current developments had largely dried out and Warsaw’s restrictive travel policy also 
rendered encounters with compatriots from behind the Iron Curtain virtually impossible.
484
 
The exile activists’ answer to these challenges can be best described with the words of 
Johannes Klesment, one of the Tief-government’s three ministers in Sweden and a steering 
committee member of the ERN, uttered during the National Council’s 1951 congress. In view 
of the lack of possibilities of receiving direct instructions from the protagonists of domestic 
resistance, he stated, it was the task of all Estonians in the free world to adopt the tactics of 
general staffs during an armed conflict: the wishes, aspirations and efforts of the domestic 
population had to be deduced on the basis of a detailed overview of every kind of published 
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material from “the enemy”,485 i.e. the communist regimes behind the Iron Curtain. This open 
source intelligence strategy of ‘reading between the lines’ was applied by a wide range of 
Western actors who for different reasons were interested in decoding elements of communist 
propaganda that could reveal an insight in the realities of life in the Soviet bloc. 
The ERN Büroo, a separate section of the ERN that, in contrast to the Council’s leading 
representatives, stayed out of the public eye, developed into the Estonian diaspora’s major 
centre for the collection of information on the developments in Soviet Estonia. Under the 
leadership of Arvo Horm, the ERN Büroo systematically gathered information from various 
sources in close cooperation with the ERF, which in turn was mainly responsible for the 
dissemination and publication of selected facts.
486
 However, this kind of activity was nothing 
new to the Estonians in Sweden. Since the end of the war they had been collecting testimonies 
from newly arrived refugees, which were completed by first-hand reports from Finland, 
delivered by a network of informants.
487
 This networking expanded also to Germany’s 
Western occupation zones, where Estonian correspondents from Stockholm started an 
interrogation programme that focused on released German prisoners of war who had spent at 
least a part of their time in the Soviet Union as forced labourers in Estonia.
488
 In the late 
1940s, this activity formed an important strategy of documenting Soviet violations of human 
rights in Estonia
489
 and was temporarily revitalised with the second wave of prisoners of war 
who returned to Germany in the mid-1950s.
490
 But in general, first-hand reports from inside 
the Soviet realm were rare and the stream of eyewitnesses returning from Estonia soon ran 
dry. Eyewitness testimonies thus never served as a major source of information, as they were 
limited in number and could not satisfy the demand of current information and data on the 
development behind the Iron Curtain.  
The few first-hand accounts served mainly as complementary sources that allowed the 
émigrés to cross-check facts and data obtained through the careful analysis of the official 
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communist propaganda,
491
 a task that was easier to accomplish, especially in considerable 
proximity to Soviet territory. Soviet Estonian radio broadcasts could be easily intercepted in 
nearby Stockholm and developed into a very valuable source that allowed the émigrés to draw 
certain conclusions on the situation on the ‘home front’.492 Equally important was the Soviet 
Estonian press, which the activitsts of the ERN Büroo and the ERF eagerly collected.
493
 Over 
the course of time, they gained an intimate knowledge of the political and social climate in 
Estonia by closely following the news coverage of a broad variety of newspapers and 
magazines; among them, apart from the party organs, the cultural weekly Sirp ja Vasar 
(‘Hammer and Sickle’), professional journals such as Nõukogude Õpetaja (‘The Soviet 
Teacher’), and even supposedly unpolitical titles such as the childrens’ newspaper Säde 
(‘Sparkle’).494 The work on the Soviet press required, as did the reading of the few letters that 
passed the censorship,
495
 a good overall understanding of the situation in Estonia and the 
necessary skills to read between the lines in order to extract additional pieces of the jigsaw 
that life in a Soviet-type society constituted. With their correspondingly trained experts, the 
ERN and the ERF developed into the main centres of expertise on Soviet Baltic topics in the 
West. Already by the late 1940s, political activities and enlightenment campaigns of Baltic 
exiles all over the Western hemisphere were primarily based on the information gathered by 
the “bandit headquarters” in Stockholm, as the Kremlin organ Pravda put it.496 
 
In the years of the early Cold War, open source intelligence turned into the backbone of 
Central and Eastern European exile activity. The information-gathering of the Polish émigrés 
in the West largely resembled the Estonian efforts of surmounting the informational blockade. 
In Sweden, it was especially the circle of activists around the newspaper Wiadomości Polskie 
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that regularly monitored the news coverage of the communist press in Poland.
497
 Moreover, 
they systematically interviewed Polish refugees, whose accounts also found their way into the 
liberal and conservative Swedish press as reliable sources, illustrating communist oppression 
in Poland.
498
 With the foundation of Radio Free Europe’s Scandinavian branch in Stockholm 
in 1951, these activities were effectively channelled and coordinated with the efforts in other 
parts of Western Europe. Under the auspices of the National Committee for a Free Europe and 
financed by the CIA, the RFE constituted as much a radio broadcast station as a research 
centre on the situation behind the Iron Curtain. In contrast to the BBC or the Voice of 
America, which mainly transmitted uncensored news from the West behind the Iron Curtain, 
Radio Free Europe aspired to develop into a true alternative to national state radio stations, 
delivering reports on domestic topics beyond the bias of communist ideology.
499
 With the 
help of a vast network of employees recruited among the Central and Eastern European exile 
communities in the West, RFE aimed at becoming a centre of support for the “indigenous 
anti-Communist elements” in the Soviet orbit.500 
Stockholm constituted one of the outposts of U.S. intelligence activity during the Cold War 
and it was not only the RFE that was interested in establishing a branch on Sweden’s eastern 
shores. Also the London-based Council of Polish Political Parties used Stockholm as one of 
its key nodes in a network that, via the transmission of oral messages, connected émigré 
circles with a number of informants in communist Poland from 1951 to the end of 1952. 
Together with West Berlin and Vienna, the Swedish capital was one of the ports through 
which the couriers, mainly diplomats and a smaller group of Poles who could legally leave 
and re-enter the country, were channelled in cooperation with Western intelligence 
services.
501
 The network of RFE’s Polish section, from spring 1952 onwards led by Jan 
Nowak-Jeziorański, the ‘courier from Warsaw’, who had provided the exile government with 
information via Sweden during the war,
502
 was organised in a similar manner with several 
local branches that were coordinated by the Munich headquarters. The Stockholm office was 
led by Michał Lisiński,503 who as an internee in occupied Norway had managed to escape to 
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Sweden in July 1944, being one of the first concentration camp prisoners on Swedish soil.
504
 
As elsewhere in the cities where the Polish section of RFE had established regional branches, 
the office’s employees aimed at gathering the maximum information on current developments 
and moods in Poland. Profiting from Stockholm’s geographical proximity to communist 
Europe, they built up a centre of currently updated knowledge on the developments behind the 
Iron Curtain, which was eagerly consulted even by the Swedish media.
505
 Due to their 
activity, which contributed to intensifying Polish anti-communist activities in Sweden in the 
early 1950s, Lisiński and his confidants, among them Norbert Żaba and General Witold 
Szymaniak, both former legation staff members, joined the list of Warsaw’s main enemies in 
Sweden. A short conversation with the employees of “Freies Europa”, as the regime 
propaganda persistently labelled the broadcasting company,
506
 could be enough to initiate an 
espionage trial resulting in harsh sentences of many years’ imprisonment, as the case of two 
Polish sailors that had visited Stockholm in the mid-1950s proved.
507
 
 
The émigrés’ information-gathering and publication activities and especially their networking 
with anti-communist circles put the Swedish government in a precarious position.
508
 The 
establishment of well-organised toeholds of the Western crusade against communism on 
Swedish soil considerably challenged the credibility of the country’s neutrality policy and had 
a negative impact on the relations with its communist neighbours.
509
 In most cases, the 
tensions did not amount to more than a number of hostile articles in the Soviet and Polish 
press, whose attacks on Sweden’s neutrality policy were, as usual, literally echoed by the 
Swedish communist newspapers. At times, however, the exile activities gained more attention 
on both the national and international level. Among them was the close cooperation between 
Estonian émigrés and the so-called ‘Kersten Committee’, an initiative of the U.S. House of 
Representatives that, under the leadership of Charles J. Kersten, reinvestigated the loss of 
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independence of the Baltic states. The preparation of reports on all aspects of Estonia’s 
Sovietisation since 1940 turned into the major task of Stockholm’s Estonian activist circles 
from autumn 1953 onwards.
510
 Up to spring 1954, the ERN, ERF and other Estonian 
organisations in Sweden had delivered around 150 written testimonies, documents and 
reports, including an original list of the Soviet occupation authorities, which had been 
smuggled to Sweden and featured the names of almost 60,000 murdered or deported victims 
of the ‘Red Year’.511 On the basis of the evidence provided by Balts all over the world, the 
‘Kersten Committee’ considered the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union as 
an unlawful act. This strengthened the U.S. government’s so far maintained line of non-
recognition
512
 and confirmed the status of the only Estonian pre-war diplomats that were still 
in office, envoy August Torma in London and consul Johannes Kaiv in New York.
513
 Due to 
their thorough documentation, the Estonian émigrés in Sweden had largely contributed to 
reaffirming the U.S. stand in the Baltic question. The concluding report of the ‘Kersten 
Committee’ reflected the unifying credo of both the émigrés and the anti-communist front in 
the West: ‘peaceful coexistence’, the Kremlin’s new motto after Stalin’s death, was nothing 
but a myth, supposed to create a time slot that allowed the communists to raise a “generation 
of fanatics” and to extend their military power to a degree that would lead to a global 
extension of the “communist colonial system”.514  
At the peak of the Cold War in the early 1950s, Central and Eastern European émigrés, the 
most loyal allies of the ‘cold warriors’ in the West, had already developed effective strategies 
of penetrating the facade of the communist orbit, which served as much their own political 
goals as those of other strongholds of anticommunism in the West. The exile activists were of 
course not the only actors of their time that exploited openly accessible sources in order to 
decode the nature, characteristics and, most importantly, the weaknesses of the communist 
regimes. The same strategies were applied by Western Sovietologists, who often tended to 
refrain from cooperating with trained émigré scholars, disparaging their expertise,
515
 and 
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Western intelligence services, which resorted to open sources as complementary material in 
order “to create a more complete picture of the capabilities and intentions” of the enemy.516 
Nevertheless, it was the émigrés from behind the Iron Curtain that played the key role in this 
field both in Sweden and other ‘frontier regions’ of divided Europe and thus turned into the 
West’s ‘eyes and ears towards the East’. The Estonian National Council, the only Estonian 
exile centre of its kind in Europe, constituted the core informational centre of the diaspora 
community with branches in several countries. The Poles in Sweden, by contrast, formed 
merely a regional offshoot of an elaborated information-gathering system, whose strategic 
core was to be found in Central Europe.
517
 However, notwithstanding the role the Estonians 
and Poles in Sweden played within their respective transnational diaspora networks, they had 
succeeded in developing centres of anti-communist agitation in neutral Sweden. Together 
with their anti-communist supporters, they dragged the country closer to the NATO than the 
government could appreciate and turned it into one of the settings for ideological warfare.  
The geographical proximity to communist Europe was doubtlessly an advantageous factor 
that considerably facilitated the émigrés’ task of decoding the opaque world of the communist 
dictatorships, both in Sweden and the Central European borderlands along the Iron Curtain. 
Yet, the informational flows beyond the bloc border were mainly one-way transfers from East 
to West. It proved to be a considerably greater challenge to reverse the flow of uncensored 
information towards the communist half of Europe. The fact that the émigrés in Sweden were 
separated only by the narrow Baltic Sea from their homelands did not increase their scope of 
action, at least not in the first half of the 1950s. As any attempts to use the Baltic waterways 
as courier routes would have been futile in view of the militarisation and high level of 
surveillance in the Baltic Sea Region, the exiles’ geographical field of activity was limited to 
Swedish territory.  
An exception formed the infiltration programme of the Western intelligence services, which 
reached far into the 1950s and resembled their war-time tactics of channelling Baltic spies 
‘behind enemy lines’. The Swedish Armed Forces’ intelligence corps, which had already 
closely cooperated with Baltic refugees in Sweden between 1943 and 1945, but also the 
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British Secret Intelligence Service, SIS, and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, 
mistakenly assumed that the Baltic Sea’s eastern shores still could be used as a gateway into 
the isolated Soviet realm. This illusionary assumption was predicated on a fundamental lack 
of understanding of the totality of control over society and the physical realm in a Soviet-type 
dictatorship. Based on the conviction that it was possible to import social unrest that would 
weaken the Kremlin’s power, the Western intelligence services started what has been called 
their “long-term, complex ‘secret army’ type operations that attempted to harness the local 
population into extensive guerrilla forces”.518  
In order to prepare their own programme of infiltration into the Soviet Union, the intelligence 
corps of the Swedish Army renewed its contacts among the Balts in Sweden already in 
1947.
519
 Seen from a national security perspective, the Soviet Baltic republics remained an 
area of specific interest especially for the military leadership in Sweden, as they hosted a large 
concentration of heavily armed Red Army units in considerable proximity to Swedish 
territorial waters. Thus, a secret training programme was set up, whose aim it was to organise 
the selection, education and smuggling of potential infiltrators recruited among the Balts in 
Sweden. Inside the Soviet Union, they were supposed to establish a network of informants, 
who would organise the transmission of relevant information of particular political and 
military interest to Sweden via radio communication. These activities were conducted in close 
consultation with the British SIS, which was closely involved in the infiltration of Soviet 
territories by émigré spies.
520
 The key figure among the Estonians in Sweden was the former 
officer Arkadi Valdin, who, as his Latvian and Lithuanian counterparts, was a direct 
subordinate of Thede Palm,
521
 the head of the secret intelligence unit of the Swedish military. 
Valdin had own contacts among the agents of the SIS and, most probably, also the CIA,
522
 
and was responsible for the educational training of the selected candidates in a Stockholm 
suburb as well as the coordination of their clandestine passage to Soviet Estonia.
523
  
These operations were conducted without any active involvement of or consultation with the 
leading representatives of the Baltic political emigration in Stockholm. The intelligence 
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services acted in the name of Sweden’s and the Western bloc’s security and did not take the 
émigrés’ struggle for the resurrection of independent Baltic republics into account. Thus, the 
pre-war Baltic military elites were, due to their expertise, definitely more attractive partners 
for cooperation. However, the operations of smuggling Baltic spies across the Baltic Sea into 
Soviet territory failed due to the effective coastal surveillance. Instead of opening up a 
gateway for Western intelligence services into the Soviet Union, the infiltration programme 
unintentionally turned into an effective tool for KGB counterintelligence operations. The 
Baltic operatives that managed to land on the Soviet coastline were either immediately killed 
or imprisoned, while others were turned into double agents, who after their conversion 
actively engaged in the KGB’s misinforming operations.524 After a failed evacuation effort, 
which resulted in the death of all involved agents that were supposed to leave Soviet Estonia 
for Sweden in September 1951, the Swedish intelligence service completely withdrew from 
the infiltration operations.
525
  
The engagement of the SIS, by contrast, continued up to the mid-1950s, as did the 
involvement of the CIA, which specialised in parachuting émigré spies into Soviet territory. 
Among them were also two Estonians that had been recruited in Sweden, educated in West 
Germany and the United States and, finally, airdropped over the Soviet Union as late as in 
May 1954.
526
 It took the SIS and the CIA, but also a number of Baltic émigrés, several years 
to realise that even the apparently successful operations were merely a chimera.
527
 According 
to one of the KGB’s legends, supposed to mislead both intelligence services and émigrés, an 
Estonian spy had succeeded in establishing contacts with a – fictional – resistance movement, 
the Estonian Liberation Committee, Eesti Vabaduskomitee. One of the KGB’s ‘stage wins’ 
was the infiltration of an agent, impersonating a courier of the Committee, to Sweden, who 
managed to win Valdin’s confidence.528 After the Swedes’ resignation from the Baltic 
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operations, the story of the Liberation Committee was used to misinform the British,
529
 until 
the Soviet press triumphantly revealed the successful counterintelligence operations as a 
propagandistic victory over the West in 1956. The circles around Valdin were, of course, 
compromised, although nothing indicates that their infiltration produced any concrete 
results.
530
 The exile’s political leadership of the ERN, by contrast, remained largely 
untouched by the scandal. In contrast to Valdin, their attitude towards the alleged resistance 
movement remained utterly reserved.
531
 Apparently, they had access to enough background 
information to understand that the existence of a successful armed resistance was highly 
unlikely, which determined their own strategies of communicating with the home country.  
 
As the physical penetration of the Iron Curtain was still virtually impossible in the early 
1950s, the anti-communist émigrés from Central and Eastern Europe preferred to make use of 
the possibilities that technology offered. They rather refrained from conspiratorial operations 
inside Moscow’s sphere of influence, at least during the years of the ‘spy hysteria’, which 
triggered a record level of mistrust in East-West encounters of all kinds and left lasting results 
also in Sweden. Communication via radio broadcasts, a strategy that had proved successful 
already during World War II, turned into one of the most important fields of émigré activity in 
the West. Ironically enough, it was the communist propaganda machinery itself that provided 
the necessary prerequisites for a successful transmission of uncensored information into the 
Soviet bloc. In the course of the large-scale modernisation programmes after the war, the 
regimes actively fostered the mass dissemination of radio receivers for their own 
propagandistic purposes, which made it considerably easier for the population to intercept 
Western broadcasts.
532
 This aspect of post-war modernisation in the East paved the way for an 
“unprecedented programme of psychological warfare in Central and Eastern Europe”.533 
With the onset of its activity in 1950, Radio Free Europe quickly turned into the major 
competitor of the BBC and the Voice of America, both of which since the war years had been 
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perceived as credible and valuable sources of information.
534
 Poland was specifically targeted 
by the radio broadcasts, which were considerably extended with the establishment of a 
separate Polish section in RFE’s Munich headquarters in May 1952. The intensity of RFE’s 
broadcasting now reached a degree that surmounted the capability of the regime’s jamming 
precautions and allowed an estimated forty percent of the transmissions to be received by 
1953, which turned RFE into the most receivable Western radio channel in the country.
535
 For 
the anti-communist Polish diaspora in the West, the cooperation with RFE was a way to 
compensate the lack of communication with the home country by actively influencing the 
broadcasts. In that sense, also the employees of RFE’s Stockholm office actively contributed 
to the attempts to reach out to a larger public in communist Poland. Their information-
gathering activities delivered the empirical data and testimonies that constituted the raw 
material of the broadcasts, whose success crucially depended on the accuracy of information 
about the conditions and moods behind the Iron Curtain.
536
 
Also in the eyes of the Estonians in Stockholm, Western broadcasting constituted the most 
efficient and fruitful way of making the political emigrant’s voice heard behind the Iron 
Curtain. The wireless transmission of uncensored information was supposed to compensate 
the widening gap between the homeland and the emigrant which, at that point, were 
completely disconnected. Encouraged by the information on the émigrés’ struggle for a free 
Estonia in the West, the domestic population was supposed to be strengthened both morally 
and ideologically. A strong, passive societal resistance was to be reached by “blow[ing] at the 
weakest point of the enemy”, as August Rei put it in a programmatic essay that advocated the 
active involvement in broadcasting activities, which he considered to be highly useful for the 
dissemination of the “propaganda of truth and freedom” behind the Iron Curtain.537 Rei was 
also among the driving forces that initiated an increased focus on Estonia in Western 
broadcasting. Already in May 1950, the ERN turned with a formal request to the Voice of 
America, the official mouthpiece of Washington in the world, to start broadcasting in 
Estonian. The petition was favoured by the broadcasting station’s institutional leadership and, 
from June 1951 onwards, Estonians behind the Iron Curtain could receive uncensored 
political information in their mother tongue.
538
 Over the course of time, the ERN developed a 
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close cooperation with the broadcasting station, not only by contributing with empirical 
information that it continually gathered on Soviet Estonia,
539
 but also by delivering analyses 
of and advices for the broadcasts of the Voice of America
540
 as well as contributing with 
direct messages to the Estonian people.
541
  
 
In the 1950s, Europe was divided by a demarcation line that can be considered unique in 
world history in view of its impermeable and insurmountable nature. The Iron Curtain 
deserved its name as a frontier line that invalidated the iron law that so far had determined 
historical evolution: that the level of communication and interaction between societies rises 
with increasing geographical proximity. During the first half of the 1950s, the struggle of the 
Central and Eastern European exiles in the free West had to adapt to the conditions. In view 
of the impossibility of communicating with their compatriots at home and joining forces in a 
concerted effort to resist Moscow’s hegemonic power, the small circles of politically active 
émigrés focused their energies on engaging in the ‘anti-communist crusade’ in the West and 
the ideological warfare that dominated global politics in the early 1950s. They observed every 
nuance in the official propaganda in order to be able to interpret the reality behind the Iron 
Curtain and make their findings public in the West. At the same time, they became the 
megaphones of the West behind the Iron Curtain, whose voices were secretly listened to by 
their compatriots and who attempted to disseminate the information they spread via 
publications in the West by broadcasting it to the East. 
During the ‘formative decade’, the Polish and Estonian émigré communities in Sweden had 
developed a specific profile, which for a long time was determined by their geographical 
location on their home countries’ opposite coasts. But the spatial factor of their oppositional 
activities almost disappeared in the strangely ‘de-spatialised’, bipolar world of the early 
1950s, when the only way of communication with their compatriots at home had, oddly 
enough, to be conducted via the centres of anti-communist agitation in Washington and New 
York. However, a certain geographical advantage remained for those ‘in the crow’s nest’ at 
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the edge of the Iron Curtain. Their location on Europe’s fault line gave the émigrés in Sweden 
“incomparably better opportunities of collecting valuable information and data”.542 This is 
why Arvo Horm in his speech on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the ERN’s 
foundation clearly reaffirmed that Sweden was and remained a natural and suitable choice for 
the Council’s headquarters, close to the suppressed home country and all its dilemmas.543 
Indeed, the geographical aspect turned out to be crucial for both Estonians and Poles with the 
onset of the post-Stalinist era. As the Baltic Sea developed into a first experimental field of 
easing the East-West tensions, the political exile activists from the opposite coasts 
experienced a foretaste of the wide field of interaction with their compatriots at home that 
opened up from the late 1960s onwards.  
 
 
IV.3 Thawing the Baltic: First encounters across the ‘Sea of Peace’ in the 
shadow of de-Stalinisation  
The death of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin on 5 March 1953 marked a decisive turning point 
with significant consequences for the development both within and outside the Soviet orbit. 
During the process of power redistribution in the Kremlin, Stalin’s uncompromising 
ideological war-mongering and doctrinaire xenophobia were replaced by a more pragmatical 
stance. This paved the way for the onset of the “first détente”544 in East-West relations and 
initiated a process of reform within the Soviet bloc, which gradually loosened the communist 
regimes’ suffocating grip on its citizens. With the famous ‘secret speech’, delivered by 
Stalin’s successor Nikita Khrushchev during the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union in February 1956, the new Kremlin leadership irrevocably dissociated 
itself from Stalin’s worldview and doctrines. The era of the “harsh and hazardous climate”545 
of Stalinist rule, which had paralysed the societies behind the Iron Curtain, was followed by 
what Poles called odwilż and Estonians sulaaeg: the Thaw.  
No sooner had Khrushchev delivered his ‘secret speech’ than Bolesław Bierut, the Stalinist 
hardliner from Warsaw who attended the Congress, suffered a fatal heart attack in Moscow. 
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His successor, Edward Ochab, proved to be unable to channel the tendencies towards 
emancipation and the social unrest in the country, which culminated in the workers’ riots of 
Poznań in June 1956. Their violent repression and Ochab’s general incapability of restoring a 
stable order in Poland led to his replacement by Władysław Gomułka, a rehabilitated victim 
of Stalin’s anti-Titoist purges, who quickly turned into a symbol of the Poles’ hope for 
reforms towards ‘national communism’.546 With his appointment as the General Secretary of 
the Polish United Workers’ Party, the transition to a post-Stalinist communist order in Poland 
proceeded peacefully and a direct Soviet intervention as in revolutionary Hungary was 
successfully avoided. But the signals from Warsaw were clear enough: the Kremlin’s 
ideological monopoly position was broken, at least in the Eastern European satellite belt.
547
   
In the Soviet Union itself, the ‘thaw period’ was much chillier, especially for the Balts, who 
experienced merely a rather weak echo of the spirit of reform that had captured Moscow and 
the Russian heartland.
548
 In Estonia, the few native leaders within the political and 
administrative apparatus had been removed before Stalin’s death and replaced by ethnic 
Russians or ‘Yestonians’.549 Ivan Käbin, the head of the Estonian Communist Party and, thus, 
formally of the republic, belonged to the latter category and adapted only slowly to the new 
post-Stalinist climate. The central and most significant reform for occupied Estonia was, 
therefore, first and foremost the end of terror.
550
 However, this was no minor achievement. 
For the first time since the beginning of the second Soviet occupation, it was possible to set 
the ground for the Estonian society’s accommodation in a stable post-war order. Unlike in 
Poland, where de-Stalinisation had led to an officially sanctioned, rising level of access to 
Western culture,
551
 the Soviet isolationist policy of course largely persisted. Nevertheless, the 
Thaw also left its marks on the Kremlin’s foreign policy line. At this point, the Baltic Sea 
Region re-entered the stage as the main experimental field for Khrushchev’s revised 
conception of East-West relations as a ‘peaceful coexistence’. 
Towards the mid-1950s, the biting tone that had so far characterised the official 
communication across the Baltic Sea turned considerably milder under the impact of 
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Moscow’s evident efforts to normalise their neighbourly relations. Initially, Stockholm’s 
response was positive. Erlander made his first official visit to the Soviet Union in spring 1956, 
which soon was followed by the decision to turn the Soviet and also the Polish legation in 
Sweden into embassies.
552
 Yet, conservative and military circles remained highly suspicious 
of Moscow’s new policy, which promoted the Baltic Sea as a “zone of eternal peace”.553 
Indeed, information from within the Kremlin walls indicated that Khrushchev’s real 
intensions aimed at a ‘neutralisation’ of Scandinavia according to the model of the Finnish-
Soviet relations.
554
 The ‘Sea of Peace’-rhetoric, embedded in the broader context of 
Moscow’s disarmament campaign and supported by East German and Polish propaganda, 
followed a clearly strategic goal: NATO forces were to be kept out of the Baltic waters, which 
thus would have been turned into a “Soviet mare clausum”.555 The parallels with Stalin’s 
tactics of expanding the security belt around the Soviet Union as far as possible were obvious 
and triggered strong protests. According to the Swedish opposition leader Hjalmarson, there 
was no doubt that the Nordic countries were merely exploited in order to “function as an echo 
chamber for the symphony of peace” of communist propaganda.556 
 
Although there was little Scandinavian support for and trust in the communist regimes’ 
sudden ‘charm offensive’, there were explicit signals of rapprochement between the riparian 
states, such as the considerable increase of cross-Baltic contacts. The repercussions of the 
Thaw were especially noticeable in Poland, which de facto “no longer [was] a fully 
totalitarian state”.557 De-Stalinisation and the political and economic destabilisation had led to 
a gradual opening up of the borders towards the West.
558
 The strict surveillance of the 
fortified Polish coastlines – a heritage of the preceding Bierut era – was considerably 
relaxed,
559
 which facilitated the development of regional tourism. In August 1956, the first 
group of Polish tourists set course for Stockholm on the cruise ship M/S Mazowsze,
560
 which 
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established a permanent touristic route between Sweden and Poland. Soon, also individual 
tourists were allowed to cruise the Baltic Sea and travels on private sailing boats to Sweden 
became quickly popular as one of the cheapest and easiest ways to organise leisure trips to the 
West.
561
 Also Poland received a growing number of foreign guests, among them the first 
émigrés on home visit, strictly monitored by a large number of intelligence agents who, as far 
as possible, maintained control over the visitors’ activities and encounters on Polish soil.562 
Poland thus constituted an exception within the bloc of communist states: it was the only 
country, where “the curtain was left half ajar”.563 
The Soviet Union, by contrast, was still largely the “fortress country”564 it had been under 
Stalin, in spite of Khrushchev’s less belligerent foreign policy line. Yet, the first breaches 
began to show in the security belt that for a decade had isolated the Balts from the outside 
world. From 1954 onwards, the postal censorship regulations were liberalised, which allowed 
the Soviet Estonians to maintain written correspondence with relatives abroad to a much 
larger degree than before,
565
 while, at the same time, the ban on foreign travel was partly 
lifted. Controlled travelling to the West turned into a tool of post-Stalinist ‘public diplomacy’ 
or, to put it bluntly, propaganda. Carefully selected members of the privileged caste of artists, 
musicians and writers were supposed to act as a counterweight to the anti-communists’ 
attacks against the Soviet Union as a ‘totalitarian system’.566 This was also the task of the first 
groups of Estonians that in summer 1956 left Leningrad for a Baltic cruise to the Nordic 
countries, the first non-communist states where Balts were allowed to travel.
567
 At the same 
time, it became possible for foreigners to catch a glimpse of Soviet Estonian reality. The first 
delegations of athletes and communist youth organisations were invited to Estonia, almost all 
of them from Finland and, to a much smaller degree, Sweden.
568
 In order to minimise the risks 
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of uncontrolled encounters, the KGB established a special department,
569
 which, similar to its 
counterpart within the Polish Security Service, Służba Bezpieczeństwa, shadowed both foreign 
delegation members and Soviet citizens abroad. Although Western influences were not seen 
as a “mortal threat”570 to Soviet rule any more, they were obviously considered contagious 
enough to justify a high level of vigilance.  
 
However, even an effective security apparatus could not reverse the fact that the first gaps in 
the Iron Curtain put an end to the so far almost total separation of homeland and exile 
communities. The communist regimes were very much aware of this side effect of the Thaw 
and thus determined to neutralise the risks that uncensored personal encounters entailed by 
officially sanctioning a rapprochement between émigrés and their compatriots at home, but on 
their own terms. Hostility and confrontation, which had characterised the relationship between 
the emigration communities and the regime in Warsaw since the end of the war, were to be 
replaced by good will and communication. In July 1955, Bierut appealed to the émigrés to 
return to the home country,
571
 which was soon echoed by an open letter of forty-eight 
prominent intellectuals, who  condemned the continuation of life in exile of tens of thousands 
of Poles as a “waste of forces” that were due to the fatherland.572 The appeals fired the 
starting shot for a propaganda campaign that, although presented as a “spontaneous initiative 
‘from below’”, was orchestrated by the Polish Security Service.573 Under the code name Kraj 
(‘Fatherland’), the authorities prepared a flood of radio broadcasts and bulletins, disseminated 
by the diplomatic representations and the merchant fleet or directly sent by post to émigré 
households.  
The mid-1950s thus saw a last reverberation of state-organised repatriation. Yet, like a decade 
earlier, the siren calls from behind the Iron Curtain mostly faded away without any 
noteworthy echo: although the return of some prominent émigré intellectuals constituted a 
certain propagandistic victory,
574
 the overall number of repatriates did not exceed a few 
hundred.
575
 Aware of the unwillingness of the majority of émigrés to return to a communist 
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Poland, the regime followed a dual strategy in its new policy towards the exiles. Its main tool 
was the Association for Cooperation with the Polish Emigration ‘Polonia’, Towarzystwo 
Łączności z Wychodźstwem ‘Polonia’, founded in September 1955. The organisation, which 
was directly subordinate to the Politburo and the Foreign Ministry, propagated the return to 
Poland as a patriotic duty, but endeavoured at the same time to establish friendly relations 
with those who refused to repatriate. According to internal considerations, the broad, 
apolitical masses could be instrumentalised as a kind of “Trojan horse”,576 which in the course 
of time would undermine the legitimacy of the ‘reactionary’ exile leaders, who in the 
propagandistic offensives usually were branded as either ‘traitors’, ‘spies’ or ‘scoundrels’.577  
In view of the gradual transformation of the Polish diaspora, this strategy worked out. 
Although most émigrés remained unwilling to cooperate and categorically rejected any 
contact with the communist authorities, other parts of the exile community turned out to be 
receptive to Warsaw’s new tunes. This applied also to the Polish émigré community in 
Sweden, which in general tended to support ‘Polish London’. One of the reasons was the 
strong nostalgia for the home country that spread among the expatriates.
578
 This tendency was 
mirrored by the steadily growing number of applications for ‘consulate passports’, i.e. 
documents issued by diplomatic representations of the People’s Republic, which facilitated 
personal contacts and travels across the Baltic Sea.
579
 Moreover, the percentage of economic 
refugees among the Poles in Sweden had, as elsewhere in the West, considerably grown since 
the turn of the decade, which tempted Warsaw to reduce the ideological bedrock of life in 
exile to a thin layer of “political varnish”580 that covered clearly economic motives. It was the 
Polonia, the community of largely apolitical compatriots abroad, which formed the target 
group and gateway for the propaganda of patriotic solidarity and peaceful cooperation.
581
  
The Estonians in Sweden and other Western countries, by contrast, were much more uniform 
in their stance towards the political order in the home country. A strong anti-Sovietism and, 
thus, anticommunism was the ‘ideological glue’ that unified the diaspora community, which 
had remained highly homogeneous since 1944. Repatriation remained a very marginal 
phenomenon also after Stalin’s death and involved exclusively elderly people, a fact that was 
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reflected by the cynical remark of a Soviet embassy secretary in Stockholm, who stated that 
Estonia obviously served as merely a “funeral parlour” for émigré repatriates.582 Repatriation 
propaganda thus definitely played only a minor role in the KGB’s attempts to split the exile 
community and to neutralise the political damage that anti-Soviet émigré activity had caused. 
Instead, the Tallinn strategists increasingly focused on the enlightenment of the 
“misinformed” Estonians in the West,583 distributing films, bulletins and publications on the 
achievements and successes of communism in Estonia especially among the émigrés in 
Sweden, the ‘head quarters’ of nationalist counterpropaganda.584 On the initiative of the 
Estonian KGB, a much broader set of strategies was elaborated already in 1957,
585
 but it was 
not until 1960 that encounters between émigrés and selected Soviet citizens were officially 
propagated. With the foundation of the Society for the Development of Cultural Ties with 
Estonians Abroad, Väliseestlastega Kultuurisidemete Arendamise Komitee, VEKSA, 
modelled according to the Soviet Russian organisation Rodina (‘Fatherland’),586 the 
authorities established a forum for controlled interpersonal exchange across the Baltic Sea. As 
its Polish counterpart, also VEKSA introduced itself as a grassroots initiative, reflecting the 
‘genuine will’ of the population to build bridges to their compatriots in the West.587 
The concerted efforts of the communist regimes to transfer the ‘first détente’ of the Thaw onto 
the level of contacts between home country and exile communities still encountered strong 
resistance. Most émigrés condemned even cultural exchange with their home countries as an 
“implicit acceptance” of the political status quo.588 In view of the crumbling front within their 
own rows, ‘Polish London’ established the so-called ‘codex of the political émigré’, obliging 
anyone considering himself a political refugee to refrain from contacts with representatives of 
the Warsaw government, even in cultural or trade-related matters.
589
 The Polish Ex-
Combatants Association, for instance, a major social force especially among the Polish 
diaspora in Sweden, firmly rejected the ‘consulate passports’ and considered even onetime 
visits at the embassy as a violation of unwritten rules.
590
 While Warsaw’s new policy 
achieved considerable success in West Germany, France and Belgium, the Poles in Sweden 
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were in general considered a “nut hard to crack”.591 The same applied to the Estonians, whose 
stance was equally orthodox towards the “Kremlin’s henchmen in Tallinn”592. In the late 
1950s, an informal suggestion to consider a minimum level of cooperation with Soviet 
Estonian scholars was enough to unleash aggressive campaigns and calls for a boycott.
593
  
 
However, in spite of the often polemical and harsh tone of the Estonian émigré community’s 
public discourses on the new Soviet policy towards the diaspora, the attitude towards the first 
signs of the deconstruction of the isolating wall around the home country was much more 
complex. The self-isolation of the diaspora community had originally been directed mainly 
against the ‘Russian occupiers' and their Estonian collaborators, but not Soviet Estonian 
society as a whole. Private correspondence, for instance, constituted an invaluable link to the 
fatherland and enabled the exiles to take part in the lives of their relatives and friends.
594
 
Therefore, private visits of ‘ordinary’ émigrés to Estonia were not always as categorically 
condemned as travels of prominent representatives of political or cultural life in exile, whose 
stay on Estonian territory could be used by the Soviet propaganda apparatus.
595
 Moreover, the 
Soviet regime’s obvious intention to allow for restricted encounters between the home 
country and émigré communities created a strategic advantage for those who fought it. With 
this in mind, it becomes clear why the approach of the ERN activists was rather pragmatic and 
unorthodox compared to the prevailing attitudes within the émigré community. The regime’s 
intention to lower the restrictions on apolitical contacts established an unprecedented gateway 
into the Soviet realm. Thus, while the exile press started an “effectless polemic, out of touch 
with everyday life, [...] the ERN büroo silently continued its work”,596 adapting its activity to 
the possibilities that Soviet Estonia’s rapprochement policy offered.  
The Thaw revolutionised the strategies of establishing information channels to the East, which 
had become an increasingly important field of émigré activity in the early 1950s. Besides their 
involvement in radio broadcasting, the Estonians in Sweden became engaged in other efforts 
of challenging the Soviet information blockade, which were coordinated with North American 
organisations and counted on random successes. From 1956 onwards, the CIA and the Free 
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Europe Committee started to cooperate closely with Central and Eastern European exiles 
within the so-called ‘Mailing Project’. As a part of the new strategy of triggering processes of 
“gradual democratisation”597 behind the Iron Curtain, this programme aimed at utilising the 
renaissance of East-West correspondence. By mass mailing Western books behind the Iron 
Curtain, the U.S. strategists hoped to overcharge the censorship authorities and to ensure that 
broad circles of authority officials, journalists and writers gained access to non-communist 
literature.
598
 Although these activities were mainly targeted at the satellite states, the 
programme was expanded even to the Baltic countries via the involvement of the New York-
based Free Estonia Committee, Vaba Eesti Komitee, the ERN and other Baltic exile 
associations.
599
 Due to the ERN’s activities, Stockholm became, together with Copenhagen, 
the Baltic branch’s major European hub. Moreover, the Estonians in Sweden actively engaged 
in the efforts of ballooning leaflets and other printed counterpropaganda behind the Iron 
Curtain,
600
 which reflected the general trend of “combining the spoken word of radio 
broadcasts and of the written word for effective propaganda”.601 Nevertheless, it was the 
development of regional tourism across the Baltic Sea that reconsolidated the Stockholm 
émigré circles’ position as the leading forefront of the Estonian cause in the West.  
The year 1956 marked a crucial watershed for both the Estonian diaspora in Sweden and 
Soviet Estonian society. For the first time since the beginning of the Soviet occupation, Balts 
could legally travel abroad, primarily to the neutral Nordic neighbour states. Around eighty 
Estonian tourists had the opportunity to go to Stockholm in summer 1956, while an even 
larger number visited the Finnish capital.
602
 Apart from a handful of refugees who had 
managed to escape from Saaremaa on a kolkhoz-owned fishing boat in autumn 1955,
603
 these 
visitors were the first Estonians on Swedish soil that could deliver first-hand information 
about life on the Soviet opposite coast. The exile activists were determined not to miss this 
opportunity, although their first communication efforts were unelaborated and the result of 
spontaneous action. The announcement of the arrival of the Soviet cruise liner M/S Pobeda 
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with a number of Estonians on board in early July 1956 reached the émigrés via Soviet radio 
only shortly before the ship entered Stockholm’s harbour. A small group of exile activists, 
among them Arvo Horm, hurried to the port in order to receive the visitors, equipped with a 
pile of newspapers and a selection of exile publications from the ERN’s office. As the tourists 
turned out to be willing to accept the offered information material, Horm hastily returned to 
the office on his bicycle in order to bring additional copies. Apart from disseminating first 
written evidence on life in exile, the émigrés succeeded in exchanging some basic information 
on the fate of prominent Estonians with the visitors, despite the omnipresent Russian 
‘politruks’, the regime’s political chaperones that followed every tourist group abroad.604  
Although the tourists showed an obvious interest and willingness to communicate, the exiles 
were highly aware of the fact that the Estonian visitors belonged to the loyal intellectual and 
administrative elites of the Soviet system and that most of them were probably party 
members. They also understood that hardly anyone would dare to take exile literature back 
across the Soviet border.
605
 Yet, the tourists were primarily seen as compatriots, 
notwithstanding their political loyalties. As they seemed to read the publications they had 
obtained from the exiles on the spot, there was a chance that they would spread the 
information among those who would not get a foreign travel permit.
606
 This pragmatic attitude 
implied that the émigré activists’ approach towards the home country had changed, as had the 
general strategy of disseminating anti-communist propaganda behind the Iron Curtain. In 
view of the failure of the uprisings and partisan resistance all over the Soviet bloc by 1956, 
the main targets of the propagandistic offensive were now those who earlier had been branded 
as collaborators: the numerous cogs in the wheel of the communist system. 
The development of cross-Baltic tourism, a result of post-Stalinist reforms and the 
reformulation of the communist states’ policies towards the Nordic neighbours, had come as a 
surprise to many émigrés in Sweden. Thus, the ERN büroo initially focused mainly on the 
collection and detailed documentation of as much factual information as possible from the 
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Estonian members of the Soviet tourist groups that visited the capital.
607
 But as the Soviet 
cruise liners from Leningrad started to head for Sweden again in the following summer, the 
exiles had already developed more advantageous strategies. While the ERF so far had been 
publishing and disseminating information material for a Western public, it now also engaged 
in the enlightenment of visiting compatriots by printing a number of information brochures in 
1957. The exiles aimed at informing Estonian tourists about the political, social and cultural 
achievements of the émigré community,
608
 but also about the émigré view on Estonia’s recent 
history, based on the available uncensored evidence and oral testimonies.
609
 The successful 
distribution of the brochures among the Soviet Estonian visitors mirrored the first gaps in the 
dense net of control and surveillance. Despite the alertness of the numerous informers that 
accompanied the tourists, an increasing number of incidents proved that it was possible to 
escape the elaborate system of security measures. Already in 1957, the KGB complained 
about several “politically and morally doubtful individuals” who had succeeded not only in 
passing the selection process for the travel permit, but also in establishing contacts abroad, 
carrying out tasks for third persons and speculating with currency and goods.
610
 
In view of the increased possibilities of direct interaction with the Soviet Estonian visitors, the 
ERN expanded its activities to Finland. Due to its status as a ‘friendly neighbour’ of the 
Soviet Union and the close linguistic and cultural ties with Estonia, the country received a 
considerably higher number of visitors from the opposite coast. It was the Estonian Lutheran 
Church in Exile which first discovered the Finnish capital as a ‘neutral ground’ for encounters 
with church representatives from the home country and a strategic basis for the systematic 
sending of parcels with religious publications to Estonia.
611
 At least from 1958 onwards, also 
the ERN regularly sent their own representatives to Helsinki in order to distribute and collect 
information from the Estonian visitors.
612
 The KGB reports of the time confirm that such 
exchange was possible and that these new forms of interaction did not slip under the radar of 
the Soviet intelligence forces.
613
 For the first time since the war years and in spite of a certain 
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degree of political dependency on the Kremlin, Finland again began to emerge as a strategic 
toehold in the anti-communist struggle of the Estonian émigré community in neighbouring 
Sweden.  
However, the strategic geopolitical location was not the only factor that strengthened 
Finland’s role as an invaluable chess piece in Estonia’s post-war history of anti-Soviet 
opposition from 1956 onwards. It was especially the commitment of Finnish citizens, the first 
Western foreigners to visit Estonia in significant numbers, which enabled both exile and 
homeland Estonians to use the Finnish-Soviet friendship as a loophole through the Iron 
Curtain. Although it took another decade and a considerable expansion of tourism across the 
Gulf of Finland to establish a more frequently used channel between Estonia and the West, 
attempts to outwit the regime’s security measures on Soviet territory occurred already during 
the second half of the 1950s. Despite the huge resources that the KGB appointed for the 
surveillance of foreign visitors in Tallinn,
614
 the informants regularly reported on suspicious 
encounters between Soviet citizens and Finnish visitors.
615
 An especially serious incident was, 
from the Soviet point of view, the case of the Tartu student Mart Niklus, later known as one 
of Estonia’s most famous political dissidents. On several occasions in 1956 and 1957, he 
succeeded in establishing contacts with visiting Finnish scholars and sportsmen both in Tartu 
and in Leningrad, who were willing to smuggle pictures and unpublished articles back to 
Finland.
616
 According to the student’s explicit wish, the Finnish mediators forwarded the 
evidence to Estonian exile circles in Sweden, as a publication of the compromising material in 
Finland itself was not possible due to the Finnish media’s self-censorship of the time. Thus, it 
was the exiles in Sweden who organised the further dissemination of the new evidence from 
Soviet Estonia to the émigré press and leading newspapers in Scandinavia and the United 
States. Niklus’ photographs were more effective than any exile publication at unmasking the 
Soviet Estonian propaganda of prosperity and optimism as Potemkin villages. Besides bearing 
witness to the poor quality of Soviet-type construction projects in Estonia, one of the 
propaganda’s flagships, the photographs showed drunken Russian soldiers and the ubiquitous 
jamming stations,
617
 visualising Estonian life under ‘foreign rule’. 
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Mart Niklus’ successful attempts to approach foreign visitors for the dissemination of anti-
Soviet material in the West reflected a spirit of mute opposition in Soviet Estonia. But 
although the case proved that there were Estonians behind the Iron Curtain who were willing 
to cooperate with the political emigration, the exile elites in Stockholm consciously refrained 
from expanding their activities to Soviet territory, mainly in order to minimise the 
omnipresent risk of KGB infiltration. Indeed, even the Soviet Estonian intelligence had, as the 
exile circles in Stockholm, recognised the strategic potential of a restricted touristic exchange 
across the Baltic Sea, especially for counterintelligence operations that aimed at infiltrating 
émigré structures. Hence, the Estonian KGB sent its own agents to Sweden, where they 
figured as tourists with an articulated interest in the diaspora, which at times proved 
successful. One of the agents who visited Stockholm in August 1957 succeeded in gaining the 
trust of Johannes Mihkelson, the head of the Estonian Social Democratic Party in Exile, and 
returned with detailed information on the exile government and the ERN’s systematic attempt 
to persuade Estonian visitors to defect.
618
 Any conspiratorial activity on Soviet territory was 
thus, as most exile activists were deeply convinced of, all the more likely to fail, as the 
embarrassing revelations about the highly unsuccessful Western infiltration efforts via Baltic 
spies had illustrated.  
Not all exile representatives remained equally cautious. REE, for instance, the Estonian 
National Congress in Sweden, obviously followed their own vision of how to utilise the 
changes of the Thaw. KGB reports imply that the organisation’s chairman, Igor Belokon, had 
formed a conspirative circle which, with the support of prominent émigrés such as Heinrich 
Laretei, planned to establish an information network with the help of old friends and 
acquaintances in their home country via Finnish couriers and Soviet Estonian visitors.
619
 
During the early Khrushchev years, though, the successful development of such clandestine 
networks was doomed to fail in a system that had developed surveillance to perfection. 
Consequently, Belokon’s secret correspondence was immediately seized upon by the KGB, 
which recruited the addressees as its own informants.
620
 The leading exile circles in 
Stockholm, by contrast, confined their activity to first encounters and information exchange 
with compatriots from Soviet Estonia on Swedish and Finnish soil in view of the effective 
Soviet counterintelligence. After years of isolation from the homeland, the Estonians in 
Sweden once again could profit from their geographical proximity to the home country, which 
                                                          
618
 Ojamaa / Hion, Aruanne 1957; pp. 191-192. 
619
 Report from Major Vertman of the Estonian KGB’s First Department (strictly confidential), 14 March 1959; 
reproduced in: Jürjo, Pagulus ja Nõukogude Eesti, pp. 312-313; p. 312. 
620
 Jürjo, Pagulus ja Nõukogude Eesti, pp. 146-147. 
135 
 
catapulted them once more into the strategic forefront of the political struggle of the 
transatlantic Estonian community. In post-Stalinist Europe, space started to matter again. 
 
With the onset of the ‘first détente’, the political exile circles were faced with a dilemma that 
would lead to incessant debates within the diaspora communities throughout the next decades. 
The gradual opening up of the communist societies led to regular personal encounters 
between the inhabitants of Eastern Europe and their compatriots in the West, which to a large 
degree facilitated the flow of information across the Iron Curtain. At the same time, it was 
obvious that the communist regimes’ rapprochement policy was instrumentalised to split the 
émigré communities. Thus, any pronounced willingness of exile representatives to 
communicate with the home country inevitably turned into potentially compromising 
ammunition for the communist propaganda apparatus. As interpersonal exchange nevertheless 
was considered to be indispensable for the anti-communist struggle, the political activists 
were confronted with the need to find a path between continuing the isolationist position of 
the chilliest Cold War years and approaching the home country in a more pragmatic way.  
In contrast to the ERN activists in Stockholm, ‘Polish London’, the transnational diaspora 
community’s political heart, chose a rather reserved stance in view of the expanding fields of 
interaction with Poles from behind the Iron Curtain. As Poland opened up its borders in the 
spirit of the Polish October, the exile government was still shaken by a scandal that had 
proved the efficiency of communist Poland’s counterintelligence. In 1955, the newly 
appointed Prime Minister in exile, Hugon Hanke, defected to Poland, where the propaganda 
machinery triumphantly unmasked his identity as an informant of the People’s Republic’s 
Security Service. The incident fostered a deep-rooted mistrust towards any form of contacts 
with representatives of the ‘other Poland’. This also affected the London government’s 
attitude towards the mostly apolitical majority of the Polish diaspora, which proved to be 
more receptive towards the new tones from Warsaw. The conservative circles around the 
President in exile, August Zaleski, thus failed to make use of the opportunities that the Thaw 
provided for their own purposes. Instead of seeking direct interaction with the home country 
and its inhabitants, they limited their activity to the continuation of the open source 
intelligence activities.
621
 Already at that point, the proceeding marginalisation of the exile 
government as a mere “symbol of legality [...] and continuity of prewar authority”,622 
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deprived of any noteworthy significance for a dynamic and effective anti-communist struggle 
outside Poland, became increasingly obvious.  
However, ‘Polish London’ was ideologically split. From 1954 onwards, the rival political 
camp organised within the framework of the so-called Provisional Council of National Unity, 
Tymczasowa Rada Jedności Narodowej. Gathered around General Anders and other critics of 
the President in exile, this faction was less orthodox in its attitude towards interaction with 
citizens of the People’s Republic. The Council’s representatives were, like the ERN activists 
in Stockholm, convinced that direct encounters with visitors from the home country would 
establish important channels of information exchange, which served the overriding goal of 
opposing the communist regime. This attitude fostered a close cooperation with the Polish 
section of Radio Free Europe in Munich, allowing the Provisional Council access to a 
currently updated treasure of accumulated knowledge about communist Poland, which formed 
the skeleton of the numerous broadcasts behind the Iron Curtain. RFE had developed a 
sophisticated system of gathering information from various sources, including the incessant 
interception of Warsaw’s radio broadcasts and the systematic interrogation of refugees and 
visitors, carried out by a network of correspondents at strategic spots in Western Europe.
623
  
The Polish October swept away the remaining parts of the informational blockade that had 
surrounded the country. For a short period, Poland opened up for Western journalists and 
launched the most liberal travel policy of the satellite belt, allowing insights that the Baltic 
émigrés only could dream of. In contrast to Soviet citizens, Poles were allowed to travel 
individually and could, as Warsaw’s foreign residencies lacked stationary intelligence 
officers, relatively freely move on foreign soil.
624
 At the same time, Polish migration to the 
West developed on a scale that would be exceeded only by the wave of mass emigration in the 
early 1980s.
625
 Thus, the RFE activists disposed of a current stream of both informants and 
potential new staff members with an intimate knowledge about communist Poland.
626
 By the 
late 1950s, Poles could be encountered all over Western Europe, but Sweden was obviously 
among the more attractive destinations, at least for those who dreamt of a better life in the 
West. According to several sources of the time, the neutral neighbour country was often 
referred to as a ‘paradise’ in the People’s Republic, not at least because of its still relatively 
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generous asylum policy.
627
 Although the refugee’s mainly economic incentives were easily 
unmasked, the Swedish Alien Commission almost never denied political asylum.
628
 Hence, 
the number of Polish asylum seekers, which had dropped to only three during 1955, rose 
dramatically with the liberalisation of foreign travel, to several hundred during the following 
three years. In 1958, as much as one tenth of all Polish tourists that visited Stockholm that 
summer as passengers on the M/S Mazowsze defected.
629
  
It is hard to estimate to what degree this high percentage of defections was the result of the 
activities of the local RFE employees, who, as the circles around the ERN büroo, were eager 
to establish personal contacts with their visiting compatriots in the harbour of the Swedish 
capital.
630
 However, it is documented that the leader of RFE’s Stockholm office, Michał 
Lisiński, together with his colleague Łukasz Winiarski systematically persuaded Polish 
visitors to defect, assisting them with the necessary formalities and recruiting future staff 
members from their rows.
631
 At that point, the office was the only centre of organised 
information gathering in Scandinavia and constituted, at the same time, the only group of 
Polish exiles in Sweden who actively utilised the permeability of the Iron Curtain for political 
purposes. Nevertheless, their scope of action seems to have been, in line with the Estonian 
émigrés’ strategy, geographically limited to Sweden, as the subversive infiltration of Polish 
society was obviously still considered to be almost impossible to carry out. Indeed, the Polish 
Security Service was, although it mainly focused on the domestic opposition, an effective 
system, whose counterintelligence operations were targeted especially at Radio Free Europe, 
both the central office in Munich and its local branches alongside the Iron Curtain in West 
Berlin, Vienna or Stockholm.
632
 Thus, it was in the relatively remote French capital that first 
successful strategies to establish direct exchange with oppositional circles in communist 
Poland were elaborated.  
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The Thaw years clearly illustrated that the international political climate had changed, which 
also affected the Central and Eastern European diaspora communities in the West. Thus, the 
Polish exile government’s claims to a return to the geopolitical status quo of the pre-war era 
seemed increasingly unrealistic and accelerated its political isolation.
633
 At the same time, the 
small but influential circle around the editor Jerzy Giedroyć and his monthly journal Kultura 
in Paris developed into the major counterweight to the ideological orthodoxy of ‘Polish 
London’. In autumn 1956, Kultura openly supported Gomułka, expressing the hope that 
‘Polish Titoism’ could contribute to a gradual democratisation of life in the People’s 
Republic.
634
 Especially the emerging independent intelligentsia fostered the belief in the 
success of national emancipation behind the Iron Curtain among the Parisian émigrés.  
The beginning liberalisation in post-Stalinist Poland gave birth to a new kind of organised, 
leftist intellectual elite, such as the Catholic circles around the weekly Tygodnik Powszechny 
or the several hundred members of the Warsaw-based Club of the Crooked Circle, Klub 
Krzywego Koła, a “forum in which like-minded intellectuals could meet to exchange and 
modify their ideas”.635 At the peak of the Thaw, communist Poland’s critical intelligentsia got 
the opportunity of getting acquainted with the political thinking of the emigration’s Paris 
wing, as Kultura and other publications of Giedroyć’s publishing house could be legally 
disseminated in Poland for almost a year. It was Kultura’s political realism in key questions 
of Poland’s post-war fate, such as the country’s eastern border and the relationship towards 
the Russians, which enabled Giedroyć and his supporters among the Polish diaspora to find a 
common language with regime critics behind the Iron Curtain.
636
 The encounters of a young 
Polish post-war intelligentsia with the progressive émigré circles in Paris was a starting shot 
of a development that fostered first, implicitly political contacts between exile and homeland, 
which proved to be durable enough to resist the challenges of re-established censorship in 
early 1957. Hanna Rewska, Giedroyć’s confidant and Kultura’s most important correspondent 
in Poland, continued her cooperation with Paris, partly with the help of a French embassy 
secretary, and organised the smuggling of Kultura across the East-West border, which led to 
her arrest and trial in 1958.
637
 Nevertheless, communication across the Iron Curtain 
incessantly continued, as the Polish Security Service had to admit in a secret report in 1963, 
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stating that around four hundred Poles maintained regular correspondence with Kultura 
employees,
638
 although the by then rougher political climate had forced most progressive 
intellectuals to leave the public scene.  
The émigrés’ main challenge of the Thaw period, the question of how to relate to 
communication and cooperation with the home country, had thus left visible traces in the 
political landscape of the Polish emigration. 1956 marked the definitive end of the diaspora 
community’s unity in ideological terms.639 From then on, the importance of ‘Polish London’ 
continuously declined as a major oppositional actor against communism. This was clearly 
reflected in the Polish authorities’ internal evaluations of the late 1950s. They witness the 
increasing shift of attention towards the Polish émigrés that worked for Kultura and Radio 
Free Europe, especially their flagships Giedroyć and Nowak-Jeziorański, who inherited the 
exile government’s role as the regime propaganda’s main target.640 The backward-looking 
ideological orthodoxy of the state apparatus in exile was an inappropriate weapon in the late 
1950s, when the numerous encounters between Poles from the home country and the diaspora 
ironically seemed to benefit the communist regime. Especially in Sweden with its very small 
circle of politically active émigré agents, the rather passive organisations of the loyal 
supporters of ‘Polish London’ that condemned all contacts with the home country and the 
masses of largely apolitical economic refugees, these tendencies were obvious. In view of the 
Polish government’s charm offensive and a formerly unknown freedom of travel across the 
Iron Curtain, a rising number of Poles decided to apply for ‘consular passports’, while the 
group of oppositional activists had shrunk to a handful.  
As has been shown, the anti-communist activity of émigrés from behind the Iron Curtain had 
entered a second and decisive decade with the onset of the 1950s. In many respects, the years 
of the high tide of ‘cold warfare’ were crucial for the exile activists of the first generation. 
Their political sympathies and networks, their ideological credo and choice of strategies for 
opposing Moscow’s hegemonic ambitions were shaped by a decade that marked an early peak 
of Cold War tensions. As elsewhere in the West, many exile activists in Sweden thus joined 
the camp of the most virulent anti-communists, who unequivocally opposed the government’s 
strict neutrality policy. This self-confident positioning was supported by a reliable front of 
prominent conservative forces and largely tolerated due to the tangental anti-communist 
course of Sweden’s governing social democrats, which gave the émigrés the societal forum 
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that their enlightenment campaigns required. These new forms of political alliances were 
exceptionally strong between Swedish conservatives and the Balts, which echoed the heritage 
of cross-Baltic solidarities of a by gone era.  
At the same time, the political unity of the transnational exile communities was challenged by 
the emergence of different factions and attitudes towards the communication with the home 
countries, which rendered any unified stance towards the developments behind the Iron 
Curtain impossible. The question of how to react to the possibilities of establishing limited 
interaction across the bloc borders not only split émigré communities into increasingly 
reactionary protagonists of the pre-war past and a politically rather indifferent majority, as the 
case of the Poles illustrated. It also deepened already existing gaps within the pronouncedly 
anti-communist camps, leading to the emergence of different ‘schools’ concerning the 
question of how to communicate and cooperate with compatriots from behind the Iron 
Curtain.  
For the exile activists in Sweden, the main challenge and determining factor of all organised 
action was the unaltered need of breaking the information blockade, which the communist 
regimes effectively secured with strict military surveillance and an effective 
counterintelligence apparatus. Currently updated, uncensored information from behind the 
Iron Curtain was the most effective weapon of anti-communist counterpropaganda. This, 
however, required a specific expertise in the field, which did not only develop among exile 
activists, but also in the rows of intelligence officers and Sovietologists throughout the 
Western hemisphere. But geography was still a decisive factor, in spite of the fact that almost 
all interaction between the blocs had been frozen during Stalin’s last years of reign. As other 
‘frontier cities’ like Vienna and West Berlin, Stockholm turned into a geographically well 
located point of observation, which allowed the agents on the edge of Europe’s front line to 
gather the maximum relevant information that unmasked the reality of life in a communist 
system behind the smoke-screens of official propaganda.    
The systematic collection of available information in Sweden was organised by activists who 
already had proven their ability and determination to organise an effective opposition against 
totalitarian rule on the opposite coasts during the war. RFE’s local office was dominated by 
former staff members of the Polish legation, while one of the main Estonian veterans of war-
time conspiracy, Arvo Horm, played a key role in the concerted efforts of the ERN and the 
ERF to decode the signals that reached them from Soviet Estonia. The information gathered 
not only fuelled the exiles’ anti-communist campaigns in the West, but also provided raw 
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material for the U.S.-financed radio broadcasts that were supposed to deliver uncensored 
information to the ‘captive nations’. While Lisiński’s Stockholm section closely cooperated 
with the RFE central office in Munich, the ERN regularly shared its findings with the 
Estonian department of the U.S. radio station Voice of America, which had been established 
on the initiative of Estonians in Stockholm. Western broadcasting to communist Europe was 
the most effective way of reversing the flow of information and initiating a kind of indirect 
communication between diaspora and homeland, especially from 1960 onwards, when the 
Soviet Union and the satellite states gradually stopped the jamming of foreign broadcasts. 
Over the course of time, the émigrés received the first feedback, which allowed them to 
evaluate and adapt the content of the programmes. Thousands of letters from the satellite 
states reached RFE’s central office every year, which additionally started to conduct personal 
interviews with listeners behind the Iron Curtain.
641
 A control mechanism of such dimensions 
was of course out of reach for the Estonian activists. Yet, they still managed to gain 
preliminary insights about the reception of the broadcasts via the systematic interrogation of a 
handful of newly arrived refugees and some of the around a hundred elderly Estonians who 
had received the permission to permanently reunite with their families in Sweden in the late 
1950s.
642
  
 
However, it was the fundamental rupture in the communist states’ foreign policy during the 
de-Stalinisation process that revolutionised the émigrés’ strategies of establishing 
communication between exile and homeland. The ‘fortress mentality’, which had 
characterised many communist states during the early post-war period, was replaced by a 
declared willingness to allow for a strictly controlled opening of the borders, which signalled 
that the regimes gave up the claim of maintaining total control of every kind of East-West 
interaction. 1956 thus marked a major turning point in many respects. The Hungarian 
revolution, which had been brutally suppressed in front of a passive Western public, proved 
beyond doubt that a geopolitical shift in Central and Eastern Europe was illusionary in the 
near future. For the diaspora communities in the West this was of course a severe setback. But 
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at the same time, they could witness the gradual lifting of the isolating cordon around the 
communist half of Europe, which brought a range of both new possibilities and challenges. 
The first encounters between exile and homeland communities led to a certain ‘clash of 
cultures’. Direct interpersonal contacts proved beyond doubt that the homelands represented 
by the visitors from behind the Iron Curtain had little in common with the countries that the 
refugees once left behind. This insight implied the need to rethink the tasks of the emigration 
and to adjust the strategies of anti-communist opposition. A continued struggle against 
communist rule required a proper portion of political realism and ideological pragmatism on 
the part of the émigrés, if they were determined to avert the decrease of support of both the 
Western public and the compatriots at home. Ideological dogmatism and the inability to adapt 
to changing geopolitical conditions only deepened the mutual alienation between homeland 
and exiled populations. As both the Estonian and Polish cases illustrate, it was mainly the 
circles that kept a distance to the uncritical glorification of an already distant pre-war reality 
that proved to be able and willing to coordinate their oppositional activities with the actual 
needs and demands of the home country, while the nationalist right-wing got stuck in an 
increasingly anachronistic line of thinking. ‘Polish London’ and its main organisations, which 
had a considerable influence especially among the Poles in Sweden, defended the Polish 
nation’s right to return to a status quo that had been irretrievably lost already with the Yalta 
agreements. Jerzy Giedroyć, by contrast, used this gap and developed together with a small 
circle of intellectuals connected to Kultura into a major partner and authority for the 
developing leftist, nonconformist intelligentsia in Poland. Similarly, it was not the Estonian 
exile’s rightist wing, which upheld the heritage of Konstantin Päts’ authoritarian pre-war 
order and had a strong base of sympathisers in the Sweden-based organisation REE that 
developed a finer instinct for the changes behind the Iron Curtain. Instead, it was the ERN as 
the representation of the former democratic opposition that learned the lesson of the failed 
revolution in Hungary and increasingly targeted the more conformist parts of Estonian 
society, treating them in the first place as compatriots with similar patriotic feelings. 
The significance of the Baltic connection for this process is indisputable, especially in the 
Estonian context. The regular encounters between exiles and Estonian visitors in Stockholm 
or Helsinki marked one of the first breaches in the ramparts that Stalin had established around 
the Soviet Union. Once again, the Baltic Sea turned into Estonia’s main connection to the 
outside world, not at least due to the unofficial support from Finland. As during the war, the 
country turned into an indispensable link between the Estonian émigrés in Sweden and their 
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compatriots, largely because of the pro-Estonian sympathies of many Finns, which fostered 
the informal exchange of information across the border and formed a stark contrast to the 
Finnish government’s pro-Soviet course. What proved crucial was also the possibility of 
receiving Finnish television in northern Estonia from the late 1950s onwards. Due to the 
linguistic similarities between Finnish and Estonian, this formed the basis for an additional, 
durable and, in the context of the Soviet Union as a whole, unique connection to the West.
643
 
Estonia’s geographical proximity to its Nordic neighbours and the exile community was not 
without consequences. Already in the early 1960s, Soviet Estonian newspapers decried the 
harmful influences of the “bourgeois propaganda” that already had reached the country via 
radio, correspondence, individual contacts and tourism.
644
 
The comparison with the Polish case is insofar interesting as the Polish emigration in the West 
from the mid-1950s onwards maintained the closest and broadest contacts to the homeland, 
while the Balts represented the Central and Eastern European exile communities with least 
direct connections behind the Iron Curtain. The freedom of travel granted by the Polish 
authorities was exceptional for the time and allowed for a lively traffic of tourists and 
travellers on private visits between Poland and the West. Also the route across the Baltic Sea 
became a much-frequented connection between Poland and the West, especially due to the 
rather apolitical stance of the majority of the Swedish Polonia. Its members were, compared 
to Polish communities elsewhere in Western Europe, exceptionally eager to establish close 
bonds with the home country, which proved that Warsaw’s propagandistic appeals to a 
common patriotism of Poles on both sides of the Iron Curtain at times fell on open ears.  
The Polish staff of Stockholm’s RFE office and especially the socialists Lisiński and 
Winiarski did not share the ideological constraints of the old guard, which in line with the 
conservatism of ‘Polish London’ increased their seclusion from the home country. As their 
colleagues in Vienna, Brussels or Bonn, they were eager to establish direct contacts with 
Polish visitors, who delivered the first-hand information that was indispensable for the 
broadcasts. However, in contrast to the Estonian case, where the neutrality and vicinity of 
Finland and Sweden formed a specific triangular constellation of interaction, the Baltic 
connection was by no means unique in the Polish case during the liberal Thaw years. 
Informational exchange and interpersonal contacts between diaspora and homeland could be 
established both in Poland itself and wherever Polish citizens were allowed to travel. Even 
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exile activists with a critical attitude towards the communist rule could relatively easily 
interact with the home country, as Jerzy Giedroyć’s Warsaw contacts illustrated. In the Polish 
case, the establishment of oppositional contacts across the Iron Curtain was, unlike during the 
war years and the early post-war period, not so much dependent on geographical vicinity, but 
on the ability of the exiles to communicate with the home country on its own terms. 
 
In view of the totality of the systemic change in Soviet-dominated Europe and the trauma of 
repeated waves of repression and terror that the population had experienced since the end of 
the war, a decade of failed communication was enough to generate a gap between exile and 
homeland populations that was hard to bridge. One of the main reasons was a rather general 
disillusionment with the West behind the Iron Curtain, which followed the failed revolutions 
of Poland and Hungary. On the one hand, Moscow’s brutal supression of the revolution on the 
streets of Budapest had convinced the communist-ruled societies of the futility of popular 
uprisings and armed resistance. However, it was the West’s passivity that had a larger impact 
on the formation of future opposition. The year of 1956 thus not only lead to direct 
connections between the people in Central and Eastern Europe and the West, but also to the 
latter’s demystification. Rumours about the ‘white ship’, a symbol of the anticipated invasion 
of the Western Allies, who would bring liberation from the Russians, had survived long into 
the post-war period in Soviet Estonia.
645
 Yet, the mass surrender of most of the remaining 
‘forest brothers’, the partisans who had continued their war-time struggle in the Estonian 
forests and bogs, proved that the hope for Western help and support had been extinguished.
646
 
Also the Poles had stopped watching out for the armies of General Anders on his ‘white 
horse’,647 which never appeared on the horizon. The Western governments had unequivocally 
proved that they would not risk a military conflict with Moscow for the sake of the ‘captive 
nations’. Seen from the perspective of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain, this passivity 
confirmed the ‘treason of Yalta’, which inevitably tinged the attitude towards the anti-
communist exile activists as well. 
The refusal to realise how limited the scope of their compatriots’ possibilities actually was 
and their continued adherence to the imagined power of the ‘state in exile’ accelerated the 
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émigrés’ increasing loss of support from their home countries. Even the nonconformist part of 
the Polish intelligentsia expressed a firm conviction that Poland’s future fate solely depended 
on decisions and action taken in the country itself.
648
 An increasing number of reports from 
Estonia implied that the general tendency was similar. As one of the Stockholm emigration’s 
informants summarised the prevailing moods, “the discourses of the exile politicians and the 
sermons of the pastors transmitted by the Voice of America are superfluous – one does not 
want to listen to them, as they do not contain anything valuable”.649 In view of the alienation 
between exile and homeland populations, a concerted opposition against communist rule 
required not only functioning communications, but also a fundamental reconfiguration of the 
exiles’ ideological attitudes and visions for the future of their home countries. This process 
started with the generational shift, which coincided with major political changes in Cold War 
Europe. 
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V. In search of a common language: The second Cold War 
generation and its approach to challenging the status quo 
 
V.1 Détente and the resurrection of a region – Cross-Baltic communication 
and miscommunication 
The growing superpower tensions that followed the Thaw and culminated in the erection of 
the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis one year later brought the world to the 
brink of a nuclear war and ‘cold warfare’ to a crossroads. Under the impression of the 
uncontrolled dynamics of the escalating crisis, Washington and Moscow considerably 
modified their confrontational course, setting the ground for a policy of consensus and 
rapprochement. The changes in the geopolitical climate were especially perceptible in Europe, 
which by the mid-1960s, as Poul Villaume and Odd Arne Westad expressed it, “was growing 
out of the straightjacket that World War II had imposed on it”.650 Despite the shock of the 
Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia in 1968, which awakened memories of the brutal 
suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and marked a severe setback in the relations 
between Moscow and its satellites, the diplomatic relations between East and West improved. 
Exchange and interaction between countries, societies and individuals on both sides of the 
Iron Curtain blossomed to an extent that by far exceeded the cautious restrictions of the Thaw 
years. This specific European version of rapprochement had a large impact on the 
development of communication between the Baltic shores as well. The spirit of détente, the 
Western societies’ swing to the left and, of course, the neutral status of Sweden and Finland 
formed a constellation that fostered lively cross-Baltic interaction. Especially the touristic 
infrastructure was considerably expanded, which allowed for a so far unprecedented level of 
encounters between East and West in Europe’s north-eastern corner. From the early 1970s 
onwards, even economic cooperation between the shores started to flourish, while the 
governments could agree on fostering direct societal and cultural exchange between the 
riparian states, as will be explored in more detail in the next chapter. 
Paradoxically enough, it was during this era of unprecedented East-West contacts, which 
triggered the development of a multi-layered web of channels between the neutral 
Scandinavian states and their communist-ruled opposite coasts, that the Polish and Estonian 
political emigration in Sweden faced a fundamental crisis. The ageing ranks of activists 
experienced the fate of all exile communities: the gradual loss of support from the more 
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assimilated, younger generation. Moreover, the understanding among Western societies for 
the exiles’ political struggle significantly dwindled, which was a side effect of the leftist turn 
of the late 1960s, while the alienation between exiled and their homeland gradually grew. The 
obvious mental gaps between the Baltic shores counteracted the structural advantages of the 
Baltic connection for the establishment of oppositional networks between East and West. 
With the onset of détente, the exile struggle thus entered a decisive phase of transition. 
 
Détente was, as Jussi Hanhimäki rightly stresses, first and foremost “a European project”.651 
Moscow of course still held the satellite states in a firm grip, if necessary by forcible means, 
but Western Europe showed clear signs of emancipation from its North American ally. 
Stalin’s menacing shadow had faded, which dispelled the worst fears of an imminent Soviet 
threat.
652
 The NATO and the U.S. military forces did not seem to be Western Europe’s only 
life assurance any more, which triggered the development of a separate political agenda. This 
tendency was especially strong in neutral Sweden, whose foreign policy took a radical 
political turn away from the pro-Western course of the 1950s.  
The gradual evolution of Stockholm’s foreign policy from the traditional defensive line of 
Foreign Minister Östen Undén towards the self-confident course of the so-called ‘active 
foreign policy’ started in the mid-1960s.653 One of the preconditions for the change was the 
generational shift within Swedish social democracy, which put an end to the personnel 
continuity in Swedish post-war politics. In 1962, Undén left his post after seventeen years, 
while Prime Minister Tage Erlander, who had led the government and Swedish social 
democracy for almost a quarter of a century, was succeeded by his radical protégé Olof Palme 
in 1969. A new generation of social democrats with a pronouncedly leftist profile propagated 
the ‘doctrine of small states’ and took a critical stance towards both superpowers, which 
ended the so far prevailing consensus in foreign policy issues across the political blocs in 
Sweden.
654
 Now, the Swedish government explicitly supported radical liberation movements 
in Africa and Latin America, but also in Vietnam, which turned the Vietnam War into an 
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important catalyst for the radical turn in Sweden’s foreign policy line.655 The openly 
displayed sympathies for the Viet Cong partisans deepened the “diplomatic schism” between 
Sweden and the United States and induced Washington to recall its ambassador from 
Stockholm.
656
 Now, it was not just the conservative, but also the liberal forces that regularly 
referred to the country’s obligation to remain neutral, calling for more cohesion in the 
government’s responses to the international situation.657 However, both conservatives and 
liberals failed to adapt to the prevailing political spirit of the late 1960s, which inescapably 
had implications for the émigrés from behind the Iron Curtain too. Palme admitted quite 
frankly that the slogan ‘no peace without freedom’ did not apply to all suppressed nations. In 
the late 1960s, the head of Swedish social democracy was generous in his support of the 
rebelling Third World, but tended to overlook the situation behind the Iron Curtain. 
Conservative criticism against this hypocritical interpretation of Sweden’s new role as a 
‘moral great power’ was fended off and accused of triggering a “crusade against the Soviet 
Union” and interfering in Soviet internal affairs.658 
The official communication between Sweden and its communist neighbours expanded in view 
of the rapid geopolitical changes of détente. From the mid-1960s onwards, the neutral country 
gradually resumed its function as a ‘bridge builder’ and considerably contributed to the 
decreasing of political tensions in the Baltic Sea Region. The turn in Sweden’s foreign policy 
was closely observed especially in Poland, where the ‘constructive role’ of both Nordic 
neutrals for the process of détente was met with considerable approval.
659
 Soon, Sweden 
gained a special status among Poland’s Western cooperation partners,660 which led to a rapid 
evolution of Swedish-Polish contacts on various levels. Prime Minister Erlander’s first state 
visit to Poland in 1967 was followed by a multitude of encounters between politicians, 
parliamentarians, delegates of youth organisations and intellectuals, and even the sea guard 
units from both countries started to cooperate. The Warsaw regime’s anti-Semitic campaign 
of 1968, a veritable witch-hunt in which the Poland’s Jewish minority served as a scapegoat 
for the government’s legitimation crisis, provoked numerous manifestations of open disgust in 
Sweden. Yet, the tensions turned out to be temporary. The political, economic and cultural 
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networking processes between Sweden and Poland soon recovered and moved towards a peak 
from 1970 onwards,
661
 as will be shown in the next chapter. After decades of conflict, the 
decisive “first steps across the abyss”662 had been taken.  
The Kremlin’s answer to détente was considerably more reserved. In contrast to the satellite 
states, the Soviet Union largely maintained its isolationist policy also under the leadership of 
Leonid Brezhnev. Yet, in the peripheral borderlands of Pribaltika, as the Russians called the 
Soviet Baltic republics, the repercussions of détente were still perceptible. As during the ‘first 
détente’ of the Thaw, the Baltic Sea Region became an experimental field of careful attempts 
to liberalise the restrictive Soviet border regime. A decisive catalyst was, in this context, the 
specificity of the relations between Moscow and Helsinki and the kinship between Finns and 
Estonians. The Finnish President Urho Kekkonen had, since the late 1950s, used the Finnish-
Soviet friendship in order to promote a gradual rapprochement between Finland and Soviet 
Estonia in Moscow.
663
 In 1964, Kekkonen finally visited Estonia on his way back from an 
official state visit in Poland and delivered a speech in the country’s native language at the 
University of Tartu.
664
 Seen from the émigré perspective, the fact that a Western European 
head of state visited Estonia was a serious setback in the exile’s efforts to prevent Western 
governments from officially recognising the occupation of the Baltic states.
665
 For Soviet 
Estonia and its inhabitants, however, Kekkonen’s visit marked a crucial watershed that 
eventually turned the previously isolated ‘hinterland of Leningrad’ into a frequently visited 
and, compared to other Soviet republics, even cosmopolitan, ‘window to the West’. 
During the Thaw years, only handpicked official delegations, exclusively from the neutral 
neighbour states or distant, non-European countries, were able to visit Tallinn. Yet, in 1960, 
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the capital of Soviet Estonia was finally opened up to Western tourists.
666
 Nevertheless, 
visiting the Baltic Soviet republic was still a complicated undertaking. Visitors had to travel 
via Helsinki and Vyborg further on to Leningrad, from where they, guided by the official 
Soviet travel agency Inturist, reached Tallinn. After Kekkonen’s visit to Estonia, travelling 
was considerably facilitated by the establishment of a direct ferry connection between Tallinn 
and Helsinki. The Finnish President’s efforts to lobby for a Finnish-Estonian rapprochement 
were thus crowned with success. In return for Brezhnev’s concessions, Kekkonen had to 
assure that the cooperation between Finns and anti-Soviet Estonian circles in Stockholm 
would stop.
667
 At the peak of the Cold War, the relations with the exile community in Sweden 
had to a certain degree compensated the lack of communication with Estonia itself. Under the 
new conditions, however, these entanglements formed a serious obstacle, as a further 
expansion of contacts across the Gulf of Finland could only develop on Moscow’s terms. 
Kekkonen himself saw to it that anyone who remained in close contact with the exiles in 
Sweden would have to end his political career.
668
 In early July 1965, the first direct 
connection between Finland and Estonia since the pre-war era could be inaugurated. The 
small medieval city of Tallinn, whose architectural heritage unmistakably revealed the 
traditionally close connections to Western Europe, thus turned into what critical voices 
labelled the main “Potemkin village”669 of Soviet propaganda, supposed to present the 
“‘achievements’ of the October Revolution”670 to an increasing number of Western visitors.  
Already in 1968, the number of travellers between Finland and Estonia amounted to 24,000 
during the summer season, to which the regular ferry connection across the Gulf of Finland 
was confined.
671
 The majority of Western visitors came from Finland, mainly because of the 
possibility of consuming cheap alcohol on the boat trip, which earned the ferry between 
Helsinki and Tallinn the name ‘vodka express’.672 But the facilitated communication between 
Estonia and the West not only attracted foreigners. Among the visitors from abroad was also a 
rising number of exile Estonians, mainly representatives of the younger generation, whose 
number amounted to eight hundred in 1965 and one thousand already one year later.
673
 Most 
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of them came from nearby Sweden, but towards the end of the 1960s, also exiles from 
overseas increasingly made use of the new connection to the old home country.
674
 The 
reversed stream of Soviet Estonian visitors to the new home countries of their relatives was of 
course smaller in scale due to the restrictive travel policy of the Soviet system. High visa fees 
also deterred many Soviet Estonians from travelling to the West. However, in the second half 
of the 1960s, several hundred Estonians visited their relatives in the West every year. Due to 
the geographical proximity, Sweden became the number one destination for the Estonians 
who were allowed to travel abroad.
675
 After two decades of relative isolation, old family and 
friendship ties between Estonians on both sides of the Iron Curtain could be re-established.  
 
At an early stage, the Estonian activists around the ERN in Stockholm recognised the 
oppositional potential of these new channels across the Baltic Sea, which “made it practically 
possible to send materials, informations [sic], tourists, observers, etc.” to Soviet Estonia.676 
For the most part, the cross-Baltic channels were, however, used in order to satisfy the more 
urgent, material needs. It was mainly consumer goods that were in short supply in the Soviet 
Union, such as shoes, fabrics and tools, which found their way to Soviet Estonia on the Baltic 
ferries.
677
 Yet, it has to be taken into consideration that all private interaction beyond direct 
state control between the home country and the exile was in a certain sense political, even 
oppositional due to the general consensus among the Estonian emigration on a common anti-
Soviet stance. The liberalised travel policy of the Soviet Union allowed Soviet Estonians to 
become familiar with the political stance of the emigrants to a much larger degree than 
before.
678
 Thus, the mutual visits were doubtlessly a more effective way of disseminating anti-
Soviet counterpropaganda than the broadcasting activities to Soviet Estonia. 
At the same time, however, this new level of contacts between the Baltic shores was highly 
contested among the émigré community itself. A majority of exiles displayed a highly 
suspicious attitude vis-à-vis Soviet Estonia and clearly opposed the idea of fostering direct 
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interaction with the home country. The partly polemical discourse on the community’s self-
perception as a political émigré population started already in 1961 with the decision of the 
famous Estonian composer Eduard Tubin from Stockholm to accept an official invitation to 
Tallinn, where one of his ballets was to be performed.
679
 Tubin’s visit to the Soviet Union was 
collectively condemned and the composer himself thrown out of his students’ fraternity,680 
which in view of the importance of fraternities and sororities in Estonian society marked a 
severe act of social exclusion. The so-called ‘Tuldava affair’ a few years later was grist to the 
mill of those who favoured a radically isolationist stance. The brilliant linguist Juhan Tuldava, 
the son of an Estonian diplomat who had been deported by the Soviets in 1941, had come to 
Sweden in the late 1950s via Finland as a political refugee. Tuldava was given a warm 
welcome by the exile community,
681
 especially by the right-wing camp of REE. The ERN and 
particularly August Rei, however, remained suspicious, with good reasons, as it turned out. 
Eventually, Tuldava was unmasked by the CIA as a KGB agent that had been sent to Sweden 
in order to infiltrate the exile community, which caused one of the major spy scandals in the 
Estonian emigration’s history.682 The isolationist stance of a majority of exiles thus rooted 
both in the still wide-spread fear of infiltration and the refusal to implicitly recognise the 
Soviet occupation by applying for a Soviet visa for visiting Estonia. Up to the perestroika 
years, the issue of visiting the home country thus remained a highly controversial topic. 
A similar conflict loomed among the Polish emigration, where the generation of war refugees 
still adhered to the ‘codex of the political émigré’, severely condemning visits to communist 
Poland. For the younger exiles, however, this ideological orthodoxy had already turned into a 
living anachronism. As elsewhere among Polish second generation émigrés in the West
683
, the 
interest among young Poles in Sweden in their home country rapidly grew with the increased 
possibilities to visit it. Thus, they consciously distanced themselves from what they perceived 
was backward-looking rigidity, which was reflected in discourses in Poland itself:  
“Feeling the homeland from a distance on the basis of atavism or the knowledge of its past”, the 
conformist Catholic newspaper Słowo Powszechne stated, “rather belongs to the domain of poetry 
than practice. Today, the same is true for the Polish émigrés, who left the country in 1939 or 1945. 
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They want to pass as experts on what is happening in Poland. [But] they keep forgetting that it 
soon will be a quarter of a century that separates us from the outbreak of the war.”684   
The articulated determination of large parts of the Polish diaspora in Sweden to maintain 
close bonds with the fatherland was reflected by the establishment of numerous organisations 
that were supposed to support the modernisation and reconstruction programmes in the 
People’s Republic. Poles in Sweden started to engage in local committees for the financial 
support of projects such as the rebuilding of Warsaw’s destroyed Royal Castle or the aspired 
opening of a thousand new schools on the occasion of the Polish Millenium in 1966,
685
 
thereby reaffirming the vital and wide-spread interest in an active participation in the 
homeland’s future development. Especially among the younger generation, the dynamic 
modernisation process and the reconstruction of the war-torn cities in communist Poland 
evoked a certain respect and even admiration, which obviously defied the fiery counter-
campaigns of the conservative faction of the political emigration.
686
 The policy of self-
isolation, which the old guard in its majority represented, increasingly lost ground.  
 
The highly controversial discourse on the question of how to make use of the liberalisation of 
East-West communication and the expanded infrastructure across the Baltic Sea for exchange 
with the home country widened the gap between the different factions among the Polish and 
Estonian emigration. Especially the generational divide played a significant role in reinforcing 
the schism. The increasing ‘apolitical’ exchange between the mostly younger exile 
representatives and the homeland groups effectively undermined the old guard’s traditional 
line of non-recognition of the geopolitical status quo in post-war Europe. Seen from the 
perspective of the communist regimes, this was a favourable development. Already in the 
early 1960s, the Soviet embassy in Stockholm could report to Tallinn that the emerging split 
within the Estonian community was strong enough to take much of the wind out of the sails of 
the ‘struggling exile’.687 The Warsaw regime, on the other hand, actively tried to reinforce the 
disintegrative tendencies between the outspokenly anti-communist exile circles and the 
politically rather neutral Polonia by consequently applying terms like ‘reactionary’ and 
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‘archaic’ to the anti-communist faction of former war refugees. It was in the regime’s interest 
to reduce the ‘state in exile’ to a small minority of “political dinosaurs”.688  
With the onset of détente, it seemed as if time was on the side of the representatives of the 
communist order on Sweden’s opposite coasts. As the 1960s came to an end, the exile 
struggle entered its fourth decade. Many of the front figures of the political emigration, who 
had earned their reputation and authority among the exile communities through their pre-war 
careers and the merits of their commitment to the national cause during World War II, had 
either died or retired from the political stage.
689
 Especially the case of the Polish community 
in Sweden had illustrated the considerable decline in the political commitment of the older 
generation during the 1950s. The death of General Anders in London in May 1970 finally 
brought down the final curtain for the era of charismatic exile leaders, which marked a 
decisive watershed in the history of Poland’s emigration in the West.690  
A similar development could be observed in the case of the Estonian exiles. Indeed, still in the 
late 1960s, the Hoover Institution considered the transnationally operating front of Estonian 
exile activists to be the most vivid community of its kind in terms of lobbying and publishing 
activities. The list of émigré movements that actively fought for either national sovereignty or 
regime changes in the homeland was topped by the three Baltic communities, followed by the 
Ukrainians, Portuguese and Greeks.
691
 However, the vigour of the Estonian activists was also 
not inexhaustible. The hope for a Soviet withdrawal from Estonia and the resurrection of a 
sovereign nation state had faded. Already in the early 1960s, this severely affected the 
fighting spirit even among the most committed activists, as a letter of Arvo Horm to Eero 
Omri, one of the North American cooperation partners of the ERN, illustrates: 
 “You also should not forget that we here are very tired, the emigration is disintegrating, weary, 
aged and we have a lot of trouble to hold the whole enormous organisation together and to finance 
it in such a damned neutral, sleeping country as Sweden, that we are sometimes depressed and 
downright desperate.”692 
In the course of the decade, the level of activity of the Estonian emigration in Sweden 
continuously declined. As in the case of the Poles, it was not only the change of the political 
climate, but also the consequences of ageing and death among the rows of first generation 
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activists that considerably weakened the struggle for national liberation. With August Rei, the 
head of the ERN and the government in exile, and Aleksander Kaelas, one of the most 
recognised exile experts on the political and economic development in Soviet Estonia, the 
anti-communist Estonian exile in Sweden had lost some of its leading spearheads. Rei’s 
successor Aleksander Warma, who as Rei himself had played a key role for the anti-Soviet 
opposition outside Estonia from 1940 onwards, held the post as the ‘Prime Minister in duties 
of the President of the Republic of Estonia’ until his death in 1970, when he was replaced by 
the exile newspaper Teataja’s chief editor Tõnis Kint. The recruiting of young Estonians who 
were able to fill the increasing gaps developed into one of the main challenges of the political 
emigration. Already the medium generation of middle-aged émigrés was poorly represented 
in the exile organisations’ leading positions, while the youth was largely absent.693  
Crucial for the future of the Estonian exile struggle in Sweden was also the fact that its most 
prominent Swedish supporters had died by the early 1970s. Among them were Sigurd 
Curman, a loyal ally of the Balts and one of the key agents of the evacuation programme in 
1944, and Birger Nerman, the longstanding head of the Baltic Committee and one of the most 
ardent advocates of the Baltic nations’ right to sovereignty. The passing away of the 
generation of activists of the first hour undermined the bedrock of the alliance between the 
Estonian exiles and their Swedish supporters. So far, it had been secured by the commitment 
of a number of outstanding representatives of Sweden’s political and intellectual life, who 
themselves partly had had strong personal pre-war bonds to the formerly independent Baltic 
states. In the course of the generational shift, even the large number of passive supporters in 
Scandinavia steadily declined, which deprived the political émigré community of the 
subsidies and donations that had made it possible to bridge the economic difficulties that the 
maintenance of a vast, organised lobbying activity on a volunteer basis had implied.
694
  
 
In view of the radical change of ideological values with which the New Left had swept across 
the Western societies, the political exile communities from behind the Iron Curtain had to face 
a steadily declining level of Western support and sympathy for their struggle against the 
communist order in their countries of origin, especially among the younger generation. The 
late 1960s marked the inexorable decline of the highly institutionalised, transnational anti-
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communist front that had developed in line with the rising superpower tensions in the 1950s. 
The phalanx of messianic anticommunism, behind which the Central and Eastern European 
exiles had lined up and which had secured the continuation of their political activity, steadily 
crumbled away under the influence of the ideological reorientation processes. With the 
gradual opening up of the borders between the blocs, opinion-makers in the West actively 
fostered the ‘de-demonisation’ of the Soviet Union, even in the United States, the motherland 
of strident opposition to communist expansionism. Intellectuals and scholars who had visited 
the country considerably contributed to the revision of stereotypes about life under 
communism, which turned the “older images of totalitarianism, with their tableaux of 
terrorized and atomized populations,” into obsolete remnants of the past.695   
By the end of the 1960s, the ‘cold warriors’ were already largely discredited in the West,696 
not at least due to the more dubious aspects of anti-communist warfare that had been 
uncovered by a number of investigative journalists. In 1967, the U.S. magazine Ramparts, one 
of the organs of the New Left, revealed the far-reaching entanglements between U.S. 
intelligence and numerous youth and student organisations, which the CIA had been 
supporting financially for propagandistic reasons since 1952.
697
 Already one year earlier, the 
New York Times had reported on the CIA’s close entanglements with the Paris-based 
Congress for Cultural Freedom, an association of both conservative and more liberal leftist 
intellectuals, which unveiled a whole network of “screen foundations” that fuelled anti-
communist propaganda under the pretext of culture.
698
 The public exposure of the underlying 
transatlantic structures of anti-communist opinion-making put an end to much of the U.S.-
financed activity in the field, leading to the dissolution of around six hundred anti-communist 
organisations in Europe.
699
 This, of course, had a negative impact on the political work of the 
émigré activists, who at the same time lost their previous status of “desired partners”700 of the 
Western governments. The Western governments’ explicit willingness to find a modus 
vivendi with the communist states implied the “survivability for the post-1945 geopolitical 
settlement”,701 which the exiles had been fighting since the days of World War II.  
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The radical processes of societal transformation and the overwhelming comeback of leftist 
thinking was especially noticeable in Sweden, which not only on the governmental level 
turned into one of the forerunners of European anti-Americanism and pronouncedly pro-leftist 
sympathies. The Swedish youth mobilised against the virulent Western anticommunism of the 
preceding decade, accusing the United States of the same expansionism that the ‘cold 
warriors’ had previously charged the Soviets with. By the late 1960s, communism had 
developed into a highly polycentric ideology, which offered the protest generation a wide 
variety of political idols and heroes to choose from. Thus, the wave of leftist sympathies had, 
paradoxically enough, an, as it in this context could be called, ‘anti-communist’ dimension in 
itself. Due to its support for sundry communist factions all over the world, the New Left could 
allow for a general criticism against ‘cold warfare’, which did not spare the Soviet Union and 
its version of ‘really existing socialism’. Especially after the Warsaw Pact invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, the motherland of communism was widely discredited among young Swedes 
as a “country of social fascism and state capitalism”.702  
The predominantly critical stance towards the Kremlin’s power politics, however, did not 
generate any noticeable solidarity with the peoples in Central and Eastern Europe among the 
younger generation, although first signs of organised societal opposition behind the Iron 
Curtain became visible. “Sweden should not collaborate with such rightist movements. 
Besides, I consider the freedom in Czechoslovakia and Hungary to be sufficient”, as Per 
Gahrton, one of the young Swedish liberals who opted for a ‘leftist liberalism’, put it.703 Seen 
from the perspective of the exiles, it was a paradox that communism, which gradually 
developed into an “outdated, degenerate ideology” among the masses of disillusioned citizens 
behind the Iron Curtain, was “retaining its old positions and even gaining new ground by its 
clever subversive tactics” in the West, as Arvo Horm put it.704 In view of the increasingly pro-
leftist moods and sympathies that pervaded large parts of Swedish society and media, the 
conservatives, the traditional supporters of the exile communities, faced a continuous decline 
of political authority and influence. Moreover, the previously benevolent attitude of the social 
democratic governments under Tage Erlander, which had been relatively tolerant towards the 
political activities of émigrés, vanished with the party’s ideological shift to the left. The 
decision of the Swedish Social Democratic Youth League, Sveriges Socialdemokratiska 
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Ungdomsförbund, to support the Finnish initiative of excluding the sister organisation of exile 
Estonians from the International Union of Socialist Youth in 1969 can thus be seen as 
symptomatic for the changed social democratic approach to the issue of exile activism.
705
  
 
As has been shown, the core of the political emigration of both Poles and Estonians in 
Sweden had to face a set of structural disadvantages, which led to the increasing 
marginalisation of the politically conservative, openly anti-communist faction among the 
exiles. The foundation for the broad societal and political support, which since the onset of the 
Cold War had sustained the anti-communist exile struggle, was crumbling under the spirit of 
détente that pervaded both the international political agenda and the ideological convictions of 
a new generation. The political demarcation processes between the generations in Cold War 
Europe were mirrored within the exile communities themselves. The recruitment of 
successors that could fill the gaps in the rows left by the departure of the ageing activists of 
the first hour turned out to be difficult, which additionally weakened political activism among 
the exiles. Yet, one of the major obstacles for a direct cooperation and convergence between 
anti-communist forces in exile communities and the homeland were the different perceptions 
of how to oppose the communist regimes. Seen from the perspective of the younger 
generation in Soviet Estonia and the People’s Republic of Poland, the conservative 
emigration’s strategy of denying Yalta and clinging to a pre-1939 status was anachronistic. 
Instead, societal discontent and opposition was channelled by applying the ideological 
framework and aspirations of the regime itself. It was thus an additional level of the 
generational divide and the lack of a common language that impeded the cooperation between 
oppositional camps on both sides of the Iron Curtain.  
Already the first encounters during the period of de-Stalinisation had illustrated the beginning 
of an alienation that increasingly characterised the attitude of the citizens of the communist 
states towards their compatriots in exile. By the mid-1960s, when détente considerably 
intensified the dynamics of interaction across the bloc border, the results of these 
deconstructive tendencies were already more than obvious, especially in the case of the 
generation that had grown up under communist rule. In the course of the rapid post-war 
transformation of the societies in Moscow’s sphere of influence according to a Soviet model 
of modernity, education became accessible to much larger segments of society than before the 
war in most of the communist states. The state-sponsored raising of a new generation of well-
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educated citizens, however, did not have an immediately destabilising influence on the 
authoritarian structure of the system. The effect was, at least initially, quite the reverse, as 
mass education in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism turned out to be the “major vehicle for 
indoctrination and conformist mentality”.706 Societal opposition to the practices of the 
communist regimes of course still existed behind the Iron Curtain, but the era of active anti-
communist resistance was irrevocably over. Intellectual criticism against state power indeed 
found expression in a revisionist turn, which juxtaposed the ideal of a ‘democratic socialism’ 
to the ‘really existing socialism’ of the present. Yet, striving for a better, but nonetheless 
“socialist future”707, the oppositional concepts of the reform communists did not challenge the 
general ideological framework of the communist order.   
The oppositional agenda of the émigrés, by contrast, remained in its anti-communist 
incarnation of the early 1950s. This fundamentally deepened the estrangement between exiled 
and their homeland counterparts and consolidated the mental gaps that severely hampered the 
development of an oppositional dialogue across the Iron Curtain. The proverbial Polish spirit 
of resistance had been transformed from a mainly conspiratorial, underground phenomenon 
into a form of public intellectual criticism, which signalled an articulated willingness to 
accept the political status quo and to establish a constructive dialogue with the regime. The 
critics of the communist reality in Poland were not determined to overthrow the system, but to 
reform it by referring to “a less political, more philosophically radical, or more concrete 
Marxism”.708 This new language of opposition was, however, incompatible with the political 
mentality of the anti-communist émigrés. The political credo of the war refugees in the West 
was largely based on the pre-war traditions of right-wing nationalism, fervent Catholicism and 
a landscape of political parties that had ceased to exist in communist Poland. Seen from the 
homeland perspective, this fundamental ideological divergence increasingly turned the 
political émigré organisations into an anachronistic remnant of the Second Republic.
709
 
The evolution of the relations between the Estonian diaspora and Soviet Estonia in the 1960s 
shares many parallels with the Polish case. Up to the mid-1950s, the topos of national 
resistance to Soviet rule was alive on both sides of the Iron Curtain. There had been an 
unconscious consensus between exiled and homeland communities that only a military attack 
on the Soviet Union and a subsequent World War III would bring liberation from the yoke of 
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Soviet or, as it was widely perceived, Russian rule. Yet, in Estonia, these hopes were finally 
crushed in the mid-1950s by the disappointment of the failed Hungarian revolution and the 
final dissolution of the partisan units. National resistance took increasingly passive forms and 
retreated into the realm of anti-Soviet anecdotes, songs and a determination to preserve the 
linguistic and cultural heritage.
710
 The belief that war would be the only adequate answer to 
the challenges of Russification and Sovietisation survived considerably longer among the 
exiles in the West.
711
 But soon, it became obvious that major social changes were imminent in 
Soviet Estonia, whose dimension the exiles could only guess on the basis of the fragments of 
information that leaked out to the West. In the course of the 1960s, Estonia was transformed 
from a conquered and defeated collective victim of Soviet expansionism into a more dynamic, 
increasingly optimistic society that was determined to reach a compromise in national issues 
within the Soviet system. While the Estonians in exile continued to categorically condemn 
Soviet rule and ruling practices, the homeland displayed an increased willingness to adjust to 
the given conditions.  
After the gloomy years of Stalinist terror, a certain degree of careful optimism could be felt in 
Soviet Estonia. The Soviet republic’s government in Tallinn had proved that a limited 
national emancipation was possible even within the system. The percentage of native 
Estonians among the party officials and administrative employees was considerably 
increased,
712
 which boosted primarily the younger citizens’ trust in the Kremlin’s willingness 
to respect their national identity. Moreover, under Käbin’s rule, the Estonian SSR turned into 
one of Moscow’s favourite experimental fields for systemic innovation, as not least the 
establishment of a direct traffic connection to a capitalist country had proved.
713
 Against this 
background, the “Komsomol generation of the ‘Golden Sixties’”714 developed a rather 
pragmatic and conformist attitude that made it possible to leave the heritage of the interwar 
period, which formed the last common point of reference for the older generation at home and 
in exile communities, behind.
715
  
With the generational shift, the alienation process between exiled and homeland groups 
accelerated. Among the Estonian diaspora in the West, the images of life in Soviet Estonia as 
an endless suffering of an enslaved and terrorised population, which had dominated the exile 
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perception of the homeland during Stalinism, still prevailed. Any kind of conformist 
behaviour was hence stigmatised as collaboration, which led to the wide-spread conviction 
that the emigration in the West constituted the only surviving ‘nationally healthy’ part of the 
Estonian people, whereas the compatriots at home had turned into communists.
716
 This 
extreme position was prevalent mainly among the North American diaspora, which, in 
contrast to the exiles in Sweden, lacked the experience of direct interaction with visitors from 
Soviet Estonia. However, ideas of that kind were echoed in Sweden as well, especially among 
the elderly and the sympathisers of the REE faction, which represented a similarly strict 
stance towards the home country and all kinds of direct contacts across the Baltic Sea. 
 
The 1960s saw the beginning of a process of regional integration, which was based on a 
considerably livelier exchange between the Baltic shores not only between Poland and its 
opposite coasts. The establishment of a direct connection between Tallinn and neutral 
Finland, which was an, in the general Soviet context, unique, step towards liberalisation, 
reconnected even Estonia to the expanding infrastructural web of cross-Baltic routes. As 
neutral states, Sweden and Finland once again played a crucial role as ‘bridge builders’ in 
Cold War Europe, which made the specific Baltic connection across the Iron Curtain possible 
and contributed to the creation of a space of exceptionally intense East-West interaction. 
Thus, even in the context of the generally facilitated flows of people, goods and information 
across the bloc border, the Baltic Sea Region formed a special field of experimental 
liberalisation. Yet, instead of contributing to strengthening oppositional alliances across the 
Baltic Sea, the integration processes in the region had, at least initially, the opposite effect. 
The willingness of a growing number of mostly younger exiles from Poland and Estonia to 
make use of the facilitated opportunities to visit the home country at first glance rather 
supported the communist regimes’ aim to depoliticise the contact between the exiled and their 
homeland. The anti-communist faction of first generation activists had proved to be unable to 
recruit suitable successors among the following generation, which, as the more assimilated 
part of the exile societies, was certainly not unaffected by the prevailing political spirit of the 
time and the general renunciation from ‘Cold War thinking’. By adhering to the pattern of 
self-isolation and the anachronistic images of Stalinist totalitarianism behind the Iron Curtain, 
the core of anti-communist exile activism in Sweden was at risk of isolating itself from both 
the homeland societies and the younger generation in exile. It was first with the fundamental 
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reconfiguration of concepts of opposition both in exile and the home country that oppositional 
forces on both sides of the Iron Curtain found a common language and the processes of 
interaction and exchange between the Baltic shores regained political relevance. 
 
 
V.2 Adapting to the status quo: The reformation of oppositional politics in 
East and West  
Paradoxically, it was the seemingly stabilising process of détente that heralded the beginning 
deconstruction of the political order in Central and Eastern Europe. Unexpectedly, the demise 
of communism started from within. At the peak of the pro-leftist euphoria of a rebelling 
Western youth, which in a spirit of social revolution effectively challenged the ideological 
superstructure of international policy-making, Soviet-style communism suffered a mortal 
blow. In August 1968, Brezhnev authorised the Warsaw Pact forces to conduct a military 
intervention in Czechoslovakia, where the reform-minded First Secretary of the Communist 
Party, Alexander Dubček, had launched a liberal political course in search of ‘socialism with 
a human face’. Moscow’s brutal suppression of the Czechoslovak experiment caused 
enormous damage to the official ideology, from which it would never recover. The Prague 
Spring came to symbolise the inability of the communist system to reform itself. Reform 
communism was buried and with it the spirit of conformism and fatalistic realism, which had 
characterised a whole post-war generation. In this context, the dissident Adam Michnik’s 
words have relevance beyond the Polish case: “First in 1968, we understood that we were up 
against a totalitarian, absolutely ruthless power, which before our very eyes stifled elementary 
human values”.717  
The formation of a new kind of societal opposition, which could be observed in various 
national incarnations in communist Europe from the late 1960s onwards, did not emerge 
overnight. It was rather the result of a gradual process that had started several years earlier, 
when the communist orbit had still been characterised by internal stability. The earliest core 
of this “parallel polis”,718 which increasingly challenged the authoritarian regimes behind the 
Iron Curtain, was to be found in the Soviet Union of the Thaw years. While the Soviet Empire 
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had proven to be immune to the armed guerrilla warfare in its western peripheries, the 
leadership turned increasingly nervous in view of the nonconformist tendencies among the 
educated strata in the Russian heartland. The wide-spread dissemination of the book One Day 
in the Life of Ivan Denisovich reflected these “momentous changes [...] on the Soviet home 
front”.719 Aleksander Solzhenitsyn’s reckoning with Stalinism, which depicted the opaque 
world of the Gulag, the institutionalised net of forced labour camps in the vast, scarcely 
populated areas of the giant realm, had been legally edited at the peak of de-Stalinisation in 
late 1962. It turned into one of the literary works that most efficiently fuelled the “explosion 
of popular discontent”720 in the late Khrushchev era, setting the focus on human rights issues 
and thus permanently damaging the legitimacy of the communist government.
721
 Nikita 
Khrushchev’s dismissal in autumn 1964 marked a restorative turn in Soviet domestic policy. 
The new leadership under Leonid Brezhnev displayed a determination to return to the stability 
of Stalin’s days, manifested in a partial rehabilitation of the ‘Father of Nations’ and a stricter 
censorship policy,
722
 which forced the critical public discourse to go underground. 
In the mid-1960s, a new type of political agent entered the stage. Societal criticism against 
Brezhnev’s “backslide to neo-Stalinism”723 was increasingly politicised inside the Soviet 
Union and found its first open manifestation in a public meeting held in Moscow’s Pushkin 
Square in December 1965. Around two hundred people had gathered in order to protest 
against the show trial against the writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, who were 
accused of having smuggled anti-Soviet material abroad for publication. For the first time, 
citizens of a communist state openly demanded the observance of human rights by directly 
referring to the constitution. The Moscow protest was the starting shot for a new kind of 
societal opposition, which expressed its criticism by pointing out the fundamental divergence 
between the official legal commitments of the socialist states and their practical 
implementation. Over the course of time, the first spontaneous grassroots-level protests of this 
kind transformed into a movement that enjoyed considerable societal support.
724
 The 
defenders of democratic and human rights, many of whom belonged to the cultural and 
scientific intelligentsia, became known as ‘dissidents’ in the West. The term was even used by 
Soviet propaganda itself instead of the “Russian equivalent inakomysliashchii – probably as 
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part of an official attempt to portray such people as stooges of the West”.725 Yet, the Soviet 
leadership soon understood that the phenomenon was firmly rooted in Soviet Russian society. 
Passive opposition increasingly replaced the spirit of societal optimism and spread in many 
central institutions of the Soviet Union, illustrating the pervasive power of this new “culture 
of dissent”.726 The formation of the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in 1969 
marked a decisive watershed. For the first time, non-governmental circles had been able to 
establish a loose network of oppositional forces, which publicly criticised the Communist 
Party.
727
 Their argumentation was based on highly moral values and supported by the 
constitutional and legal framework of the Soviet Union itself. Thus, the human rights 
movement developed a force that had the potential to strike at the very foundations of the 
legitimacy and stability of Soviet rule. 
The nucleus of Soviet dissent emerged out of the intellectual environment of Moscow and 
Leningrad, the centres of the Russian intelligentsia. Soon, however, the ideas spread from the 
highly urbanised areas to the countryside and from the Russian heartland to the Soviet 
Empire’s western peripheries.728 Ironically, it was the labour camps as institutions of 
punishment for those who had leaped out of the conformist masses that turned into one of the 
major channels for the dissemination of oppositional thinking. The camps developed into 
meeting places for a pan-Soviet kaleidoscope of actors with an outspokenly critical attitude 
towards the system, which paved the way for the emergence of the first oppositional networks 
that went beyond the borders of the Soviet republics. Enn Tarto, like Mart Niklus a central 
key figure of the first generation of Soviet Estonian dissent, recalls that fundamental 
principles and strategies of national resistance, which gradually started to emerge from the 
late 1960s onwards in the non-Russian republics along the Soviet Union’s western borders, 
were elaborated among political prisoners with different national or ethnic backgrounds.
729
 
The patriotic activists among the camp inmates agreed on the Russian intelligentsia’s strategy 
of referring both to the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights and the legal framework 
of the Soviet constitution as a point of departure. As the dissident ideas reached Soviet 
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Estonia towards the turn of the decade, the spirit of resistance left lasting marks on the 
intellectual discourses in the Estonian SSR.
730
  
However, in comparison to the spirit of unrest that swept over the satellite belt, the situation 
in the Soviet Baltic republics was still relatively stable. The development in Poland, 
traditionally one of the most restive countries among Stalin’s territorial war-time conquests, 
had gone much further. There was a seething discontent especially among the intelligentsia, 
which increasingly dared to openly question the founding myths of the People’s Republic and 
thus the historical truths of the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the past. While the official 
propaganda still clung to the mantra of the historical friendship between Poles and Russians, a 
growing number of exile publications that reached Poland illegally from the West revealed a 
different picture. Already during the Thaw years, Giedroyć in Paris had shown a vivid interest 
in reaching out to communist Poland. By the 1960s, a net of various smuggling channels 
secured a regular stream of exile publications to the home country, predominantly deriving 
from the publishing house Instytut Literacki in Maison-Laffitte, outside Paris, which also 
edited the monthly journal Kultura. The influence of these publications on the political 
climate in Poland cannot be underestimated, as they were the only Western publications that 
were widely available among the educated strata. The mass dissemination of Kultura, which 
had developed into a major forum for a critical historical discourse, gradually undermined the 
regime’s efforts to suppress a public discussion of the hushed up events in Poland’s recent 
history. Moreover, it triggered the development of new political and ideational conceptions, 
which were considerably influenced by the parallel discourses among émigré intellectuals. 
Therefore, Kultura can be seen as a breeding ground for the intellectual opposition that 
emerged in communist Poland during the 1960s.
731
 For the most part of the decade, these 
dynamics found a peaceful outlet in the prevailing spirit of reform communism, until the 
events of March 1968 put an end to the belief in the possibility of reforming the communist 
system.  
 
The student riots on the streets of Warsaw, which echoed the increasing societal opposition to 
the relapse into methods of harsher authoritarian rule all over communist Europe, marked a 
decisive watershed in Poland’s post-war history. Their repercussions affected the Polish 
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diaspora directly, especially the émigrés in Sweden, for whom Poland’s most serious political 
crisis since 1956 marked a radical rupture. The most visible effect of the political turmoil on 
the opposite coast was the increased influx of Polish asylum seekers to the neutral country. 
Polish emigration to Sweden had, since the mid-1950s, been characterised mainly by 
economic motives. The largely apolitical character of the migratory movements across the 
Baltic Sea partly explains the constant decline of political exile activity and the wide-spread 
willingness to maintain close bonds with the home country among the Polish community in 
Sweden. However, with the new wave of Polish immigration to Sweden from 1968 onwards, 
this trend was broken. Between 1968 and 1971, several thousand Polish citizens of Jewish 
origin were granted political asylum, followed by a second wave of mostly non-Jewish Poles 
who reached Sweden in the aftermath of the 1970 workers’ protests.732 The arrival of 
thousands of political refugees from the home country constituted a challenge for the Polish 
exile community. As eyewitnesses of the accelerating crisis of the People’s Republic, they 
had a distinctly oppositional political profile, which, however, crucially differed from the 
anticommunism of the old guard. But in spite of the mixed reactions that their arrival 
provoked, the Polish Jews triggered a renaissance of anti-communist exile activism on 
Swedish soil.  
The Warsaw regime’s anti-Semitic or, as Gomułka himself labelled it, ‘anti-Zionist’ campaign 
had its roots in the escalating Arab-Israeli conflict, which reached a peak in the guise of the 
Six-Day War in June 1967. Poland adopted the pro-Arab stance of the Kremlin and initiated a 
propaganda crusade against the fully assimilated Jewish minority, which was identified as a 
‘fifth column’ of supporters of the ‘Israeli aggressor’. The First Secretary of the Polish 
Communist Party left the practical part to the Minister of the Interior, the hardliner General 
Mieczysław Moczar, who executed first purges among the armed forces.733 As it turned out, 
this was only a prelude to the much more vigorous anti-Semitic propaganda offensive of the 
following spring.  
In early March 1968, a theatre performance in Warsaw provoked an avalanche of public 
protests. The classical drama Forefathers’ Eve, written by the great Polish romanticist and 
national hero Adam Mickiewicz during the era of Poland’s partition, regained its former 
explosive political force due to the strong appeals to patriotic and anti-Russian sentiments. In 
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view of the surprisingly dynamic transfer of revolutionary moods from the stage to the 
audience, which culminated in the first street manifestation since 1956, the authorities opted 
for a radical preventive measure and banned the play. But this crude act of censorship did not 
solve the problem. By contrast, it provoked a storm of indignation among Warsaw’s 
intellectual elite, which led to further manifestations of societal discontent during the 
following days. The dismissal of two students from the University of Warsaw, Adam Michnik 
and Henryk Szlajfer, both of partially Jewish origin, was the final straw.
734
 Students and 
professors organised a mass meeting, defending the democratic freedoms of speech and 
assembly by referring to their firm entrenchment in the People’s Republic’s constitution, 
which mirrored the argumentation of the Soviet dissidents. The arrival of heavily armed 
militia units, however, quickly dissolved the meeting and clearly signalled that the 
government would adhere to its belief in violence as an all-purpose remedy to maintain public 
order.
735
 Dozens of students and even some of the professors, among them the Marxist 
philosopher Leszek Kołakowski, were expelled from the university. Strikingly many of them 
had a Jewish background, which, as Tony Judt has pointed out, “was no coincidence”.736 The 
motif of the ‘fifth column’ returned and led to purges in a large number of official institutions 
and authorities. ‘Zionist’ had become the word du jour in 1968 Poland, closely linked to and 
practically synonymous with attributes like ‘oppositional’, ‘dissent’ and ‘anti-communist’.737 
The officially sanctioned discrimination induced around 13,000 Polish citizens of Jewish 
descent to leave the country, which amounted to half of the remaining Jewish population in 
communist Poland. As the anti-Semitic campaign was mainly targeted against the 
intelligentsia, the percentage of urban residents with higher education was disproportionally 
high.
738
 Gomułka did not hide the fact that the Polish government supported and even actively 
encouraged Jewish emigration, which thus proceeded legally and in accordance with the 
political leadership. The required passports, otherwise not always easy to obtain, were 
distributed en masse, but for the Jews they were in fact one-way tickets to the West. Having 
left the country, they were automatically deprived of their Polish citizenship and thus 
stateless. However, only a minority reached Israel, the officially declared destination at the 
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time of their departure from Poland. Many Polish Jews eventually migrated to Western 
Europe, mostly to France, Italy or Sweden, depending on which embassy they had contacted 
prior to their departure.
739
 The Swedish embassy in Warsaw displayed unconditional moral 
support for Jews that were willing to leave the country, since the Swedish parliament had 
agreed to grant political asylum to two thousand families of “aggrieved refugees”.740 
Eventually, an estimated number of five thousand Polish Jews arrived in Sweden.
741
 By 
expelling its Jewish citizens, the Warsaw regime had thus bargained on getting rid of a 
significant part of a potentially oppositional intelligentsia. Yet, due to Sweden’s solidarity 
with the persecuted minority, a considerable part of them ended up in Poland’s immediate 
neighbourhood, which would take its toll in the course of the next decade. 
It soon turned out that Warsaw‘s strategy of labelling the Jews and especially the 
intelligentsia as anti-Polish agents did not lead to internal stability. Although the political 
leadership initially succeeded in playing off the working class against the intellectuals, it was 
soon the turn of the workers to set off a wave of mass protests. The demonstrations started in 
mid-December 1970, only a week after the Gomułka regime had achieved its greatest foreign 
policy success: the signing of the so-called Treaty of Warsaw by the People’s Republic and 
the Federal Republic of Germany, which de facto implied a West German recognition of the 
current Polish borders. It was the government’s decision to dramatically raise the food prices 
shortly before Christmas that precipitated the country’s next major crisis. The situation 
escalated as the militsia and the army fired into the peaceful crowds of protesters in Gdynia, 
Poland’s major port city, which caused dozens of casualties. But the repeated use of naked 
violence finally cost Gomułka his position. The former shining light of the ‘Polish road to 
socialism’ was quickly replaced by his down-to-earth comrade Edward Gierek, who not least 
due to his working class background and the resulting credibility, but also at the cost of far-
reaching financial concessions succeeded in temporarily restoring the workers’ confidence.742 
However, the wave of mass emigration to the West continued. In 1971 alone, 2,500 Polish 
asylum seekers arrived to Sweden, followed by an approximate number of one thousand every 
year up to 1974.
743
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Considering the relatively small size of Sweden’s Polish community, it becomes clear why 
the influx of several thousand refugees in only half a decade radically altered the exile 
community and its relations to the home country. Especially the old guard of war refugees 
maintained a sceptical distance from the asylum seekers, fearing communist provocation and 
targeted infiltration.
744
 There were rumours going around that most of the Jewish immigrants 
had been party officials and functionaries of the Office of Public Security, which indeed was 
not pure invention.
745
 This atmosphere of suspicion and distrust induced the Polish Refugee 
Council, the old emigration’s central umbrella organisation, to modify its statute in order to 
prevent the new generation of refugees from dominating it.
746
 However, it turned out that the 
immigrants from communist Poland were fairly indifferent towards the established émigré 
institutions. Having been raised and socialised in a country that had very little in common 
with the pre-war republic, whose political heritage was still cherished among the older 
émigrés, the newly arrived refugees displayed similar reactions to the old guard as their age-
mates that had grown up in exile.
747
 Although especially the Jewish refugees nursed a deep 
grievance against the state that had expelled them, there were no signs of convergence 
between their hostile attitude towards the regime in Warsaw and the old émigré 
anticommunism. On the one hand, only a minority of the newcomer refugees actively engaged 
in political issues.
748
 Those who did, on the other hand, preferred to establish close ties within 
their own group and focused on networking with Western agents instead of trying to melt into 
the exile society.
749
 
The ‘new emigration’, as the community of Poles who immigrated from 1968 onwards was 
called, considerably revitalised the Swedish discourses on the political development in 
communist Poland. The Swedes developed a distinct interest in the anti-Semitic campaign and 
its background, which was reflected in the increased attention in the roots of Poland’s internal 
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unrest among Swedish journalists and publicists.
750
 As eyewitnesses of the state-sponsored 
anti-Semitic campaign and its repercussions on the social climate, the Polish Jews in Sweden 
turned into important sources of first-hand information. Their reports resulted in a highly 
critical coverage of the topic by the press as well as Sweden’s radio and television.751 The 
dominant tone of the Swedish media thus increasingly counteracted the spirit of 
rapprochement that still characterised the official Swedish-Polish relations.
752
  
But the immigrants themselves also actively used their background knowledge in order to 
revitalise the critical intellectual examination of Poland’s present and future. Due to the fact 
that most of the refugees of the post-1968 Jewish immigration wave settled down in Sweden’s 
few metropolitan areas, old pre-existing networks remained largely intact. This enabled the 
Polish-Jewish circles in Stockholm and Uppsala to start a lively publishing activity with own 
regularly edited journals. Thus, a new generation of activists could continue the oppositional 
discourses that had developed among the intelligentsia in Poland in the 1960s in the free 
West, not least due to the financial support that they received, among others from the Swedish 
Social Democratic Party.
753
 Among the journals they edited was Przegląd, which was 
published by the Association of Polish Jews in Sweden and heavily attacked the regime in 
Poland, and the Uppsala-based quarterly Aneks. The latter gained considerable popularity and 
developed into one of the most influential Polish exile journals.
754
 With a general focus on the 
political and ideological development behind the Iron Curtain, Aneks drew direct inspiration 
from Kultura, which also co-financed the first editions.
755
 
The divergent reactions of different factions of the political emigration to the new generation 
of oppositional activists from Poland illustrated two contradictory approaches to the home 
country.
756
 Already at an early stage, the circles around Kultura had distanced themselves 
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from the ideological dogmatism of ‘Polish London’. It was not without reason that the 
propaganda of the Warsaw regime by the late 1960s had proceeded to ridicule the bloated 
apparatus of the ‘state in exile’, while it continued its incessant attacks against the 
“ideological sabotage” of Giedroyć and Nowak-Jeziorański.757 Both Kultura and Radio Free 
Europe were considered to be significantly more dangerous enemies, as they represented 
specific circles among the emigration with an outspokenly pragmatic approach to the political 
reality in communist Poland. Thus, it was RFE’s Stockholm office that first reached out to the 
representatives of the ‘new emigration’ immediately after their arrival in Sweden. Lisiński 
and his colleagues knew how to use their expertise and first-hand knowledge as an invaluable 
asset. According to a Polish counterintelligence report, a number of newly arrived immigrants 
were recruited in order to conduct interviews with Polish tourists, sailors and political asylum 
seekers in Sweden on behalf of Radio Free Europe.
758
 Seen from the perspective of the 
Warsaw government, these kinds of oppositional exile-homeland alliances constituted a much 
more serious threat for the stability of the communist order then the polemical attacks of the 
government in exile.  
The anti-communist Polish emigration in Sweden consisted largely of supporters for the 
political course of the exiled government. However, by the end of the 1960s, the dynamics of 
anti-communist opposition in exile had moved from ‘Polish London’ to ‘Polish Paris’. For 
Giedroyć, the uninterrupted dialogue between exiled and their homeland compatriots formed 
a key aspect of opposition to the communist regime, if it was supposed to matter on either 
side of the Iron Curtain. This fundamental credo formed the bedrock of the increasing 
transnationalisation of Polish societal opposition, for which the Swedish connection would 
play a crucial role. Already by the onset of détente, it was difficult to unequivocally separate 
exile and homeland opposition, as Giedroyć’s oldest networks across the bloc border dated 
back to the second half of the 1950s. In spite of an effective counterintelligence apparatus, the 
regime never succeeded in locating and cutting off these clandestine connections.
759
 There 
was thus a steady stream of exile publications that found their way from Paris to the People’s 
Republic, where they were illegally disseminated and passed on from hand to hand. It is hard 
to estimate the dimension of the smuggling activities, although it is almost certain that a 
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“substantial part of [Kultura’s, L.F.S.] circulation”760 was allocated to be distributed behind 
the Iron Curtain. The effects, however, were indisputable. The intellectual forum that 
Giedroyć provided for selected, not exclusively Polish émigré writers and publicists was a 
crucial source of inspiration that to a large degree determined the evolution of oppositional 
thinking in Poland. In the course of the ‘March emigration’ from 1968 onwards, the exile 
community witnessed the arrival of a “large group of intellectuals raised in the home country 
on publications from the Literary Institute in Paris that had been smuggled to Poland”.761 In 
view of these strong entanglements between Kultura and the nonconformist Polish 
intelligentsia, it was only natural for Giedroyć to plead in favour of the integration of “new 
people from the home country” into the structures of exile activism in the West.762  
Kultura did not stand for a specific organisation or institution, and neither did it constitute a 
geographically fixed group of agents. The journal has rather turned into a synonym for an 
intellectual current that united a very loose network of Polish émigré intellectuals in different 
countries and on different continents. Neither was Jerzy Giedroyć himself a founding father of 
a specific school of political thinking. His role as Kultura’s editor was rather that of a 
mediator and moderator of a transnational intellectual discourse on the history, politics and 
possible future developments behind the Iron Curtain. The Literary Institute in Maisons-
Laffitte, a town on the outskirts of Paris, and the small permanent staff, consisting of 
Giedroyć himself, the artist Józef Czapski and Zygmunt and Zofia Hertz constituted the 
central node where all the threads came together. With the mass exodus of a post-war 
generation for which Kultura had been a highly recognised intellectual and moral authority, 
the journal’s position was considerably strengthened in the larger context of exile politics. In 
Sweden, the number of subscriptions skyrocketed with the arrival of several thousand second 
generation émigrés. It was also on their initative that the Society of Friends of Kultura, 
Towarzystwo Przyjaciół ‘Kultury’, was founded in Stockholm, a supporting organisation and 
representation of the journal in Sweden. The chairman of the society was Norbert Żaba, one 
of the activists of the first hour and spearhead of the anti-communist emigration. With the 
ideological visions and intellectual currents of Kultura as a common denominator, a first step 
towards bridging the generational gap and the abyss of differing political loyalties between 
the Polish emigration in Stockholm and the more pragmatic Parisian camp had been taken. 
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Most political émigrés in Sweden, however, maintained a reserved attitude towards the new 
generation and the progressive visions of Kultura. As a result of major political controversies 
within the conservative faction, a number of prominent exile activists were thrown out of the 
Polish Refugee Council in the beginning of the 1970s, among them Wiesław Patek, the 
official delegate of the London government in exile, and Norbert Żaba.763 The Society of 
Friends of Kultura, on the other hand, was excluded from the Centre of Polish Organisations 
for Independence, Ośrodek Polskich Organizacji Niepodległościowych, an umbrella 
organisation for all anti-communist exile associations in Sweden.
764
 The established political 
émigré circles thus missed the chance to forge alliances with the circles that represented and 
maintained contacts with oppositional forces in communist Poland. In the aftermath of the 
‘clash of generations’, the old guard of anti-communist émigrés secluded itself as an 
increasingly marginalised community with distinct clerical, militarist and nationalist traits. 
Nonetheless, Polish anti-communist activity was considerably revived in Sweden after a long 
period of decline due to the arrival of a huge number of younger immigrants that replaced the 
missing second generation cohort of émigré activists. 
 
In contrast to the case of the Polish diaspora, which due to the uninterrupted flow of Polish 
asylum seekers to Sweden regularly altered its composition and the balance between political 
and economic refugees, the Estonian community remained highly homogeneous throughout 
the Cold War. It was almost impossible to leave the Soviet Union illegally and the few 
Estonians that had settled in Sweden after the war were mostly elderly relatives that had been 
allowed to emigrate in the course of the family reunification programme of the late 1950s. 
The generational shift thus brought a younger group of agents to the scene, which in a 
biological sense formed a second generation of émigré activists. However, the evolution of 
their political strategies and ideological frame of reference bore a striking resemblance to the 
processes that revolutionised the Polish emigration from 1968 onwards. Thus, the term 
‘second generation’ can be used for comparative purposes in both cases, distinguishing the 
younger exile Estonians that became active during détente from the established anti-
communist elites of war refugees.
765
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Seen from the perspective of the generation that followed the veterans of the anti-Soviet and 
thus anti-communist exile struggle, the outcome of a quarter of a century of 
counterpropaganda and unconditional commitment to the cause of national liberation was 
rather sobering. In the mid-1960s, there was no reason to believe that Estonia would be 
liberated from the Soviet yoke in the near future. Also the invasion of Czechslovakia left little 
hope for a change of the status quo in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, a growing number of 
second generation exiles increasingly questioned the so far prevailing political strategies of 
the political emigration. The gap between the generations quickly widened, especially in view 
of the ongoing political changes of the late 1960s. These disintegrative tendencies were 
especially susceptible in North America,
766
 where the diaspora community in its majority 
represented an extremely conservative political stance. In 1967, a group of young and radical 
exile intellectuals established the Forest University, Metsaülikool, which was organised in 
Canada every year in the form of a summer camp that provided an open, political unbiased 
forum for discussions on the perspectives of life in exile and the development in the home 
country.
767
 The seminars were organised by a number of young Estonian university scholars 
from the United States and Canada, a group that was underrepresented among the Estonian 
community in Sweden, and not by exile politicians. This was a crucial difference, which 
highly contributed to the dynamics of the exile youth’s discourses during the annual meetings. 
From its beginning onwards, the Forest University succeeded in developing an alternative, 
pronouncedly intellectual and liberal environment that invited not only the North American 
exile youth for discussion, but also young Estonians from Sweden and other European 
countries, who regularly attended the annual workshops.
768
 
With the onset of détente, it seemed increasingly fruitless to insist on the rights of the 
Estonian people to freedom and a sovereign nation state by referring to the fact that the 
United States and its allies never had recognised the annexation of 1940.
769
 As Washington 
obviously prioritised the rapprochement with Moscow over the freedom of the Baltic peoples, 
a growing number of younger exile intellectuals started to question the traditional symbiosis 
between U.S. politics and the Baltic exile communities. As the prospect of the resurrection of 
a democratic and sovereign Estonia receded into the distance, they advocated for a more 
pragmatic line of Realpolitik. There was, as the second generation activist Jaak Maandi stated 
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in a programmatic speech in Stockholm in 1967, no reason to revise the long-term aim of the 
political emigration. It was the strategy that had to be adapted to the changing conditions.
770
  
The second generation émigrés increasingly pinned their hopes on a liberalisation and 
transformation process towards a kind of ‘socialism with a human face’, which would allow 
for a greater level of national autonomy within the Soviet Union.
771
 This conceptual change 
was, seen from the perspective of the older generation, revolutionary. The line of non-
recognition had been a kind of mantra for all émigré communities from behind the Iron 
Curtain since the end of the war. It constituted not only the émigrés’ raison d’être for life in 
political exile, but also for their anti-communist struggle. There was thus only limited 
enthusiasm for radical concepts such as the proposal of the Estonian-American political 
scientist Rein Taagepera, who opted for an ‘Estonian Paasikivi line’.772 Although the idea of a 
compromise of a gradual ‘satellisation’ of Estonia found some support, even by prominent 
exiles such as the former envoy Heinrich Laretei, who already since the end of the war had 
resigned from exile politics, the reactions were predominantly negative: “Every kind of 
‘satellisation’ and ‘Estonian Paasikivi lines’ are a step towards a concession to communism. 
This is a question, where there cannot be any compromise”, as Esmo Ridala put it.773 
The second generation’s political realism brought the issue of private visits to Estonia back on 
the agenda. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Estonian newspapers in Sweden regularly 
published the names of exiles that had visited their home country, which, as one second 
generation émigré recalls, at times led to social exclusion.
774
 This issue thus touched upon the 
very core of the Estonian emigration’s ideological self-perception. The topic was widely 
discussed within the Forest University and also the younger Estonian activists in Sweden 
showed an increasing determination to critically revise the isolationist option. As early as 
1960, the historian Aleksander Loit had kicked off a public debate in the journal Vaba Eesti, 
arguing that it was the task of the exiles to strengthen the bonds to their home country. By 
visiting Soviet Estonia, he stated, the exile community had actually more to win than to 
lose.
775
 Yet, at the time, Loit’s proposition was met with strong disapproval. The strongest 
counter-argument touched upon the dangers that a visit to the Soviet Union implied. 
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According to Soviet legal standards, the Baltic war refugees and their offspring were still 
considered citizens of the Soviet Union, which would turn them into subjects to local 
jurisdiction on Soviet territory.
776
  
By the late 1960s, the attitudes in this issue had changed. Younger exiles with no or only 
vague memories of the horrors of the first Soviet occupation did not share the older 
generation’s inherent fear of the communist system.777 Moreover, the tourist traffic between 
Estonia and the West had been ‘normalised’ by the direct ferry connection and the constantly 
rising numbers of Western visitors on Tallinn’s cobblestone streets. These changed 
preconditions for the communication between Sweden and Estonia introduced a new 
perspective on the struggle against the communist order. The political exile leadership had, as 
Andres Küng, one of the most vigorous second generation activists in Sweden, argued, so far 
been limited by the refugee perspective and neglected the fact that the majority of Estonians 
still lived in the occupied home country.
778
 The question of visiting Estonia had thus to be re-
evaluated, but from the point of view of the homeland.
779
 Closer ties with the centres of 
Estonian culture in the West, Küng claimed, would counterweigh the effects of Russification 
and Sovietisation. At the same time, a steady stream of visitors would help to undermine the 
censorship by fostering an unhindered flow of information.
780
 In the eyes of many second 
generation exiles, this goal justified far-reaching compromises. This included the cooperation 
with VEKSA, the Society for the Development of Cultural Ties with Estonians Abroad, which 
since the early 1960s had courted the Estonian émigrés. Despite its close bonds to the KGB, 
VEKSA was tolerated as an “inevitable communication channel”.781  
These new approaches met with considerable resistance among both ideological factions 
among the Estonian exile society in Sweden. The right-wing camp of REE adopted a highly 
critical stance, which echoed the prevailing attitude among Estonians in North America, who 
strongly rejected any interaction with Soviet Estonia. But also the circles around the ERN 
were rather opposed to the idea of promoting travels to the Soviet Union among the exile 
community. Indeed, the ERN had since the Thaw years, revised its political strategies and 
focused on closer contacts with visitors from the home country. However, direct encounters 
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had always taken place outside the Soviet Union, which marked an important difference to the 
more radical concepts of the younger generation.
782
  
Yet, there were also more enthusiastic voices among first generation activists. The writer Karl 
Ast, before the war employed as press attaché at the Estonian legation in Stockholm, agreed to 
the younger generation’s criticism of the isolationist reflexes among the exiles. “You there”, 
he wrote to Stockholm from New York in 1968, “[should] do whatever is possible to establish 
ties to the home country in order to get to know and understand the people at home”.783 At the 
time, the Estonian exile in Sweden had every reason to monitor the ongoing processes on the 
Soviet opposite coast. In 1968, first signs of nationalist opposition to Soviet rule became 
visible in Estonia. A letter signed ‘The representatives of the technical intelligentsia of 
Tallinn’ had leaked out to the West. The authors warned for a renaissance of Stalinism and 
demanded the right for non-Russian republics to secede from the Soviet Union.
784
 Against this 
background, also August Koern, the former Estonian envoy to Denmark, encouraged the exile 
community in the West to travel to Estonia more frequently. The first signs of a reawakening 
Estonian nationalism, he argued, were something that should be observed from up close.
785
  
 
Although the political discourses between the generations of the Estonian exile community 
engaged in the late 1960s and early 1970s proceeded along slightly different lines, the core 
issue was the same as in the case of the Polish political emigration. The pragmatic approach to 
contacts with oppositional forces in the home country, represented by the circles that 
sympathised with Kultura in Paris, was mirrored in the attempts of the Estonian second 
generation activists to challenge the mutual isolation between exiled and their homeland. 
Especially in view of the multi-layered communication channels across the Baltic Sea that 
started to develop with the onset of détente, Sweden turned into a favourably located base for 
the establishment of closer exchange with the émigrés’ home countries.  
The discourses on the reconfiguration of the exile’s political activities in view of the 
increasingly permeable borders between the blocs led to a lasting split of the émigré 
communities, which to a large degree revealed a generational conflict. The old central 
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organisations of the anti-communist exile, once spearheads of ‘cold warfare’ and partners of 
the conservative Western elites, had obvious difficulties in adapting to the new preconditions. 
With its hesitant attitude towards the use of the cross-Baltic infrastructure for political 
purposes, the Estonian National Council isolated itself from an increasingly dynamic 
oppositional spirit adopted by a new generation of exile activists, as the case of the Baltic 
Institute illustrated. The Institute was founded in 1970 by a number of Baltic exile 
intellectuals in Stockholm in order to promote and foster research on Baltic topics. It was 
initially closely linked to the Baltic Committee and thus to Arvo Horm, one of the key figures 
both in the Committee and the ERN.
786
 Yet, it soon became obvious that the younger scholars 
were eager to prevent the Institute from becoming a flagship of the anti-communist exile, 
especially with respect to their ambition to develop professional networks with the Soviet 
Baltic republics. In view of the Institute’s aim to cooperate with Soviet institutions, Horm 
backed out.
787
 Thus, he failed to connect the ERN circles to a network that a decade later 
would play a major role for the development of close links between the Baltic shores. 
The discourses about appropriate strategies for an oppositional exile struggle in a changing 
world among Poles and Estonians revealed a common tendency. Questioning the traditional 
orientation towards close cooperation with Western supporters, the younger exiles implicitly 
challenged the institutionalised structure of the émigré communities themselves. A stronger 
focus on interaction and exchange with the societies behind the Iron Curtain demanded more 
flexible structures based on loose networks and individual commitment. Private visits of exile 
Estonians to the home country had, as Jaak Maandi stressed, accomplished more than the 
decades of anti-communist activism of the exile communities’ central organisations.788 
Andres Küng, born in Sweden by Estonian parents, was a prime example of how individual 
commitment could matter, but also how a change of political paradigms affected the reaction 
among Swedish society to oppositional exile activism. The second generation exiles had 
learned an important lesson. They understood that the radical anticommunism and uncritical 
pro-American support had cost the Estonian community a lot of sympathies in Sweden.
789
 
Instead of taking a generally anti-communist stance, they focused again on the specifically 
anti-Soviet element of their struggle, stressing the anticolonial aspect of their oppositional 
work. Küng thus decided not to enter the sinking ship of the conservatives, but became active 
                                                          
786
 Loit, “Kulturförbindelser mellan Sverige och Estland”; p. 78. 
787
 Jürjo, Pagulus ja Nõukogude Eesti; p. 262. 
788
 Manuscript of Jaak Maandi’s speech titled “Seisukohti välistegevuse taktikas”, held during the general 
meeting of the ERN, 2 December 1967. ERA 5008.1.11.139. 
789
 Küng, Saatusi ja saavutusi; p. 13. 
180 
 
in the Liberal People’s Party, which developed into a refuge for many politically active 
émigrés from behind the Iron Curtain. His parallel activism against the rightist regimes in 
Latin America gave him additional credibility and caught the spirit of the time, which helped 
him to translate the post-war fate of Estonia into a context that the Swedish public could 
understand and sympathise with. This background helps to explain the considerable success of 
Andres Küng’s publications on colonialism in general and the Estonian case in particular. As 
a radio journalist, he succeeded in collecting an impressive amount of empirical material 
about the political, economic and social conditions in Soviet Estonia. In the early 1970s, he 
travelled as a tourist to Estonia twice, but used his visits to conduct as many interviews as 
possible with people on the streets, intellectuals and even state officials.
790
 His publications, 
which were translated into several Western European languages, were the first books written 
during the post-war period by someone who both spoke Estonian and had visited the 
country.
791
 Also due to his remarkable productivity, Küng quickly turned into one of the most 
prominent Estonian exile publicists in the West.
792
  
The representatives of the younger generation chose a similar strategy as the Polish 
immigrants who had arrived to Sweden from 1968 onwards, avoiding any considerable 
engagement in the traditional battle organisations of the Estonian emigration. The 
generational change in the Estonian exile organisations in Sweden was thus, as in the case of 
their counterparts overseas, not reflected in a change within the established political elites 
among the diaspora community.
793
 But the second generation’s unorthodox political thinking 
still had a decisive impact on the political activism of the Estonian emigration, as the first 
Estonian World Festival, ESTO 72, in Toronto doubtlessly illustrated. The encounter between 
thousands of exile Estonians from all over the Western hemisphere strengthened and 
revitalised the cooperation between the different exile centres and consolidated a common 
political vision. One of the resolutions adopted on the occasion of the Festival proclaimed that 
“Estonians in the occupied home country and in the free world constitute an indivisible 
unity”, echoing the convictions of the younger generation. In the future, the document further 
stated, the émigrés would strive to take into account the homeland society’s opinions and 
viewpoints to a much larger degree than before.
794
 With the ambition to bridge the mental 
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gaps in a common effort to oppose the threats of Sovietisation and Russification, the Estonian 
exiles paved the way for a gradual convergence between anti-Soviet opposition on both sides 
of the Iron Curtain. At the same time, the vocabulary of the exile activists was adapted to the 
current political discourses in the West, avoiding the highly charged language of ‘cold 
warfare’. A greater focus on ‘Russian imperialism and colonialism’ referred directly to the 
ongoing discourses about the liberation movements in the Third World, while especially the 
Soviet violations of human rights were highlighted,
795
 which mirrored the argumentation of 
the Soviet Russian opposition that soon would be adopted by a genuinely Estonian dissident 
movement. 
 
The 1960s marked an era of revolutionary changes and turning points in many respects. Both 
the ruptures in Cold War politics and the dynamics of social change on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain challenged the structure of political power distribution, the alliances and loyalties and 
visions for the future that had developed during the first half of the Cold War. As has been 
shown in this chapter, this applied also to the field of exile politics. The ideological 
convictions and strategies of the old guard of war refugees seemed increasingly anachronistic, 
as the Western societies targeted an arrangement with the communist states and the 
geopolitical status quo of post-war Europe. The inability of many first generation activists to 
dissociate themselves from the doctrine of non-recognition and to acknowledge the profound 
changes in the homeland increasingly isolated and marginalised the established centres of the 
political emigration in the West. The loss of moral support from the compatriots behind the 
Iron Curtain, Western public opinion and even the second exile generation turned the 
spearheads of the anti-communist exile into paper tigers.  
The gradual stabilisation of the East-West relations was counteracted by the rising societal 
discontent both in the Soviet Union itself and in the satellite states. With the liberalisation of 
the repressive power mechanisms, the main incentive for ideological conformism had 
disappeared, which inclined a rising number of citizens to develop an oppositional stance 
against the system. Both the March events in Warsaw and the first demonstrations in the 
Soviet Union indicated that a new kind of opposition was developing, which aimed to unmask 
the communist regimes’ hypocrisy by referring to the fundamental contrast between ambition 
and reality within the system. At the same time, the ideological framework of the émigré 
struggle underwent a profound transformation. A younger generation of oppositional activists 
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in exile, whose thinking was considerably shaped by the political and societal climate of the 
time, entered the stage. Their articulated willingness to adjust their political activism to the 
needs and paradigms of the homeland set the ground for an oppositional dialogue across the 
bloc border, which in spite of the infrastructural networking processes between East and West 
had been hampered by years of mutual isolation and alienation.  
In contrast to the Soviet Union, Poland had since the Thaw years been a comparably open 
society, which allowed for a quite lively East-West interaction due to the remarkable mobility 
of Polish citizens and a fairly liberal border regime. Thus, it was in the Polish case that the 
first convergences between oppositional thought on both sides of the Iron Curtain could 
blossom. In this context, the Polish émigré journal Kultura played a central role and had a 
decisive influence on the formation of an intellectual opposition in Poland, which increasingly 
blurred the borders between exiled and homeland communities. With the onset of a new wave 
of mass emigration to Western Europe in 1968, these entanglements developed into a network 
with a multitude of hubs in the East and the West. Many of the newly arrived émigrés from 
Poland proved capable of forging alliances with the progressive intellectual circles among the 
Polish emigration, with which they shared a common political language. Due to their 
familiarity with the system in communist Poland and their private networks within the 
country, the dynamics of Polish exile activism turned into a considerable threat to the regime 
in Warsaw, especially in view of the settlement of a large number of émigrés in neighbouring 
Sweden. The ‘new emigration’ formed a counterpart to the largely apolitical masses of the 
Swedish Polonia, which made frequent use of the well-developed infrastructure across the 
Baltic Sea. The alliance of the newly arrived exiles with the Paris-based camp of Kultura thus 
put Sweden on the map of the emerging transnational structures of oppositional cooperation 
between the blocs.  
The Estonian case, on the other hand, represented the other extreme. In spite of the 
exceptional role that Tallinn played within the framework of the Soviet Union as one of the 
few meeting points between East and West, Estonia was still largely isolated from the outside 
world and strictly monitored. Both the strict Soviet border regime and the wide-spread refusal 
among the Estonian diaspora in the West to visit the home country reduced the interaction 
between homeland and exiled populations to a minimum. The uncontrolled communication 
was restricted to sporadic mutual visits of relatives and close friends, which largely limited 
the scope of a subversive intellectual exchange on a larger scale. In view of the scarcity of 
mutual influences, the decisive incentives and inspirations for the first careful steps towards a 
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nationally framed opposition to Soviet rule in Estonia came from the Soviet Russian 
heartland, where first dissident circles had been established among the intelligentsia. 
However, the formation of a new core of oppositional exile activism, which increasingly 
challenged the isolationist option of the war generation, set the ground for a gradual bridging 
of the mental gaps between exiled and homeland groups. The agenda of supporting the 
compatriots at home in their struggle against Russification and Sovietisation heralded a new 
level of cooperation based on a common consensus of patriotism. Andres Küng’s books on 
Soviet Estonia illustrated the oppositional potential of seemingly apolitical visits to the home 
country, which heralded an increase of politically motivated homeland tourism among the 
Estonians in the West. Küng’s commitment also showed that anti-communist activism did not 
necessarily have to be confronted with rejection on the part of Swedish society, which was 
largely marked by the radical swing to the left. The positive echo of his publications proved, 
as well as the high level of attention that the reports of the eyewitnesses of the anti-Semitic 
excesses in the People’s Republic of Poland triggered, the existence of a generally critical 
attitude towards state socialism in Sweden, which could be instrumentalised in the anti-
communist exile struggle. The existence of a certain potential of societal support among 
Swedish society and the well-developed infrastructure between Sweden and its opposite 
coasts turned into very important preconditions for a new form of oppositional networks 
between the Baltic shores, which could develop from the mid-1970s onwards. 
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VI. A challenge to détente – The transnationalisation of dissent 
around the Baltic rim  
 
VI.1 Bridging the Baltic Sea: Undermining détente from below  
The early 1970s marked the high tide of détente, not least due to the gradual deideologisation 
of Washington’s foreign policy. With the onset of Richard Nixon’s Presidency, the United 
States considerably toned down the ideological and moral dimension of geopolitics. 
Especially under the influence of Nixon’s National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, who 
advocated an outspokenly pragmatic Realpolitik approach, the U.S. government proceeded to 
treating Brezhnev’s Empire as “an ordinary state with reasonable national goals and 
interests”.796 This power-balancing process was an important precondition for the Western 
European states to regain agency in the field of East-West diplomacy. In view of the decrease 
of superpower tensions and the first successes of West Germany’s Ostpolitik, a chance to 
bridge the gap across the divided continent had finally come within reach.  
As the talks of the CSCE, the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe, began in 
November 1972, the policy of rapprochement was heading towards its zenith. Thirty-three 
European states as well as the United States and Canada were engaged in a large-scale, multi-
level process that was supposed to lay the foundations for a “new kind of Europe, one no 
longer exclusively dominated by East-West rivalries”.797 Although North American states 
were also involved, the CSCE was and remained basically a European project, aimed at 
finding a modus vivendi through the “intensification of peaceful interaction”.798 The choice of 
Finland as the main site of the multilateral conference was an unambiguous signal, especially 
as the Finnish government had often been criticised in the West for pursuing a compliant 
political course vis-à-vis its Soviet neighbour. Now, however, it was obvious that the West 
was willing to come to terms with the communist states. The ideological dogmatism that had 
characterised the stance of many Western governments in international matters during the past 
decades would certainly have jeopardised the success of this diplomatic breakthrough. Thus, 
idealist principles such as ‘justice’ or ‘human rights’ did not initially figure among the major 
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topics of the negotiations, which first and foremost reflected Western Europe’s most urgent 
desire: to facilitate the flow of people, goods and information across the bloc border.
799
   
The CSCE served as a key vehicle for European détente, which fostered a “‘people first’ 
approach”800 and supported various forms of grassroots-level cooperation across the Iron 
Curtain. Initially, the effects of this considerable political turn became visible especially in the 
economic sphere. Commercial East-West contacts started to boom in the early 1970s, which 
was reinforced by the need of the satellite states to reform their economies after the decades 
of rapid industrialisation and Soviet-type modernisation.
801
 Poland, the biggest national 
economy of the satellite belt, showed a particular interest in expanding its trade ties 
westwards, not at least in order to decrease its economic and, thus, political dependence on 
Moscow.
802
 Edward Gierek, the Polish Communist Party’s General Secretary, was determined 
to modernise the country’s industries through a mass import of Western technologies, which 
were supposed to be financed by favourable foreign credits.
803
 This programmatic turn in 
Poland’s economic policy led to intensified cooperation with the country’s non-communist 
neighbours, especially with Sweden. The country’s neutrality doctrine was doubtlessly a key 
factor, as it turned the bilateral cooperation into a ‘politically safe’ undertaking. Warsaw 
expected the Swedish government to stick to “neutrality at any price”, which seemed to lower 
the risk of foreign interference in Polish internal affairs.
804
 But Sweden was also highly 
interested in expanding bilateral commercial relations. Trade ties with the Eastern bloc 
countries promised great economic potential, from which Sweden’s export-oriented industries 
would be able to profit.
805
 Hence, cross-Baltic trade experienced a remarkable renaissance 
from the turn of the decade onwards, securing Sweden’s supply of cheap fuel and satisfying 
Warsaw’s needs for machines and technical equipment, industrial objects and high-quality 
copper.
806
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The quickly developing Polish-Swedish cooperation sheds some light on the role of the 
neutral states in bridging the abyss between NATO and Warsaw Pact Europe, which certainly 
went far beyond their intermediary function in the framework of the CSCE.
807
 Already since 
the late 1960s, the Palme government’s foreign policy had been increasingly focusing on 
decolonisation and Third World issues. Giving priority to the increasing gap between North 
and South, Stockholm expressed its conviction that the dichotomies of the Cold War had been 
overcome by the process of détente.
808
 Palme underlined this approach during a meeting with 
Poland’s Minister of Defense, Wojciech Jaruzelski, in September 1972. Referring to Radio 
Free Europe’s Stockholm office, which had caused significant diplomatic irritation during the 
past two decades, Palme stated that this “anomalous” phenomenon had to be buried as a 
remnant of the Cold War.
809
 Soon, the two governments signed an agreement on increased 
cooperation in the fields of culture, science and education. The document was supposed to 
enhance the networking between research institutions, trade unions and youth organisations in 
the spirit of détente.
810
 At the same time, Poland started its negotiations with the European 
neutrals about the abolishment of the visa constraint in order to foster cross-border mobility. 
In 1973, a direct ferry connection between Helsinki and Gdynia was established, while 
Finnish citizens were unilaterally allowed to enter Poland without the obligatory visa.
811
 In 
the following year, Palme and Gierek signed a similar treaty, which considerably facilitated 
travelling between the two countries and marked the climax of Swedish-Polish détente.  
The official promotion of tourism between the countries found a strong echo on both sides of 
the Iron Curtain. Already in 1973, one year before the lifting of the visa requirement, the 
number of Swedish citizens travelling to Poland amounted to more than 43,000. During the 
same time period, 13,000 Poles visited Sweden
812
, of course only after having been carefully 
screened by the Polish authorities, which ultimately granted the approval for individual trips 
abroad. From summer 1974 onwards, Poles could even take up legal temporary employment 
during their stay in Sweden. This triggered a stream of thousands of seasonal workers to 
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Sweden, usually students or young university graduates who used the summer break to work 
in the fruit harvest.
813
 The unprecedented dimensions of the passenger traffic between Sweden 
and Poland went, of course, far beyond the Polish authorities’ monitoring abilities. Yet, the 
Warsaw government did not consider its new policy of openness to be an immediate threat to 
the system’s stability. Trusting in the soothing effects of the Gierek era’s compromise 
between state and society, the regime considered the risks to be manageable.
814
  
The riots along the Polish coastline in December 1970 had indeed been a warning signal, 
especially as they marked the most severe outburst of working class discontent since 1956. 
But Gierek proved to be able to learn from his predecessor’s faults. His determination to open 
up the country to the West reflected a willingness to make concessions to society. Giving up 
the ambition of maintaining totalitarian control, the government counted on the stabilising 
effects of economic growth and rising living standards, financed by Western loans.
815
 The 
strategy of securing social peace and thus reducing politically motivated unrest was indeed 
successful, at least up to the mid-1970s. Frustration was still wide-spread in Polish society, 
but remained largely tacit, lacking the potential to mobilise large-scale opposition across class 
borders. The nonconformist intellectual elites were still paralysed by the wave of persecution 
that followed the March events of 1968, which had prevented the educated strata from 
actively supporting the protesting workers in 1970.
816
 Despite Poland’s impressive record of 
anti-communist uprisings since the end of the war, society remained largely atomised.  
Even the Polish diaspora in neighbouring Sweden showed clear signs of fatigue, as far as anti-
communist activism was concerned, especially since the dissolution of RFE’s Stockholm 
office in 1972.
817
 Public demonstrations in front of the Polish embassy still occurred 
occasionally, but any attempts of coordinating collective action on a larger scale remained 
unsuccessful.
818
 Norbert Żaba, who maintained close contacts with Giedroyć in Paris, was one 
of the few first generation émigrés to continue his active political engagement. As the 
chairman of the Society of Friends of Kultura, he organised regular meetings and discussions 
on the current political development in Poland. However, activities of this kind were generally 
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rare in the early 1970s.
819
 Seen from the perspective of the Warsaw government, the increased 
exchange between the Polish exiles in Sweden and inhabitants of communist Poland did thus 
not cause major concerns. By contrast, it was the regime that seemed to profit most from the 
developing cross-Baltic traffic. Since the onset of the Gierek era, Warsaw had made 
considerable efforts to strengthen the bonds between the apolitical masses of the Polish 
diaspora and their home country, aiming its propaganda primarily at the intelligentsia and the 
youth abroad.
820
 Due to its geographical location, the favourable visa policy for travels across 
the Baltic Sea and its largely apolitical character, the Swedish Polonia soon developed into 
the exile community with the closest and most frequent contacts to the home country.
821
 
The CSCE negotiations were widely perceived as the flagship of détente and a major success 
of Western Ostpolitik. Increasingly permeable borders and a freer flow of people and 
information heralded a brighter future for the crisis-torn continent. According to its Western 
supporters, the CSCE would have a stabilising effect, not only on the international relations, 
but, at least in a longer perspective, even on the development in the communist states. 
Especially the liberalisation of travel restrictions had, as the more optimistic among them 
claimed, the potential to foster greater transparency, which might trigger a process of gradual 
democratisation. However, the catchphrase of ‘change through rapprochement’ did not remain 
unchallenged. Especially American conservatives warned against the consequences of a 
“Yalta II”822, referring to the problematic issue of Europe’s post-war borders, whose formal 
recognition by all parts involved formed one of the prerequisites for the CSCE talks.    
Deep mistrust of the Kremlin’s intentions mobilised resistance also among the Central and 
Eastern European diaspora communities. Especially the Balts, who for decades had been 
fighting for a continuation of the Western line of non-recognition, reacted strongly. The 
Estonian exile government argued that the CSCE first and foremost benefited the communist 
states, as it contributed to consolidating the geopolitical status quo in Europe.
823
 Similar 
concerns were raised by leading representatives of ‘Polish London’, who in their great 
majority still defended Poland’s right to its lost eastern territories. The multilateral East-West 
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talks were rejected as an implicit Western “sanctioning of the Soviet Union’s territorial 
conquests” of the war years.824 From the beginning onwards, the Helsinki talks were closely 
monitored by representatives of the Estonian emigration, among them the journalist Andres 
Küng from Malmö and the ERN’s unofficial representative in Finland, Esmo Ridala. Among 
their tasks was to disseminate information material on the fate of the Baltic nations since 1940 
and to establish personal contacts with the delegates.
825
 Also Wiesław Patek from Stockholm, 
one of the anti-communist veterans of Sweden’s Polish community, regularly attended the 
Helsinki meetings, unofficially representing the London-based exile government.
826
 The 
border issue thus proved to be a highly delicate aspect of the CSCE process. It once again 
recalled the fact that the territorial borders in Central and Eastern Europe had not been 
determined by negotiations between independent governments, but by the Red Army’s 
military advances westwards. Especially the annexation of the Baltic states, a still 
controversial topic in Western foreign policy discourses, was brought back on the agenda, but 
not only in the West. In Estonia, only a short boat trip away from Helsinki, a small group of 
oppositional activists decided to make their voices heard in the discourse about the 
geopolitical repercussions of the CSCE. Eventually, this decision marked the starting point of 
a gradual convergence of exile and homeland opposition to Soviet rule, as will be examined in 
detail after a closer look at the origins of national dissent in Estonia. 
 
While the domestic situation in Poland slowly stabilised with the onset of the Gierek era, the 
Kremlin had to face the long-term effects of de-Stalinisation, which had eventually led to 
“first significant cracks in the Soviet home front”.827 Moscow’s diplomatic successes on the 
international stage formed a sharp contrast to the situation at home, where societal opposition 
steadily grew. This induced Brezhnev to fall back on trusted methods, which led to a neo-
Stalinist turn in Soviet domestic policy and a considerable tightening of censorship.
828
 Under 
the leadership of Yuri Andropov, the KGB developed into the regime’s main tool of 
repression. Shaken by the Czechoslovak experience of 1968, the Kremlin had obviously 
learned its lesson. To a larger degree than before, the secret police apparatus now focused on 
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the monitoring of Soviet society.
829
 From the late 1960s onwards, one of Andropov’s 
preferred methods of coping with political nonconformism was forced psychiatric treatment, 
conducted in close cooperation with a “network of psychiatric hospitals”.830 First with the 
onset of the CSCE talks, the KGB proceeded to more sophisticated strategies, forcing 
dissidents to emigrate and depriving them of Soviet citizenship.
831
 Initially, these methods 
were mainly applied in Soviet Russia, the major toehold of the Brezhnev era’s dissent. Soon, 
however, societal discontent and organised opposition spread to the peripheries of the Empire.  
In 1968, the Estonian KGB formed a special subdivision, whose task it was to reveal 
nationalist sentiments among the Soviet Estonian intelligentsia.
832
 The increasing state 
surveillance had thus already affected the non-Russian republics, which revealed the 
Kremlin’s fear of unrest also outside Moscow and Leningrad. So far, the situation in Estonia 
had not caused any significant concerns among the Soviet leadership. Thanks to the Brezhnev 
compromise, the Estonians had been able to maintain a certain level of national autonomy. 
Yet, it eventually turned out that these concessions were not enough to compensate the 
failures of planned economy and the Soviet migration policy. As elsewhere in the Soviet 
Union, Estonia also had to cope with a chronic lack of consumer goods and housing space. 
However, these problems took, as in neighbouring Latvia, an additional, national dimension. 
As mobility within the Union was officially supported, a current stream of industrial workers 
and professionals from the Russian heartlands reached the comparatively booming Baltic 
republics, where living standards were higher. Their undue preference in the supply of 
housing and other services triggered anti-Russian sentiments among the local population.
833
  
The first signs of nationalist opposition were rather harmless. In 1969, the members of two 
conspiratorial youth leagues were sentenced to imprisonment for anti-Soviet agitation,
834
 
which were reminiscent of the 1950s trials against schoolboys involved in similar activities. 
The convicts’ idealisation of Nazi Germany as the main enemy of the Soviet Union revealed 
indeed that the historical memory of the war years was still alive, even among the ‘Komsomol 
generation’. Yet, these incidents could still be downplayed as an example of rebellious 
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youthfulness rather than of an authentic nationalist opposition. Only two years later, anti-
Soviet leaflets were circulated in Estonia, signed by a group that called itself Rahvuskomitee, 
National Committee, in reference to the resistance against the German occupation of World 
War II.
835
 One of these pamphlets, which denounced the Russification policy, reached the 
ERF in Stockholm, which provided for its dissemination as the first proof of nationalist 
opposition in Estonia.
836
 By then, the situation had changed. In the early 1970s, members of 
the intelligentsia became engaged in oppositional activities. They differed from the pro-fascist 
youth both in education and their access to networks that connected them to like-minded 
circles in other Soviet republics.
837
  
Soviet Estonian dissent started as a local offshoot of the intellectual opposition in Moscow 
and Leningrad. One of the key figures of this transfer process was Sergei Soldatov, an 
Estonian-born lecturer of Russian origin, who was closely interconnected with Russian 
dissidents. The freedom of travel within the Soviet Union considerably facilitated the 
informational exchange between centre and periphery. A regular channel of communication 
was established between Moscow and Tallinn, which allowed the oppositional circles in 
Estonia to take an active interest in the discourses of the Russian dissidents. Publications of 
the samizdat, the illegal small-scale reproduction of uncensored texts, regularly reached 
Estonia,
838
 among them the underground periodical Chronicle of Current Events, which 
provided information on human rights violations in the Soviet Union and had its own 
correspondents in Tallinn.
839
 With the foundation of the Nõukogude Liidu Demokraatlik 
Liikumine, the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union, NLDL, in autumn 1969, the first 
genuinely Estonian dissident organisation was born,
840
 although most of its members were 
ethnically Russian. Soon, however, their visions of necessary reforms turned out to be 
incompatible with the ideological underpinnings of the Soviet Russian dissent,
841
 which 
showed tendencies of a “growing conservative Russian nationalism”.842 This led to an 
ideological split, which considerably triggered the nationalisation of opposition in Soviet 
Estonia. 
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The Tallinn-based Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union turned out to be a rather short-
lived phenomenon, not least due to the lack of support from dissident circles in Moscow and 
Leningrad. In summer 1970, a number of ethnic Estonians left the NLDL in order to establish 
their own organisations: the Estonian National Front, Eesti Rahvusrinne, ERR, and the 
Estonian Democratic Movement, Eesti Demokraatlik Liikumine, EDL. The ERR, led by Kalju 
Mätik and Arvo-Gunnar Varato, was ethnically more homogeneous than the EDL, whose 
leading figures were Mati Kiirend and Artjom Juškevitš. In spite of some minor differences, 
the political visions of both groups were rather similar. They took a strong stance against the 
steadily growing influx of non-Estonian immigrants and the creeping Russification of Estonia. 
Both the ERR and the EDL were involved in the translation and reproduction of Russian 
samizdat and tamizdat, i.e. manuscripts that had been smuggled into the West for publication 
and channelled back to the Soviet Union in printed form. The dissidents even produced their  
own underground newspapers, which counted among the first Estonian samizdat publications. 
Yet, in view of the KGB’s vigilance, the activists stuck to strictly conspiratorial patterns, 
limiting the dissemination of dissident writings to a small intellectual public in Tallinn and 
Tartu.
843
 
The Estonian dissidents had agreed on involving only close and trustworthy friends in their 
activities. Any attempts to reach out to larger segments of Soviet Estonian society or even to 
involve the émigré groups in the West would have made it considerably easier for the KGB to 
keep track of the conspiratorial circles. Thus, the emigrant population remained for a long 
time unaware of the existence of the two underground organisations. Indeed, there had been a 
marginal note on an Estonian dissident organisation named the Estonian National Front in the 
Russian Chronicle of Current Events, which was regularly smuggled into the West. But this 
had only led to speculations among the émigrés, who lacked the possibilities of verifying the 
substance of the information.
844
 It was first under the impact of the news on the approaching 
CSCE talks in Helsinki that the Estonian dissidents radically changed their strategy. The 
decisive trigger was the de facto recognition of the territorial borders in Europe, which had 
already mobilised considerable protests among the exiles. According to the dissidents, a 
European agreement on cross-border cooperation would have been equivalent to an official 
Western recognition of the Soviet occupation. In view of the forthcoming negotiations in 
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nearby Finland, the Soviet Estonian activists thus decided to take action and to make their 
protest heard in the West.
845
  
In October 1972, one month before the official opening of the CSCE talks, the ERR and the 
EDL drafted a common memorandum addressed to the United Nations, to whose predecessor 
organisation Estonia had once belonged. In their appeal, the dissidents articulated demands, 
which in their radical nature so far had only been publicly formulated by the Estonian exile. 
“Estonia”, the memorandum stated, “formerly an internationally recognised sovereign state 
and member of the League of Nations since 1921 was, as the other Baltic states, forcefully 
deprived of its sovereignty and turned into a colonial territory”. The signatories demanded the 
restitution of a sovereign Estonia, its admission to the United Nations, the liquidation of the 
Soviet “colonial administrative apparatus” and the withdrawal of Red Army divisions.846 In 
contrast to the so far published Soviet dissident appeals in the West, the document thus openly 
demanded the abolition, rather than reformation of the Soviet system.
847
 The memorandum 
gave decisive impulses for the struggle of the Estonian emigrant population, which played a 
key role in the document’s dissemination in the West, as the dissidents had chosen to channel 
the memorandum via the political exile organisations in nearby Stockholm. However, it took 
two years until the memorandum and an accompanying letter, addressed to UN Secretary-
General Kurt Waldheim, reached Stockholm. Seen from its eastern shores, the Baltic Sea was 
still an almost insurmountable barrier in the early 1970s.  
 
Up to today, there is no satisfactory explanation for the late arrival of the memorandum to 
Stockholm.
848
 It is of course in the nature of clandestine networks to be built upon very loose 
structures and a widely ramified system of intermediaries, which rely on highly decentralised 
and conspiratorial forms of communication. Against this background, an examination of the 
possible scenarios will have to be sufficient at this point. In general, it was first and foremost 
the ferry connection between Tallinn and Helsinki that provided the first channels to the West 
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from Estonia, which for decades had been largely isolated from the outside world. Already 
since the emergence of an Estonian national consciousness in the mid-nineteenth century, the 
metaphor of the ‘Finnish bridge’, soome sild, had been a recurring theme in poetry and 
literature.
849
 The geographical proximity and interaction across the Gulf of Finland had 
always had a crucial impact on Estonia’s history, and the Cold War era was no exception. Due 
to the regular ferry traffic, Tallinn could develop into one of the central nodes of the 
informational exchange between the Soviet Union and the West.
850
  
With the onset of détente, both Sweden and Finland had developed into a kind of ‘neutral 
buffer zones’ between East and West. Their status as ‘friendly neighbours’ allowed for the 
establishment of direct traffic connections with both Poland and Soviet Estonia, which 
considerably increased cross-Baltic mobility and interaction. However, the ferry connections 
were not only a visible symbol of European détente. They also considerably contributed to 
undermining it. Already at an early point, Polish émigré activists in Sweden had understood 
the strategic advantages of the cross-Baltic infrastructure and how to use it for their purposes. 
Via the Baltic connection, the risky crossing of the borders of the Warsaw Pact transit 
countries could be avoided, which considerably facilitated the smuggling of illegal Western 
literature into the People’s Republic. Again, it was Norbert Żaba who played a key role as one 
of the main organisers of the transfer of forbidden books to communist Poland.
851
 For these 
purposes, Żaba closely cooperated with the Polish-Jewish activists around the journal Aneks 
in Uppsala and the local branch of the Society of Friends of Kultura in southern Sweden.
852
 
One of his closest allies and a “pioneer”853 in the field of smuggling between Sweden and 
Poland was Andrzej Koraszewski from Lund, who had left Poland together with his Jewish 
wife in 1969. Already since the war years, the university town of Lund had been a small, but 
important centre of Polish intellectuals and activists, among them well-known personalities 
such as the university lector Zygmunt Łakociński and Countess Ludwika Broel-Plater. In 
view of its proximity to the port of Ystad, which directly connected the Polish town of 
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Świnoujście to Sweden, Lund and its Polish community gained strategic importance. The 
smuggling of literature was basically a continuation of the U.S.-financed ‘Mailing Project’ of 
the Thaw years, although now voluntary couriers were recruited among Polish tourists visiting 
Lund. Over the course of time, the transports reached such dimensions that the same route 
was used for smuggling Western literature even to Czechoslovakia and the Lithuanian SSR.
854
  
The direct ferry connection to the West was at least equally significant in the case of Soviet 
Estonia. Of course, Poland and Estonia represented the different ends of the spectrum in the 
regional and, maybe, even European context. Firstly, the number of travellers across the Gulf 
of Finland was incomparably smaller than between Sweden and Poland. Secondly, the 
possibilities of smuggling illegal goods, such as Western literature, were much more limited 
due to the meticulous screening during entry and departure by the KGB in the port of Tallinn. 
The significance of the ferries for the exchange of oral information, by contrast, is 
uncontested. Seen from this angle, every family visit of an émigré to the home country and 
vice versa successfully undermined the informational blockade, not to mention the importance 
of these mutual visits for the compensation of the weak supply of consumer goods in Soviet 
Estonia. But the question of the cross-Baltic flows of uncensored information still remains a 
dilemma for historical research, constituting a phenomenon that is as “difficult to map”855 as 
the immediate consequences of the possibility to receive Finnish television, which also 
doubtlessly hade a crucial impact on Estonian society. 
However, there is plenty of evidence indicating that the smuggling of books occurred already 
in the early 1970s. Initially, it was first and foremost spiritual literature that found its way to 
Estonia via Helsinki. Religious life in Estonia was, as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, largely 
suppressed. The Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church in Exile, by contrast, whose 
headquarters had been moved from Stockholm to Toronto, still played a prominent role in the 
life of the diaspora. In 1968, it published the Bible in a new Estonian translation, which was 
noted with great interest in Soviet Estonia and considerably triggered smuggling activities 
across the Baltic Sea. Estonian pensioners at times tried to smuggle a copy into Estonia on 
their way back from family visits in Sweden, but also visiting émigrés became active. This 
induced Andres Küng to proclaim this field as the new “mission” of the Baltic exiles, 
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invoking the historical smuggling routes of Lithuanian newspapers in Latin script from East 
Prussia to Czarist Lithuania during the worst days of nineteenth-century Russification.
856
  
Yet, it was mainly Finns who lay behind the illegal importing of Bibles and Christian journals 
to Estonia and turned Tallinn into one of the central gateways for the organised smuggling of 
religious literature into the Soviet Union. A network of Finnish Baptists was closely involved 
with the Wurmbrand Mission, a U.S.-based organisation whose aim it was to support 
suppressed Christian believers behind the Iron Curtain. From the early 1970s onwards, 
Finnish couriers regularly blended in with the masses of tourists in order to smuggle the 
forbidden spiritual reading across the Gulf of Finland.
857
 Moreover, also the land route via the 
Finnish-Soviet border to Leningrad was used in order to smuggle further material by car. The 
Finnish Baptists not only smuggled items in Estonian, but also in Russian, Latvian, 
Lithuanian, Ukrainian and Georgian, supplying large parts of the communist Empire.
858
 A 
Finnish-Soviet agreement on controlling illegal imports and exports, signed in March 1976, 
gives some indication of the dimension of these clandestine activities. The document 
explicitly mentions Bibles as an example of “anti-government and anti-socialist literature”,859 
whose smuggling into the Soviet Union was to be prevented by the Finnish authorities. An 
open letter to the Estonian émigré population, smuggled out of Estonia in the same year, 
reinforces this impression. The exile church’s new Bible translation, the document stated, had 
gained considerable authority in Soviet Estonia and was widely popular throughout the 
republic. The same applied to other spiritual and secular exile literature, such as Andres 
Küng’s anti-Soviet publications or the Catholic journal Maarjamaa, edited by the Estonian 
priest Vello Salo.
860
  
The first secret channels between Estonia and Finland obviously facilitated even the 
smuggling of writings back to the West. Already in 1972, a secret undercover investigation, 
carried out by the Estonian KGB, confirmed the fears Soviet authorities. According to the 
final report, information could flow relatively freely between Tallinn and the West, especially 
due to the willingness of foreign tourists to smuggle private letters and messages out of the 
country.
861
 Moreover, from 1974 onwards, the Finnish Baptists also agreed on smuggling 
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written records out of the country. Some of them maintained direct communication with the 
representatives of the Estonian émigré population in Stockholm, which led to the 
establishment of an important channel for the transfer of messages of the Estonian dissidents 
to the West.
862
 As it was practically impossible to smuggle typed documents out of the 
country, they were usually photographed on microfilms, which became a practical and easily 
concealable medium for the transfer of samizdat and uncensored information to the West.
863
  
However, it is still contested whether the dissidents’ memorandum to the United Nations was 
smuggled out on the ferry to Helsinki. An opposing hypothesis suggests that it was the 
Estonian democratic opposition’s contacts with dissident circles in Moscow that provided the 
necessary channels for the forwarding of the document to the West. Moscow was of central 
importance as a key node for the informational exchange between Soviet dissidents and the 
outside world. The capital was the only Soviet city with a significant community of Western 
citizens, mostly diplomats and correspondents, with whom the Russian dissidents maintained 
close contacts.
864
 The underground journal Chronicle of Current Events, for example, was 
usually brought out of the country by Western journalists
865
, which, as the former dissident 
Tunne Kelam later recalled, was the most common way of smuggling Soviet samizdat abroad. 
Referring to the smuggling of the memorandum, Kelam and ERR leader Kalju Mätik stated 
that Sergei Soldatov had promised to contact his Russian networks in this matter. There is 
also evidence suggesting that dissidents in Moscow knew about the existence of the document 
as early as in 1973.
866
 However, any unambiguous proof in this issue remains to be 
discovered. 
Regardless of the couriers and the route that eventually brought the memorandum to Sweden, 
it marked a watershed for the relations between exiles and their homeland and laid the 
foundation for the development of an oppositional dialogue across the Baltic Sea. The anti-
communist exile activists saw the memorandum as an ultimate proof that parts of Soviet 
Estonian society had already joined the “free Estonians” in a common struggle against the 
Soviet yoke,
867
 which considerably boosted the political emigration’s lobbying activities in 
the West.
868
 Nevertheless, some doubts concerning the validity of the memorandum still 
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remained. The authenticity of the two oppositional organisations that answered for the 
memorandum could not be verified and the fear of communist provocation was still wide-
spread among the Estonian diaspora. One of the first to approve the memorandum’s 
credibility was the Catholic Priest Vello Salo, the former editor of Radio Vatican’s Estonian 
broadcasts. The political scientist Rein Taagepera in the United States, whom he had 
consulted on this issue, assented to Salo’s view and opted for immediate publication.869 
Subsequently, the ERF in Stockholm disseminated thousands of printed copies in Sweden and 
other Western European countries. The Baltic Appeal to the United Nations, a common Baltic 
exile initiative that aimed at regularly informing the UN headquarters in New York on Baltic 
issues, took over the task to disseminate the document in North America.
870
 Up to the signing 
of the CSCE’s Final Act, four further appeals and open letters reached the emigrant 
population in Stockholm from Soviet Estonia with the instruction to forward them to the 
appropriate institutions.
871
 The last document that was smuggled out of Estonia in the run-up 
to the Helsinki summit in summer 1975 was a common declaration of Estonian and Latvian 
dissidents, addressed to the governments of the participating states. Together with a statement 
of support for the Baltic cause by Andrei Sakharov and other prominent Moscow 
dissidents
872
, the document lent additional credibility to the news about the emergence of an 
organised nationalist opposition in Estonia and highlighted its interconnectedness with similar 
circles in other Soviet republics.  
 
In the end, the exile campaigns had “little discernible impact”.873 On 1 August 1975, the 
delegates of the participating states solemnly signed the Final Act, a multilateral agreement 
that touched upon “virtually every aspect of Pan-European security”,874 in the Finlandia Hall 
in central Helsinki. Much to the disdain of the exiles, the document affirmed the inviolability 
of borders in Europe in its ‘first basket’, as the Final Act’s four parts were referred to. Yet, 
this did not imply deviation on the part of the United States and other NATO members from 
the previous line of non-recognition concerning the fate of the Baltic states, which was 
reinforced by a passage that conceded the possibility of territorial changes by peaceful means. 
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This was one of the concessions that the Soviet Union had to make to the Western European 
partners in exchange for a de facto recognition of the political status quo in post-war 
Europe.
875
  
However, in a longer perspective it was the ‘third basket’ on the “free movement of people, 
family reunification and visits, and informational, cultural, and educational openness”876 that 
eventually had a much more decisive impact on the East-West dialogue. This clear political 
commitment to the essential value of human rights, as expressed in both the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, reflected the increasing 
attention that the topic had received in the West in the early 1970s. Especially the 1973 
publication of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s monumental account on the Stalinist labour camps in 
Russia’s Siberian hinterlands, the Archipel GULAG, had left a great “moral and emotional 
impact”877 on Western discourses on the Soviet system. The “Gulag effect”878 doubtlessly 
even influenced the formulations of the Helsinki Accords, although Solzhenitsyn’s dissident 
epos, ironically enough, had not found an editor in Finland.
879
 Some of the communist 
satellite states raised serious concerns about the recognition of the ‘third basket’, which in 
internal discussions was labelled a “Trojan horse”.880 Moscow, however, did not share this 
scepticism and brought its allies into line. The Kremlin was convinced that a concession on 
this issue would not have any significant impact on internal matters of the communist states.  
Indeed, there were no signs that heralded any radical changes in Soviet domestic policy 
during the months that followed. By contrast, the regime considerably tightened the reins, 
especially in the Baltic republics. In October 1975, the Estonians witnessed the biggest 
political trial since Stalin’s days in Tallinn, only eighty kilometres away from the city where 
Brezhnev had demonstrated his commitment to human rights two months earlier. Already in 
late 1974, after the Estonian dissidents’ memorandum to the United Nations had been 
published in the West, the leadership of the democratic opposition had been decapitated. Both 
the ERR leaders Mätik and Varato and the heads of the EDL, Kiirend and Juškevitš, were 
arrested. Shortly afterwards, the same fate befell Sergei Soldatov. The authors of the 
memorandum were accused of having systematically disseminated anti-Soviet propaganda. 
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One of the central charges related to the dissidents’ alleged contacts to the émigré 
communities, which had made the memorandum’s dissemination via the “bourgeois and exile 
press” in the West and “anti-Soviet radio stations” possible.881 The dissidents had been well 
aware of the fact that the memorandum would lead to a wave of repression. Therefore, they 
had agreed not to spread the document in Soviet Estonia itself, as long as it had not been 
published in the West.
882
 The long time span between the drafting of the appeal and its arrival 
in Sweden had thus retarded the KGB’s offensive and enabled the dissidents to continue their 
activities for another two years.
883
 But with the conviction of the leading dissidents to several 
years of imprisonment, oppositional activity significantly declined in Soviet Estonia.
884
  
Eventually, however, the regime scored an own goal with its harsh reaction towards the first 
signs of opposition in Estonia. First and foremost, the Tallinn trial unmistakably proved the 
memorandum’s authenticity and confirmed the existence of a nationalist opposition in Soviet 
Estonia. Apart from that, the émigrés could now refer to concrete names and faces behind the 
so far anonymous dissident organisations.
885
 The exile activists in Sweden were now able to 
efficiently counter the regular attacks of leftist circles that regularly denounced the Baltic 
émigrés as ‘war hawks’ with no ideological support among their compatriots at home. Their 
informational campaigns now focused increasingly on the fate of the political prisoners, 
which allowed them to relate to the current discourses on human rights and national self-
determination, which lent additional justification to their struggle. The emigration’s political 
agenda now touched upon highly topical issues and thus could not be reduced to a somewhat 
utopian striving for a return to the status quo ante of 1940 any more.
886
  
Also in Estonia itself, the Tallinn trial cast a long shadow. While the dissident organisations 
had been largely unknown during their active period, the news on the wave of arrests and the 
following trial considerably contributed to popularising the dissidents’ political activities and 
visions.
887
 In some cases, the trial had a mobilising effect, in spite of the regime’s obvious 
determination to persecute any nationalist Baltic dissent. Eve Pärnaste and Lagle Parek, for 
example, who both belonged to the inner circle of a new generation of dissidents, recall that it 
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was precisely the 1975 trial that induced them to get involved in oppositional activities.
888
 
Pärnaste knew Mati Kiirend, one of the accused, and attended the public sessions of the trial, 
about which she later drafted a written report for Kiirend’s friends. Extracts of her report were 
later transmitted back to Estonia via Western radio broadcasts, which proved that the 
document had been successfully smuggled out of the Soviet Union.
889
 Evidently, the 
imprisonment of the democratic movement’s leadership did not affect the courier traffic 
between Tallinn and Stockholm. Already in late 1975, the ERF received two detailed reports 
on the October trial, which immediately went to publication.
890
 By the mid-1970s, the cross-
Baltic connection had thus become an efficient and reliable channel for the clandestine 
transfer of information between Estonia and the West.   
 
By enhancing mobility and grassroots-level contacts between East and West, European 
détente almost inevitably fostered an increasingly uncontrolled flow of information. The 
entangling processes facilitated the development of subversive contacts in the shadow of the 
expanding cross-border traffic in the Baltic Sea Region. The emerging infrastructure provided 
important loopholes for oppositional activity. Hence, the communication between exiles and 
dissidents figured among the corollaries of the rapprochement between the neutral 
Scandinavian states and their communist neighbours. The loss of totalitarian control was the 
price that the communist regimes had to pay for the decrease of Cold War tensions in Europe 
and the economic benefits of increased East-West cooperation.  
The transnationalisation of opposition against the political status quo was a gradual process, 
which had its roots in the Thaw years. From the late 1950s onwards, Poland had the most 
liberal border regime in communist Europe, despite the temporary restorative measures that 
followed phases of public unrest. With the onset of détente, interaction with the West steadily 
increased and allowed for a largely unhampered transfer of ideas, which triggered a 
convergence of Polish oppositional thought in the East and the West. Compared to the Polish 
case, the Estonian exile’s possibilities of interacting with the home country were at least two 
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decades behind the times. Despite the émigrés’ recurrent efforts to facilitate the informational 
flow between Sweden and Estonia, it was first the dissidents’ memorandum that signalled a 
similar determination to establish an oppositional dialogue in Soviet Estonia.   
The Estonian opposition had its intellectual roots in the Russian dissident movement, with 
which it shared common strategies and structures. However, with the decision to interact with 
the West via the emigration in Stockholm, the dissidents proved to be conscious about the 
exile’s political struggle. Both Western radio broadcasts and tourism were of course important 
bearers of information and there is also evidence that exile publications circulated in Soviet 
Estonia by the early 1970s. Yet, it is difficult to assess whether and to what degree the 
dissidents themselves were influenced by the émigré population. Indeed, it is striking that the 
memorandum and Andres Küng’s publications echoed an almost identical vision of national 
liberation via a referendum under the auspices of the United Nations.
891
 It would nevertheless 
be highly speculative to assume that cross-fertilising tendencies existed between oppositional 
thinking among the Swedish emigration and circles in Soviet Estonia. First by the mid-1970s, 
it is possible to speak of a beginning transnationalisation of Estonian opposition around the 
Baltic rim. In contrast to the Polish exile-homeland networks, Estonian cross-border contacts 
were deeply rooted in the specific geopolitical constellation. The coastline constituted the 
Estonians’ own ‘window to the West’ and especially to Finland, whose bridging function was 
indispensable for the further development of exile-homeland networks. 
However, it was first from the mid-1970s onwards that the exile-homeland networks took the 
decisive step towards concrete oppositional action. Initially in the aftermath of the CSCE, it 
became increasingly obvious that the communist regimes’ formal recognition of human rights 
in the Final Act in fact was a “time bomb”.892 A rapid rise in oppositional manifestations 
behind the Iron Curtain and a considerably sensitised Western public opinion constituted the 
bedrock that eventually triggered the émigrés to actively engage in dissident activities. 
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VI.2 Anti-communist opposition and human rights discourses in post-
Helsinki Europe: Consolidating cross-Baltic alliances 
The Helsinki Accords had a long-lasting effect on both the official East-West relations and 
the power balance between the communist regimes and the societies they ruled over. 
Designed as a “‘living’ document”,893 the Final Act marked merely the beginning of a 
dynamic process that was to be accompanied by regular follow-up conferences. In view of 
this long-term arrangement and the monitoring mechanisms that oversaw the adherence to the 
terms agreed on, the human rights issue turned into an increasingly important topic of 
international politics. While the Western European governments still held on to a course of 
Realpolitik, Washington considerably changed its tone towards the communist states. Jimmy 
Carter, elected president in autumn 1976, did not refrain from openly addressing human rights 
violations behind the Iron Curtain. While the Carter government’s return to a foreign policy 
with a strong moral dimension was met with considerable societal approval in the West, 
Brezhnev sensed signs of “psychological warfare”.894  
Seen from the Soviet perspective, the Western engagement in human rights issues was 
alarming, especially in view of the rising opposition on the home front. Already in May 1976, 
a first Helsinki Watch Group was formed in Moscow, aimed at monitoring the 
implementation of the practices that the regime had committed to by signing the Final Act. As 
this new form of dissident activity spread to the more peripheral republics, the Soviet 
leadership certainly understood that it had underestimated the signal effect of the ‘third 
basket’. By early 1977, similar groups had been established in Georgia, Armenia, Lithuania 
and the Ukraine, where dissidents systematically documented human rights violations for a 
Western public.
895
 Yet, it was in the satellite belt that oppositional societal self-organisation 
reached its decisive historical breakthrough.  
In the run-up to the Helsinki summit, the Polish government had been outspokenly critical of 
Brezhnev’s nonchalance towards the Final Act’s passages on human rights and the danger of 
“ideological infiltration”896 they might entail. However, it was less secretive interference from 
outside than the gradual erosion of Gierek’s domestic political calculations that eventually 
developed into a substantial threat to the regime. So far, the government had relied upon the 
stabilising effect of rising living standards, financed by Western loans. But the reactions to the 
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authorities’ decision to drastically raise basic food prices in June 1976 clearly illustrated the 
fragility and limits of this strategy. Societal discontent rapidly erupted into a wave of strikes 
and street protests. In Ursus, an industrial district in the outskirts of Warsaw, and the 
provincial town of Radom, the situation escalated into the brutal suppression of the workers’ 
protests by the police. This episode marked one of the major watersheds in Poland’s post-war 
history. It triggered a so far unprecedented level of societal opposition, which led to the 
formation of the Komitet Obrony Robotników, KOR, the Committee for the Defense of 
Workers. KOR’s primary task was to provide help and assistance to those who had suffered 
persecution in the wake of the June protests. However, the Committee soon developed into a 
central node of human rights activism, which explicitly legitimised its activities by referring 
to the constitution and the Helsinki Final Act.
897
 
The founders of KOR represented different factions and generations of nonconformist 
intellectuals. Among them were both prominent activists of the pre-war Socialist Party, which 
since its forced incorporation into the Communist Party in 1948 continued its existence in 
exile, and representatives of the Catholic intelligentsia. Jacek Kuroń, a Warsaw historian and 
since the Thaw years involved in oppositional activities, and Adam Michnik, one of the 
protagonists of the March events in 1968, became the leading theorisers.
898
 Soon, KOR 
developed into a heterogeneous network that united student activists of 1968, young believers 
and participants of the June riots as well as former university lecturers under a common 
roof.
899
 The overarching philosophical foundation of KOR referred to a “community in 
humanist values [...] based on a synthesis of Catholic and socialist humanism”.900 For the first 
time in Polish post-war history, the two main strands of intellectual opposition, associated 
with the Church on the one hand and the non-communist Left on the other, merged into a 
common struggle. This consolidation of societal dissent eventually paved the way for the 
“convergence of independent groups with the interests of the working class”901 that Michnik 
had propagated in one of his essays. With the emergence of common oppositional 
manifestations across class borders, the atomisation of society could be gradually overcome.  
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Bridging the gap between the intelligentsia and the working masses first and foremost 
presupposed a functioning system of disseminating relevant information. Soon, KOR 
succeeded in establishing a reliable network of informants, which made it possible to 
systematically compile evidence on the violation of human rights by the police and unfair 
political trials in the course of the June riots.
902
 This information was regularly spread via a 
typed samizdat bulletin, the Biuletyn Informacyjny, which was modelled on the Soviet 
Russian Chronicle of Current Events. In September 1977, KOR was renamed the Committee 
for Social Self-Defense, Komitet Samoobrony Społecznej KOR, now covering all forms of 
human rights violations in the country.
903
 During this rapidly advancing process of societal 
self-organisation, further shades of opposition became visible. The founders of the Movement 
for the Defense of Human and Civic Rights, Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela, 
ROPCiO, for instance, were close to the nationalist right. But although their ideological 
background largely differed from KOR’s ideal of a democratic socialism, their political 
agenda was similar. With its determination to “watch over the observance of civil liberties [...] 
and [to] cooperate in defence of human rights with external bodies”,904 also ROPCiO 
developed into a kind of Helsinki Watch Group in Poland. The convergence of these very 
different forces into a closely interconnected opposition movement developed into a 
considerable threat for the regime, especially as the activists unmasked the shallow official 
rhetoric by referring to the legal framework that the state leadership publicly appealed to. 
With the increasing societal self-organisation, samizdat practices were considerably 
professionalised in Poland. The opposition developed a vast underground infrastructure with 
several illegally functioning publishing houses. The biggest of them was NOWA, Niezależna 
Oficyna Wydawnicza, the Independent Publishing House, which reproduced Western 
literature and exile publications as well as uncensored domestic prose and poetry.
905
 The sheer 
scale of the clandestine book production marked a watershed in the history of anti-communist 
opposition. With the development of a “parallel public sphere”,906 which emerged due to the 
                                                          
902
 Borowska / Święcicki, “Inledning”; p. 19. 
903
 Kemp-Welch, “Eastern Europe: Stalinism to Solidarity”; p. 234. 
904
 Kemp-Welch, Poland under Communism; p. 226.  
905
 The publishing houses were constituted by rather small teams of activists who made use of currently changing 
locations for the clandestine mass production of books. According to Mirosław Chojecki, the head of NOWA, 
the required paper, a limited resource that was purchased via acquaintances, and portable stencil duplicators were 
usually brought to “some detached house in the outskirts of Warsaw”, where a group of printers worked in shift 
for several days. The imprinted paper was then brought to some private apartment, where bookbinders performed 
the finishing steps. The complete edition was finally divided into several portions and stored in cellars and 
storerooms, from where couriers brought them to their addressees. Interview conducted by the author with 
Mirosław Chojecki, Warszawa, Poland, 7 December 2011. 
906
 Suri, Power and Protest; p. 108. 
207 
 
drugi obieg, or ‘second circulation’ as samizdat was referred to in Poland, uncensored 
information could be disseminated throughout the country. Western radio broadcasts thus lost 
their significance as the largest threat to the communist regime’s legitimacy and forced the 
intelligence service to almost completely reformulate its defense strategies.
907
 
 
The oppositional leaders had an ambiguous attitude towards the political emigrant 
community, especially its traditional structures. ‘Polish London’ and its political factions and 
conflicts did not receive much attention in the underground press. This scepticism, however, 
was mutual. Many representatives of the war generation categorically rejected any opposition 
movement in the home country that did not recognise the authority of the exiled 
government.
908
 Yet, the attitude of many second generation exiles, especially of those who 
had left Poland after 1968 and thus were familiar with the intellectual milieu that KOR had 
derived from, differed considerably from the orthodoxy of the older émigrés. The choice of 
ideological guidelines and suitable strategies was left to the opposition movement itself. 
Moreover, the ‘new emigration’ communities still maintained their own personal networks in 
the home country, which was facilitated by the relative permeability of the Polish borders 
during détente. This connection as well as common experiences and similar political visions 
paved the way for fruitful cross-border cooperation. In this context, Sweden’s role cannot be 
underestimated. Poland’s northern neighbour had been one of the preferred destinies of 
political refugees in the aftermaths of the March events in 1968. Moreover, there was a 
functioning and frequently used infrastructure across the Baltic Sea, which opened up a 
reliable channel to the West for the democratic movement in the People’s Republic.  
The formation of an organised Polish opposition movement had a highly stimulating effect on 
the exiles in Sweden. Especially representatives of the so-called ‘new emigration’ group 
started to organise far-reaching assistance for the home country. Soon after the formation of 
the first human rights organisations in Poland, a number of activists formed a small but 
efficient group in support of KOR. Two of the most important nodes of this network were 
Jakub Święcicki and Maria Borowska, who both represented the non-Jewish faction of the 
post-1968 emigration in Sweden.
909
 Święcicki had arrived to Stockholm only four years 
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earlier, while Borowska had left the country in the aftermath of the anti-Semitic campaign 
together with her Jewish husband. Initially, Borowska and Święcicki aimed at operating 
within the framework of the Centre of Polish Organisations for Independence, an umbrella 
organisation for the established anti-communist exiles. But most member organisations had 
their ideological roots in the late 1940s and maintained close bonds with ‘Polish London’, 
which soon led to a clash of opinions. In view of the conflict potential of cooperating with 
war veterans and other highly conservative first generation activists, the younger exiles 
decided to look for new ways of organising constructive and efficient support for the Polish 
opposition.
910
  
The support for KOR involved a loose network of younger émigrés, among them, besides 
Borowska, Święcicki and his wife Elżbieta, also Ryszard Szulkin, Aleksander Orłowski, Józef 
Dajczgewand and Kazimierz Gruszka, in order to mention just some of the names. A major 
task was to secure an unhampered flow of currently updated news on the political 
developments in Poland. The most valuable source was the leadership of KOR itself, whose 
first-hand reports were mostly spread via émigré channels in the West. The informants in 
Warsaw not only delivered reliable information about KOR, but also other oppositional 
organisations such as ROPCiO or the Student Committees of Solidarity, Studenckie Komitety 
Solidarności, which had been established in response to the alleged political murder of a 
Cracow student by security service agents in May 1977.
911
 Jacek Kuroń’s Warsaw apartment 
turned into a veritable information centre, not least for Western correspondents in Poland.
912
 
Most of the information was disseminated via his private phone. One of his main contacts 
abroad was Eugeniusz Smolar, the co-founder of Aneks, who had left Uppsala in 1975 and 
now worked for the Polish section of the BBC in London. But also the Stockholm-based 
activists maintained regular communication with KOR.
913
 The contents of appeals and other 
documents of the opposition were regularly transmitted over the phone, after which the texts 
were immediately typed and copied. Copies were directly sent to the Swedish press, Radio 
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Free Europe in Munich, Smolar in London and Giedroyć in Paris.914 Although Giedroyć’s 
Literary Institute was the uncontested centre for the reproduction of documents of the Polish 
democratic movement in the West
915
, even émigré activists in Sweden edited their own 
brochures in Polish and Swedish and a series of publications titled “Polski samizdat”.916  
 
The émigrés’ lobbying activities in support of KOR had a crucial impact on Swedish society. 
To a larger degree than other Polish communities abroad, such as the British one, the émigrés 
in Sweden proved to be able to establish durable networks in their new home country.
917
 By 
interacting with key actors and organisations of Sweden’s political and cultural sphere, they 
succeeded in gradually undermining the government’s course of rapprochement from below. 
Important, in this context, was the change of the political climate in the mid-1970s. With the 
election of the first non-social democratic government since 1932, the high tide of the New 
Left was irrevocably over. The pronouncedly leftist Prime Minister Palme was succeeded by 
Thorbjörn Fälldin, the leader of the Centre Party, which entered a coalition with the Liberal 
People’s Party. Due to the commitment of a number of second generation exiles, especially 
Jakub Święcicki and the Estonian Ülo Ignats, the liberal camp provided the first platform for 
lobbying activities that triggered a general interest in human rights issues behind the Iron 
Curtain.  
The Liberal Party’s Youth League, Folkpartiets ungdomsförbund, FPU, served as a suitable 
vehicle for the popularisation of the aims of the Polish opposition in Sweden. The Youth 
League was more flexible than the party leadership and less bound to the governmental policy 
of rapprochement. In 1976, FPU’s national committees of Poles, Balts and Czechs merged 
into the Eastern European Solidarity Committee, Östeuropeiska Solidaritetskommittén, 
ÖESK.
918
 In a number of brochures dedicated to the June riots and the formation of KOR, 
documents of the opposition and first-hand reports were published in Swedish. For the 
Swedish reader, this constituted a first intertextual encounter with the Polish opposition, 
which was enriched by articles that severely criticized the lack of knowledge about the 
development behind the Iron Curtain in Sweden.
919
 Triggered by the high level of activism 
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among its own members, FPU started a nation-wide campaign against the “last dictatorships 
of Europe” already in the following year.920 Nevertheless, social democracy was still the 
dominant force in the field of opinion-making in Sweden, in spite of the interlude during 
which the party was forced into opposition. The supporters of KOR were well aware of the 
fact that Western socialists ranked among the “most important allies” of the democratic 
movements behind the Iron Curtain, as the Czech émigré Zdeněk Hejzlar put it.921 But the 
general attitude towards KOR was still highly ambiguous among Swedish social democratic 
circles, which often criticised the Committee of being overly critical of its government.
922
 The 
émigré activists thus aimed at directly convincing the party elites to support the democratic 
movement, a strategy that soon turned out to be successful.  
As the assistant of Olof Palme’s advisor Sten Johansson, sociology professor at the University 
of Stockholm and editor of Tiden, the theoretical party organ of the Social Democratic Party, 
Maria Borowska had direct access to one of the key actors of Swedish social democracy. On 
her recommendation, Johansson travelled to Warsaw in autumn 1976, where Borowska had 
arranged meetings with leading representatives of KOR via her vast contact network in the 
Polish capital.
923
 In 1977, Johansson travelled a second time to Poland, now as an officially 
invited guest of KOR. During his visit, he gave a lecture on the current problems of Swedish 
social democracy at one of the illegal sessions of the ‘Flying University’, an underground 
educational structure that offered courses beyond the ideological doctrine.
924
 Moreover, he 
attended a private meeting in Kuroń’s apartment, where he forwarded Palme’s personal 
greetings, which triggered particular enthusiasm among his Polish hosts. Due to his direct 
connection to Palme, Johansson came to play an important mediating role. He could deliver 
first-hand accounts on the activities and aims of the Polish opposition and forward their 
request for official recognition by Sweden’s social democracy directly to the party leader.925 
Initially, these new forms of cross-Baltic encounters were not institutionalised, but their 
impact on the perception of the Polish opposition in Sweden proved to be crucial.  
In order to facilitate their intermediary activities between Polish oppositional groups and the 
highly institutionalised political sphere in Sweden, the Polish émigré activists adopted a more 
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formal organisational structure.
926
 In May 1978, they formed the Contact Group of the Polish 
Democratic Movement in Sweden, Polska Demokratiska Rörelsens Kontaktgrupp i Sverige. 
The proclaimed aim of KOR’s official representatives in Sweden was to “contribute to 
establishing contacts between [the opposition] and Swedish society on the terms of the Polish 
democratic movement”.927 Over time, their intermediary efforts triggered a pattern of regular 
Polish-Swedish encounters. Prominent oppositional activists, among them Jan Józef Lipski, 
Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuroń and other leading KOR members, were invited to Sweden for 
consultations and discussions with representatives of Sweden’s political sphere, often under 
the guise of academic conferences.
928
 Thus, vivid intellectual exchange could develop 
between Polish democrats and representatives of Swedish society. These encounters involved 
a variety of actors and organisations, among them leading trade union members, the Social 
Democratic Party and the Swedish Pen Club as well as journalists, politicians and Members of 
Parliament.
929
 Hence, the Polish activists’ commitment highly influenced the development of 
personal contacts underneath the official level. Ironically enough, it was the Polish 
government’s officially declared willingness to foster societal interaction across the Baltic Sea 
that contributed to the development of a transnational platform for oppositional thinking.  
While the émigrés’ efforts to foster cross-Baltic elite networks bore their first fruit, Borowska 
and Święcicki used their good connections to the Swedish media in order to reach a wider 
public.
930
 One of their major successes in this field was the cooperation with Gunnar 
Fredriksson, a prominent publicist who worked for the social democratic daily Aftonbladet. 
Following Borowska’s suggestion, Fredriksson travelled to Cracow shortly after the election 
of the city’s Cardinal, Karol Wojtyła, to the papacy, and was received by several prominent 
opposition leaders. His visit resulted in a much-noticed series of articles on the Polish 
opposition, which, in the long term, had a lasting impact on the tone of Swedish media reports 
on communist Europe.
931
 At the same time, the émigrés started their own attempts to actively 
influence Swedish public opinion. Thanks to their close contact with Tiden’s editor Sten 
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Johansson, they were able to get considerable financial and organisational support for a 
Swedish publication devoted to the Polish democractic movement. In their book, Borowska 
and Święcicki offered a representative selection of translated samizdat documents and 
eyewitness accounts from Gierek’s Poland. The volume, titled Kamp för Demokrati (‘Fight 
for Democracy’), received considerable attention and excellent reviews in the press and 
changed much of the Swedish perception of the Polish opposition.
932
 Earlier reports on 
Catholic-chauvinistic, fanatically anti-Russian and, most of all, anti-Semitic views among 
anti-communist circles in Poland had cemented a negative image of Polish resistance to 
communism in Sweden.
933
 However, by presenting the liberal and social democratic forces 
around KOR, the exile activists helped to diminish the power of popular stereotypes. 
Comparisons between the Polish opposition and the Swedish traditions of popular movements 
and societal self-organisation helped to promote open support for the democratic forces in 
Poland.
934
 It was, thus, not only the dissemination of Polish samizdat texts in the West that 
mattered, but also the cultural translation process, which broke down mental boundaries and 
facilitated the development of a rising level of support.  
 
The networking between Swedish intellectuals and politicians and Polish opposition leaders 
counted among the major achievements of the émigrés’ political activity. Their intermediary 
function provided the ground for Swedish societal support and created important Western 
contacts for the Polish opposition of the pre-Solidarity era. However, there was another, less 
visible quality to the cross-Baltic networks, which was at least equally important for the 
democratic movement. Although the moral backing of the West indeed formed an invaluable 
support, the demands for rather practical aid should not be underestimated. Especially the 
underground publishing houses were highly dependent on technical support from the West. 
An efficient samizdat apparatus presupposed a regular supply of equipment, mainly stencil 
duplicators, which enabled the opposition to reproduce texts on a mass scale by simple means. 
As the domestic market did not offer any of the necessary devices, the duplicators themselves 
as well as the spare parts and further equipment needed had to be smuggled from Western 
Europe.
935
 Thus, a large-scale support programme was elaborated by a vast émigré network 
with nodes in Paris, London and the United States. The organisation of the clandestine 
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transports, however, was mainly the task of the exile circles in Sweden, which turned 
Poland’s neutral neighbour country into a central hub for the illegal cross-border traffic.936 
Paris, the “Capital of Eastern European dissidence”,937 had since the Thaw years been a major 
toehold of Polish oppositional thought in the West. As the seat of Kultura and the Literary 
Institute, the city retained its relevance as an intellectual centre of anti-communist opposition 
even after the foundation of KOR, with which it maintained close contacts. However, 
unhampered communication between Paris and Warsaw presupposed a functioning network 
of intermediaries. As the Baltic waterways formed an important and convenient connection 
between Poland and the West, Sweden developed into an indispensable link between the 
Polish opposition and leading émigré circles and institutions. The communication between the 
Literary Institute in Paris and the underground publishing house NOWA, for instance, was 
entirely carried out via Swedish couriers and Giedroyć’s contact Norbert Żaba.938 It was most 
probably this connection that eventually led to the development of the highly efficient 
network that organised the smuggling of printing equipment across the Baltic Sea. As Jakub 
Święcicki, one of Żaba’s closest associates among the ‘new emigration’, recalls, it was a 
request by NOWA’s founder and head Mirosław Chojecki that constituted the starting shot. 
On Chojecki’s request, Święcicki arranged the first illegal transport of a portable stencil 
duplicator to Poland and thus set off an activity that soon would develop into an undertaking 
of considerably larger proportions.
939
  
The largest part of the necessary financial means derived from the Polish diaspora in North 
America and Western Europe. The money was usually transmitted by intermediaries, such as 
Eugeniusz Smolar in London and Jerzy Giedroyć in Paris, into the hands of the exiles in 
Sweden. However, Swedish donors also contributed to securing a financial basis for the 
illegal cross-Baltic traffic. Apart from the local Polonia, Swedish university students and 
scholars donated money, as did the ÖESK, the exile branch of the FPU.
940
 The money was not 
only used for the purchase of technical equipment, which at times was organised in Paris or 
London, but also for paying the couriers who conducted the transports. One of the cheapest 
ways was the use of voluntary couriers among the ferry passengers, usually journalists or 
representatives of Swedish student or youth organisations, who travelled to Poland for official 
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meetings and conferences. In this context, especially the émigré activists’ contacts with 
Trotskyite circles, who counted among the “key actors in the face-to-face contacts with 
dissidents”,941 turned out to be most useful. For larger transports, special couriers had to be 
recruited and vehicles to be acquired, which consumed a considerable part of the budget.
942
 
Due to regular communication via smuggled and coded messages, the illegal traffic of 
technical equipment from Sweden to Poland could be tailored to the concrete needs of the 
opposition.
943
 Usually, Swedish tourists and visitors were used for the transfer of written 
purchase orders to the corresponding addressees.
944
 In Sweden, the émigrés organised the 
requested equipment upon consultation with Giedroyć and Smolar. Another reliable channel 
was, according to one of the involved activists, the Swedish ambassador to Poland, Knut 
Thyberg, which sheds an interesting light on the potential involvement of Swedish officials in 
the illegal cross-Baltic flows of information and goods.
945
 In 1979, Jakub Święcicki, one of 
the main coordinators of the smuggling activities, was granted an entry permit by the Warsaw 
government for the first time since his emigration. Under the pretext of family visits, he could 
personally meet with representatives of the democratic movement. During his stay in Warsaw, 
NOWA’s leadership introduced him to the applied techniques of underground printing, which 
considerably facilitated the future ordering procedures.
946
  
It is possible to reconstruct one of those smuggling transports due to of the few disastrous 
incidents which occurred when one of the couriers, a Swedish student named Björn Gunnar 
Laquist, was stopped in his car after he had left the ferry in the port of Gdańsk in December 
1979. During the following interrogation, he named the Estonian exile activist Ülo Ignats as 
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his contact person in Sweden
947, who together with Jakub Święcicki was one of the leading 
figures of the Eastern European Solidarity Committee. In the trunk of Laquist’s car, the Polish 
customs officials found a portable mimeograph designated for NOWA in Warsaw,
948
 ribbons 
for the rotating drum, two pressure rollers and a quartz lamp.
949
 However, the range of 
devices that were smuggled on the Baltic ferries was much broader. Among the items listed 
on the purchase orders that reached the exile activists from the home country, all kinds of 
equipment needed for the mass reproduction of texts could be found. The printing houses 
requested everything from chemicals, solvents for ink production and colour ribbons for 
typewriters to bookbinding glue, paper cutting machines, woven mesh for silk screen printing 
and simple staple fasteners.
950
 Other equipment that was smuggled on request of the Polish 
opposition included cameras, slide films, batteries and audiocassettes,
951
 which were used for 
the audiovisual documentation of illegal lectures, public demonstrations and the brutality of 
the police forces. While the transport of technical equipment was usually planned and 
conducted in Stockholm, the émigré activists in Lund considerably extended the organised 
smuggling of literature. The driving force behind this activity was, besides Andrzej 
Koraszewski, a journalist from Łódź who had left Poland in 1969, Józef Lebenbaum. Via 
Lund, the underground publishing houses were supplied with books for mass-scale 
reprinting,
952
 mostly delivered from Paris via Żaba, while the ‘Flying University’ received 
titles for its ‘Libraries of Forbidden Literature’.953 The amount of smuggled books 
considerably increased when Lebenbaum managed to recruit two Swedish lorry drivers who 
agreed to take several dozen titles every time they delivered goods to Poland.
954
  
The significance of this very practical aspect of support cannot be underestimated. Mirosław 
Chojecki estimates that the main part of the technical equipment that reached Poland before 
1980 was smuggled via Sweden. NOWA, for instance, worked exclusively with technical 
equipment from Sweden,
955
 but sporadic transports were also conducted on the ferries 
                                                          
947
 Translation of the verdict against Björn Gunnar Laquist into German (the language used for the 
communication with the Swedish authorities) titled “Abschrift – Strafentscheidung”, 29 January 1980. AO 
III/2450.6.1. 
948
 Copy of a journal article titled “När svensk greps för smuggling hamnade han mitt i helvetet. Så knäcks 
Björn, 29, i ett polskt skräckfängelse”, Lektyr, December 1979 or January 1980. AO III/2450.6.2; p. 29. 
949
 Translation of the verdict against Björn Gunnar Laquist titled “Abschrift – Strafentscheidung”, 29 January 
1980. AO III/2450.6.1. 
950
 Letter from Jakub Święcicki to an unidentified contact, 23 April 1979. AO III/2450.18. 
951
 Undated note on the requested material for contact persons in Cracow and Warsaw. AO II/2450.9. 
952
 Ibid. 
953
 Account on the incoming funds and expenses, October 1978 to April 1979. AO III/2450.9. 
954
 Interview with Józef Lebenbaum. 
955
 “När svensk greps för smuggling hamnade han mitt i helvetet”, Lektyr. AO III/2450.6.2; p. 46. 
216 
 
between West Germany and Poland and by car from France.
956
 Even smaller printing offices 
profited from the pomoc poligraficzna or ‘printing support’, as this illegal traffic across the 
Baltic Sea was referred to, among them especially the Students’ Solidarity Committees.957 
Also for the regular supply of Western books, the Swedish connection played an increasingly 
important role. By 1980, the illegal transport from Lund had developed into a large-scale 
smuggling of forbidden literature in bulk. Due to the well-functioning networks, the supplies 
of the Warsaw bookshop Księgarnia Św. Wojciecha, the “central node in the dissemination of 
émigré literature”, were regularly replenished. From there, the books found their way to the 
underground publishers, who prepared their reprinting and mass dissemination.
958
   
The increased attention in human rights issues had discernible repercussions on both sides of 
the Iron Curtain, as the development in Poland from 1976 onwards illustrates. The first 
spontaneous protests against the regime’s practice of suppressing public demonstrations by 
force had eventually developed into a transborder network of concerted oppositional 
activities. Due to the active and strategic involvement of the exile, the free circulation of 
uncensored information was significantly facilitated. The considerable technical support from 
abroad enabled the Polish democratic movement to spread documents and appeals on a mass 
scale throughout the country. Via communication with the emigrant groups, the information 
also reached the West. Exile activists proved to be well-interconnected with Western media, 
while they, at the same time, closely cooperated with the anti-communist broadcast stations, 
which retransmitted the currently updated information from Poland back into the country.  
In the context of this very lively transborder interaction, which used the infrastructure and the 
‘loopholes’ of détente, Sweden played a crucial role as a bridging country between the Polish 
opposition and the West. Although the number of émigrés involved in Sweden itself was 
rather small, they were nevertheless able to form an important hub for the current flow of 
information and material support. Their parallel engagement in contemporary political 
discourses and opinion-making was equally important. The attention that their lobbying 
activities gained among parts of Swedish society was doubtlessly a result of the changed 
political climate, which reflected the generally diminishing success of radically leftist 
thinking in the West. The engagement of not only political actors, but also media 
representatives and voluntary couriers clearly marked a considerable first success for the 
oppositional forces of post-Helsinki Europe. In view of these multi-level processes, it became 
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clear that the foundations of the official Polish-Swedish détente were slowly, but steadily 
eroding.  
 
However, it has to be remembered that public attention in human rights violations behind the 
Iron Curtain grew only gradually. A breakthrough was first reached in the 1980s, when the 
mass-scale mobilisation of oppositional forces behind the Iron Curtain forced the Western 
public to take a decisive stance. Nevertheless, the crucial transition from a broad consensus on 
the principle of ‘change through rapprochement’ to a generally critical stance towards the 
communist governments among Western societies and media took place in the late 1970s and 
was largely influenced by émigré activists. Yet, there were still huge differences in the public 
Swedish perception of the situation in the satellite states and the Soviet Baltic republics. 
While the public discourse on a possible democratisation within the satellite belt quickly 
developed in Sweden, the inconvenient and controversial Baltic question was preferably 
omitted. Andres Küng had indeed gained public attention with various publications that 
promoted the Baltic peoples’ right to self-determination by referring to the principles of 
international law and human rights. Yet, one of the rare manifestations of sympathy for the 
Baltic case was most probably triggered by the commitment of Ülo Ignats, who was active as 
an ombudsman for the Liberal People’s Party’s Youth League and a driving force of its 
campaign for human rights behind the Iron Curtain. In one of its brochures, FPU declared that  
“The Baltic countries are, to the same degree as the rest of Eastern Europe, victims of the Soviet 
Union’s imperialism. The Baltic peoples should be able to decide themselves upon their future – 
among other things about whether they want to remain within the Soviet Union or become 
independent.”959 
There had not been many Swedish manifestations of this kind since the public street marches 
and manifestations against the extradition of the Balts three decades earlier. However, FPU’s 
strong support of the exile activists’ stance remained an isolated case.  
Prior to 1980, the Baltic issue did not even nearly arouse as much public attention and 
sympathy as the new forms of societal opposition in Poland and also in Czechslovakia. 
Nevertheless, Estonian exile activism entered a new phase in the mid-1970s, mobilised by the 
first signs of national opposition and active resistance to Russification in Soviet Estonia. 
While the emigrant population had for decades aimed at counterweighing Moscow’s imperial 
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aspirations by influencing Western governments and public opinion, the main focus now 
clearly shifted eastwards.
960
 In June 1975, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty inaugurated its 
broadcast service in Estonian, using the fact that the Soviet Union had stopped its jamming 
activities in the course of the CSCE process. The Estonian section’s main editor was the 
Estonian-born journalist Aleksander Terras from Sweden, who took up his work at the RFE 
headquarters in Munich, where he already had worked for Voice of America in the 1950s.
961
  
Also oppositional circles in Soviet Estonia increasingly demonstrated their willingness to 
communicate and cooperate with the political emigration in the West. On the occasion of the 
second Estonian World Festival, ESTO 76, held in Baltimore, an appeal reached the emigrant 
community in Stockholm from Soviet Estonia. The open letter was signed by an anonymous 
group that referred to itself as Mõtlevate Eestlaste Ühendus (‘Association of Thinking 
Estonians’) with members in Tallinn and Tartu.962 Echoing the views of the less dogmatic 
faction of the Estonian émigré population, the authors encouraged the Estonians in the West 
and especially the younger generation to visit the home country more frequently. Homeland 
and exile groups, the letter stated, not only shared a common past, but even a common future. 
Estonians on both sides of the Iron Curtain had “instinctively been working towards the same 
aims, only under different conditions and according to different methods”.963 However, 
concerted action of exiled and homeland activists required first and foremost a considerable 
improvement of the information exchange between Soviet Estonia and the West.  
With the trial of the leaders of the EDL and the ERR in autumn 1975, the first phase of 
Estonian dissent came to a sudden end. After the signing of the Final Act, Helsinki Watch 
Groups were established in both the Ukraine and Lithuania, where the Church formed the 
stronghold of opposition. A similar plan was proposed by Enn Tarto and Erik Udam, who 
together with other former political prisoners, such as Mart Niklus and Endel Ratas, 
constituted the backbone of Soviet Estonian dissent in the late 1970s. Tarto and Udam aimed 
at mobilising intellectuals and the republic’s religious and ethnic minorities, but the 
cooperation eventually failed due to the wide-spread fear of repression.
964
 However, it was 
due to this failure that the former political prisoners escaped the Soviet-wide wave of 
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repression in early 1977, when “the KGB cracked down on the Helsinki Watch groups and 
arrested their activists”.965 Hence, while oppositional movements in other Soviet republics 
were decapitated, Estonia saw the beginning of a new wave of dissident activity. The 
dissidents regularly drafted open letters and appeals, generally “one of the most common 
genres of samizdat”966 in the Soviet Union, addressed to the Soviet leadership, Western 
governments and international organisations. Referring to the Final Act and the resulting 
legality of their activity, the dissidents now signed with their full names, which significantly 
increased the effect of these documents, especially in the West.
967
 From 1978 onwards, the 
first regular Estonian samizdat journal, drafted according to the pattern of the Chronicle of 
Current Events, was disseminated in Soviet Estonia. The chronicle Lisandusi mõtete ja 
uudiste vabale levikule Eestis (‘Some additions to the free flow of thoughts and news in 
Estonia’) informed its readers on dissident activity in- and outside the Soviet Union and 
especially on the ongoing human rights violations.
968
 Thus, Soviet Estonian dissent had 
recovered by the late 1970s and left the anonymity of the underground.  
A comparison between the Polish opposition, an organised movement with well-functioning 
networks in Poland and beyond, and the handful of dissidents in Estonia illustrates the huge 
discrepancy between the satellite belt and the Soviet Union in post-Helsinki Europe. While 
the underground publishing houses in Poland could reprint Western books and home-grown 
samizdat on a mass scale, Estonian dissidents lacked both the technical equipment and the 
necessary infrastructure. Western radio broadcasts were thus still of central importance for the 
mass dissemination of uncensored information. The Finnish Baptists constituted an important 
connection to the West, although they were not always willing to involve dissidents into their 
secret smuggling networks.
969
 Also the contact with Western correspondents was of central 
importance. Apparently, it was not always necessary to travel to Moscow on this matter. A 
report of the Estonian KGB mentions similar conspiratorial encounters in Tallinn.
970
 Another 
channel had its roots in the networks of the former political prisoners. Niklus and Tarto, who 
already were veterans of anti-Soviet opposition, maintained close contacts with former fellow 
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prisoners from Lithuania. The Lithuanian SSR was used as a transit route to Poland,
971
 where 
activists with contacts both among Estonians in Sweden and RFE in Munich transmitted the 
information to the addressees.
972
 By the late 1970s, Soviet Estonian dissent was thus 
comparatively well connected to the West. Messages from Estonia to Stockholm could now 
be delivered within a month or only a few weeks.
973
  
Stockholm had by then turned into the major switchboard for the dissemination of documents 
that had been smuggled out of Estonia via various routes. The exile community in Sweden 
was thus well-informed about the oppositional activities in the home country. A closer look at 
the émigré discourses of the time, however, reveals that there was great uncertainty about how 
to react to the new situation. The emergence of an organised opposition had for a long time 
been considered most unlikely in Stockholm. Moreover, the institutional structure of the 
political exile groups had not been created with a possible convergence of exile and homeland 
opposition in mind, which explains the confusion that arose among the émigrés.
974
 The 
publication of the memorandum to the United Nations in 1974 had thus triggered a lively 
discourse on how to realign exile politics both towards the West and the home country.
975
 In 
this context, especially the ERN displayed a surprisingly passive stance. Arvo Horm, who in 
earlier years had made use of unorthodox methods in order to establish direct contacts with 
Soviet Estonian visitors in the West, now explicitly warned against inconsiderate actions that 
could endanger the dissidents’ safety.976 However, the passivity of the emigrant community in 
Stockholm ended with the appearance of a new actor on the stage of exile politics, which led 
to an unexpected twist in the exile-homeland relations.  
The retired businessman Ants Kippar belonged to the generation of war refugees and was 
known for his controversial political past. Kippar had been active in the anti-parliamentarian, 
right-wing camp of Estonian exile politics, but decided to leave the field after an alleged 
election fraud in 1947.
977
 Later, he joined the Estonian National Congress, REE, functioning 
as the vice-chairman of its Commission on Foreign Relations and Soviet Estonian Affairs. As 
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many other representatives of his generation, he ostentatiously rejected the liberal approach 
towards contacts with Soviet Estonia that were wide-spread among younger exile Estonians. 
He counted among REE’s fiercest critics of any forms of collaboration, which, according to 
him, included even private visits to Estonia.
978
 Hence, it came as a surprise to many when he 
founded his own organisation in 1978, the Relief Centre for Estonian Prisoners of Conscience, 
Eesti Vangistatud Vabadusvõitlejate Abistamiskeskus, EVVA. An even greater surprise, 
however, was the remarkable success of his efforts to establish direct communication and 
cooperation with oppositional circles on the Soviet Estonian opposite coast.  
The Relief Centre was modelled on Amnesty International, which had increased its 
engagement in Eastern European issues in view of the harsh treatment of the Helsinki Watch 
Groups in the Soviet Union.
979
 EVVA’s main objective was to collect information on the fate 
of the imprisoned Soviet Estonian dissidents and to provide material support to them and their 
families.
980
 In close cooperation with Amnesty International Groups in Sweden, Great Britain 
and the United States, Kippar succeeded in compiling a list of all known political prisoners 
from Estonia. Besides their names, the currently updated list contained the exact addresses of 
the prison camps and of the dissidents’ closest relatives in Estonia.981 EVVA provided 
humanitarian aid to the affected families and established direct contact to the political 
prisoners via regular mail. The aim of writing to the prison camps in the Russian hinterland 
was both to support the imprisoned dissidents morally and to protect them from encroachment 
by the camp leadership. At the same time, EVVA aimed at drawing attention to the existence 
of Soviet camps for political prisoners and demanded the adherence to the Helsinki Final Act, 
which included the right of free correspondence and the release of political prisoners.
982
 
Ants Kippar’s organisation quickly expanded into a transnational network of adoption groups 
and godfathers for the Estonian political prisoners in Europe, North America and Australia.
983
 
The structures were loose and Kippar relied largely on himself, avoiding any cooperation with 
other exile organisations. However, within EVVA’s first year of existence, he had managed to 
gather a small group of supporters, mainly representatives of the younger exile generation. 
One of them was involved in the activities of the ÖESK, while the majority, among them 
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Kippar himself, were members of the conservative Swedish Moderate Party, the former 
Rightist Party. Also the Moderate Party’s Youth League had, as its liberal counterpart, shown 
an increasing interest in Baltic issues,
984
 but this interest did not develop into open support 
until the late 1980s. In spring 1979, EVVA invited a recent émigré from Estonia to join its 
board. Jüri Lina was a young dissident with close contacts to the key figures of the Soviet 
Estonian opposition and had been forced to emigrate by the KGB.
985
 The Relief Centre thus 
involved a fairly heterogeneous group, whose activities marked a major turn in the history of 
the Estonian emigration. Kippar and his sympathisers were the first exile activists to seek and 
find direct contact with the dissident movement,
986
 which marked a crucial step towards a 
convergence of exile and homeland forces into a common front against the occupying power. 
 
In the 1970s, transborder relations in Cold War Europe changed considerably. Détente and the 
CSCE process affected not only the preconditions for intergovernmental cooperation, but also 
of exchange and interaction between East and West on the grassroots-level. The territorial and 
political order of post-Helsinki Europe was the same as before, but the preconditions for 
communication between the blocs had irrevocably changed. The new Western European 
foreign policy strategy counted on the effects of ‘change through rapprochement’. For the 
communist governments, this change towards a more defensive attitude provided a most 
welcome breathing space and allowed the financially battered states to temporarily recover 
from the social and economic consequences of ‘cold warfare’. However, the price they had to 
pay for this ceasefire was high. With the signing of the Helsinki Accords, the communist 
states had officially declared their commitment to human rights. Societal disobedience and 
nonconformist behaviour, which in the eyes of the communist regimes included any forms of 
public criticism against their practices and policies, was thus de facto ‘legalised’. This 
triggered the formation of a variety of monitoring groups behind the Iron Curtain and the 
development of a “subterranean culture beneath the enforced conformity”987 of the communist 
societies throughout the Soviet bloc.  
Another effect of the CSCE process and the Helsinki Accords was the increased public 
attention and awareness for the human rights violations that regularly occurred behind the 
                                                          
984
 Press release of the ERN titled “Eesti Rahvusnõukogu Informatsioonikonverents”, 2 January 1975. RR, f. 3, 
n. 7, s. 78; p. 11. 
985
 Protocol of an assembly of EVVA, 19 May 1979. ERAF 9608.1.3.4. 
986
 Niitsoo, Viktor (1992): “Avalik vastupanuliikumine Eestis aastail 1977-1984 II”. – In: Akadeemia 10, pp. 
2180-2194; p. 2181. 
987
 Suri, Power and Protest; p. 108. 
223 
 
Iron Curtain. The communist governments’ harsh reactions to any form of societal opposition, 
such as the strikes of Poland’s industrial workers or the resistance against the increasing 
Russification in the Soviet Baltic republics, sharply contrasted with the commitments of the 
Final Act. As has been shown, exile activists in Sweden and elsewhere in the West 
consciously used these contradictions for their purposes, which altered the strategy of the 
lobbying activities. Instead of continuing the discourse on the inviolability of pre-war borders 
and each nation’s right to self-determination, the exile activists now focused on the repeated 
and systematic violation of human rights behind the Iron Curtain. Thus, they were able to link 
the political development in their home countries to highly topical political discourses, which 
triggered a renaissance of Western engagement and public interest in Central and Eastern 
European issues. The focus of the media and the dense network of Helsinki Watch Groups in 
the Western hemisphere functioned as “a sort of lifeline”988 for the oppositional forces behind 
the Iron Curtain. Protected by the framework of the Final Act’s ‘third basket’ and the 
monitoring activities in the West, dissidents and human rights activists could finally leave the 
underground and act openly. In the aftermath of the Helsinki talks, the ‘captive nations’ had 
started to talk for themselves.   
The dynamic development of oppositional structures in the communist societies radically 
changed the role of the political emigrant community. The emerging oppositional movements 
did not show any initiatives to assign the ‘states in exile’ any form of ideological or moral 
leadership in their struggle against the ossified state structures in the communist bloc. Now it 
depended on the exiles themselves and their abilities to align with the oppositional forces on 
their own terms. In the aftermath of the 1976 crisis in Poland, ‘Polish London’ had proved to 
be unable to adapt to the ideological and political visions of the Polish opposition, which 
largely isolated the ‘old emigrant’ groups from the dynamic activist circles in Poland. Jerzy 
Giedroyć in Paris, by contrast, could profit from his close bonds with the post-1968 
emigration. This alliance set the ground for an extension of the Polish opposition’s alliances 
with political actors in the West. The émigré activists involved thus turned into integrative 
elements of the transnational networks of Polish societal opposition to the regime in Warsaw.   
Due to the incomparably smaller scale of dissent in Estonia and the Soviet republic’s relative 
isolation, the Estonian emigration’s capacities to directly collaborating with the oppositional 
movement in the home country were much more limited. However, even mental borders had 
to be crossed. For decades, the emigration had underestimated the home country’s potential to 
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actively oppose the regime and thus perceived itself as the mouthpiece of a nation that was a 
defenseless victim of Russian imperialism. The highly institutionalised organisational 
structure of the political exile was thus mainly designed for lobbying activities and interaction 
with governments and international organisations in the West, but not for any direct 
interference in Soviet affairs. Hence, the formation of a nationalist opposition in Estonia took 
the political emigrant community by surprise and caused considerable confusion, especially 
due to the omnipresent fear of communist infiltration and provocation and the lack of 
possibilities to verify the information. Another reason that delayed the development of a 
transborder dialogue between exile activists and oppositional actors in Estonia was the fear of 
jeopardising the dissidents’ situation by direct interference. It was thus not before the late 
1970s that Kippar’s bold and, in many ways, radical and uncompromising attitude opened a 
door to the dissidents in their home country, which so far had only been ajar.  
The new forms of dissent triggered a substantial restructuring of exile activity. During the first 
three decades of the Cold War, the émigré communities had developed highly 
institutionalised, quasi-governmental structures with their own elected officials and a flora of 
parties, associations and other forms of political representation. In view of the dynamic 
evolution of dissident movements in Central and Eastern Europe, these structures were 
reduced to their symbolic function and de facto lost their influence on the current 
developments. Individual commitment as well as flexible structures turned out to matter more 
than the ponderous ‘states in exile’, which were shaken by internal conflicts and political 
rivalries. In the late 1970s, the most dynamic circles of exile activism relied more than before 
on their own private contacts and formed informal networks that in many ways mirrored the 
organisational pattern of societal dissent behind the Iron Curtain. The oppositional exile 
organisations adapted to the needs of operating in a dictatorship and established highly 
decentralised structures that were difficult to infiltrate. In Poland, societal opposition had 
developed into a widely ramified system of underground organisations that did not necessarily 
cooperate directly,
989
 although all of them were in some way interconnected within Poland 
and beyond its borders. The Polish emigration adopted a similar strategy, which resulted in 
the development of autonomous centres, such as the circles around Kultura in Paris, Aneks in 
London and the KOR representatives in Stockholm that all maintained their own channels to 
the People’s Republic.990 This decentralisation of communication was the key to the challenge 
of surmounting the still highly controlled borderland between East and West. In Estonia, 
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where state surveillance kept a much tighter grip on society, the level of conspiracy was much 
higher. The networks between dissidents, couriers and contact persons in the West were 
almost impossible to follow even for insiders themselves, as every cog only knew “as much as 
necessary and as little as possible”.991 Nevertheless, the first attempts of establishing direct 
communication between Tallinn and Stockholm turned out to be successful. By the second 
half of the 1970s, anti-communist opposition had thus developed into a transnational structure 
of “informal, non-bureaucratic, dynamic and open communities”992, which proved to be able 
to coordinate their activities across the bloc border.  
Anti-communist activity in post-Helsinki Europe is a topic that cannot be examined without 
taking its transborder qualities into account. The human rights discourses developed into the 
vehicle that, due to the intermediary efforts of the émigrés, involved Western human rights 
activists and increasingly also the political elites. Subversive networks across the Iron Curtain 
connected societal dissent to the West and turned it into an important factor of international 
Cold War politics. At the same time, oppositional actors in East and West developed patterns 
of symbiotic coexistence. The intertwined system of samizdat and tamizdat symbolises the 
blurring of borders between exile and homeland opposition to the communist regimes. Dissent 
and oppositional discourses thus expanded beyond geographical borders and triggered the 
gradual convergence of exile and homeland opposition groups.  
Sweden and its exile communities from the opposite coasts played a key role in these 
transnationalisation processes, as the examination of the new forms of oppositional exile-
homeland cooperation has illustrated. Détente had turned the Scandinavian neutrals into zones 
of transition between the blocs with a functioning cross-Baltic infrastructure. Anti-communist 
actors on both sides of the Iron Curtain proved to be able to make use of this Scandinavian 
connection that bound Poland and Soviet Estonia directly to the West. For the Estonian 
dissent, the ‘Finnish bridge’ and its extensions to Stockholm formed the only direct channel to 
the Western world, which in view of its relative isolation from the outside world was of 
utmost importance. However, it was only from the turn of the decade onwards that these 
preconditions could be used for the establishment of a dynamic oppositional dialogue across 
the Baltic Sea. The Poles, by contrast, had already by the late 1970s succeeded in establishing 
reliable and frequently used channels with the West. The connection to Sweden and the local 
Polish emigration played an outstanding role in this context, as it soon came to constitute the 
major smuggling route of technical supply for the underground press, which formed an 
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exceptionally vibrant form of oppositional exile-homeland cooperation. Ironically, these new 
forms of transborder cooperation were a corollary of détente, from which the communist 
states had expected a stabilising effect. As the oppositional dialogue across the Baltic Sea 
slowly expanded, it increasingly eroded the foundations for the rapprochement between 
Sweden and its neighbours on the opposite coasts, until the eventual failure of the ‘bridge 
building policy’ of détente became obvious in the early 1980s. 
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VII. From individual to mass-based opposition: The transnational 
dimension of the ‘anti-communist revolutions’ 
 
VII.1 ‘First Gdańsk, then Tallinn’ – Cross-Baltic opposition and the public 
sphere  
The Kremlin’s decision to invade Afghanistan in December 1979 put an end to the Soviet 
policy of restraint. Moscow’s military offensive in Central Asia was the grist to the mill of the 
fiercest critics of détente in the West, who interpreted the policy of rapprochement as a sign of 
weakness. The early 1980s saw a renaissance of anticommunism in international politics. 
Ronald Reagan’s election as President of the United States paved the way for neoconservative 
forces that did not refrain from openly supporting anti-communist dissent behind the Iron 
Curtain.
993
 Thus, the international political climate had considerably changed, as the 
communist delegates could convince themselves of already at the follow-up CSCE conference 
in Madrid in 1980, during which the human rights issue became a major topic of dispute.
994
  
Another reason for concern was, seen from the perspective of the communist governments, 
the quickly progressing “ideological degeneration”995 that became visible throughout the 
Soviet sphere of influence. The estrangement between the masses, which suffered under the 
chronic supply shortages of planned economy and the suffocation of critical thinking, and the 
largely corrupted Party nomenklatura had significantly grown during the 1970s. It was in 
crisis-torn Poland that this development reached yet another climax. In summer 1980, the 
Polish government’s decision to suddenly raise the meat prices triggered, as four years before, 
a wave of publicly displayed discontent. But in contrast to the 1976 events, which erupted in 
spontaneous street demonstrations and violent confrontations with police forces, societal 
protest now found expression in a number of peaceful strikes, which soon affected state-
owned factories all across the country.
996
 The explosive political potential of the strikes 
became obvious with the engagement of prominent KOR activists, who set out to fill the 
“ideological vacuum”997 of the workers’ protests in the industrial centres of the inland and the 
shipyards at the Baltic coastline. The fact that the working masses and intellectuals 
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immediately joined forces illustrated a new quality of opposition in communist Poland, 
especially as it was discretely backed by an additional societal force. By 1980, the Catholic 
Church had recovered from the years of suppression and collaboration and regained its 
traditional strength and authority as the central pillar of Polish society. John Paul II’s first 
pilgrimage to his home country after his election to papacy in June 1979 marked the decisive 
breakthrough in the Polish Church’s post-war history. The millions of enthusiastic spectators 
on the streets and squares were greeted by a spiritual leader who presented the Catholic 
Church as a moral counterforce to Marxism and a shelter for those who opposed it.
998
 
By mid-August, the coastal city of Gdańsk had developed into the centre of the nation-wide 
strike movement. The firing of Anna Walentynowicz, an employee at the Lenin Shipyard, 
mobilised broad opposition among the workers. Led by the dismissed electrician Lech 
Wałęsa, they established a strike committee, which was the nucleus of what later became 
known as the Solidarity movement. The committee’s ‘twenty-one demands’, which developed 
into the programmatic agenda of strikers all across the country, contained many of the 
fundamental rights that the government in Warsaw had already committed to by signing the 
Helsinki Accords.
999
 Leading KOR representatives soon joined the Lenin Shipyard workers in 
order to support them in their negotiations with the authorities. Initially, there was a 
conviction among government officials that the workers had been manipulated by their 
intellectual advisors,
1000
 which inclined the government to put its trust in direct proceedings 
with the strikers. However, the workers’ position remained unaltered. In order to avert the 
danger of a civil war or even a Soviet intervention, Gierek decided to give in. The famous 
Gdańsk Agreement, signed at the end of August, legalised independent trade unions and 
eventually cost Gierek his position. This revolutionary breakthrough, which led to the birth of 
Solidarność a few weeks later, the first self-governing trade union behind the Iron Curtain, 
might not necessarily have been the prelude to the inevitable breakdown of communism a 
decade later, as it often is retrospectively presented. Nevertheless, the Gdańsk Agreement still 
marked, as Tony Judt put it, the spectacular peak of a decade of workers’ protests in Poland 
and illustrated the significant shift in the power balance between society and the communist 
authorities.
1001
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In the summer of 1980, the eyes of the world were directed at the events that evolved on the 
Baltic Sea’s southern coastline. At the same time, however, attention was drawn to a so far 
rather peaceful corner of the region. Shortly after the signing of the agreement between the 
striking workers and the Polish government, the Soviet Estonian capital of Tallinn was shaken 
by violent street protests, which involved up to two thousand schoolboys. Government 
representatives were quick to refer to ‘hooligans’, but the obvious political dimension of the 
demonstrations, which displayed strong anti-Soviet and anti-Russian sentiments, was 
clear.
1002
 An open letter to the Soviet Estonian press, signed by forty prominent intellectuals, 
expressed severe concerns about the brutal and pitiless persecution of the demonstrating 
youth. Even this unprecedented protest by the so far politically rather cautious intellectual 
elite of Soviet Estonia did not remain unnoticed in the West.
1003
 
By the turn of the decade, the Soviet regime had considerably tightened the reins. Especially 
in view of the approaching Summer Olympic Games, hosted by the Soviet Union and with 
sailing competitions supposed to take place in Tallinn, censorship turned considerably stricter 
and the KGB increased its monitoring activities.
1004
 Moreover, the Soviet government 
reintroduced the jamming of Western radio broadcasts, fearing a spill-over effect from the 
Polish crisis into the neighbouring Baltic republics.
1005
 Whether it was the rumours about the 
striking workers in Poland that provoked the street protests in Tallinn, as an article published 
in The Economist suggested,
1006
 is hard to verify, as is the article’s second hypothesis of 
foreign inspirations. It was widely known in Estonia that Stockholm had been the venue of the 
third Estonian World Festival, ESTO 80, with up to 25,000 participants, only a few months 
before the Tallinn protests.
1007
 Doubtlessly, it must have made a considerable impression on 
the inhabitants of Soviet Estonia to receive the reports from the nearby Swedish capital, which 
for a week was dressed in the national colours of the independent Republic of Estonia.
1008
 
Also in the Western media, ESTO 80 received considerable attention
1009
 and the leaders of 
Sweden’s main political parties sent their official greetings to the gathered émigré 
representatives from Europe, America and Australia.
1010
 But regardless of the question, 
whether the Tallinn riots were partly inspired by the events around the Baltic rim or not, they 
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contributed to the re-entry of the Estonian question into Western political discourses, not least 
in neighbouring Sweden. Also the fact that the sailing competitions of the Summer Olympic 
Games were supposed to be held on ‘occupied territory’ led to a rising Western consciousness 
concerning Estonia’s post-war fate. Eventually, this was one of the reasons besides the Soviet 
invasion in Afghanistan that led to a boycott of the event by sixty-six states.
1011
   
‘First Gdańsk, then Tallinn’, as the subheading of the abovementioned article in The 
Economist stated, did not suggest that the forms and extent of the public protests in Poland 
and Soviet Estonia were to any degree comparable. But it indicated the emergence of a new 
Western sensitivity for the signs of the time, which were reflected in the chain of events along 
the Baltic coasts. In 1980, the societies behind the Iron Curtain had proved their potential to 
organise oppositional manifestations that expanded beyond the narrow limits of conspiratorial 
dissident circles. Societal discontent and oppositional action started to take place in the public 
sphere, both in relatively liberal Poland and the peripheral republics of the Soviet Union itself, 
and an enlightened and well-informed Western public would closely observe its evolution.  
 
ESTO 80 put the Baltic question in general and the fate of the Estonian nation in particular 
back on the political agenda in Sweden. From the summer of 1980 onwards, Baltic issues 
were discussed in the Swedish media to a much larger degree than before,
1012
 which put an 
end to the “conspiracy of silence”,1013 as Andres Küng provocatively summarised the 
complicated Swedish stance towards the post-war fate of the Baltic neighbours. The official, 
government position towards Baltic affairs, however, remained unchanged. Stockholm aimed 
to continue its bridging efforts of the détente years and remained reluctant to endanger its 
relations with Moscow.
1014
 In the United States, by contrast, the government attitude towards 
the Balts and anti-Soviet opposition noticeably changed with the election of Ronald Reagan as 
President. Baltic émigrés in the United States had noticeably intensified their lobbying 
activities during the preceding decade, and first with the onset of Reagan’s Presidency, these 
efforts were met with demonstrative support from the political leadership.
1015
 The suppression 
of oppositional activities in the Soviet Union, however, grew proportionally with the 
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increasing Western attention and support for anti-Soviet dissent. By 1980, the persecution of 
nonconformist thinking had reached its peak, which led the Soviet dissident movement to “its 
lowest ebb since its emergence in the 1960s”.1016 The human rights activist and Nobel Peace 
laureate Andrei Sakharov was sent into internal exile in Gorky, while other prominent 
dissidents were forced to emigrate, which considerably weakened Moscow’s significance as a 
centre of dissent. In view of the visible decline of the democratic movement in the Russian 
heartlands, the renaissance of dissent in Soviet Estonia received all the more attention.
1017
 
In contrast to its Russian counterpart, Estonian dissent moved towards its most active period. 
By the turn of the decade, a group of around thirty people were united into a loose network of 
anti-Soviet activists. This movement involved both former political prisoners, such as Tarto, 
Udam or Ratas, and a new generation of dissidents that only recently had become involved, 
such as Viktor Niitsoo, Tiit Madisson or Heiki Ahonen. Doubtlessly, the news about the 
striking workers’ successful negotiations with the government in Gdańsk had a mobilising 
effect on the Estonian dissidents. This new optimism is reflected in a telegram to Lech 
Wałęsa, in which prominent Estonian and Lithuanian dissidents complimented him on the 
democratic reforms that were “so much needed by the whole socialist camp”.1018 The anti-
Soviet activists followed a double strategy. Besides regularly drafting open letters to both 
Soviet authorities and Western institutions, they simultaneously engaged in the production 
and dissemination of samizdat and looked for possible smuggling routes to the West.
1019
  
The Estonian dissidents were well aware of the political emigration’s potential of functioning 
as their natural partner in the West. However, the majority of exiles in nearby Stockholm still 
maintained their sceptical attitude and preferred to adopt an observant stance. The ERN 
activist Arvo Horm underlined that private family visits of Estonian émigrés to their home 
country had so far been the platform of exile-homeland communication that was least 
endangered by direct KGB infiltration. Due to the lack of direct risks that this field implied 
and the corroding effects of at first glance apolitical exchange, the private visits thus still 
constituted the most effective strategy of influencing the developments inside the Soviet 
Union, according to Horm.
1020
 Against this background, it becomes clear why the ERN, an 
established Cold War institution, did not develop into a preferred partner for the much more 
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radical dissident circles.
1021
 It is due to Ants Kippar’s engagement that Stockholm 
nevertheless turned into a central hub of anti-Soviet opposition abroad. Kippar’s organisation 
EVVA took the decisive step from being a lobbying organisation directed towards a Western 
public to supporting and enhancing dissent in Soviet Estonia. Via the Finnish nodes of his 
humanitarian network, Kippar succeeded in establishing direct communication with the 
protagonists of the democratic movement.
1022
 The dissidents’ willingness to trust in and 
cooperate with him marked the beginning of a fruitful symbiosis of opposition across the 
Baltic Sea. 
Once again, the ‘Finnish bridge’ was essential for the establishment of a functioning 
communication system between Sweden and Estonia. Much of EVVA’s humanitarian aid for 
the political prisoners’ families reached Estonia via Helsinki, which meant that Kippar 
presided over a functioning network even in Finland.
1023
 According to the investigations of 
the Estonian KGB, it was mainly the task of the recently emigrated Jüri Lina to coordinate 
reliable channels that allowed Kippar to remain informed about the situation and 
developments in Soviet Estonia. Lina had a contact in Tallinn, which whom he communicated 
via Finnish tourists and crew members of the M/S Georg Ots, the ferry that connected Tallinn 
to Helsinki.
1024
 As Lina’s contact later testified during an interrogation by the KGB, even 
direct communication with Kippar’s people was possible via two Finnish couriers, who 
maintained close contact with Kippar in Stockholm and regularly visited Estonia.
1025
 Shorter 
messages were, as Eve Pärnaste remembers, typed on interlining cloth, which was then sewn 
into the couriers’ clothes and thus relatively easy to smuggle out of the country.1026 A much 
riskier, but incomparably quicker way of communicating was the phone,
1027
 which since the 
formation of KOR had constituted a main channel of communication between Polish 
oppositional activists and their allies in different Western European capitals. But phones were 
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by far not as common in Estonia as they were in Poland and state surveillance in the Soviet 
Union was much stricter, which made the communication via phone very easy to intercept. 
Thus, phone calls were conducted from changing locations and mainly used to confirm that 
messages had been received. However, even the courier system was not safe from KGB 
interference. As it later turned out, one of Kippar’s Finnish confidants had been blackmailed 
by the KGB because of his homosexual contacts in Tallinn and thus become an involuntary 
informant.
1028
 
The KGB was thus well aware of the ongoing communication between Kippar and the 
dissidents. In order to control these channels as far as possible, the KGB relied on a 
combination of monitoring and infiltration. The channels between Estonia and the West were 
not institutionalised and smuggling opportunities often arose coincidentally, so that the 
dissidents remained highly pragmatic in their choice of couriers to carry out the forwarding of 
documents. This is why they accepted the offered help of an Estonian sailor, in spite of the 
obvious risks. The sailor volunteered for smuggling samizdat material, such as the Estonian 
underground chronicle Lisandusi and further documentation of political persecution and trials, 
directly to Sweden on his frequent cross-Baltic trips on Soviet vessels.
1029
 Although the 
dissidents harboured considerable doubts regarding the reliability of this channel, the route 
proved to work. On the phone, Kippar used to read out segments of the documents he had 
received in order to verify their authenticity, which also confirmed that the documents 
smuggled by the sailor had reached their addressee.
1030
 After the wave of arrests that struck 
the dissident movement in 1983 it was, however, revealed that the channel had been created 
on behalf of the KGB, which systematically collected copies of every document that Kippar 
received.
1031
 Infiltrating the cross-Baltic smuggling activities, the intelligence units were able 
to control the subversive contacts and to gain valuable insights into the inner circles of 
opposition, which explains why the conspiratorial missions were nevertheless 
accomplished.
1032
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However, most documents that reached Stockholm from Soviet Estonia arrived via the 
already established channels. Finnish Baptists sporadically carried out the task of smuggling 
microfilms out of the country, mainly via the Finnish-Soviet land border by car.
1033
 Yet, the 
most reliable channel between the dissidents and Kippar were still the Western 
correspondents, who already for years had been useful intermediaries that successfully 
bridged the barriers between the Soviet opposition and the West. Although the journalists 
were mainly interested in first-hand information from the Baltic republics, they usually agreed 
on organising the transport of samizdat material to the West.
1034
 The names of journalists 
involved that figure in the KGB reports were, apart from one correspondent who worked for 
the Associated Press, predominantly Swedish. Among them were the representative for the 
Swedish television in Moscow, his colleague from the Swedish radio and the correspondent 
for the liberal daily Dagens Nyheter.
1035
 Lagle Parek, Heiki Ahonen and Arvo Pesti frequently 
travelled to Moscow in order to meet with them, sharing their information about the situation 
in Estonia and handing over the latest editions of the underground chronicle Lisandusi for 
Kippar, who was supposed to organise their further dissemination in the West.
1036
  
The first edition of Lisandusi reached Stockholm in 1981.
1037
 Due to Kippar’s close relations 
with Aleksander Terras, the head of RFE’s Estonian section in Munich, the contents could 
quickly be broadcasted back to Estonia.
1038
 In view of the limited possibilities of reproducing 
printed or typed material in the Soviet Union, Kippar thus filled a key function not only for 
the dissemination of uncensored information from Estonia in the West, but also within 
Estonia itself. In contrast to Poland, where well-organised underground printing offices could 
reproduce whole books in editions that could amount up to forty thousand items,
1039
 Soviet 
samizdat was still virtually ‘handmade’. The existing electrographic equipment was entirely 
under the control of the authorities and therefore impossible to use for subversive 
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purposes.
1040
 Apparently, an opportunity to illegally import a mimeograph from the West via 
Moscow once opened up in 1982, but the Estonian dissidents refrained from that option due to 
the lack of a suitable hiding place.
1041
 Also typewriters were officially listed and registered, 
which made it possible to trace exactly the typewriter used for reproducing samizdat 
documents. However, there were alternatives. One way of gaining access to unregistered 
typewriters was to buy them on the black market in Moscow and to replace the Cyrillic 
typebars with Latin ones. In other cases, portable typewriters were purchased in the West and 
then smuggled into the country via the Finnish-Soviet border, from where they finally reached 
Estonia.
1042
  
One of those illegally imported typewriters was used by Eve Pärnaste, a representative of the 
younger dissident generation. Among her main tasks was to type multiple carbon copies, 
usually on a dozen sheets of very thin paper at a time.
1043
 This time-consuming, small-scale 
reproduction of samizdat, which Robert Daniels compared to the “transmission of learning by 
monastic copyists in the Middle Ages”,1044 was wide-spread among oppositional circles in the 
Soviet Union. The most readable first copy was commonly used for photographing, another 
frequently applied, but equally labour-intensive strategy of reproducing written records.
1045
 
Thus, it was almost impossible to circulate uncensored information among a public that 
exceeded the narrow circles of friends and acquaintances. Therefore, direct and unhampered 
communication with Kippar was of great importance for the dissident activists, as his efficient 
personal network guaranteed that information quickly reached the RFE and the Voice of 
America. Although heavily jammed,
1046
 Western broadcasting remained the only effective 
vehicle for the dissemination of uncensored information in Estonia.
1047
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In spite of the fact that Kippar acted mainly on his own, the outcome of his commitment was 
remarkable. Due to EVVA’s energetic lobbying activities and Kippar’s role as a major 
informant of the Western press on the situation in Estonia, the level of attention in Estonian 
issues had noticeably grown, not only in Sweden.
1048
 The dissidents appreciated this 
dedication
1049
, which, as the imprisoned Tiit Madisson stated in a letter that was smuggled out 
of the prison camp, was “a proof for the home country that the Estonians abroad sympathise 
with and help the democratic movement that has emerged in Estonia”.1050 Yet, his activities 
were also met with sharp criticism from both political camps of the Estonian emigrant 
community in Stockholm. Direct interaction with Kippar, his critics stated, constituted a 
considerable risk for oppositional activists in Soviet Estonia.
1051
 Those who accused Kippar of 
acting incautiously and carelessly
1052
 most probably felt vindicated in spring 1983, when the 
mass arrests of dissidents started the KGB’s broad offensive against societal opposition in 
Estonia.  
Especially after the death of Jüri Kukk, who had been arrested for oppositional activities and 
died after a hunger strike in a Soviet labour camp in Vologda in March 1981, the regime’s 
determination to persecute the dissidents grew.
1053
 In spring 1983, Andropov’s KGB finally 
decided to crack upon societal opposition in Estonia, which led to a new wave of repression 
and the arrest of a large number of activists, among them Lagle Parek, Heiki Ahonen, Arvo 
Pesti and Enn Tarto. The main charges against the dissidents referred to their “criminal 
contacts with a criminal organisation called Estonian Relief Centre for Political Prisoners in 
Sweden”.1054 The Supreme Court of the Estonian SSR took it as given that the dissidents had 
maintained close communication with Ants Kippar in Stockholm for several years. These 
charges were based both on intercepted phone calls
1055
 and the detection of open letters and 
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information material from Kippar’s EVVA in the homes of the accused.1056 Eventually, the 
dissidents were sentenced to several years of imprisonment in Russian labour camps. The 
activity of those who had escaped arrest and trial was from now on focused on the support of 
the prisoners, which de facto marked the end of the Soviet Estonian dissident movement.
1057
 
With the arrest of Parek, Ahonen and Pesti, the works on the underground chronicle Lisandusi 
stagnated and the eighteenth edition remained unfinished.
1058
 This severely hampered the 
planned intensification of exile-homeland cooperation in the field of samizdat. Before their 
arrest, the dissidents had instructed Kippar to organise the reprint of all editions that had 
reached him, reserving a certain number of pocket-size copies that were to be smuggled back 
into the Soviet Union for redistribution in Estonia itself.
1059
 As the oppositional leadership 
was imprisoned and technical and logistic problems delayed the reprint of Lisandusi in 
Stockholm, this plan eventually failed. From 1984 onwards, several edited volumes could be 
published in the West, although their contents by then were outdated and their format too 
large to smuggle them back into the Soviet Union.
1060
 
The suppression of the Estonian dissident movement was thus doubtlessly connected to the 
conspiratorial networking activities that had evolved between Sweden and Estonia. But the 
general critique directed against Kippar exceeded the accusations of having jeopardised the 
dissident’s personal security by cooperating with them. According to Arvo Horm, who 
counted among the central opinion-makers of Stockholm’s Estonian community, Kippar’s 
lobbying efforts in favour of political prisoners and radically anti-Soviet dissidents had 
distorted the general picture of the oppositional landscape in Soviet Estonia. “The national 
resistance of the Estonian nation in the home country is quite much broader, deeper, more 
open and considerably more diverse than Kippar currently is presenting it to the Estonians 
abroad”,1061 Horm stated. Due to his close cooperation with the most radical wing of 
opposition to the regime, the criticism continued, the Relief Centre had monopolised the field 
of oppositional contacts with the home country. The obvious risks of communicating with the 
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exile via Kippar had, as Horm claimed, induced the patriotic and anti-Soviet circles among 
the Soviet Estonian intelligentsia to refrain from any contacts with the political emigration.
1062
  
In his objections, Horm omitted the parallel development of another field of exile-homeland 
contacts, which certainly was equally as significant as the subversive dissident networks 
across the Baltic Sea. From the early 1980s onwards, the Stockholm-based Baltic Institute had 
developed into a platform for semi-official contacts between representatives of cultural and 
academic life in Sweden and Soviet Estonia. This exchange formed a contrast to the dominant 
tendency among the transatlantic Estonian exile community to categorically reject any kind of 
official contacts with the home country. The young émigré intellectuals in Stockholm, 
however, made a clear distinction between “Soviet contacts” and “contacts with Estonians in 
Soviet-occupied Estonia”.1063 They made use of the official sanctioning of societal exchange 
between East and West in the spirit of Helsinki as a vehicle for fostering personal contacts 
across the Baltic Sea. In autumn 1976, Sweden and the Soviet Union had signed an agreement 
on the expansion of bilateral contacts in the fields of culture and science. Over the course of 
time, it became possible to circumvent the bureaucratic procedures via the centralised 
administration in Moscow and to establish direct cooperation between institutions in Sweden 
and Soviet Estonia.
1064
 The Baltic Institute consciously avoided public statements and 
manifestations that could be interpreted politically in order to be able to use the new openings 
for their own purposes. Already by the mid-1970s, the émigré scholars involved had 
completely distanced themselves from the political emigration and strengthened their bonds 
with the Swedish academic community, which resulted in close cooperation with the 
University of Stockholm.
1065
 Covered by a Swedish state institution, the Baltic Institute could 
thus develop into an intermediary and coordinate the institutional entangling processes that 
developed between Sweden and Soviet Estonia from the late 1970s onwards.   
The exile scholars’ underlying political strategy was very similar to the calculation of the 
Western European governments during the high tide of détente. According to their vision of 
‘change through rapprochement’, they hoped that Western influences and contacts with 
Estonian institutions and scholars would foster a spirit of reform from within. This was the 
subversive aspect of the new forms of exile-homeland communication, which caused Soviet 
propaganda to accuse the émigrés involved of using the ambition of fostering cultural and 
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scholarly exchange as a smoke screen in order to cover up their anti-Soviet intentions.
1066
 
Already in the late 1970s, the Baltic Institute succeeded in inviting Soviet Estonian scholars 
and artists to Sweden in close cooperation with Swedish universities and museums. In 1980, 
the Swedish Parliament held a ballot on the question of establishing a separate research 
institute at the University of Stockholm, the Centre for Baltic Studies. The research centre 
became the driving force for the development of scholarly cooperation across the Baltic Sea, 
while the Baltic Institute exclusively focused on coordinating the cultural contacts.
1067
 At the 
sixth conference of the Baltic Institute, held in 1981, a considerable number of Baltic scholars 
participated, which was considered a major breakthrough. Conservative émigré circles heavily 
criticised the cooperation with the Soviet Estonian elite, especially in North America, where 
one Estonian newspaper wrote about the invited guests as “the thirty Chekists” from the 
Baltic republics.
1068
 However, other activists, such as Andres Küng, who himself had earlier 
been critical towards the Baltic Institute’s activities, eventually defended the strategy, as the 
travels to Sweden provided a “breathing space” for the Soviet Estonian intelligentsia.1069  
The Baltic Institute was a pioneer in promoting the rapprochement of exile and homeland 
elites. A few years later, the general attitude among the Estonian community in Sweden had 
already noticeably changed in favour of multilayered interaction with the home country.
1070
 
By the mid-1980s, a pattern of regular cultural encounters and institutional cooperation had 
developed between Sweden and Estonia, which fostered mutual study visits, guest lectures 
and performances of theatres and choirs. Even a twinning arrangement between Uppsala and 
Tartu was under discussion already in 1982, when three Swedish delegates took part in the 
festivities of the 350
th
 anniversary of the University of Tartu as the only foreigners apart from 
their Finnish colleagues. Even though this field of interaction officially formed a subsection 
of Swedish-Soviet relations, the Estonian exiles were usually the driving forces behind the 
Swedish institutions’ efforts to foster mobility and exchange across the Baltic Sea.1071 Due to 
their efforts, the Soviet Estonian intelligentsia could establish durable contacts in the West, 
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not at least with their compatriots in exile. Thus, both the dissidents and the intellectual elite, 
which in spite of its at first glance conformist stance was still the traditional bearer of 
nationalist values, were in various ways and via very different channels connected to the 
political emigrant community on Estonia’s opposite coast. With the emergence of the 
independence movement in the late 1980s, these two isolated strands would join forces, which 
led to the convergence of the different contacts into a much broader web of exile-homeland 
cooperation.   
 
The turn of the decade was thus a major watershed for both Soviet Estonia and the Estonian 
emigration in many respects. The Scandinavian-Soviet rapprochement enabled actors on both 
sides of the Iron Curtain to find new channels and levels of communication, which ended the 
decades during which interaction between Soviet Estonia and the West was reduced to 
individual and irregular encounters. However, neither the surprisingly efficient dissident 
networks, nor the, at first glance, apolitical institutional exchanges reached the intensity of the 
multifarious pattern of communication that had developed between Sweden and Poland from 
the early 1970s onwards. The formation of Solidarność provided an additional note to the 
Swedish-Polish networking processes and substantially broadened the basis for non-
governmental cooperation. The legalisation of Poland’s first independent trade union paved 
the way for a considerable intensification of the societal contacts between Swedes and Poles, 
which inevitably adopted a highly politicised, even oppositional profile.  
The official reactions from Stockholm were, however, rather reserved. The right-wing 
government under Prime Minister Fälldin was eager to avoid interfering in Poland’s internal 
affairs
1072
, and even the social democrats, at the time in opposition, refrained from openly 
supporting Solidarity. Party leader Palme had, together with leading European social 
democrats, among them Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky, for several years been engaged in a 
multilateral dialogue with the Polish government, which certainly limited his scope of action 
in the matter of Solidarity.
1073
 In view of the reserved attitude of the social democratic 
leadership, the firm and unambiguous support of Solidarity by the Swedish trade union 
movement, which traditionally followed the political line with the Social Democratic Party, is 
remarkable. The leading trade union federations in Germany, Austria or Denmark were 
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considerably more modest in their reactions.
1074
 However, the fact that these countries were 
ruled by social democratic governments may have influenced the trade unions, the closest 
allies of social democracy, to take the obligations of the official policy of rapprochement with 
the communist states into account. In Sweden, by contrast, trade union leaders became 
quickly involved in a transnational support network, which might be partly explained with the 
earlier engagement of prominent Swedish social democrats for the pre-Solidarity opposition 
movement. At the time of the formation of Solidarność in summer 1980, the characteristics 
and aims of the democratic opposition were already well known in Sweden due to the strong 
lobbying activism of the Polish emigration. This doubtlessly contributed to the many 
manifestations of public support for Solidarity and fostered the rapid and effective 
development of organisational structures that aimed at assisting the young trade union 
movement in neighbouring Poland.  
Landsorganisationen, LO, the “largest and best resourced Swedish trade union 
federation”1075, had earlier been involved in the efforts of the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions, ICFTU, to cooperate with the state-sponsored trade unions behind the Iron 
Curtain. LO’s course of “détente from below”1076 was, however, radically altered by the 
advent of Solidarity, which triggered a substantial change of thinking among the trade union 
leadership. In September 1980, Charles Kassman, who worked for the news bulletin of 
Arbetarrörelsens internationella centrum, the Labour Movement’s International Centre, 
returned from a visit to Gdańsk with personal messages to LO from, among others, Lech 
Wałęsa and Jacek Kuroń. The oppositional leadership, he reported, welcomed contacts with 
trade unions in the West and, especially, Sweden. Sweden’s key role was unequivocally 
emphasised in a letter from strike-leader Wałęsa to Otto Kersten, ICFTU’s general secretary, 
in November 1980. In the letter, Wałęsa instructed LO to “coordinate and channel” all 
incoming support from both the ICFTU and affiliated organisations. Sweden was, he 
continued, ideally suited to act as an intermediary both due to its neutrality and the visa-free 
traffic to and from Poland, which considerably facilitated regular communication. Moreover, 
Polish émigrés in Sweden had, as he stated, already established close bonds to the Solidarity 
leadership and begun to organise material support, from which Solidarność could profit in the 
future.
1077
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Soon, the communication between LO and Solidarity developed into a dense network of 
regular visits and consultations, in which especially the Graphic Workers’ Union, Grafiska 
Förbundet, GF, played a leading role. This was certainly “not a coincidence, [...] since the 
Poles needed printing equipment and expertise”.1078 LO employed Ture Mattson, GF’s 
technical ombudsman, as a full-time coordinator for the organisation of practical support for 
Solidarity. This included numerous transports of technical equipment, which were funded 
both by the ICFTU, LO and other trade unions in the West, and the schooling of Solidarity’s 
own graphic workers in the handling of the newest printing presses.
1079
 While the Polish 
exiles’ support for the underground publishing houses still had to be organised via highly 
conspiratorial channels in the late 1970s, technical equipment could now be legally shipped 
across the border, as Solidarity was officially recognised by the Warsaw government.
1080
 The 
technical aid was of crucial importance for the development of the independent trade union 
press. Due to the Western support, Solidarity was equipped with highly efficient printing 
offices, whose technical facilities were “often better than [that of] their official state 
controlled counterparts”.1081 In the context of the various Western aid programmes, the 
Swedish connection certainly counted among the most significant channels. LO financed two 
complete printing offices and a number of smaller printing shops, where, among other things, 
the material for Solidarity’s first national congress in September 1981 was produced.1082  
LO’s leadership in Stockholm was eager to stress that the cross-Baltic cooperation involved 
two autonomous societal organisations and that LO’s own engagement did not have a political 
dimension. The Swedish trade unionists’ determination to depoliticise its support found 
expression in a clearly negative stance towards Solidarity’s advisors of KOR, which was 
regarded as “a political organization whose involvement should be avoided”.1083 This 
misconception of the conditions in a communist society, where economic demands by striking 
employees of state-owned industries inevitably turned political,
1084
 also led to a certain 
tension between LO and the Polish émigrés, who so far had acted as KOR’s official 
representatives in Sweden. The exile activists were still involved in the consultations and 
meetings between trade union representatives from both countries, but their role was 
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significantly reduced to marginal activities such as interpreting.
1085
 This development marked 
a turn in the political activities of second generation émigrés, whose “relative importance 
somewhat diminished as many others got involved in the aid”1086 for the Polish opposition. 
With the formation of the first mass-based oppositional movement in Poland, the oppositional 
dialogue across the Baltic Sea had also changed and developed into a much more complex 
web of individual and institutional commitment. 
But in spite of LO’s attempts to marginalise the exile activists, their lobbying activities 
consistently exercised a profound influence on the attitude of the Swedish media and public 
towards Solidarity. In autumn 1981, they succeeded in forming a committee named Polen 
Solidaritet, which was modelled on the earlier, cross-party support committees for Vietnam 
and Chile.
1087
 The organisation united mainly Swedish supporters, whose vital commitment 
for the dissemination of news on the development in Poland was of crucial importance for the 
popularisation of Solidarity and its political programme.
1088
 Moreover, Maria Borowska’s 
close cooperation with Sten Johansson resulted in a much-noticed publication, in which the 
authors made a passionate plea for the unconditional support of the independent trade union 
movement. The intention was to give a comprehensive overview of the movement’s history, 
to popularise its aims and to dispel common stereotypes. Especially Solidarity’s close bonds 
with the Church had, at times, an alienating effect on many Western observers, among them 
also LO members in Sweden. In this context, Johansson’s and Borowska’s fine distinction 
between Solidarity’s pronouncedly Catholic appearance and the secular contents of its 
ideological programme was of special importance.
1089
 Apart from lobbying for the support of 
Solidarity abroad, the émigrés also established close personal contacts with the Solidarity 
leadership during the trade union’s ‘legal period’ from August 1980 to December 1981.1090 
The fact that Jakub Święcicki was invited as a guest of honour to Solidarity’s first national 
congress certainly proves that the Swedish connection was highly appreciated.
1091
 
 
The compromise between Solidarność and the communist government was from the 
beginning an unstable arrangement and the negotiations increasingly faltered throughout 
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1981. As the trade union at its height had ten million members, it was obvious that Poland’s 
trinity of opposition, the alliance between workers, the intelligentsia and the Church, had 
developed into a fundamental threat for the internal stability of Poland and the entire 
communist bloc. The increasing pressure from Moscow on the Polish government strained the 
governmental relations within the Soviet bloc, which fostered tensions that soon affected also 
the relations between East and West. In autumn 1981, the Swedish-Polish relations cooled 
down significantly after the Swedish Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten’s open critique of the 
Polish government’s political course towards Solidarity.1092 Also Soviet representatives 
started to raise their voice against Sweden’s stance in the Polish question. In an official note 
from the Soviet embassy, opposition leader Palme was openly confronted with ill-concealed 
attacks against the Social Democratic Party, whose engagement in LO’s aid programme via 
the Labour Movement’s International Centre was interpreted as a support for “an oppositional 
political power”.1093  
By the end of 1981, Sweden showed clear signs of abandoning its ‘bridge building policy’ 
and taking an outspokenly pro-Western stance in the upcoming ‘second Cold War’. The 
gradual deterioration of Sweden’s relations with its communist neighbours was accompanied 
by several incidents on the Baltic waters. Already from autumn 1980 onwards, the Swedish 
Navy suspected Soviet submarines were secretly exploring Sweden’s territorial waters. The 
suspicion was confirmed one year later by the so-called ‘Whiskey-on-the-rocks’ affair, when 
a Whiskey-class submarine grounded in a restricted military zone outside the naval base of 
Karlskrona. The submarine affair, which the social democratic journal Tiden compared to 
Nazi Germany’s invasion of Norway in 1940, considerably triggered anti-Soviet sentiments in 
Sweden.
1094
 In view of another alarming incident that had occurred only a month earlier, 
everything seemed to point at a retransformation of the Baltic Sea back into a ‘sea of war’. In 
early September, shortly before the beginning of Solidarity’s first national congress, the 
Warsaw Pact carried out the largest military exercise in its history.
1095
 The military 
demonstration of power on the Baltic waters started at the coasts of the Soviet Baltic 
republics, passed the Polish shores and the trouble spot of Gdańsk and ended with amphibious 
landings on East German territory.
1096
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Already in late 1980, both Sweden and Denmark had intensified air and sea patrols along their 
Baltic coastlines, and in summer 1981, the Swedish Army systemically prepared the southern 
ports for the expected mass flight of Polish citizens across the Baltic Sea.
1097
 However, 
although much pointed to a forthcoming military intervention in Poland by Warsaw Pact 
forces as in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the events took a different course. In October 1981, 
Gierek’s successor Stanisław Kania had been replaced by the hardliner and former Minister of 
Defense, General Jaruzelski, which was a clear signal that the government’s willingness to 
negotiate with Solidarity was decreasing. In the early morning of 13 December, television and 
radio broadcast a speech held by Jaruzelski, in which he informed the nation that martial law 
had been imposed, which put an end to the democratic experiment. Thousands of Solidarity 
members were imprisoned and the trade union was banned.
1098
  
In summer 1980, the neighbour states sealed off their borders towards rebellious Poland in 
order to prevent the wave of unrests from spreading, so that it was considerably easier for 
Solidarity members to visit the West than the Soviet Union or other satellite states.
1099
 Thus, 
the events of December 1981 took dozens of Solidarity activists travelling in Western Europe 
by surprise. Stefan Trzciński, who had been active in Solidarity’s Masovian branch and was 
on his way to a Solidarity conference in Switzerland when martial law was proclaimed, 
proposed the formation of a separate section of Solidarity abroad with Stockholm as its 
headquarter.
1100
 This plan was not realised, but several local and national Solidarity 
committees were formed by Polish Solidarity members in many Western European countries 
and even overseas.
1101
 Soon, the communication barrier between the trade union activists 
abroad and the home country, where the Solidarity leaders that had escaped imprisonment 
continued their work in the underground, could soon be surmounted.
1102
 In summer 1982, the 
Solidarity activists abroad received instructions from the secretly operating trade union 
leadership to organise a Coordination Office in Brussels, which quickly developed into the 
major link between the West and the democratic underground.
1103
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In reaction to Jaruzelski’s coup d’état, Solidarity’s Information Office in Stockholm was 
established. It was completely financed by LO and formed the Swedish hub of the wider 
network of Solidarity branches in Western countries. Its staff consisted of a group of 
Solidarity activists that had been in Sweden when martial law was announced. They were the 
first representatives of the so-called ‘newest emigration’, as the Polish immigration wave of 
the early 1980s was labelled in order to distinguish the arriving asylum seekers from the post-
1968 exiles.
1104
 Despite LO’s reservations, even the former supporters and representatives of 
KOR in Sweden, among them Borowska, Święcicki and Szulkin, became involved in the 
Information Office’s activities, mainly as advisors and intermediaries.1105 Święcicki, whose 
private apartment had turned into the first improvised information centre for the Swedish 
media immediately after the imposition of martial law,
1106
 was elected head of the 
Information Office. At this point, however, the LO leadership intervened. KOR had indeed 
been dissolved in 1981, but the trade unionists’ mistrust of the intelligentsia’s influence on 
Solidarity persisted, which even affected the relations between LO and KOR’s former 
representatives in Sweden. In spite of the mediation efforts of the ICFTU, which opted for 
cooperation with the Polish émigré circles, LO insisted on Święcicki’s dismissal. LO 
representatives stated in January 1982 that the Swedish trade union federation was determined 
to limit its communication with Poland to trade union contacts and that any political activities 
were to be avoided.
1107
 LO’s frontrunner Stefan Trzciński proved to be a highly unpopular 
solution and after negotiations with the Coordination Office in Brussels, all actors involved 
agreed on the young journalist and Solidarity member Marek Michalski from Warsaw as the 
head of Solidarity’s Information Office in Stockholm.1108 
As the official representation of Solidarity abroad and due to the close links to LO, the 
Information Office focused mainly on the cooperation with Swedish social democrats, whose 
attitude towards the suppressed Solidarity movement had changed by the recent events in 
Poland. In a meeting with representatives of Solidarity’s Stockholm office, Olof Palme 
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explicitly assured his and his party’s solidarity with the now illegal trade union,1109 which 
echoed the common protest statement of LO and the Swedish Social Democratic Party to the 
Polish government.
1110
 Lund, by contrast, the second centre of oppositional Polish activism in 
Sweden, developed into a certain counterbalance of the Stockholm-based exile activists’ focus 
on Solidarity and the networking among social democratic circles, focusing on broader 
contacts that went beyond the limitation of ideological affinities. Within a week after 
Jaruzelski’s coup d’état, a group of young Poles, among them Józef Lebenbaum, had 
organised a highly publicised hunger strike in the Lund Cathedral, appealing to the 
government in Stockholm, the Swedish Church and the Red Cross to openly take a stance 
against the Polish government. The group of protesters formed the core of the Swedish 
Solidarity Support Committee with members in both Lund and nearby Malmö. Among the 
activists involved was even a young Swede, Jan Axel Stoltz, who was supposed to facilitate 
the contacts and communication with Swedish society. Already in January 1982, the Support 
Committee reached a first, considerable success. A delegation from Lund met with Karin 
Andersson, the Minister for Immigration, and obtained her assurance to liberalise the Swedish 
asylum policy for Poles. A few days later, the decision was confirmed by the government, 
which marked “an unusual and, in comparison to other countries, very generous gesture”.1111   
Lebenbaum and Koraszewski, who counted among the leading members of the Support 
Committee, had during the past five years established a dense network with different 
oppositional circles in neighbouring Poland. Prior to the establishment of Solidarność, the 
Lund activists had maintained regular communication with KOR, but also with independent 
publishing houses such as NOWA and the younger Krąg, which quickly gained considerable 
importance.
1112
 In early 1982, the main task of the Committee was to reconstruct their contact 
network under the new conditions of martial law and the imprisonment of many of their 
former partners. However, Lebenbaum could soon communicate in an interview that reliable 
channels of communication had been restored. From now on, Lund turned into an important 
centre of information that kept the media in Sweden and beyond updated about the current 
events in Poland.
1113
 In contrast to the Information Office, the Lund intiative was based on the 
conviction that cooperation with oppositional activists and groups had to be organised 
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irrespective of ideological sympathies or alliances.
1114
 This applied both to the various camps 
of opposition in Poland and potential cooperation partners in Sweden. Due to their different 
profiles, the Swedish Solidarity Support Committee and Solidarity’s Information Office in 
Stockholm could thus complement each other and were able to establish fruitful cooperation 
in supporting the suppressed opposition in Jaruzelski’s Poland.1115 
In order to ‘pacify’ workers’ strikes throughout the country, General Jaruzelski sent out 
special units of the paramilitary so-called ZOMO troops, which at times with considerable 
brutality fulfilled their mission. During these raids, the troops were to avoid damage in the 
state-owned factories, but not in Solidarity’s own offices, where “all printing equipment, 
typewriters and office furniture were demolished”.1116 This affected also the two modern 
printing offices in Gdańsk and Poznań that the Swedish LO had financed and equipped. 
During the ‘legal period’, Solidarity activists had repeatedly tried to convince the LO 
leadership of focusing on small, portable stencil duplicators of the kind that had been used by 
the underground printing houses in the late 1970s, which, if necessary, could easily be stored 
in cellars or similar hiding spots. Yet, LO arranged the purchase of printing equipment 
according to its own visions and the pattern of the Swedish trade unions’ printing houses, 
which, however, did not suit the needs of secretly operating underground networks.
1117
 
From December 1981 onwards, one of the main tasks of the democratic underground in 
Poland was to reconstruct the basis for an independent press and the continued reproduction 
of domestic and foreign literature that had been banned by the authorities. This could not be 
accomplished without effective support from the West. Hence, the smuggling routes that the 
political emigration had managed to establish during the second half of the 1970s were 
reactivated. In spite of the Polish crisis, the cross-Baltic ferry traffic was soon resumed and 
made direct communication between the émigrés and the delegalised trade union possible.
1118
 
The oppositional circles in Poland used a similar strategy as the Estonian dissidents in Tallinn 
to communicate with their partners in the West, smuggling messages written on interlining 
cloth, which easily could be hidden inside the couriers’ clothes, abroad.1119 Via this channel, 
the Polish opposition’s ‘order lists’ safely reached Sweden, where smuggling transports of 
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technical equipment and money could be organised according to the concrete needs of the 
democratic underground.
1120
 The appeals from the illegally operating trade union members 
triggered the development of a clandestine, cross-Baltic network that by far exceeded the 
dimension of the smuggling activities of the KOR years. Soon, the two main centres of Polish 
opposition in Sweden, Stockholm and Lund, developed into the major hubs of a large-scale, 
transnational aid programme that effectively undermined the Polish authorities’ attempts to 
isolate the anti-communist underground from the outside world.  
Many of the émigrés’ contacts in Poland were imprisoned by early 1982. First and foremost, 
the exile activists in Sweden thus had to rebuild their contacts with oppositional circles in 
Poland, which initially delayed the establishment of a well-operating smuggling network 
between Sweden and Poland. However, at the latest from mid-1982 onwards, the smuggling 
of printing equipment and financial means across the Baltic Sea already worked 
efficiently.
1121
 Marek Michalski, the head of Solidarity’s Information Office, and Ryszard 
Szulkin played a key role for the organisation of transports from Stockholm, which mainly 
supplied Solidarity’s underground printing houses in Masovia, the hinterland of the Polish 
capital. Szulkin’s contacts to Trotskyite circles once again turned out to be most useful. Via 
the Trotskyists’ central organisation, the Fourth International, it was easy to find young 
Swedish volunteers who were willing to support political opposition against the Marxist-
Leninist regimes.
1122
 In Poland, by contrast, the opposition could count on the help of the 
Church, as much of the smuggled material was received and temporarily stored by Catholic 
priests.
1123
 The Information Office disposed of a converted van, in which six to seven offset 
printers at a time could be smuggled across the border. In order to take maximum advantage 
of each cross-Baltic journey, empty spaces were filled with spare parts, electronic devices, 
equipment for Solidarity’s underground radio as well as émigré literature and journals, which 
were delivered to Michalski by both Norbert Żaba and Jakub Święcicki.1124  
When the van and its passengers Göran Jacobsson and Niklas Holm were stopped in the 
harbour of Szczecin in November 1983, the Polish customs found five Xerox copiers, two or 
three mimeographs, ink, copying paper as well as émigré publications inside the van. After six 
weeks in prison, the young Trotskyists were released and allowed to return to Sweden after 
the payment of ten thousand U.S. dollars to the Polish state, which the Information Centre had 
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managed to collect. The surplus of the collected funds was used to buy further printing 
equipment for the Polish underground.
1125
 As the van had been confiscated, Michalski and 
Szulkin now used a specially prepared Volvo and the voluntary courier services of Swedish 
sociologists, Szulkin’s colleagues from the University of Stockholm. The size of the car made 
the smuggling of copying machines impossible, so that it was mainly used for spare parts, ink 
and literature.
1126
 However, larger transports could still be organised via the Baltic waterways 
on private boats. The handover of the smuggled goods was conducted on the open sea in 
cooperation with the crews of Polish yachts, which belonged to sailing clubs along the Polish 
coast and officially cruised around in national territorial waters only. Thus, they were not 
subject to customs controls.
1127
 
The cross-Baltic smuggling was one of the clandestine fields of activity of Solidarity’s 
Information Office in Stockholm, especially in view of the fact that it was financed by LO, 
which, at least publicly, rejected any involvement in ‘political issues’. The costs of the 
transports themselves were thus mainly funded via the Polish emigration’s own channels. 
Giedroyć in Paris, but also the exile government and the North American Polonia contributed 
with money.
1128
 However, the purchase of the printing equipment itself was still financed by 
the Labour Movement’s International Centre1129, a support institution for trade unions abroad 
founded by LO and the Social Democratic Party, and the Graphic Workers’ Union. The close 
cooperation between Michalski and Mattson implies that at least the latter was aware of the 
practices of using dual accounts in order to hide the nature of the shipments that left the 
Swedish ports.
1130
 However, it is probable that even LO’s leadership was well-informed about 
the secret support programme. In a letter to LO’s chairman Stig Malm, Zbigniew Bujak, one 
of the most prominent leaders of the underground trade union, expressed his gratefulness for 
the financial help from LO funds, which had been used for the purchase of printing equipment 
and items for Radio Solidarity and “the work of the underground structures”.1131 
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Already in January 1982, a first smuggling transport was organised from Lund, the seat of the 
Swedish Solidarity Support Committee.
1132
 After having initially focused on humanitarian aid 
for the imprisoned Solidarity activists and their families, the Committee soon decided to 
concentrate exclusively on assisting the democratic underground, as the humanitarian needs 
were already covered by the Red Cross, the Swedish Church and other organisations.
1133
 
However, only very few of the dozen Committee members were directly involved in the 
conspiratorial activities, among them Lebenbaum and Mirosław Ancypo, who organised the 
transports in close cooperation with Marian Kaleta in Malmö. Moreover, the activists were 
supported by around fifteen independent couriers, who carried out the transports to Poland.
1134
 
But in spite of the clandestine structure of the smuggling networks and the precautionary 
measures, it sometimes turned out that the operations were infiltrated by the Polish 
intelligence service. In these cases, which were reminiscent of the infiltration of the Swedish-
Estonian networks and illustrate how well-informed the communist authorities were about the 
many forms of oppositional interaction across the Baltic Sea, the couriers were quickly 
replaced.
1135
  
The support from Lund, however, was not designated for Solidarity’s underground structures 
alone. The main principle of the Solidarity Support Committee was to remain independent of 
any political alliances in Sweden, which was also reflected in its policy towards the Polish 
democratic opposition. Thus, the clandestine cross-Baltic transports benefited much wider 
circles of societal opposition in the People’s Republic. Apart from delivering financial and 
technical support to the central underground institutions of Solidarity, the Committee 
supported even more radical groups, such as Solidarność Walcząca (‘Fighting Solidarity’) in 
Wrocław, the urban partisans of the Warsaw-based Grupa Wola, underground publishing 
houses such as Krąg and Świt as well as the neo-rightist movement Niepodległość 
(‘Independence’).1136 The Committee’s activities turned the small university town into one of 
the major Western shipping points of printing equipment, ink, paper, photographic equipment 
and, as the ‘order lists’ from Poland show, even working clothes for the underground 
printers.
1137
 As one of Kaleta’s couriers, the Swedish lorry driver Lennart Järn, was arrested in 
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Świnoujście in November 1984 while he carried out his fifteenth smuggling transport, the 
customs confiscated the impressive number of seventy stencil duplicators, twenty offset 
printers, but also computers, broadcast transmitters and forbidden literature.
1138
  
In order to coordinate its steadily expanding secret cooperation with oppositional circles in 
Poland, the Swedish Solidarity Support Committee established a separate subsection in spring 
1983, the Independent Polish Agency, IPA. Together with a handful of activists, among them 
Ancypo and Koraszewski, Lebenbaum built up an organisation that not only developed into a 
major Western toehold of the Polish opposition, but also an indispensable link to the political 
centres of the Polish diaspora. Among the members of the IPA’s advisory board were, apart 
from a representative of the underground Provisional Coordination Committee of Solidarity in 
Poland, several prominent émigré activists. Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, who for decades had led 
RFE’s Polish Section in Munich and now resided in Washington, constituted an important 
link to the North American emigration, while the exiles in London were represented by the 
head of the émigré publishing house Polonia, Jan Chodakowski. Mirosław Chojecki, the 
recently emigrated former head of NOWA, and Jerzy Giedroyć were the representatives of 
‘Polish Paris’.1139 Due to Lebenbaum’s dense web of contacts in- and outside Sweden and, 
especially, in communist Poland itself, the strategically located émigré organisation in Lund 
soon became a crucial hub of the anti-communist emigration’s transnational network. The 
significance of the IPA was underlined by the role it came to play within the framework of the 
U.S.-based Conference of Solidarity Support Organisations, CSSO. The CSSO was an 
umbrella organisation that united several dozen Solidarity support groups from twelve 
countries. Next to the web of Solidarity representations in the West, which was headed by the 
Coordination Office in Brussels and financed by the ICFTU, the CSSO thus formed a parallel 
network of institutionalised support for Solidarity in the West.
1140
 The CSSO’s decision to 
choose Lebenbaum and the IPA as its European coordinator
1141
 cemented Lund’s importance 
as a major link between the Polish opposition and its supporters in the West.  
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One of the main tasks of the IPA was to organise and coordinate the smuggling of technical 
equipment, financial means as well as printed items to Poland.
1142
 At the same time, it 
functioned as an independent representation of oppositional organisations and publishing 
houses that operated in the Polish underground.
1143
 These institutionalised entanglements 
across the Baltic Sea triggered a reversed flow of smuggled goods from Poland back to Lund 
and further integrated the émigré community with the activities of the Polish opposition. One 
example was the close cooperation that developed between the IPA and the radically anti-
communist circles of the neo-rightist organisation Niepodległość, which authorised the IPA to 
edit its underground journal outside Poland. The IPA’s plan to synchronise the publication 
dates of the journal in the home country and the West gives some indication of the efficiency 
of the communication between Lund and its Polish partners.
1144
 Yet, the majority of the 
material smuggled from communist Poland to Lund consisted of photos, audio and video 
tapes that documented events and everyday life in Jaruzelski’s Poland. The systematic 
collection of photographed, taped and filmed documentation by the Support Committee from 
early 1982 onwards had been one of the various incentives to establish the IPA as a supply 
centre of audiovisual documents for the Western media.
1145
  
The IPA was thus an organisation with an impressive range of tasks and functions. Its 
transnational character was manifested by Lebenbaum’s idea of forming a team of salaried 
employees in Poland itself in order to systematise the flow of material to Sweden.
1146
 Already 
in autumn 1983, Lebenbaum’s contacts could confirm that a team of activists working for the 
IPA had been formed in five Polish cities.
1147
 The activists received several cameras and slide 
films with the assignment of producing visual documents for the émigrés in Lund, who would 
provide for the material’s publication in the West.1148 This close cross-Baltic cooperation was 
the continuation of a symbiosis between exile communities and the homeland, which already 
in 1982 had led to the publication of a picture book titled Poland December 13
th
 1981 - ...The 
War Against the Nation, which the Swedish Solidarity Support Committee edited by using the 
work of anonymous photographers in Poland. The émigrés, whose activism later led to the 
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foundation of the IPA, had closely cooperated with the underground publishing houses in 
Poland, among others with NOWA and Krąg in compiling the collection of photographs.1149 
The proceeds of the items sold were designated for the opposition movement in Poland, where 
the copies of the publication that had been smuggled back across the Baltic Sea received 
enthusiastic reactions.
1150
 The structure of the widely ramified network thus illustrates to what 
degree opposition to the Warsaw regime already had turned into a largely transnational 
phenomenon, where the borders between the exile struggle and domestic dissent were 
increasingly blurred.  
The crucial role that the activists in Lund and, to a lesser degree, Stockholm played for the 
reconstruction of functioning underground structures is uncontested. During Solidarity’s 
‘legal period’, non-governmental contacts and exchange with the West could develop 
relatively freely. Jaruzelski’s decision to crush the destabilising independent structures in 
December 1981, however, ended these dynamic entangling processes and established new 
barriers between the Polish opposition and its Western sympathisers. Thus, the Polish émigrés 
in Sweden re-entered the stage as important intermediaries with reliable networks on both 
sides of the Iron Curtain and considerable experience in undermining the communist 
authorities’ border regime. As during the late 1970s, when KOR formed the spearhead of 
Polish opposition, Sweden developed into the main smuggling channel for material support 
from the West to Poland. However, the émigrés in Lund and Stockholm were not the only 
actors in this intricate transnational mosaic of individuals, organisations and couriers engaged 
in the shipping of printing equipment, literature and financial means into the People’s 
Republic.
1151
 Thus, it might have been out of diplomatic politeness that Jan Józef Lipski, one 
of KOR’s founding fathers, stated that “[i]t was generally known that the most significant 
import to Poland after 1981 came from Sweden” during a meeting with Sweden’s Foreign 
                                                          
1149
 “Utsmugglade bilder i unik Polen-bok”, article from an unspecified Swedish newspaper, November or 
December 1982. AO, collection titled “Materiały wypożyczone przez A. Stecha” (uncatalogued collection of 
press articles), f. 1. 
1150
 Letter from Józef Lebenbaum to Kazimierz Romanowicz, 17 February 1983. AO IV, Józef Lebenbaum’s 
collection, folder labelled “Lund zdjęcia + varia”.  
1151
 As Mirosław Chojecki recalls, printing equipment reached Poland even from many other Western European 
countries via the land route, especially from France, but also other countries such as Italy, Austria, Norway, 
Denmark or West Germany; interview with Mirosław Chojecki. Activists involved in the smuggling transports 
from Italy, for example, remember that copying machines, radio equipment and ink were smuggled in lorries 
with humanitarian aid, which in large numbers reached Poland from the West in the early 1980s; Cavallucci, 
Sandra / Amicis, Nino de (2010): “Italy. Diversity within United Solidarity”. – In: Goddeeris, Solidarity with 
Solidarity, pp. 75-100; p. 85. The use of humanitarian transport with food and medicine for politically motivated 
smuggling activities implied a high risk, as any incident during the controls at the Polish border easily could 
have jeopardised the relatively free flow of material goods needed by the population of Poland during the hard 
times of martial law. For this reason, the Polish activists in Sweden usually refrained from using these channels 
for their purposes. 
255 
 
Minister Sten Andersson in 1989.
1152
 Nevertheless, similar testimonies reinforce the 
impression that the Swedish connection indeed was the backbone of the clandestine support of 
Poland’s oppositional underground in the 1980s.1153 Mirosław Chojecki, the former head of 
NOWA, estimates that the large majority of smuggled equipment reached Poland from 
Sweden. The fact that he was one of the main coordinators of the European-wide smuggling 
networks after the imposition of martial law granted him a certain authority.
1154
  
In view of the dimensions that the shipments of illegal goods from Swedish ports took from 
1982 onwards, it is highly implausible that the authorities remained unaware of the 
organisation of smuggling transports on Swedish soil. Sweden’s significance within the 
structures of Western support for the now illegal Polish opposition stood in sharp contrast to 
the government’s official policy towards its communist neighbours and the neutrality 
doctrine. Yet, it was not the first time in Sweden’s Cold War history that ideological 
sympathies of large parts of society and even state officials did not correspond to the officially 
proclaimed political course. In the early 1980s, this gap was widening, especially due to the 
cooling down of the relations between Sweden and the communist regimes on its opposite 
coasts. Thus, the émigré activists could count on passive support or, at least, tacit consent 
even on the part of the Swedish authorities, which considerably facilitated their missions.  
“The Swedes helped silently”, Józef Lebenbaum stated, “silently, so that there would be no 
stir, that there would be no scandals, but silently. When discretion was kept and they had 
trust, it was possible to arrange everything”.1155 According to Göran Jacobsson, one of the 
Trotskyite couriers, the Swedish customs uncovered the cavity inside the van as he and Niklas 
Holm returned to the port of Ystad from one of their trips to Poland. However, the customs 
officials let them pass after having been informed about the purpose of the secret cubby and 
what it transported.
1156
 Szulkin remembers that even his colleagues from the faculty of 
sociology were once stopped in their converted Volvo. On their way back to Sweden, the 
couriers had taken the opportunity to smuggle some bottles of vodka in the now empty cavity 
under the back seat next to some Polish underground journals. During the following 
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interrogation, they explained that the space under the back seat was utilised as part of their 
mission of smuggling technical equipment and literature to the Polish opposition. Although 
the customs official on duty confiscated the alcohol, he let the university employees drive on 
with their prepared car after having expressed his personal admiration for their 
commitment.
1157
 Interesting in this context is also another story told by Lebenbaum, who 
organised most of the smuggling traffic that reached Poland via Lund. In October 1981, a 
Polish sail boat reached the small port of Simrishamn in southern Sweden. Officially, the boat 
was cruising from Gdańsk to Szczecin on Polish territorial waters only, but the crew had 
decided to take the risk and to dock at a Swedish port in order to take illegal items back to 
Poland. Lebenbaum received a message from his contacts in Poland and started to make the 
necessary preparations. One of his contact persons among the Swedish Security Police 
(SÄPO) supervised the stowage of offset printers, ink and hundreds of books in order to 
ensure that the nightly encounter did not involve illegal goods such as alcohol or cigarettes. 
As a declared anti-communist and Pentecostal, however, he openly approved of the illegal 
support for the Polish opposition.
1158
 At this point, it is still difficult to deliver further proofs 
on the involvement of Swedish authority officials in the smuggling activities that the Polish 
émigrés regularly carried out in Sweden. But the various testimonies imply that the attitude of 
Swedish officials was certainly crucial for the success of an organised smuggling activity of 
such dimensions.  
 
The turn of the decade saw the vital development of interaction and exchanges between the 
Baltic shores on a variety of levels. Grassroots-level contacts now increasingly involved 
institutions and societal organisations on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The expansion of 
semi-official contacts between Sweden and its opposite coasts was in most cases closely 
linked to the intermediary efforts of émigrés. As the cooperation between institutions in 
Sweden and Soviet Estonia illustrates, exile activists played an important role behind the 
scenes of a development that seemed to be an outcome of the CSCE and governmental 
agreements on intensified bilateral relations. The dialogue between representatives of 
Sweden’s political and cultural sphere and Polish oppositional activists in the late 1970s had 
developed according to a similar pattern. Although the lively engagement of LO in Polish 
affairs from autumn 1980 onwards was rooted in a genuine ideological interest in assisting the 
independent Polish trade union movement, the émigrés’ good connections to the oppositional 
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leadership were still a significant factor. They were one of the reasons why Wałęsa chose the 
Swedish trade union federation as Solidarity’s closest partner in the West and enabled the LO 
to quickly establish a functioning cooperative partnership with the Polish trade union activists.  
In spite of their semi-official character, these new fields of cross-Baltic cooperation had a 
hidden, but unambiguously oppositional dimension. The overwhelmingly positive reactions of 
the Swedish media and societal organisations to the legalisation of Solidarity in Poland clearly 
showed that democratic reforms in communist Europe were seen as a long overdue necessity 
by a majority of Swedes. LO’s active support for Solidarity during the ‘legal period’ and the 
far-going assistance in establishing the preconditions for an independent press and, thus, 
pluralist opinion-making in Poland came very close to interfering in the affairs of a foreign 
state, which against the background of Sweden’s neutrality was a highly controversial issue. 
In view of the intensity and the largely uncontrolled character of the bilateral contacts, the 
dialogue between Poland and Sweden was undoubtedly exceptional. Compared to the vital 
networking processes between Sweden and its southern opposite coast, the Swedish-Soviet 
relations, by contrast, were still stuck in a Cold War limbo. The 1976 agreement marked the 
first careful step towards a rapprochement between the Soviet Empire and the neutral state 
and reawakened Sweden’s interest in its Baltic neighbours. Even the first institutionalised 
contacts between Sweden and the Soviet Baltic republics, however, contained an oppositional 
element that was hard to overlook. The beginning of scholarly and cultural exchanges was at 
its core an exile initiative.
1159
 Under the guise of Swedish state institutions, Estonian émigrés 
prepared the first platform which enabled them to establish a dialogue with the Soviet 
Estonian elites on ‘neutral’ ground. Yet, the underlying intentions had a clearly political 
dimension, aiming at influencing the development in Estonia via its elites and opinion-
makers.  
Already with the onset of the human rights discourse, the international political climate 
considerably changed and new tensions were introduced into the relations between the blocs. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is usually seen as the final straw in the beginning of a 
‘second Cold War’, which considerably strained the dialogue between East and West. Against 
this background, it is hardly surprising that even supposedly apolitical contacts became 
inevitably politicised. Another reason was the renaissance of anti-communist sentiments in 
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the West, which also spread among non-rightist circles and left its mark even on Swedish 
political discourses. Critical reporting on the conditions in communist Europe had become the 
norm of all political colours in Sweden’s print media, except the few orthodox communist 
newspapers. But with the incoming reports on societal discontent and open protests on 
Sweden’s opposite coasts in summer 1980, publicists and journalists took a clearer stand, 
expressing open support for oppositional circles behind the Iron Curtain. Solidarity’s 
successful negotiations with the government were perceived as a test case that proved that 
things could be put in motion in communist Europe. This historical breakthrough brought the 
development on Sweden’s opposite coasts back into focus. The topicality of the events in 
neighbouring Poland and the Soviet Baltic republics reactivated a close cooperation between 
émigré activists and the Swedish media, which increasingly relied on the expertise and first-
hand knowledge of exile representatives in Sweden. The names of Ants Kippar, Jakub 
Święcicki and Józef Lebenbaum regularly figured in the country’s main newspapers as 
reliable sources and informants on the current events behind the Iron Curtain. This inevitably 
influenced the tone of the media reports, which more and more adopted the opposition’s 
stance and interpretation of the developments in communist Europe. The media coverage of 
the time thus illustrates the gradual widening of the gap between governmental neutrality and 
the unambiguous political sympathies by large parts of Swedish society.  
The resurgence of anticommunism in the West was mirrored by the intensification of societal 
opposition against the regimes behind the Iron Curtain. Oppositional groups and organisations 
on Sweden’s opposite coasts developed increasingly radical anti-communist agendas, which 
was certainly linked to the growing manifestations of support that dissident activities had 
triggered in the West. As East-West relations cooled down and repressions against 
oppositional circles increased, it was the anti-communist faction of the diaspora communities 
that developed into the main Western toeholds of underground movements. Ants Kippar, the 
decisive link between the Soviet Estonian dissident movement and the West, represented the 
far right of the Estonian community in Sweden, which unconditionally rejected the strategies 
of ‘change through rapprochement’ of the more liberal émigré circles. The connection 
between Solidarity, the first legal, mass-based opposition movement in communist Europe, 
and Sweden, by contrast, established a new kind of cross-Baltic interaction and developed 
into a dense net of grassroots-level contacts not only between exiles and their homeland, but 
two national societies. The political aspects of this cooperation were toned down by the 
Swedish side, which resulted in a gradual marginalisation of the Polish exile activists. 
However, with the turn of December 1981, it was again the more pronouncedly anti-
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communist emigration groups that turned into the major hub of the communication between 
the Polish opposition and the West. The oppositional dialogue that developed during the early 
1980s between Sweden and its opposite coasts thus marked the climax of the 
transnationalisation processes of societal dissent in both Poland and Estonia. Due to the 
frequent appearances of émigré activists in the media, Swedish society was well-informed 
about the clandestine channels of communication across the Baltic Sea. Particularly the more 
spectacular cases, such as the arrest of the Swedish couriers Holm, Jacobsson and Järn, who 
all spent considerable time in Polish prisons and were released first after the payment of 
substantial bails, engaged the Swedish public. In spite of the fact that they had been involved 
in illegal smuggling activities, whose scale was only revealed by the numerous media reports 
on the cases, the support and sympathy of large parts of society for their commitment did not 
diminish.  
By the early 1980s, the web of oppositional contacts across the sea had developed into a 
widely ramified system of informants, couriers and intermediaries, which made use of various 
channels and engaged a wide range of actors. The loose structures and the flexibility in 
recruiting supporters and identifying ‘loopholes’ in the Iron Curtain made it increasingly 
difficult for the communist authorities to control the clandestine interaction between the 
Baltic shores. With the involvement of a growing number of passive and active supporters 
from both Sweden and Finland, the networks stretched beyond the level of exile-homeland 
cooperation. Swedish support for the opposition behind the Iron Curtain was thus not reduced 
to moral support. The contacts between Swedish correspondents and Estonian dissidents 
constituted a major channel for the smuggling of uncensored information to the West. The 
journalists’ campaign for the Baltic cause marks the first documented case of Swedish 
involvement in conspiratorial interaction with the Estonian opposition, which so far had been 
a field in which mainly Finns were involved. While Swedish citizens already in the late 1970s 
had played a major role in the smuggling of printing equipment to the circles around KOR, 
their involvement grew proportionally with the dimensions of the cross-Baltic smuggling 
activities, which reached a peak after December 1981. The success of the large-scale 
importing of technical equipment and literature to Jaruzelski’s Poland, which the émigré 
activists in Sweden organised in coordination with the Polish diaspora’s political centres, 
depended to a large degree on the level of cooperation of Swedish actors. Thus, the tacit 
consent and passive support of Swedish state officials and trade union activists was an equally 
indispensable precondition for an efficient cooperation with the Polish opposition as was the 
willingness of students, youth organisation delegates and lorry drivers to act as couriers. 
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The Baltic waterways had, in the course of the expansion of the cross-Baltic infrastructure in 
the spirit of détente, developed into vital lines of communication between oppositional 
activists behind the Iron Curtain and their Western supporters. With its transformation into a 
major European smuggling route across the bloc border, the Baltic Sea thus became one of the 
settings for the ‘second Cold War’ and the resurgence of ideological antagonisms. This 
process went hand in hand with the gradual retransformation of the small inland sea into a 
‘sea of war’, as Zapad 81,1160 the large-scale naval exercise of the Warsaw Pact member states 
in autumn 1981, clearly illustrated. In view of the growing superpower tensions, it was no 
coincidence that the Soviet Union rediscovered the Baltic waters as a strategically important 
space, which explained the recurrent incidents with Soviet submarines in Swedish territorial 
waters.
1161
 The large-scale exercise of the NATO navy forces on Baltic waters in 1985, which 
involved gigantic vessels that, as the Swedish press claimed, used missiles “in the size of 
Volvos”,1162 can thus be seen as an unambiguous signal from the West. Apparently, NATO 
felt a need to communicate that it did not consider the Baltic Sea to be a “Mare 
Sovieticum”.1163 
Europe’s descent into another state of Cold War hardened the fronts between East and West, 
which had significant consequences for the communication across the Iron Curtain. The 
euphoria in the West, which had followed the legalisation of Solidarity and triggered hopes of 
a possibility to reform the communist system from within, had quickly faded away. The 
general stagnation that characterised the mid-1980s significantly affected even the 
oppositional networks across the Baltic Sea. Already in autumn 1983, Ants Kippar stated that 
the wave of arrests had not only considerably weakened the Soviet Estonian dissident 
movement, but also cut most of the connections between Estonia and EVVA in Stockholm. 
The phone lines of the activists that had escaped imprisonment had been disconnected by the 
authorities, which illustrated the regime’s determination to prevent any further leaks of 
information to the West and considerably complicated Kippar’s work.1164 Even the Polish 
émigrés in Sweden, whose networks with the oppositional underground were much broader 
and whose numerous connections were considerably more difficult to block, faced a certain 
depression. The public commitment of the Swedes to the Polish cause, which had been 
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manifested in regular mass demonstrations on Sweden’s streets and squares, decreased 
significantly, as did the incoming monetary support from organisations and individual 
donations for the smuggling activities.
1165
 Moreover, the Polish customs service had by 1984 
considerably increased the controls both at the port of Świnoujście, from where the ferries to 
Ystad left, and in the trains from Paris and Berlin to Warsaw, which also had been used as a 
smuggling channel.
1166
 At the same time, the once mighty Solidarity movement had shrunk to 
a few thousand underground activists and it seemed as if Jaruzelski would maintain full 
control of the situation in the forseeable future. Although martial law was gradually lifted 
from 1983 onwards, it had, as Jacek Kuroń put it, achieved its aim, the “atomisation of 
society”.1167  
 
 
VII.2 At the dawn of the Cold War era: Transnational opposition in the 
light of the ‘anti-communist revolutions’ 
On the eve of Michail Gorbachev’s perestroika, the oppositional dynamics behind the Iron 
Curtain had considerably decelerated. The communist leadership’s harsh reaction to organised 
societal opposition had led to a stalemate between the regimes and its adversaries both in 
Poland and the Soviet Baltic republics, which cemented a feeling of stagnation. Nevertheless, 
the émigrés in Sweden continued their lobbying campaigns, although the public attention in 
the development on the opposite coasts had significantly decreased. However, the general 
Swedish perception of state socialism had irrevocably changed. Especially semi-revolutionary 
Poland and its numerous entanglements with Swedish organisations and supporters had left 
lasting marks on the discourses about communist Europe. In the mid-1980s, Swedish society 
and media were highly sensitised by the dimension of human rights violations and 
suppression behind the Iron Curtain, which triggered a societal consensus that increasingly 
undermined the government’s neutrality doctrine and practically reduced it to a formality. The 
Swedish-Polish dialogue had become ‘monopolised’ by the oppositional forces, whose values 
und political interpretations turned into a commonly acknowledged frame of reference. One of 
the most unambiguous signals of the radical change of paradigms in the West that 
characterised the new post-détente era was the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Lech 
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Wałęsa, who since his release in 1983 was under house detention. Similarly to the Swedish 
Nobel Committee’s decision to honour the Polish émigré Czesław Miłosz’s literary oeuvre in 
December 1980
1168
, the award implied a conscious and unambiguous political statement. 
Another sign that the “Polish drama”1169 had not been forgotten was the foundation of the 
Polish-Swedish Cultural Centre, an initiative of a number of intellectuals who intended to 
“trigger contacts between independent Polish culture and Swedish cultural life”.1170 Maria 
Borowska and Jakub Święcicki were, together with the Swedish novellist Agneta Pleijel, the 
writer and linguist Lars Kleberg and the translator Anders Bodegård, the driving forces 
behind the Centre’s journal Hotel Örnsköld. The journal was modelled on Giedroyć’s Kultura 
and was first published at the time of the political trials against Michnik, Kuroń and other 
prominent oppositional activists in summer 1984. In order to “present examples of the free 
Polish culture”1171 to a Swedish public, the journal reprinted the literary texts and political 
essays of the Polish underground. Hotel Örnsköld raised considerable attention in the Swedish 
press, which almost unanimously expressed a deep respect for the texts’ “moral power, 
which”, as Svenska Dagbladet stated, “Jaruzelski and his henchmen cannot overcome”.1172 
The high level of public support and attention that the rise and fall of Solidarity had triggered 
in Sweden stood in sharp contrast to the handling of the Baltic question, which rather formed 
a long-repressed memory of Swedish society. Yet, the chillier tone of the East-West dialogue 
and the growing support for Baltic émigré organisations especially in the United States 
significantly changed the general attitude towards the Baltic nations’ struggle for liberation, 
not only in Sweden but in Western Europe in general. A decisive watershed was a resolution 
drafted by the European Parliament in January 1983. The document was inspired by the so-
called Baltic Appeal, which had been signed by Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian dissidents 
in August 1979 and subsequently smuggled out to the West.
1173
 In its resolution, the European 
Parliament condemned the occupation of 1940 and proposed the establishment of a special 
board for the “decolonisation” of the Baltic territories under the auspices of the United 
Nations.
1174
 A few months later, the topic was introduced in the agenda of the Swedish 
Parliament due to an interpellation by Margareta af Ugglas, a member of the conservative 
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Moderate Party. During the following debate, the social democratic Foreign Minister Lennart 
Bodström took a surprisingly critical stand on the suppression in the Soviet Baltic republics, 
which added a new quality to the discourse on Baltic issues in neutral Sweden.
1175
 The MP 
Per-Olof Strindberg, who also represented the Moderate Party, went even further during a 
parliamentary foreign policy debate in March 1985, when he claimed that Sweden as the 
“conscience of the world” could not forget the three Baltic nations, whose demands for 
national independence should not been ignored any more.
1176
 
On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the 1975 CSCE summit and the signing of the 
Final Act, the Nordic capitals of Copenhagen, Helsinki and Stockholm became the setting of a 
series of anti-Soviet demonstrations. The manifestations for the Baltic peoples’ independence 
were organised by émigré organisations and have been described as “the most creative and 
effective public relations campaign ever waged by diaspora Balts”.1177 In the end of July 
1985, an international jury of distinguished scholars and politicians, among them Per 
Ahlmark, a member of the Liberal People’s Party and former Vice Prime Minister of Sweden, 
inaugurated the so-called Baltic Tribunal in Copenhagen. The assembled jury members 
listened to numerous testimonies on Soviet crimes against the Baltic nations, among others by 
the former dissident Sergei Soldatov and the Estonian musician couple Leila Miller and Valdo 
Randpere, whose escape to Sweden one year earlier had hit the headlines in the Swedish 
press.
1178
 Subsequently, the Baltic Tribunal issued the so-called ‘Copenhagen manifesto’, 
which considered the annexation of the Baltic states as an unlawful act and heavily 
condemned the Russification policy of the Soviet Union which, as the document stated, was 
targeted at the elimination of the Baltic languages, culture and identity.
1179
 The Copenhagen 
Tribunal was followed by the Baltic Peace and Freedom Cruise aboard the Baltic Star, which 
started in Copenhagen, heading for Stockholm via Helsinki. On board were representatives of 
several youth organisations of the Baltic emigrant population, which turned the Baltic Star 
into a venue for a number of seminars and national manifestations. On its way across the 
Baltic Sea, the ship cruised on the edge of Soviet territorial waters, passing close to the 
Estonian island of Saaremaa, where, as Tunne Kelam remembers, people gathered at the 
beaches in order to get a glimpse of the ship, about whose cruise they had heard on Western 
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radio broadcasts.
1180
 The series of pro-Baltic manifestations, which was followed by 
demonstrations in all three capitals, led to sharp diplomatic attacks from the Soviet Union 
against its Nordic neighbours. However, the Nordic governments did nothing to prevent the 
Baltic protests, so that the “pirate ship”, as the Soviet news agency TASS called the Baltic 
Star, could enter even the port of Helsinki during the official celebration of the CSCE 
anniversary.
1181
 The closing rally took place in central Stockholm in front a crowd of two 
thousand spectators, including several Swedish party leaders.
1182
 The Swedes had finally 
rediscovered their long-forgotten Baltic neighbours.  
 
The indirect support of the Baltic émigrés’ anti-Soviet manifestations on the part of the 
Nordic governments and the attention-grabbing demonstrations for Baltic independence in the 
capital cities on the Baltic shores marked an important turn. The increasing attention and 
engagement in the matters of the Baltic nations heralded the return of the Baltic Sea Region 
into the consciousness of the Nordic societies. From the mid-1980s onwards, the awareness of 
the historical and cultural entanglements across the Baltic Sea grew, while the political 
development on the opposite coasts received growing public attention.
1183
 The decisive trigger 
was the election of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, which set off a dynamic evolution of oppositional grassroots-level activity 
throughout the Soviet bloc. Although Gorbachev’s political course, internationally known 
under its Russian name perestroika (‘restructuring’), primarily aimed at the overdue 
reformation of the highly inefficient Soviet economy, it soon transformed into a large-scale 
reorganisation of the Soviet system in general. The nuclear disaster of Chernobyl in April 
1986 triggered another, equally radical reform. Glasnost (‘openness’), which developed into 
the second pillar of Gorbachev’s consequent de-Stalinisation policy,1184 made it possible to 
publicy discuss controversial issues. The official promotion of “heterodox thinking” in the 
Soviet Union’s official institutions fostered a new dimension of open oppositional behaviour 
and by far exceeded the effects of decades of samizdat production and dissemination.
1185
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Nevertheless, many core issues of the policy of perestroika and glasnost bore a striking 
resemblance to the demands of the human rights activists,
1186
 turning it into a kind of ‘dissent 
from above’. However, the Kremlin’s new domestic policy not only led to radical changes 
within the institutional structures of the Soviet Union. It also reactivated groups that stemmed 
from the dissident movements, especially in the Baltic republics. In spite of the KGB’s 
undisputable success in suppressing societal dissent, there were, as in neighbouring Latvia 
and Lithuania, still active grassroots-level organisations with a distinct pro-independence 
profile in the Estonian SSR. The origins of these “proto-political forces”1187 lay in the ongoing 
discourses on the protection of the environment and the native cultural heritage in the Baltic 
republics. One of these groups was the Estonian National Heritage Society, which openly 
protested against the authorities’ neglect of threatened national monuments and practices such 
as the transfer of archaeological findings directly to Soviet Russia.
1188
 Also the ecological 
protest groups played a central role in the national reawakening of the Baltic peoples in the 
course of perestroika. The disastrous environmental consequences of the over-exploitation of 
resources by the Soviet planned economy were already visible throughout the Baltic 
republics, such as around the phosphate mines in north-eastern Estonia. The planned 
expansion of the mining industry met strong opposition, not at least due to the envisaged mass 
influx of Russian workers,
1189
 which in the new political climate of perestroika and glasnost 
could be openly articulated. Both the ecological problems and the threat against the Baltic 
national cultures could now be linked to the dysfunctional aspects of a Soviet-type communist 
society as a whole,
1190
 which inevitably added a national dimension to the discourse.  
With the onset of Gorbachev’s time in office, the Soviet Union had, surprisingly, enough 
developed into the spearhead of reformist thinking in communist Europe, which raised severe 
concerns about domestic unrest and destabilisation among the nomenklatura of most satellite 
states. Jaruzelski, however, whose country was plunging deeper and deeper into a severe 
economic crisis, seems to have perceived perestroika as a chance for reforms towards “a more 
flexible economic management with minimal political change”.1191 As in the Soviet Union, 
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where the active persecution of dissident activists had largely stopped by mid-1986,
1192
 in 
Poland a far-reaching political amnesty was also proclaimed, which led to the release of 
almost all political prisoners in September 1986.
1193
 This milestone towards a liberalisation of 
Polish communism triggered a decisive turn in the strategies of the Solidarity leadership. In 
the aftermath of the amnesty declaration, Solidarity activists increasingly left their 
conspiratorial underground circles and started to act openly.
1194
 Wałęsa became the head of a 
temporary council of the Solidarity movement, which in 1987 merged with the trade union’s 
main underground representation into the National Executive Commission, Komisja Krajowa 
Wykonawcza.
1195
 Thus, although any organised political opposition to the regime was still 
officially illegal in Jaruzelski’s Poland, Solidarity had de facto “re-emerged as a political 
fact”.1196 
 
The reawakening of oppositional activity on the opposite coasts had an activating effect also 
on the émigré circles in neutral Sweden. In spite of the years of stagnation that had followed 
the imposition of martial law, the smuggling transport networks between Sweden and Poland 
had continued and moved towards a new peak from the mid-1980s onwards. The port of 
Ystad, from where Kaleta and Lebenbaum had been sending their smuggled goods to 
Świnoujście since the early 1980s, now developed into the central hub of the secret Western 
aid programmes for the Polish opposition. Due to his well-functioning networks, which, as 
Marek Michalski stated, constituted the “broadest smuggling channels in Europe”,1197 Kaleta 
was appointed the main coordinator of the Brussels-based Coordination Office’s entire 
smuggling activity. The crucial significance of the Swedish connection was also reflected by 
the CSSO’s decision to relocate its international office from New York to Lund.1198 Józef 
Lebenbaum, the head of the IPA, thus advanced from being the European coordinator of the 
CSSO-sponsored activities to directing the worldwide aid programme of the CSSO and its 
member organisations.
1199
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The IPA’s account of charges for the year 1986 indicates that the Polish opposition was 
steadily supplied with offsets, stencil duplicators and a variety of audiovisual technical 
equipment. Moreover, the émigrés channelled so-called walkie-talkies and short wave radios 
to Poland,
1200
 which allowed the oppositional activists to intercept the police radio and to 
prepare themselves in case of imminent raids.
1201
 The numerous microfiche readers that were 
smuggled across the Baltic Sea constituted a new item among the smuggled goods. 
Microfiches played an increasingly important role for the dissemination of banned writings in 
Poland, as they offered a practical and cheap alternative to the shipment of printed items. 
Already in early 1985, the IPA had started to systematically produce microfilms with the 
complete editions of émigré journals, such as Kultura, Aneks or the Literary Institute’s Zeszyty 
Historyczne, as well as of written documentation that had reached the West from Poland in 
order to smuggle them back into the country.
1202
 The microfiches were, together with the 
necessary readers, secreted across the border and distributed mainly among scholars, 
publicists, writers and other opinion-makers.
1203
 However, the large-scale smuggling of books 
and other printed material across the Baltic Sea also continued, which laid the foundation for 
the establishment of a network of underground libraries in several Polish cities.
1204
 The 
overall weight of the books, including both regular and miniature editions, and journals that 
were smuggled by the Polish émigrés in Lund and Malmö between January and August 1986 
amounted up to 10,000 kilogrammes
1205
, which gives an idea of the scale of the activities. 
During the same year, 1,000 kilogrammes of books were channelled to the Ukrainian SSR via 
Poland, 50 kilogrammes each to Lithuania and Hungary and another 500 kilogrammes were 
designated for the Soviet garisons on Polish territory.
1206
 Thus, the Swedish connection 
reached even beyond Poland, which was used as a transit country for a wider dissemination of 
banned writings in communist Europe.   
By the mid-1980s, the émigré activists in Sweden had faced serious financial problems due to 
the dramatic decrease of incoming donations, which forced the organisers of the smuggling 
transports to seek new funding opportunities. The work of the Lund-based Swedish Solidarity 
Support Committee could be largely financed via subsidies of the Swedish state, which paid 
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the wages for four of the activists involved. The smuggling activities themselves were, 
however, unlikely to be financed by the Swedish taxpayers’ money. Yet, the émigrés 
eventually managed to find a sponsor that covered a great part of their expenses. At least from 
January 1986 onwards, the smuggling from southern Sweden to Poland was financially 
supported by the National Endowment for Democracy. The NED, founded in 1983, was a 
U.S.-based non-governmental institution that financially supported democratic movements 
and organisations worldwide,
1207
 among them the Coordination Office in Brussels.
1208
 The 
NED’s financial means, however, derived directly from the U.S. government and every grant 
bestowed by the Endowment was first considered on with the advice of the State 
Department.
1209
 Neutral Sweden thus turned into the setting of a large-scale support 
programme for the Polish opposition that was directly financed by the U.S. government and 
carried out by openly anti-communist émigré activists, who to a large degree already had 
obtained Swedish citizenship. 
The involvement of the NED was, however, not limited to the subversive activities of the 
Polish emigrant community in Sweden. In spite of the mass arrests among Soviet Estonian 
dissidents in spring 1983 and some initial difficulties in reconstructing the channels of regular 
communication between Sweden and Estonia, Kippar’s organisation EVVA continued its 
work, especially in the field of delivering humanitarian aid to the political prisoners and their 
families. Yet, even the cooperation with oppositional camps in Estonia continued, although 
the available sources in the Relief Centre’s archive do not reveal the identity of the 
individuals or organisations that Kippar was in regular contact with from 1983 onwards. 
However, the Estonian dissident movement might have been decapitated, but was not entirely 
crushed. Only leading activists had been arrested and sentenced to imprisonment in the 
Russian hinterland, while a considerable number of oppositional activists remained in Estonia. 
The organised smuggling of uncensored information sources from Sweden to Soviet Estonia 
could thus continue and was, at least from autumn 1985 onwards, expanded by the illegal 
transfer of tape recorders and video films across the Soviet border.
1210
 At the same time, the 
question of smuggling printing equipment into the Soviet Union, which had been discussed in 
Stockholm already in the early 1980s after several requests from oppositional groups in 
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Estonia, was brought back onto the agenda. In May 1985, Ants Kippar started to look for 
potential funds for a considerably extended aid programme. As his application letters 
addressed to U.S. foundations indicate, the smuggling activities envisaged were not only 
aimed at transferring Western literature, newspapers and émigré publications across the 
border, but also duplicators, cameras and tape recorders.
1211
 Kippar’s fundraising efforts 
eventually met with success. From January 1986 onwards, the NED financed even the 
Estonian émigrés’ attempts to support anti-communist movements via neutral Sweden.  
Up to the mid-1980s, it had been virtually impossible to smuggle technical equipment across 
the Soviet border. Thus, the technical supply for the Estonian opposition from abroad 
amounted to nothing more than a number of Western typewriters that had successfully been 
channelled into the Soviet Union by Finnish couriers.
1212
 From 1986 onwards, however, the 
range of smuggled items significantly expanded, as EVVA gradually intensified its more 
subversive activities in view of the ongoing changes on the opposite Soviet coasts. Due to the 
funding opportunities that had opened up via the cooperation with the NED in Washington, 
Kippar and his confidants succeeded in establishing reliable courier routes, which finally 
made it possible to smuggle not only books and journals, but also first printing machines and 
duplicators into Estonia.
1213
 In spite of Kippar’s sudden death in January 1987, which 
temporarily paralysed the aid programme
1214, the Relief Centre’s activities continued to 
expand under its new chairman Jaak Jüriado, a second generation émigré who, as Kippar, had 
been an active member of the REE. Already during the first half of 1987, EVVA proceeded to 
channel the technical prerequisites for the systematic audiovisual documentation of current 
events to Estonia, which mirrored the strategies of Lebenbaum’s IPA in Lund. The video and 
photo cameras, mini-taperecorders, neck-microphones, tapes and slide films were supposed to 
enable the opposition “to collect and give truthful information to the Estonian people”. 
Moreover, the amount of five thousand rubles had been transferred to Tallinn from the Relief 
Centre’s own budget in order to finance the purchase of a television set, which was needed to 
play the videotapes.
1215
 EVVA also arranged the smuggling of further items that the 
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opposition needed in order to unmask the propaganda efforts to deceive the population, such 
as radiation dosimeters and detailed U.S. army maps over Soviet Estonia.
1216
   
The financial support that EVVA received from the NED in Washington from 1986 onwards 
amounted up to a yearly grant of US$25,000.
1217
 In view of the wide range of costly technical 
equipment that was smuggled from Sweden to Estonia and the additional “travel and per diem 
expenses” for the couriers involved,1218 it is obvious that the Endowment’s support only 
covered a part of the financial means needed. Already during the NED representative Yale 
Richmond’s visit to Stockholm in autumn 1986, Kippar mentioned the existence of further 
financial resources for the smuggling of technical equipment to Estonia.
1219
 According to the 
estimation of the former dissident and political prisoner Heiki Ahonen, who after his forced 
emigration to Sweden in 1988 took over the chairmanship of EVVA for almost a year, the 
NED grant constituted only a minor part of EVVA’s financial means. Ahonen claims that the 
yearly budget ranged between half a million and one million Swedish crowns. Even the lower 
limit of the scale would by far exceed the sum of US$25,000,
1220
 so that the donations from 
Estonian exiles in North America and a number of wealthy Finnish sponsors mentioned by 
Ahonen most probably constituted the main sources of financial support.
1221
  
 
In 1987, glasnost triggered a new dimension of nationalist opposition in the Baltic republics. 
The march of thousands of Latvians to the Freedom Monument in central Riga on 14 June, 
which was supposed to commemorate the large-scale deportations that had been carried out 
by the Soviet occupiers throughout the Baltic territories in 1941, was an unprecedented event. 
Its signal effect activated even the Estonian and Lithuanian opposition and rang in what has 
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been called the Baltic “year of thaw”.1222 A series of ‘calendar day demonstrations’ followed 
in all three Baltic republics, organised by oppositional circles in order to protest against the 
state-sponsored falsification of history and to condemn Soviet crimes against the Baltic 
nations. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its secret protocol of August 1939 in particular 
became a central topic of the Baltic opposition’s counterpropaganda campaigns. The 
existence of the document was, according to standard Soviet practices, officially denied by 
Gorbachev and the Kremlin, which, however, unmasked the hypocrisy of the Soviet regime 
and thus stressed the moral dimension of the anti-Soviet protests in the Baltic republics.
1223
  
In August 1987, a number of released political prisoners, among them Parek, Ahonen, 
Madisson and Kiirend, founded the so-called Estonian Group on the Publication of the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Molotov-Ribbentropi Pakti Avalikustamise Eesti Grupp, MRP-
AEG. The formation of the group was echoed by the establishment of a local offshoot in 
nearby Stockholm, which was led by a number of young exile Estonians and developed into 
the main representation of the MRP-AEG in the West.
1224
 In commemoration of the signing of 
the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union, the MRP-AEG 
leadership planned, like similar oppositional circles in Latvia and Lithuania, a huge 
demonstration in the capital of the republic. Due to EVVA’s regular and well-functioning 
communication with the Estonian opposition, Kippar’s successor Jaak Jüriado had been 
informed about the ongoing preparations for the large-scale demonstrations in the former 
Baltic capitals already one week earlier.
1225
 On 23 August 1987, the Baltic activists eventually 
succeeded in organising parallel street manifestations in Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn, which 
marked the onset of coordinated opposition to the Soviet system throughout the Baltic 
republics. Less known is probably the fact that a parallel demonstration against the Soviet 
policy of concealment regarding the secret protocol took place in central Stockholm.
1226
 The 
public protests of the Baltic exiles in neutral Sweden formed an extension of the chain of 
revolutionary events in the Soviet Baltic territories, which illustrates the efficiency of the 
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communication and cooperation network between the Baltic opposition and the emigrant 
population in Sweden.  
The demonstration in Tallinn’s Hirvepark has a firm place in the collective memory of 
Estonia, as no other event symbolised the transition from individual to mass-based dissent 
against Soviet rule in such a manner. It was after this large-scale manifestation, Vardo 
Rumessen recalls, that the broad masses became aware of the unlawfulness of the current 
geopolitical status quo.
1227
 By popularising an alternative historical account on Estonia’s 
incorporation into the Soviet Union, which so far had been spread mainly among the exiles, 
the Estonian opposition thus considerably contributed to the collapse of the official historical 
narrative that Stalinist propaganda had once imposed upon the nation.
1228
 But with the first 
onset of the far-going liberalisation, which from 1988 onwards developed in the spirit of 
perestroika and radically altered the living conditions in the Soviet Baltic republics, the 
growing societal discontent could emerge into a mass-based nationalist opposition movement. 
The constant jamming of Western radio broadcasts was eventually stopped,
1229
 while the 
formerly strict border regime was significantly liberalised,
1230
 which enabled the Balts to 
travel abroad to a much larger degree than before. At the same time, the regime proclaimed, 
as in Poland two years earlier, a far-reaching amnesty for political prisoners. Enn Tarto, one 
of the last Estonian dissidents to return from the Russian labour camps, was greeted by an 
enthusiastic crowd in autumn 1988.
1231
 The abolishment of political persecution put an end 
also to the common Soviet practice of forcing dissidents to emigrate, which had led to the 
‘deportation’ of dissidents to Sweden instead of to Siberia, as Jüriado stated in one of his 
reports,
1232
 among them Heiki Ahonen and Tiit Madisson, the main organiser of the Hirvepark 
manifestation. The authorities’ attempts to sabotage the preparations for a public 
demonstration on the anniversary of the 1949 deportation wave in March 1988 marked the 
last example of direct interference by the regime.
1233
 From then on, nationalist opposition was 
de facto legalised. 
The new political climate reactivated the underlying patriotic sentiments among the 
intelligentsia in the Soviet Baltic republics, which initially had formed “Gorbachev’s natural 
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constituency of support”1234 for the implementation of his far-going reform programme. As 
the liberalisation process proceeded, the intellectual elites developed their own, outspokenly 
nationalist political agenda, which to an increasing degree affected even the local branches of 
the Soviet Union’s Communist Party in the Baltic republics. The conservative factions of the 
party leadership in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were gradually marginalised, which 
eventually led to the replacement of the party secretaries in all three republics. Karl Vaino, the 
Moscow-loyal head of the Estonian Communist Party, was succeeded by Vaino Väljas. The 
latter played a crucial role in the unification of the Party with the Estonian Popular Front,
1235
 
Rahvarinne, which in spring 1988 had been established as the first of the Baltic Popular 
Fronts.
1236
 By the end of the year, when Estonia already found itself amidst its so-called 
‘Singing Revolution’,1237 the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR had not only reintroduced 
the flag of the sovereign pre-war republic but declared Estonian as the republic’s official 
language. In November, a sovereignty declaration was issued, which subordinated all-union 
laws under the laws of the Estonian SSR.
1238
 
The emancipation process in the Soviet Baltic republics turned the Balts into the “leaders of 
reform” not only in the Soviet Union itself, but in the entire Soviet bloc.1239 The oppositional 
dynamics that grasped the Baltic societies had significant repercussions on the Estonian 
emigrant population, which was considerably “revived and activated”1240 by the ongoing 
events. While the moderates among the diaspora community had initially welcomed 
perestroika on its own terms as a compromise between nation and regime, the agenda was 
now set by the more radical nationalist circles, which was mirrored in the radicalisation of 
RFE’s Estonian broadcasts.1241 With its increasingly far-reaching demands, the Popular Front 
had adopted more and more the “symbols and slogans” of the political exile,1242 which 
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significantly contributed to the convergence of anti-communist forces in Soviet Estonia and 
the West.  
Already a decade earlier, U.S. Congress member Ed Derwinski had stressed in one of his 
speeches at the House of Representatives that the Baltic exile communities were so well 
organised that they would be able to offer their compatriots at home every kind of help in 
regaining national independence, if the political situation would allow for it.
1243
 The 
repercussions of Gorbachev’s perestroika, the opening up of the Soviet borders and the spirit 
of nationalist revival in the Baltic republics eventually set the ground for the active 
involvement of the exiles in the processes of radical change that shook the Soviet Union. The 
convergence of former dissident circles with the nationalist faction of the Estonian 
Communist Party contributed to the gradual surmounting of the mental barriers that for 
decades had hampered the communication between Soviet Estonia and the political 
emigration. “[I]deological differences should not constitute a barrier to closer links”, as a 
programmatic article written by Baltic exile representatives stated. “[A] member of the 
Communist Party of Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania”, the authors continued, “should not be 
shunned by the exile community just because of CP membership”.1244 The blurring of the 
borders between dissidents and communists, heroes and collaborators considerably helped the 
activists on both sides of the Iron Curtain to find a common language of national opposition. 
In view of the radical nature of political reforms in the Soviet Baltic republics, the Western 
governments chose to adopt an observant and passive stance, mainly in order not to endanger 
the superpower negotiations, which had been resumed in 1987. President George Bush 
proposed a “gentleman’s agreement” to Gorbachev, promising that Washington would refrain 
from supporting the radical Baltic demands in exchange for a guarantee that Moscow would 
avoid the use of force.
1245
 Even the neutral Nordic neighbour states maintained, fairly 
surprisingly, a very low profile over the Baltic issue. The Finnish government clearly 
supported Moscow’s point of view in the ongoing conflict between centre and periphery,1246 
while the Swedish government vacillated, still unable to decide whether the Baltic secession 
movements stood on solid legal ground or not.
1247
 The passivity of the West marked a sharp 
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contrast to the increasingly dynamic exchange that could gradually develop between exile and 
homeland. By then, the Soviet authorities had finally lost control and influence over the 
developing transborder networks,
1248
 which allowed the oppositional exile activists to 
coordinate a large-scale aid programme of technological, financial and propagandistic support 
for the pro-independence forces in Soviet Estonia.
1249
 
Via EVVA’s smuggling channels, the Soviet Estonian independence movement was regularly 
supplied with the technical items that its political work required. From 1988 onwards, the first 
computers reached Estonia, including maintenance parts and software.
1250
 Due to the lack of 
spare parts and expertise in Soviet Estonia, the Relief Centre developed strategies of 
smuggling the delivered equipment, such as computers, cameras and tape recorders, out to the 
West for maintenance and reparations, after which they were channelled back to the Estonian 
opposition.
1251
 Eve Pärnaste remembers that the office of the Estonian National Independence 
Party, Eesti Rahvuslik Sõltumatuse Partei, one of the first independent political parties with a 
radically anti-communist agenda, was equipped with a portable computer and a printer 
financed by EVVA already in autumn 1988.
1252
 According to her, the computer had most 
probably been smuggled directly from Sweden to Estonia by members of Hortus Musicus, an 
ensemble for early music from Tallinn, on the return trip from one of their guest 
performances. Although it is not the only time that Hortus Musicus has been mentioned in the 
context of smuggling activities between Soviet Estonia and the West,
1253
 there is no written 
evidence that confirms this connection, at least not among the archival collections of EVVA. 
According to the reports that the Relief Centre’s leadership regularly prepared for its sponsors 
from the National Endowment for Democracy, couriers were, at least from spring 1989 
onwards, recruited from the growing number of tourists and Western businessmen travelling 
to Estonia.
1254
 For the smuggling of the “more valuable things”, however, which doubtlessly 
included costly items such as computers, EVVA still relied on its “old couriers”, about whose 
                                                          
1248
 Jürjo, Pagulus ja Nõukogude Eesti; p. 277. 
1249
 Motyl, Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality; p. 143. 
1250
 Preliminary report of Vice ChairmanTiit Madisson and Jaak Jüriado, Vice Chairman and Treasurer of the 
Relief Centre, for the National Endowment for Democracy on EVVA’s activities for the period between July and 
September 1989, 30 October 1989. ERAF 9608.1.7.33. 
1251
 Ibid.; report of Jaak Jüriado on EVVA’s financial activities for the period between April 1989 and March 
1990, 5 May 1990. ERAF 9608.1.7.35. 
1252
 Interview with Eve Pärnaste.  
1253
 Even the opposition leader Tunne Kelam recalls that the ensemble’s regular concert trips abroad in the 1980s 
provided opportunities for the smuggling of uncensored material, such as microfilms, to the West. In one case, 
he remembers, a member of Hortus Musicus was able to deliver the material directly to the Munich headquarters 
of Radio Free Europe. Interview with Tunne Kelam. 
1254
 Report of Jaak Jüriado on EVVA’s financial activities for the period between April 1989 and March 1990, 5 
May 1990. ERAF 9608.1.7.35. 
276 
 
identity nothing is mentioned.
1255
 By 1989, the border regime of the Soviet Union had been 
liberalised to such an extent that the importing of technical equipment was considerably 
facilitated. A contemporary account of the ongoing changes mentions that tape recorders, fax 
machines and computers for the independence movement were brought into Estonia even by 
young exiles from North America, who served as volunteers in a U.S. organisation named 
Baltic Peace Corps.
1256
 EVVA, however, still preferred to use its smuggling channels, mainly 
in order to “avoi[d] the registration of the equipment by the KGB”.1257 
In the aftermath of the Balts’ first foray towards national sovereignty in 1988, the borders had 
become surprisingly permeable. While the communication between dissident circles and their 
supporters in exile had required a well-functioning conspiratorial network and thorough 
precautionary measures only half a decade earlier, both exile and homeland activists could 
now cross the Soviet border relatively freely. Lagle Parek was among the first former 
dissidents to visit Sweden and North America in spring 1989. She attended a large number of 
political meetings and personally got acquainted with many leading representatives of the 
transatlantic diaspora community, among them also Kippar’s successor Jaak Jüriado.1258 
Jüriado himself visited Soviet Estonia for the first time in December 1989. During his stay, he 
had the opportunity to meet the activists that EVVA had supported for years and to witness 
the smuggled technical equipment, whose purchase and transport he himself had helped to 
organise, in use.
1259
 With the liberalisation of the travel policy, the restrictions that had 
restrained the mobility of foreign visitors in Estonia to Tallinn and, in case that a special 
permit was granted, Tartu and Pärnu, were also finally abolished. This enabled visiting exile 
Estonians to get a much more detailed insight into the realities of life in Soviet Estonia. Soon, 
the exchange between exiles and their homeland took more institutionalised forms. In summer 
1989, the series of seminars and political discussions, which the North American exile 
community organised yearly under the name Forest University, could for the first time in its 
history be held on Estonian soil in the village of Kääriku, located far in Estonia’s south-
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eastern hinterland. From 1989 onwards, the Forest University developed into one of the most 
important forums for intellectual and political exchange between exile and homeland groups. 
Already in the following year, its Swedish equivalent could invite a large group of Soviet 
Estonian intellectuals and politicians, also due to the considerable financial support of the 
Swedish Foreign Ministry.
1260
 In general, however, it was mainly the North American exile 
organisations that provided the funds needed for the regular invitation and accommodation of 
leading figures of the Estonian independence movement to nearby Sweden.
1261
 
Due to the multi-layered contacts that emerged between Soviet Estonia and the West, “émigré 
influences on Soviet internal developments boomed” by the end of the 1980s,1262 also in the 
field of business. At an early stage, Baltic émigrés had started to reflect about a systematic 
know-how transfer via the exile communities, which gathered “a large number of people with 
knowledge and experience of Western business and management”.1263 The question to what 
degree the cooperation between the diaspora community and Soviet Estonian actors had an 
impact on the emergence of first grassroots-level market economy structures cannot be 
answered without further research on the topic. However, by 1990, Estonia hosted a larger 
number of private business cooperatives than all remaining Soviet republics together,
1264
 
which suggests that there is a certain correlation between Soviet Estonia’s well-functioning 
channels to the West via the diaspora and the dynamics of economic change on the eve of the 
restoration of Estonia’s independence. At the same time, the ground for future business 
relations between Soviet Estonia and neighbouring Sweden were set, which was considerably 
facilitated by the establishment of a direct ferry connection between Tallinn and Stockholm in 
spring 1990.
1265
 From early 1990 onwards, Poles and Balts were given the possibility of 
working in Swedish companies for one year, which was supposed to trigger a transfer of 
know-how back to the opposite coasts.
1266
 In the first steps towards direct economic 
cooperation with Soviet Estonia, the Swedish government and Swedish companies counted on 
the linguistic competence and the intermediary services of the Estonian exiles.
1267
 The 
                                                          
1260
 Interview with Jaak Maandi. 
1261
 Manuscript of a speech titled “Kuidas vabad eestlased saavad kaasa aidata Eesti vabadusvõitlusele”, held by 
one of the representatives of the MRP-AEG in the West during the celebrations of the fortieth anniversary of the 
establishment of the ERN in Stockholm, 1987. ERA 5008.1.21.76.  
1262
 Motyl, Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality; p. 142. 
1263
 Article titled “Our interaction with our homelands”, written by G. Berzins and N. Morley-Fletcher and 
published in the Occasional Papers on Baltic Political Action 2/3, 1988; quoted in: Motyl, Sovietology, 
Rationality, Nationality; p. 143. 
1264
 Jekabson, “Economic independence is not enough for Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia”; p. 353. 
1265
 Mark, “Eesti Rahvusnõukogu tegevuse kroonika 1983-1997”; p. 151. 
1266
 “Rootsi võiks tööle minna”, Edasi, 25 September 1990. 
1267
 Runblom, “The challenges of diversity”; p. 397. 
278 
 
commitment of the émigrés was not insignificant. Due to the steadily rising number of Soviet 
Estonian visitors in Sweden, the Estonian House in Stockholm gradually developed into an 
unofficial embassy, where Ilmar Olesk, the secretary of the ERN, assisted in solving 
bureaucratic problems and recruiting suitable Estonian work forces for Swedish 
employers.
1268
   
The transborder cooperation reached a new dimension with the active involvement of the 
emigrant community in the reconstruction of democratic, pluralistic political structures, which 
started long before Estonia declared its independence. A crucial platform for the interaction 
between exiles and their homeland was the Congress of Estonia, an informal parliament that 
had been established in 1989 in opposition to the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR. In 
June 1989, the Estonian pianist Vardo Rumessen, a member of the Congress’s executive 
committee, which was led by the former dissident Tunne Kelam, travelled to Sweden in an 
official capacity. Hidden between the pages of a music book, Rumessen smuggled a message 
to the exile government in Stockholm, in which the Congress asked for formal recognition.
1269
 
This was the first approach towards cooperation with the exile community’s political 
representations and marked the beginning of a series of consultations between the Congress, 
the exile government in Stockholm and the Estonian consul general in New York. The aim of 
the numerous discussions was to identify appropriate strategies in order to reconstruct a solid, 
legitimate and lawful form of sovereign governance in Estonia.
1270
  
The Congress of Estonia, which followed an outspokenly nationalist course, was widely 
supported by the Estonian diaspora. At times, this led to conflicts with the Supreme Soviet of 
the Estonian SSR, which represented the rather moderate political forces. The Soviet-type 
parliamentarian representation lacked similar contacts among the emigration and was more 
inclined to negotiate compromises than the Congress, whose members largely supported the 
radical demands for unconditional independence. Already in 1989, the Congress started, in 
close cooperation with the diaspora, to register the eligible candidates for a future Estonian 
citizenship, which was supposed to be inherited by descent and thus included even the war 
refugees and their offspring.
1271
 However, the political cooperation between exiles and 
homeland groups soon expanded beyond the centralised communication between the 
Congress of Estonia and the major exile organisations. An essay of Heinrich Mark, the head 
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of the Estonian government in exile, which due to the abolition of censorship could be 
published in the Soviet Estonian literary journal Looming in autumn 1989, triggered a new 
interest in the political structures of the emigrant population. The publication of Mark’s 
account on the political history of the Estonian exile community paved the way for a multi-
layered pattern of political cooperation across the Baltic Sea. These regular consultations 
triggered close contacts between emerging Estonian political parties and other grassroots-
level associations with their counterparts, especially the numerous political parties in exile, 
whose leadership was based in Sweden.
1272
 The climax of these cross-Baltic consultations, 
however, was the Stockholm Round Table, which took place in January 1991 and involved 
representatives of the exile government, the Congress of Estonia as well as the Legal 
Commission of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR. During the three days of 
proceedings, exile politicians and Soviet Estonia’s political elites discussed a common 
strategy and the juridical and political obstacles on the way to independence, which finally 
was achieved in August of the same year.
1273
 
 
From 1988 onwards, the Baltic opposition movements went through a process of 
radicalisation along the lines of an increasingly nationalist rhetoric. As the liberal turn of 
Soviet domestic politics under Gorbachev loosened the Kremlin’s grip on the Soviet Union’s 
non-Russian peripheries, Baltic opposition against the unlawful grounds of Soviet rule could 
develop into mass movements. The broad alliances between former dissidents, local 
communists and the nationalist intelligentsia paved the way for the secession from the Union 
and the restoration of national sovereignty. In the satellite belt, however, the dynamics of anti-
communist opposition developed according to a different pattern. The processes that lay 
behind the activation of anti-communist forces in Poland were initially similar. Gorbachev’s 
policy of perestroika and glasnost led to a “spillover” of reformist moods to the People’s 
Republic,
1274
 which significantly weakened the stability of Jaruzelski’s regime. A series of 
mass strikes in August 1988, which quickly developed into manifestations of support for the 
illegal trade union movement, finally paved the way for Solidarity’s political comeback. At 
first, the authorities refused to negotiate with the oppositional forces “under the threat of a 
strike gun”. Soon, however, the government backed down and invited the moderate wing of 
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the opposition to take part in the series of proceedings that became known as the Round Table 
meetings, which took place between February and April 1989 with delegates from the 
Catholic Church as a mediator between regime and society.
1275
  
In contrast to its Estonian counterpart in Stockholm, the Polish Round Table is widely 
acknowledged as a milestone in the history of the end of communism in Europe. The 
negotiations triggered a number of constitutional changes, which led Solidarity regaining its 
legal status.
1276
 General Jaruzelski touted this compromise between the communist leadership 
and Polish society as a “great historical experiment”,1277 which eventually would have a 
stabilising effect on the domestic scene. Even the Soviet leadership declared its satisfaction 
with the development in Poland. Due to the compromise of the Round Table negotiations, the 
Communist Party’s authority was officially reaffirmed, while the legal status granted to 
Solidarity signalled the government’s willingness to launch democratic reforms. According to 
the assumptions of the Kremlin, this would incline the West to increase its economic support 
for the crisis-torn satellite state.
1278
 However, the initial optimism of the communist 
leadership soon gave way to disillusionment. The outcome of the “first ‘partially free’ 
election since World War II” in communist Europe, which took place in Poland in early June 
1989, was unambiguous and forced Jaruzelski’s regime to face the consequences of its course 
of liberalisation. The candidates of Solidarity achieved a landslide victory and it was only a 
hastily carried out reform of Poland’s electoral law that, with the consent of the Solidarity 
leadership, allowed the Communist Party to send the agreed number of representatives to the 
Polish parliament.
1279
  
The Polish ‘revolution’ of 1989 was thus, in fact, rather a negotiated compromise between the 
less radical faction of the Polish opposition and the elites of the old order. In contrast to the 
oppositional mass mobilisation that characterised the emancipation process of the Balts, 
Polish society displayed signs of apathy and resignation, which illustrated the long-term 
effects of a decade of economic recession and a permanent state of crisis. Thus, open support 
for Solidarity had significantly declined by the end of the 1980s.
1280
 The Round Table talks 
even triggered a certain distrust of the Solidarity leadership, which mirrored the wide-spread 
“fear of a secret deal” between the nomenklatura and the opposition leaders, who, as was 
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suspected, might “accept terms far below society’s aspirations”.1281 Solidarity had thus failed 
to revive the spirit of opposition that once again had turned Poland into a hotbed of anti-
communist upheaval in the summer of 1980. Societal opposition against the communist 
regime remained split and fragmented, so that the result of the 1989 elections can be seen as 
“a vote against communism rather than a vote for Solidarity”.1282 The failed unification of 
anti-communist forces contributed to the gradual deceleration of the reform process, which 
significantly hampered the implementation of the opposition movement’s once radical 
agenda. Structural changes were superficial, which in many aspects reflected the “policy of 
the ‘thick line’” propagated by Poland’s first non-communist Prime Minister, Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki.
1283
 Seen from a comparative perspective, the plummeting oppositional dynamics 
in Poland is astonishing, especially in view of the following spectacular series of events that 
shook Central and Eastern Europe in autumn 1989. In contrast to the communist leaders in the 
surrounding satellite states, General Jaruzelski managed to maintain his political influence by 
holding the office of the president up to his dismissal in December 1990. With the first free 
parliamentary elections taking place in autumn 1991, Poland had become a late-bloomer 
among the transforming states of the region.  
The fundamentally different turn that the anti-communist revolution took in Poland had a 
fundamentally important influence on the political emigration and determined its future 
impact on the political transformation of Poland. In contrast to the Estonian case, where, as 
has been shown, the independence movement’s cooperation with the exile community played 
a significant role for the development of an uncompromisingly nationalist oppositional 
course, exiles are largely absent from the narratives about the end of communism in Poland. 
Of course, the smuggling networks between Poland and the West, which provided the 
opposition with technical equipment and facilitated the establishment of a parallel sphere of 
uncensored communication, persisted uninterrupted. The émigré supporters continued to 
supply the different oppositional camps with the required technical equipment, which 
certainly facilitated the reconstruction of pluralistic public structures in the late 1980s. The 
Round Table negotiations triggered an “explosion of unofficial information”,1284 which was 
mirrored by the foundation of the Gazeta Wyborcza shortly after the talks had ended. The first 
independent newspaper in Poland’s post-war history developed, under the editorship of Adam 
Michnik, into the leading mouthpiece of Solidarity and received, as its unofficial underground 
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predecessors, its technical equipment via Sweden.
1285
 However, beyond this very practical 
level of support, the influence of the political emigration in Sweden and the West in general 
on domestic processes in Poland seems to have been rather insignificant. During a meeting 
with exile representatives in Stockholm in July 1988, Jacek Kuroń and Janusz Onyszkiewicz, 
one of Solidarity’s founders, stressed that Solidarity considered the Warsaw government as its 
natural negotiating partner. There would thus not be any attempts to involve the exile 
government in London, whose role the opposition leaders saw as merely symbolic. The 
representatives of ‘Polish London’, on the other hand, were highly critical of Solidarity’s 
willingness to negotiate with the regime within the framework of the Round Table. In the eyes 
of its critics, this step implied an indirect legitimation of communist rule by the anti-
communist opposition.
1286
 Hence, it was a general ideological gap and the Solidarity 
leadership’s decision to find a compromise with the regime that hampered any constructive 
cooperation between oppositional forces in exile and in Poland itself during the country’s 
decisive phase of transition towards democracy. A large number of prominent émigré figures, 
among them also Jerzy Giedroyć, remained highly critical of the Polish solution of 1989, 
which consequently limited the emigrant community’s intellectual influence on Polish 
politics.
1287
 
In spite of the multi-layered interweaving processes that had developed between the Polish 
opposition and its supporters in the West, influences from abroad played a surprisingly 
marginal role during the decisive months in 1989. The deconstruction of the communist 
system in Poland took place on the domestic scene. Even the Swedish connection, which for 
years had been of crucial importance for the Polish opposition and its leadership during the 
early 1980s, gradually lost its significance. In contrast to the majority of the political 
emigrants, LO’s leadership openly supported the moderate course of Solidarity in spring 
1989.
1288
 In the course of the comeback of Solidarity as a political actor in 1988, the interest 
in the ‘Swedish model’, which in the late 1970s and early 1980s had been an important 
inspiration for the Polish opposition, was temporarily rekindled as “the most acceptable model 
to reform Poland”.1289 The social democratic welfare state had for years represented an 
alternative to both Western capitalism and Soviet-type socialism for the oppositional 
leadership. This was reflected by the wide-spread respect and admiration for Olof Palme 
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among the trade union movement,
1290
 which had named one of its underground printing 
offices after the Swedish Prime Minister following his assassination in 1986.
1291
 However, the 
ideological entanglements between the Polish opposition and Swedish social democracy lost 
their significance, as it soon turned out that the reorganisation of the Polish state would 
develop along different ideological lines.
1292
 
There are several possible explanations for the sudden decline in significance of the 
transnational dimension of opposition. Firstly, the Round Table negotiations could not be 
considered as an unconditional success of the anti-communist forces. Kuroń, Michnik and 
other prominent KOR representatives had been barred from the talks between the regime and 
the opposition movement. They belonged to the blacklisted factions, whose presence at the 
Round Table meetings had been rejected by the Ministry of the Interior, which viewed the 
KOR leadership as the “extremists” among the opposition.1293 With the exclusion of the 
former KOR members from the talks, which to a large degree determined the future 
transformation process in Poland, the wing of Solidarity with most contacts to the political 
emigrant population lost their possibility to influence the course of events.
1294
 At the same 
time, the intellectual circles of KOR “never achieved truly democratic legitimation” within 
the Solidarity movement.
1295
 This additionally weakened their position and thus the 
emigrants’ possibilities of influencing the development in the home country via their 
cooperation partners among the oppositional intelligentsia. Secondly, the Solidarity 
movement underwent a far-reaching transformation during the 1980s. As Timothy Garton 
Ash, who closely followed the evolution of the Polish opposition from 1980 onwards, stated, 
a “new Solidarity generation”1296 had emerged by the late 1980s. The founding fathers of the 
trade union movement, who had developed strong bonds with both the Polish emigrant 
communities in the West and especially with the Swedish trade union movement, were now 
increasingly marginalised as the “old guard”,1297 which also might be one of the reasons why 
the transnational networks lost their significance for the ongoing changes. Thirdly, everything 
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might have been a matter of size. In the course of the mass escape of 1944, Estonia had lost a 
considerable part of its population and an even greater percentage of its political, intellectual 
and cultural elites. In view of the lively continuation of Estonian culture and political thought 
in the West, cooperating with the exiles might have been a much more self-evident decision 
for the oppositional leadership in Estonia. The Polish case, however, was different. In view of 
the population’s considerable size and the long traditions of independent political thinking in 
post-war Poland itself, the convergence of the domestic opposition with the anti-communist 
forces in exile never appeared as a precondition for a successful political strategy. Finally, it 
was the emigrant population itself that consciously refrained from interfering in the ongoing 
transition process. In contrast to the Estonian case, where the opposition adopted the radically 
anti-communist stance of the exiles, the Polish strategy of negotiating change did not meet 
with approval by the exile centres in the West. A certain sense of disappointment and 
irritation thus widened the gap between the new semi-democratically elected Polish leadership 
and the anti-communist factions of the diaspora.  
 
The guarded reactions among Swedish society and media to the looming historical 
compromise between the regime and the oppositional leadership reflected the dominant 
Western perception of the “negotiated revolution”1298 as an anticlimax. From the mid-1980s 
onwards, public attention in the developments in Poland had been gradually declining in 
Sweden. This development formed a sharp contrast to the first half of the decade, when 
Solidarity had triggered regular mass manifestations of societal support. Even the 
governmental stance was pronouncedly reserved and observant, not at least with respect to the 
Swedish-Soviet relations. Initially it was with the state visit of Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson 
to Poland in summer 1989 that the Polish-Swedish relations slowly started to reconfigure 
under the new conditions.
1299
 The same cautious attitude marked the Swedish government’s 
reactions to the ongoing changes on its Soviet-ruled opposite coasts. By March 1990, all three 
Baltic republics had declared both their economic independence from Moscow and national 
sovereignty. In view of the gradual dissolution of the Soviet Empire, Gorbachev tightened the 
reins and openly accused the Baltic nationalist elites of “fascist tendencies”.1300 In spite of the 
dramatic rise of internal Soviet tensions and the imminent threat of military interference on 
Baltic territories, the governments of both Finland and Sweden maintained a very low profile.  
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However, by then, public opinion in Scandinavia had developed in a diametrically opposed 
direction, which led to an open declaration of support of the Baltic independence movements 
in the Nordic states.
1301
 Iceland in particular adopted a pronouncedly pro-Baltic foreign policy 
line, while the Danish government considerably expanded its informal support for the Baltic 
republics on various levels.
1302
 Even in Finland, where sympathies for the Balts and especially 
the Estonians had been wide-spread throughout the post-war decades, but never publicly 
expressed, the situation began to change. Societal discontent with the government’s refusal to 
declare any official support for the Balts grew and the press also took an increasingly 
unambiguous stance in this issue.
1303
 In neighbouring Sweden, the growing support for the 
Baltic cause took an even more unequivocal expression. Inspired by the so-called ‘Monday 
demonstrations’ in East Germany, which in autumn 1989 set the ground for a protest 
movement against the regime, a group of Swedish actors established a similar tradition in 
Stockholm. Andres Küng and Peeter Luuksep, both second generation Estonian exile 
activists, organised the first in a series of weekly demonstration in March 1990 together with 
the MPs Gunnar Hökmark and Håkan Holmberg, who represented the Liberal People’s Party 
and the Moderate Party. The måndagsmöten (‘Monday meetings’) turned into the main forum 
for the “Swedish solidarity movement for the freedom of the Baltic countries”,1304 which 
became an important element of the Baltic liberation struggle, providing Baltic nationalists 
with a public forum in the West.
1305
 For the first time since the demonstrations against the 
extradition of the Baltic soldiers forty-five years earlier, Swedes openly protested in support 
of the Baltic nations against the hegemonic ambitions of Moscow. The pro-Baltic protests in 
Sweden, which had been triggered by both exile activists and conservative forces, reached a 
climax in the aftermath of the bloody clash between the Soviet military and demonstrating 
Lithuanians in Vilnius in January 1991, when seven thousand protesters gathered on 
Norrmalmstorg, a square in the heart of Stockholm. Under the impact of the escalating 
conflict, the protest movement spread to dozens of Swedish cities and towns all over the 
country, where both Baltic exiles and Swedish citizens took the initiative to organise parallel 
manifestations.
1306
 On Sweden’s national holiday in June 1991, the protesting crowds were 
joined by the leaders of all the major Swedish political parties, who had just attended an 
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official lunch in honour of Michail Gorbachev, who was visiting Stockholm at the time.
1307
 
There was no longer any doubt concerning the factual sympathies of Swedish society and the 
political elites, in spite of the government’s unaltered reserved stance over the issue of the 
Baltic nations.  
With the election of Boris Yeltsin as Gorbachev’s successor a couple of months later, the 
gates towards national sovereignty were finally open. The last ‘Monday meeting’ took place 
in mid-September 1991, only ten days after the official recognition of the national sovereignty 
of the Baltic states by the Kremlin. The manifestation on Norrmalmstorg marked the end of 
half a century of anti-communist exile activity on Swedish soil, which closed an important 
chapter in the country’s post-war history. At the same time, it opened up a new chapter for the 
Polish and Baltic exiles in Sweden, which turned from political emigrant communities into 
transnational diaspora communities, whose activities now mainly focused on cultural issues. 
Although they still played an important role as intermediaries between the societies along the 
Baltic shores, this function was increasingly taken over by the new non-communist 
governments’ diplomatic representations in Sweden. The final chord and a major symbolic 
step that accompanied this depoliticisation process of the exiles was the dissolution of the 
exile governments. In December 1990, President in exile Ryszard Kaczorowski solemnly 
handed over the insignia of presidential power to President Lech Wałęsa.1308 A similar 
ceremony took place in Tallinn almost two years later. After the declaration of independence, 
the first non-communist government formally recognised the exile government in Stockholm 
as Estonia’s legitimate government during the decades of Soviet occupation. In October 1992, 
Heinrich Mark, the last Prime Minister in the duty of the President of Estonia, travelled to 
Tallinn, where he was received by President Lennart Meri, with which the work of the 
Stockholm-based exile government formally ended.
1309
 While the ceremonies in Warsaw and 
Tallinn celebrated the onset of a new era in the history of the now independent states, they 
also marked the “historical closure”1310 of the exile’s political mission, which had been the 
decisive driving force of oppositional politics both in neutral Sweden and the West in general 
for decades.   
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The Polish and Estonian experiences of opposition, reform and upheaval were fundamentally 
different, as were the dynamics that finally led to the abolition of the communist system. 
While Poland turned into the forerunner of emancipation in communist Europe with the 
formation and legalisation of the Solidarity movement, Estonian society was still largely 
paralysed in 1980. Yet, with the onset of perestroika, it was the Balts that temporarily took a 
leading position among the anti-communist forces in the Soviet bloc with their radical reform 
programme, which was quickly developed and implemented due to the mass mobilisation of 
both anti-Soviet and anti-Russian opposition forces. In spite of the differences between the 
evolution of anti-communist opposition in Poland and Estonia, the strategies of cooperating 
with the political emigrants are nevertheless to a certain degree comparable. The ferry 
connections with the neutral Nordic neighbour states were important prerequisites for the 
establishment of functioning channels of communication between the exile and the domestic 
opposition. Structurally similar courier networks and communication strategies were used by 
exile activists in Sweden in order to establish contacts to both Estonian dissidents and the 
Polish opposition, as soon as it was forced to operate in the underground after the imposition 
of martial law. In both cases, Baltic ferries played a crucial role for the clandestine supply of 
technical equipment and uncensored literature, although the material support for Estonia 
developed relatively late and on a much smaller scale than its Polish counterpart. However, 
the cross-Baltic channels were of central importance for oppositional activists in both Poland 
and Estonia. For the Estonian dissidents as well as for the independence movement during the 
perestroika years, the contacts with EVVA constituted the only channel of direct cooperation 
with the anti-communist emigration.
1311
 The Swedish connection, which in the Estonian case 
formed an extension of the ‘Finnish bridge’, was thus of crucial importance for the 
coordination of synchronised oppositional activities. Although the topography of the Polish 
emigration was fundamentally different, even the Polish opposition largely profited from the 
cooperation with the activists in Sweden, which developed into a major lifeline to the West, at 
least as far as the material support for the democratic movement was concerned. With the 
financial support of the transnational diaspora communities and the National Endowment for 
Democracy, which channelled funds that directly derived from the U.S. government, neutral 
Sweden thus developed into one of the major Western toeholds of anti-communist opposition.  
Whether and to what degree the cross-Baltic networks between the exile and the democratic 
movements had an impact on the deconstruction of the communist order is difficult to 
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measure. It is beyond doubt that the large-scale supply of the Polish underground with 
technical equipment and uncensored literature via Sweden was of crucial importance for the 
maintenance of oppositional structures under martial law and beyond. However, the turn of 
the negotiations between the Solidarity leadership and the regime in 1989 imply that the 
influence of the Western connections declined. The Estonian opposition, by contrast, 
significantly strengthened its bonds with the political emigrant community especially in 
Sweden from 1988 onwards. The rapid development of close networks between the 
oppositional leadership and the exiles doubtlessly had a major impact on the gradual ‘re-
Westernisation’ of Estonia, both concerning the reconstruction of market economy structures 
and a pluralistic political landscape. This sheds an interesting light on the standard master 
narratives of the Soviet Union’s demise, which is considered as a “predominantly domestic 
process”.1312 
Less disputable is certainly the question to what degree the oppositional networks across the 
Baltic Sea influenced Swedish society. Both the public attention in the political developments 
in communist Europe from 1980 onwards and the vigorous lobbying activities of Poles and 
Balts in Sweden significantly triggered societal support for the democratic movements in 
communist Europe, which formed a sharp contrast to the government’s reserved stance. The 
numerous street manifestations and other forms of active support constituted an unambiguous 
statement against the communist regimes on the opposite coasts. To a certain degree, they 
anticipated the return of the Baltic Sea Region into the broader consciousness of Swedish 
society, which from 1990 onwards materialised in the rapid development of a widely ramified 
pattern of contacts with the opposite coasts.  
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VIII. Conclusion 
The present study has, with the underlying aim of outlining a first synthesis of the Cold War 
era as seen through the prism of a European sub-region, redrawn the contours of a 
surprisingly dynamic pattern of interaction that transcended the Iron Curtain. So far, the Baltic 
Sea Region has received undeservedly little attention in Cold War historiography, not at least 
in view of the fact that some of the key events of Europe’s conflictual history of the twentieth 
century took place around the Baltic rim. Gdańsk, or Danzig as it was at the time, was not 
only the place where the first shots of World War II were fired. The Baltic port city saw also 
the rise of the first organised, mass-based opposition movement in communist Europe four 
decades later. The defining breakthrough of European détente, on the other hand, which 
succeeded in bridging the abyss between NATO and Warsaw Pact Europe in many respects, is 
symbolised by another city at the Baltic coastline. Helsinki has become the synonym for the 
process of rapprochement that revolutionised European Cold War diplomacy. Even the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, which marked the end of the socialist experiment in Europe, 
took its beginning at the Baltic shores, when the Balts unleashed their ‘Singing Revolutions’ 
in the late 1980s.   
Seen from this angle, the Baltic Sea Region was far from being a peripheral borderland or a 
mere off stage element of the Cold War. By contrast, the simmering conflict between the 
blocs was, as along the continental front lines, highly perceptible throughout the post-war 
decades. At times, the ideological dichotomy of the Cold War erupted in more or less 
dramatic demonstrations of military power along the Baltic shores, such as the downing of a 
Swedish airforce plane in 1952 and the Soviet submarine incidents of the early 1980s or the 
manoeuvres carried out by the naval forces of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The 
evolution of conflicts and communication between the riparian states mirrored the extremes 
and ruptures in half a century of conflict and coexistence, rapprochement and demarcation in 
European history. Having been a major battlefield of World War II and the setting for waves 
of forced mass migrations on the backwash of retreating armies, the Baltic Sea Region saw 
the same processes of demarcation and isolation as the continental borderlands during the 
upcoming superpower conflict of the late 1940s. During the Thaw, the small inland sea turned 
into a symbol of the first post-Stalinist efforts of bridging the gaps between the blocs as a ‘Sea 
of Peace’, which marked the prelude to détente and the development of an exceptionally 
liberal flow of people, goods and ideas between the Baltic shores. This eventually fostered the 
cooperation of oppositional circles on both sides of the Iron Curtain and the development of 
networks that significantly contributed to the demise of the communist order.  
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Despite the dense net of military surveillance, the chain of watchtowers and the raked sand 
beaches along its southern and eastern shores, the Baltic Sea did not entirely lose its 
traditional function as a European contact zone. The geopolitical constellation around the 
Baltic rim not only fostered exceptionally close relations between neutral Sweden and the 
People’s Republic of Poland as the biggest satellite state, but allowed also for a unique 
opening towards the Soviet orbit via the Finnish-Estonian connection. Hence, the North 
appears as a decisive political factor in post-war Europe and a third element in the East-West 
conflict, which is crucial for the understanding of European Cold War history. The status of 
the Nordic neutral states as principally ‘friendly neighbours’ of communist Europe paved the 
way for an exceptionally far-reaching policy of rapprochement between the blocs. Under the 
impact of the Thaw and the following process of détente, the Baltic Sea Region turned into an 
experimental field of Cold War politics, which allowed for the implementation of outspokenly 
liberal policies. Estonia could develop into a meeting point between the West and the Soviet 
orbit, while the Polish-Swedish dialogue led to an infrastructure of visa-free travelling that 
even outlived the proclamation of martial law and thus was unique in Europe.  
The specificity of the political constellation around the Baltic rim was a precondition for the 
dynamics of interaction and encounters that developed underneath the level of state 
diplomacy. The comparatively low level of East-West tensions in Europe’s north-eastern 
corner paved the way for an official sanctioning of exchange and interaction between the 
riparian states, which fostered the development of a continually expanding infrastructural web 
between the Baltic shores. As a specific transition area between the blocs, the Baltic 
waterways not only fostered the mobility of official delegates, guided tourist groups and 
individual travellers. The Baltic connection also triggered the exceptionally efficient 
communication between oppositional circles on both sides of the Iron Curtain, which led to an 
additional, but less visible field of cross-Baltic exchange. Against this background, the Baltic 
Sea Region constituted a veritable “laboratory of Europe”1313 even and, maybe, especially 
during the Cold War era. 
 
Oppositional thinking among both political émigrés in the West and nonconformist activist 
circles within the communist orbit itself turned out to be a dynamic societal force that, often 
successfully, challenged the divisive function of the Iron Curtain throughout the Cold War 
era. The forms of communication and the type of actors involved were largely determined by 
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the current climate of international politics and the constantly changing structural 
preconditions of uncontrolled exchange between the blocs. The reconstruction of the 
dynamics of oppositional thinking and its potential to trigger activities that transcended 
boundaries and front lines required the integration of the years of World War II into a larger 
chronological framework. Already the early efforts of the leading circles among the Polish 
and Estonian war refugees in Sweden to support the homeland partisan movements reveal 
significant similarities in the attempts to establish secret channels of communication across 
the Baltic Sea during the immediate post-war years. Thus, the present study covers half a 
century of transnational resistance and opposition to the expansionist and hegemonic great 
power politics on the Baltic Sea Region’s southern and eastern shores, highlighting the impact 
on the various forms of interaction and exchange across the Baltic Sea.  
Polish and Estonian war-time resistance against both the German and Soviet aggressors was a 
transnational phenomenon, based on regular communication between the underground 
structures in the occupied territories and exiled circles behind the front lines. Due to Sweden’s 
neutrality and its trade ties to the German-occupied territories as well as the functioning 
infrastructure between Nazi-ruled Estonia and Berlin’s ally Finland, the Baltic waterways 
directly linked both Polish and Estonian partisans to the representatives of their countries’ 
pre-war order in Stockholm. These clandestine connections were not immediately cut off with 
the invasion of the Red Army, although all communication across the Baltic Sea significantly 
decreased with the Soviet advances westwards. Therefore, it is difficult to draw a clear line 
between resistance and opposition to the radical political reconfiguration processes that took 
place in Poland and the Baltic states. The transition from transnationally coordinated partisan 
resistance to organised political opposition was rather a gradual process. It took place in the 
course of two parallel developments that accompanied the transformation of the Baltic Sea 
into one of the ‘battlefields’ of the upcoming Cold War: the internal consolidation of the 
communist dictatorships and the restructuring of the provisional war refugee communities 
into organised exile societies with a distinct anti-Soviet and, thus, anti-communist, profile.  
By the late 1940s, the intensifying conflict between the superpowers and the gradual 
consolidation of the dividing line between the non-communist states and Moscow’s sphere of 
influence had developed into a bipolar pattern that could be discerned on various levels. The 
general tendencies of disintegration were mirrored by the growing mental gap between the 
Central and Eastern European exile communities and their increasingly isolated compatriots 
behind the Iron Curtain. This split was reinforced by the ubiquitous spy hysteria of the era and 
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the following self-isolation of the émigré societies towards their Sovietised homelands. 
Oppositional activism now took the form of lobbying campaigns in the West and incessant 
attempts to sabotage the communist regimes’ aim to monopolise national information services 
behind the Iron Curtain via anti-communist broadcasting stations. As the possibilities of 
physically penetrating communist Europe’s demarcation line towards the West decreased, the 
political struggle of the exiles thus shifted towards a war of ideologies. During the high tide of 
the Cold War, Sweden’s obligation to maintain strict neutrality in the superpower conflict 
turned out to be an obstacle for the clearly anti-communist agenda of the political emigrant 
communities. Moreover, geography increasingly lost its significance in the early 1950s, when 
transatlantic communication was considerably easier to establish than contacts between 
neighbouring countries in the borderlands of divided Europe. These structural disadvantages 
contributed to the gradual marginalisation of the Polish and Estonian exile activists on 
Swedish soil in the larger framework of their respective transnational diaspora communities. 
Instead, it was the émigré centres in Western Europe and the United States that turned into the 
crucial hubs of the networking processes with the spearheads of the fervent Western 
anticommunism of the era. However, even at the peak of the East-West conflict, it was still 
considerably easier to gather fragments of uncensored information on the development behind 
the Iron Curtain in considerable proximity to the communist orbit. It was thus certainly no 
coincidence that many of Radio Free Europe’s offices, whose task it was to collect and 
decode relevant information, were located in the borderlands of divided Europe. Thus, the 
role of the exile activists in Sweden, which due to the proximity to the communist-ruled 
opposite coasts counted among the strategic outposts of the West, cannot be underestimated, 
at least as far as the efforts of breaking the information cordon around the Soviet bloc are 
concerned.  
The specific role of the neutral Nordic states again became evident with the onset of the 
Thaw, when the communist regimes gave up their ambition to maintain totalitarian control 
over their territories. Poland developed into the frontrunner among the satellite states as far as 
the liberalisation of exchange with the West was concerned, which triggered a considerable 
expansion of the touristic infrastructure also between Poland and its Nordic neighbours. At 
the same time, the Soviet Estonians witnessed the first careful opening towards the neutral 
Nordic states, which in the Soviet context marked a unique process of liberalisation. By 
establishing direct contacts with the first official delegations from the home country that 
visited the neutral Nordic states, the Estonian exiles in Sweden significantly contributed to the 
reorientation of the exile struggle towards interaction with the homeland. The self-isolation 
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towards communist Europe, which still prevailed among the émigré communities from behind 
the Iron Curtain, was of course a major obstacle for these first attempts to bridge the gaps. 
Due to the line of non-recognition, which formed the ideological bedrock of the political 
emigration, it was mainly the factions that did not lay claim to embodying the geopolitical 
status quo ante that were able to make use of the first ‘loopholes’ in the Iron Curtain. In the 
Polish case, the circles around the exile journal Kultura in Paris proved to be able to follow a 
more realistic political line than ‘Polish London’, which in itself was a relic of the Second 
Republic. A parallel development could be discerned among the Estonians. In contrast to the 
right-wing sympathisers of the Päts regime, who dominated the emigration in North America, 
it was mainly the circles around the ERN in Sweden, the representatives of the democratic 
opposition of the pre-war period, who first understood the need to transform the exile struggle 
into a more multi-layered set of strategies.  
Détente radically altered the preconditions for these more subversive aspects of oppositional 
activity. The rapidly expanding touristic infrastructure in the Baltic Sea Region developed 
into the backbone for the establishment of an additional level of contacts between East and 
West. The official sanctioning of societal encounters across the sea formed an important 
precondition for the uncontrolled exchange of information and thus considerably determined 
the political agenda of the exile activists. Due to these new channels of communication, the 
exiles and increasingly also the protagonists of the societal opposition behind the Iron Curtain 
were able to efficiently undermine the communist regimes’ attempts to prevent the evolution 
of clandestine transnational structures that challenged the border regime. The driving forces 
behind the major shift in the strategies, which turned East-West contacts into an element of 
opposition and not collaboration, were mainly due to the rise of the generation émigrés. A 
younger cohort of Estonians and a new wave of political exiles from communist Poland 
followed a very similar strategy in bridging the mental and ideological gaps that isolated the 
anti-communist emigration from the homelands. By critically revising oppositional aims and 
strategies, the second generation émigrés considerably contributed to paving the way for a 
convergence of various oppositional circles on both sides of the Iron Curtain, which was 
based on a ‘common language’ that bound activists in exile and the homeland together.  
From the mid-1970s onwards, it was the unprecedented vitality of oppositional dynamics 
behind the Iron Curtain that directly stimulated the political emigration and determined its 
strategies of oppositional activism. Exile circles in the West adopted the organisational 
structure of societal opposition in the communist societies, forming loose networks of support 
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that could directly and efficiently respond to the needs and demands of the homeland activists. 
At the same time, the tone of the lobbying activities in the West converged with the 
oppositional rhetoric behind the Iron Curtain, which increasingly stressed the principles of 
human rights, but also national self-determination and, in the case of the Estonians, 
decolonisation as pillars of a transnational oppositional agenda. Hence, anti-communist 
activism in post-Helsinki Europe mirrored the significantly increased possibilities of 
establishing reliable channels of communication between the blocs, which formed the 
precondition for the development of an oppositional dialogue that was able to transcend the 
Iron Curtain.  
The CSCE process, which embodied European détente in the early 1970s, not only fostered a 
considerable expansion of the physical infrastructure between the Baltic shores. It also 
compelled the communist governments to actively support and enhance encounters between 
societal organisations and actors from communist and non-communist states. A small number 
of recently emigrated Polish activists in Sweden proved to be able to make use of the effects 
that détente had on grassroots-level encounters across the Iron Curtain by establishing the 
necessary channels for a vital intellectual exchange between Swedish opinion-makers and the 
intellectual leadership of the young Polish democratic movement. Under the guise of 
scholarly and intellectual exchange between Poland and Sweden, which both governments 
had agreed to support, the exile activists contributed to bridging the ideological gaps between 
the non-communist Left in Poland and Swedish social democracy. To a certain degree, these 
networks set the ground for the fruitful cooperation between societal actors and institutions in 
both countries after the rise of the Solidarity movement. Under similar premises, the first 
attempts were even made to foster societal exchange between Sweden and the Soviet Baltic 
republics. Scholarly contacts could develop first in 1981, mainly due to the commitment of 
several younger exile scholars in Sweden, who were opposed to the still wide-spread 
isolationist stance among the Baltic exile communities. Covered by official Swedish 
institutions, the exile activists succeeded in establishing the first channel of communication 
with the conformist, established intelligentsia on the Soviet opposite coasts, which 
nevertheless had a clear-cut oppositional aspect. However, these networks developed as an 
additional level of exile-homeland contacts and did not involve Swedish society to any 
considerable degree.  
The cross-linking of intellectual elites in the communist states with Western circles developed 
concurrently with the more clandestine contacts between illegal underground activists and 
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their supports in the neutral Nordic states, which together formed a multilayered set of 
contacts that developed beyond direct state control. This intricate transnational web of 
oppositional activism and an infrastructure of regular traffic connections between the shores 
were among the preconditions for the development of a new field of oppositional activity in 
the region. From the mid-1970s onwards, the Baltic waterways transformed into a frequently 
trafficked smuggling route that, in many ways, was unique in Cold War Europe. Smuggling 
on the Baltic ferries that connected Sweden and Poland on the one hand and Soviet Estonia 
and Finland on the other had, as elsewhere in the borderlands of divided Europe, become a 
side effect of the gradual opening up of the borders between the blocs. These channels served 
mainly to compensate for the lack of the scarce resources behind the Iron Curtain. Yet, they 
were also used to satisfy the more immaterial needs of the communist societies, especially the 
demand for the religious and political writings that were officially banned. However, with the 
first organised smuggling of printing equipment to Poland in the second half of the 1970s, this 
field of oppositional activity reached a new level. The smuggling networks differed from 
earlier efforts to foster the free circulation of uncensored information across the Iron Curtain, 
such as the symbiosis between open source intelligence and anti-communist broadcasting or 
the entangling processes of samizdat and tamizdat, the smuggling of manuscripts to the West 
and printed editions back into the communist orbit. Providing the technical and logistic 
preconditions for the development of an oppositional public discourse behind the Iron 
Curtain, the exiles and their Western supporters actively engaged in the communist states’ 
domestic politics. The large-scale smuggling of technical equipment for the opposition 
movements behind the Iron Curtain, which developed on the Baltic waters from the late 1970s 
onwards and continued until the fall of communism, thus marked a climax of transnational, 
concerted oppositional activity directed against the communist regimes.  
A direct comparison between the Polish and Estonian cases reveals at first glance huge 
differences. Particularly concerning the scale of societal opposition itself, Poland and Estonia 
once again demonstrated the huge gaps between the oppositional potential of the satellite 
belt’s most open society and a small nation within a multiethnic empire that was additionally 
weakened by state-sponsored mass immigration from all over the Soviet Union. Moreover, 
the Poles could count on the support of large segments of Swedish society, while the Estonian 
exiles were, apart from the personal, but utmost discrete commitment of the Finnish couriers, 
largely on their own in their political struggle. Nevertheless, the specificity of the Baltic 
connection and the striking similarity of applied strategies by Polish and Estonian exile 
activists once again justify the comparative perspective of the present study. In both cases, 
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reliable channels of communication could be established due to the regular ferry connections 
and the willingness of Swedish and Finnish citizens to function as intermediaries, which 
considerably facilitated the cooperation between exile activists and the underground 
opposition behind the Iron Curtain in the early 1980s. From 1985 onwards, the Estonians also 
succeeded in organising direct practical support which, as in the Polish case, was supposed to 
provide the technical and material ground for the establishment of a parallel, nonconformist 
society in the home country. Up to the end of the decade, the smuggling of printing and 
audiovisual equipment to both Poland and Estonia via the émigré circles in Sweden turned the 
neutral country into a backbone of transnational opposition on the eve of the Cold War era.  
With the onset of perestroika, the preconditions for the establishment of functioning 
oppositional networks across the Iron Curtain radically changed. Already in 1985, the Polish-
Swedish journal Hotel Örnsköld proclaimed that the borders between official and unofficial 
texts had been increasingly blurred by the formation of an increasingly autonomous society 
with a non-governmental, independent press in Poland.
1314
 At the same time, the post-war 
culture of samizdat de facto ended with the emergence of a new political culture, even in the 
Soviet Union.
1315
 In the Baltic republics, this process of gradual liberalisation started later 
than in the Russian heartland, but introduced exceptionally revolutionary changes. As in 
Poland seven years earlier, opposition developed into a mass phenomenon in the Soviet 
Union’s western peripheries. The parallel opening up of the borders triggered, as in the Polish 
case in the beginning of the decade, new dynamics of contacts with the West and especially 
with the Nordic neighbours. Nationalist factions among oppositional forces in exile and in the 
homeland joined forces in the secession process, which fostered an early, transnationally 
coordinated process of societal reorganisation and reconfiguration that evolved already before 
the Baltic independence declarations.  
The Polish case, by contrast, features a surprising decline in oppositional cooperation with 
organisations and activists outside the country in spite of the relatively open borders, which 
can be at least partly explained by the remarkably plummeting revolutionary moods in Poland 
after the delegalisation of the Solidarity movement. In contrast to the situation in Soviet 
Estonia, where the fruitful symbiosis between exile and homeland forces set the ground for 
first market economy structures and a pluralistic political landscape, in Poland it was rather 
the moderate forces that set the course for democratisation. At the Round Table meetings in 
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Warsaw, the dismantling of the communist economic system was not even discussed.
1316
 
Despite these contrasting developments at the end of half a century of resistance and 
opposition and the very different dynamics of cross-Baltic cooperation in the decisive phase 
of transition, it is nevertheless obvious that the Baltic connection played an outstanding role 
for the evolution of opposition both in Poland and Estonia. The mosaic of border-crossing 
contacts, communication and cooperation that characterised the evolution of oppositional 
thinking and activism in Cold War Europe put the Baltic Sea Region on the map as an area of 
especially intense and far-reaching interaction between the blocs.  
 
The oppositional networking processes that developed between the Baltic shores had 
considerable repercussions not only for the societies behind the Iron Curtain, but also for 
neutral Sweden. Sweden’s diplomatic relations with its communist neighbours on the opposite 
coasts is essentially a Cold War history of confrontration and conflict, not least due to the 
existence of considerable political exile communities from Poland and the Baltic states on 
Swedish soil. Their pronouncedly anti-communist activism and the relatively tolerant stance 
of the Swedish government reinforced the tensions on the diplomatic level. Also the domestic 
political discourses in Sweden itself did not remain unaffected. As has been shown, the exiles 
succeeded in developing a perceptible influence over the media coverage in Sweden 
throughout the Cold War era, which had a considerable impact on opinion-making processes 
in the neutral country. By influencing public opinion, the exiles even indirectly strained 
Sweden’s official relations with the communist states negatively. In a certain sense, the anti-
communist exiles thus brought the Cold War to Sweden.  
The exiles’ influence on Swedish public opinion was relatively strong already during the high 
tide of the Cold War, when leading Baltic émigrés succeeded in transforming pre-war 
networks between university scholars into a remarkably stable political alliance. The close 
bonds between Baltic and Swedish conservative intellectuals not only facilitated the war-time 
support of the partisan movements in the occupied Baltic territories and the mass evacuation 
of Baltic refugees towards the end of the war, they also developed into a main vehicle for a 
Swedish version of ‘cold warfare’, which was organised in close cooperation between 
Swedish conservatives and the political émigrés. One of the exile activists’ main weapons in 
their ideological war was the close observation of the developments behind the Iron Curtain 
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and the rebuttal of the communist regimes’ propaganda of success. Especially the Estonians in 
Sweden proved to be able to make use of their proximity to Soviet Estonia by compiling large 
databases of information on the political development behind the Iron Curtain, which were 
astonishingly accurate.
1317
 Due to their good connections to the liberal and conservative press, 
they were able to disseminate their knowledge among a critical Swedish public, which 
certainly had an impact on the political climate of the time.
1318
 
It was first with the radical political shift of détente and the leftist turn among Western 
societies that the alliance between the first generation exiles and the conservative Swedish 
elites suddenly lost its political relevance. Only due to the ability of a number of second 
generation activists to adapt the exile struggle to contemporary political discourses, could 
potential supporters among Swedish society be mobilised. Decisive key moments of 
international politics that triggered a favourable political climate for the exiles were the 
signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 and the election of Jimmy Carter to the Presidency in 
the United States one year later, which heralded a more confrontational course in the dialogue 
with Moscow. The stronger focus on the moral aspects of communist ruling practices in 
Europe led the exile activists out of the dead end of ‘cold warfare’ and enabled them to link to 
a discourse that dominated both the international political debates in the West and the 
negotiations between the blocs of the time. The change of paradigms in the oppositional 
rhetoric both among the exile communities and the dissident and opposition movements 
behind the Iron Curtain proved to have the potential to mobilise considerable support among 
political and societal elites in the West. Demanding the implementation of the legal principles 
that the communist governments had committed to in the course of the CSCE process, 
oppositional forces in the East and the West managed to connect to the human rights 
discourse, which had triggered significant grassroots-level activity among Western societies.  
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 As Professor Olaf Mertelsmann from the University of Tartu pointed out in a conversation with the author in 
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Lobbying for societal support depended to a large degree depended on the cultural translation 
of the aims and strategies of oppositional movements behind the Iron Curtain into a language 
that the potential supporters in the West could relate to. Eventually, this paved the way for the 
engagement of Swedish political actors across party borders with the cause of the Polish 
opposition, which set the ground for the considerable mobilisation of Swedish society in 
support of the first independent trade union movement in Poland. For the Estonians, by 
contrast, it was considerably harder to promote an agenda of national emancipation in neutral 
Sweden. Yet, a number of younger exile activists succeeded in shifting the emphasis from the 
anti-communist struggle of the first generation towards the specifically anti-Soviet edge of 
nationalist opposition. Thus, they succeeded in integrating the Estonian case into the anti-
colonial discourses of the time, placing the occupied country in the row of suppressed nations. 
The victory of this strategy shone through in the success of Andres Küng’s published works, 
the engagement of the Liberal Party’s Youth League for the Baltic cause and the awakening 
interest among Sweden’s Moderate Party for the Balts’ oppositional struggle.   
From 1980 onwards, the influence of the oppositional forces on opinion-making in Sweden 
rose considerably due to the renewal of the close links between exile representatives and the 
Swedish media, which in their majority took a course that increasingly counteracted the 
Swedish government’s neutrality doctrine by adopting the oppositional language of the exile 
activists and the democratic movements behind the Iron Curtain. To a certain degree, the 
intensified media coverage on the events in nearby Poland and the Baltic republics even 
contributed to the gradual renaissance of the Baltic Sea Region as a concept. The geographical 
vicinity and the common regional context was increasingly highlighted in Swedish media 
reports of the late 1980s, which certainly paved the way for the processes of integration that 
could develop in line with the processes of systemic transition on Sweden’s opposite coasts 
from 1989 onwards. 
 
The impact of the oppositional networks between Sweden and its opposite coasts on the 
exiles’ home countries was equally significant. As the reconstruction of the war-time 
networks of resistance has shown, Sweden played a crucial role for the support of the 
underground movements in the occupied territories already from an early stage of World War 
II onwards. However, with the onset of the Cold War, the concrete effects of the cross-Baltic 
channels on the communist societies are more difficult to assess. The proximity of neutral 
Sweden to the People’s Republic of Poland was not necessarily decisive for the development 
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of uncontrolled channels of communication between Poland and the non-communist world. 
Warsaw’s border regime was unusually liberal, at least from the Thaw onwards, which 
enabled Polish citizens to travel relatively freely in the West. Yet, Sweden’s liberal asylum 
policy certainly put the country on the map for both economic and political refugees, as the 
Polish waves of immigration between 1956 and 1958 and from 1968 onwards illustrated. 
Beginning with the development of an organised democratic movement and a reliable 
network of supporters in the West, the Baltic waterways regained their function as a major 
lifeline across the Iron Curtain. Sweden turned into the main hub for the organised smuggling 
of technical equipment for the largest opposition movement of communist Europe, which 
undoubtedly had a huge impact on the evolution of oppositional activism in Poland from the 
mid-1970s onwards. The crucial importance of the Swedish-Polish connection is also 
reflected in the exceptional cooperation between the Solidarity movement and the Swedish 
trade unions, which for a certain period triggered a lively interest in the Swedish model 
among the oppositional circles in communist Poland.  
In the Estonian case, by contrast, the geographical vicinity to Finland and Sweden was a 
factor that considerably determined the course of events throughout the war-time and post-
war history of Estonia. The significance of the Finnish-Estonian connection from the post-
Stalinist Thaw up to the proclamation of Estonian sovereignty in 1991 is uncontested and 
forms a remarkable exception in Europe’s Cold War history. The much-cited topos of the 
‘Finnish bridge’ was a central element for large segments of Soviet Estonian society, as it, due 
to its function as the most important Soviet ‘loophole’ to the West, determined much of the 
Estonian perception of the non-communist world throughout the Cold War era. However, as 
far as oppositional thinking and action is concerned, it was especially neutral Sweden, in a 
certain sense the extension of the ‘Finnish bridge’, which played a major role in Estonia’s 
post-war history. As the political and cultural centre of the Estonian diaspora in Europe, 
Stockholm was also called “capital of Exile Estonia”.1319 The city’s proximity to Estonia 
certainly had an important impact on Soviet Estonian society, not least psychologically. The 
former dissident Heiki Ahonen recalls that the awareness of the exile’s political struggle on 
Estonia’s opposite coasts had a consolidating function on societal opposition in Estonia. The 
politically and culturally active exile community represented “a kind of ‘alternative Estonia’” 
that would persist even if Estonia itself had been completely Russified.
1320
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The proximity and neutral status of Sweden were important preconditions for the 
development of direct exchange between exile and homeland communities. Similarly to 
Finland, Sweden was also considered a relatively ‘friendly neighbour’, which facilitated 
travelling between Soviet Estonia and Sweden for those who wanted to reconnect with 
relatives and friends. From the mid-1970s onwards, the cross-Baltic links turned Sweden into 
a major Western toehold for Soviet Estonian dissent and, towards the end of the 1980s, for the 
mass-based independence movement that could emerge under the impact of perestroika and 
glasnost. Kippar’s Relief Centre in Stockholm was up to the late 1980s the only Western 
organisation that maintained direct contacts with the core of the Soviet Estonian 
opposition.
1321
 Once again, the ‘Finnish bridge’ and the willingness of numerous Finnish 
citizens to function as couriers cannot be overestimated as the missing link between the 
oppositional activists on both sides of the Iron Curtain. However, at first glance apolitical 
networking processes between exile scholars in Sweden and the Soviet Estonian intelligentsia 
from the early 1980s onwards also doubtlessly played an important role in the gradual 
opening up of Estonian society towards the West. The concrete impact of these processes is, 
nevertheless, hard to assess, especially in view of the huge research gaps in the field. The 
same is true for the significance of the Swedish connection for the introduction of first market 
economy structures in Soviet Estonia in 1990 and 1991. Even in this context, the Estonians 
émigrés in Sweden seem to have served an important intermediary function. Thus, the cultural 
and economic contacts between Sweden and Estonia developed already years before the 
secession from the Soviet Union due to the commitment of the exiles in Sweden, which 
formed a solid ground for the further development of bilateral relations in the 1990s.  
In comparison to the Polish case, where Swedish intermediaries played a crucial role in the 
establishment of direct communication channels between the Polish democratic movement 
and the West, the significance of Swedish supporters was only of secondary importance in the 
networking processes between Sweden and Soviet Estonia. Due to the ferry connection 
between Tallinn and Helsinki and the incomparably higher number of Finnish travellers to 
Estonia, it was mainly the Finns who developed a multi-layered web of contacts with their 
southern neighbours already from the mid-1950s onwards. Finnish couriers and intermediaries 
thus filled an important function in the Estonian topography of opposition during the Cold 
War. While the émigrés played a key role in bridging the gap between Sweden and the Baltic 
neighbours on the opposite coast, the Finns established their links with Soviet Estonia on their 
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own accord. The grassroots-level contacts that developed during the Cold War between 
Estonians and Finns thus constituted a separate pattern of cross-Baltic communication that in 
the context of the present study has certainly not received the attention it deserves.  
The active commitment of Finnish citizens that developed underneath the level of the 
solemnly proclaimed Finnish-Soviet friendship forms a clear contrast to the relative 
reluctance of Swedish society and politics to engage with the Estonian cause. In contrast to 
the Polish opposition, which promoted change within the framework of the communist order, 
the Estonian exiles demanded, as did the dissident circles, the abolition of the communist 
system itself, which was perceived as a yoke of foreign occupation. This is why the Polish 
cause triggered considerably stronger engagement on the part of Swedish society than the 
Baltic émigrés’ political struggle. Swedish public manifestations of support for the Baltic 
independence struggle both among the media and society emerged only after the collapse of 
the communist regimes in the satellite belt. Thus, Swedish society displayed rather a rational 
line of Realpolitik than any historically motivated sympathies for the Baltic neighbours, which 
are often referred to as an explanation for the close bonds between the Baltic nations and 
Sweden. A common culture and shared histories played a much more central role for the 
entangling processes between Finland and Estonia, which developed in spite of the much 
stricter understanding of neutrality in Cold War Finland.  
 
The central aim of the research project was to open up a new field of research on a so far 
overlooked, specific pattern of communication and cooperation that could develop in the 
Baltic Sea Region during the Cold War era. The present study on the history of transnational 
networking processes between the Baltic shores has certainly at least partly filled an academic 
void, although much empirical research still remains to be done. At this point, however, two 
specific issues that the study has touched upon shall be shortly addressed in view of their 
significance for further Cold War research: the understanding of Nordic neutrality during the 
Cold War and the question of periodisation.  
Due to the anti-communist exile communities from behind the Iron Curtain, Sweden formed a 
centre and major toehold of opposition in the Baltic Sea Region throughout the Cold War. 
This aspect of Sweden’s recent history contradicts the common perception of the country’s 
role in the geopolitical system of post-war Europe. The neutrality doctrine that determined 
Sweden’s foreign policy after the end of World War II is often perceived and interpreted as 
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the logical consequence of a continuous, identity-shaping ‘tradition’. Indeed, the roots of 
Swedish neutrality reach back to the beginning of the nineteenth century, but, as after World 
War II, the choice to remain neutral was dictated by a perceived threat from the East. Hence, 
it is rather a tradition of geopolitically determined Realpolitik that characterises the past two 
centuries of Swedish history. While the National Union Government’s compliant stance up to 
1943 resulted from the presence of a victorious and powerful fascist dictatorship in close 
vicinity to the Swedish borders, the post-war social democratic government once again had to 
adapt the country’s policy to its geopolitical position within the field of interest of another 
powerful, non-democratic and expansionist neighbour, the Soviet Union. The fragile balance 
of power in the Baltic Sea Region dictated the necessity of good relations with the socialist 
neighbouring states on the opposite coasts and of a neutrality doctrine that was supposed to 
keep Sweden out of future wars. Thus, it was rather political calculation than sympathy or 
friendship that characterised Sweden’s stance towards the socialist bloc, which was obvious 
for most contemporary observers as much in the East as in the West.
1322
 
This background helps in understanding the huge gap between the formal and informal 
practices of neutrality politics in post-war Sweden. In view of the at times far-reaching 
unofficial institutional support for the anti-communist exile activists throughout World War II 
and the Cold War era, a different narrative of Swedish post-war neutrality emerges. The 
present study has revealed a consistent tendency among state officials, non-governmental 
organisations and individuals to openly or discretely support oppositional forces throughout 
the decades of the East-West conflict, which unequivocally thwarted the government’s 
officially proclaimed policy. In view of the often unambiguous sympathies for the circles that 
were opposed to the Soviet-type regimes on Sweden’s opposite coasts, neutral Sweden was 
thus in many respects more Western than was widely perceived. Especially in the light of the 
close cooperation between the intelligence services of Great Britain and the United States 
with the exile activists in Sweden, which started during World War II and continued at least 
up to the end of the 1950s,
1323
 Sweden can even be seen as a veritable front line of the Cold 
War conflict in Northern Europe.  
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Although the more subversive forms of communication across the Baltic Sea were established 
and maintained by highly conspiratorial networks, there is much evidence that indicates that 
the Swedish authorities were often highly aware of the émigrés’ oppositional activities. In 
many cases, the exiles’ activities met, as has been shown, with tacit approval on the part of 
the Swedish authorities. Especially the large-scale smuggling activities that were planned and 
conducted by exile networks in Sweden from the mid-1970s onwards required substantial 
support, not only by the voluntary couriers that were regularly recruited among Swedish and 
Finnish citizens who travelled on Baltic ferries. This specific field of oppositional activism 
demanded both the silent consent of the authorities and a discrete institutional support, which, 
as has been shown, was offered not only by diplomats, but also, among others, by customs 
officers and members of the Swedish National Security Service.  
Already from the early days of World War II onwards, the Swedish Foreign Ministry formed 
a certain counterweight to the strictly neutral official course of the government, which was 
mirrored by frequent propagandistic attacks of the communist press that were explicitly 
directed at the Foreign Ministry and not the government itself. As Swedish diplomats were 
repeatedly accused of having supported oppositional activities around the Baltic rim and in 
view of many accounts given by former exile activists that imply an involvement of Swedish 
diplomats in the clandestine cross-Baltic networks, future research on the topic might reveal 
further interesting evidence.
1324
 Another field of potentially fruitful research is the 
investigation of the gap between society and government in the question of neutrality, which 
is especially striking in the Finnish case. Due to the specificity of Finnish post-war neutrality, 
which to a large part was determined by geopolitical necessities, and a certain tendency of 
self-censorship, the Finnish press is not a suitable indicator for a possible divergence between 
official policies and societal reactions to it. The specific pattern of Finnish-Estonian 
grassroots-level encounters, however, which at times took clearly oppositional forms, could 
be an interesting aspect of further investigation as a contrast to the officially maintained 
‘Paasikivi-Kekkonen line’. A stronger focus on these acts of ‘societal disobedience’ could 
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efficiently counteract the narrative of Finnish compliance towards the Soviet Union, which 
often has been deprecatingly labelled as ‘Finlandisation’.1325 
 
Another aspect that has been touched upon in the present study and might provide a basis for 
further research is the critical revision of the symbolism of the year 1945 as the decisive 
watershed in Europe’s twentieth century history. The focus on forced migration and the 
entangling function of migrants for the countries around the Baltic rim led to a revision of the 
present study’s time frame, which goes beyond the traditional chronological limits of Cold 
War studies. As has been shown, the Cold War conflict was, in the specific context of the 
Baltic Sea Region, mainly about Soviet expansionism and the reactions to it. Seen from this 
perspective, the year of 1939 appears as an, in many ways, more essential caesura. Due to the 
strong association of 1939 with the onset of Nazi Germany’s aggressive crusade eastwards, it 
is often overlooked that the same year marked the beginning of Soviet expansionism 
westwards. A few weeks after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Stalin’s Red Army 
invaded eastern Poland and established first military bases in the neutral Baltic states, which 
formed a prelude to their annexation in the summer of the following year. The demarcation 
process in the Baltic Sea Region, which was divided into occupied and non-occupied 
territories, thus started already with the onset of World War II and continued into the Cold 
War period without any major ruptures. The transformation of the Baltic Sea into a ‘sea of 
conflict’ has thus to be seen in a wider chronological perspective, in the light of which the war 
years appear as a part of the process rather than as a mere prelude to the Cold War. 
At the same time, the first war refugees from the opposite coasts started their political 
activities in neutral Sweden. Despite the clearly anti-German stance that both Poles and Balts 
displayed throughout the war, the anti-Soviet peak of their activism was clearly perceptible 
already before the Red Army’s advances westwards. Both the experiences of exile on the part 
of the refugees in the West and of occupation among the inhabitants of the Polish and Baltic 
territories continued after 1945. The coordinated underground resistance of the war years 
gradually passed over into post-war opposition, as the evolution of the Polish and Estonian 
exile struggle in Sweden has illustrated. The Cold War conflict itself, at least in the form, in 
which it is commonly perceived, namely as a diplomatic war and a stalemate of two 
competing superpowers, emerged first towards the end of the 1940s, when Scandinavia was 
reconfigured along the lines of changing political alliances and the Baltic waterways were 
                                                          
1325
 Bomsdorf, Sicherheit im Norden Europas; pp. 142-143. 
306 
 
gradually blocked. However, in the context of the present study’s interpretation of the Cold 
War conflict, the period between 1939 and 1989/1991 seems to be a more appropriate 
chronological frame for the investigation of cross-Baltic resistance and opposition.  
 
As has been expounded in the introductory chapter, Cold War historiography is an 
exceptionally dynamic field that at present, more than two decades after the end of the 
systemic conflict and the bipolarity of Europe, is in a state of constant transformation. As the 
conflict itself and ‘Cold War thinking’ slowly turn into history, the traditional focus on 
political and diplomatic aspects has been substituted by a wider perspective that enables 
contemporary research to go beyond the narrative of confrontation. The focus on 
communication and networks between the blocs has revealed patterns of societal cooperation 
even in the political sphere, which fostered dynamics that efficiently undermined the attempts 
to subordinate contacts between the blocs to state control and conformity with the geopolitical 
status quo.  
The transnational approach to Cold War history, as it has been applied in the present study, 
does not form an alternative or competing perspective. However, it helps to widen the views 
and to grasp phenomena that expand beyond and transcend geographical boundaries, as the 
investigation of the networks of opposition with its multitude of actors involved and hubs in- 
and outside Europe and on both sides of the Iron Curtain has shown. This angle supports the 
hypothesis that anti-communist opposition both in the West and within the communist 
societies themselves, which is a much-researched topic in contemporary, mainly nationally 
framed Cold War history, demands a perspective that goes beyond the topos of the Iron 
Curtain. Opposition in East and West were no phenomena that mirrored each other, but 
products of constant interaction and mutual influences. This nexus has already been stressed, 
for instance, in the research on the “double life” of tamizdat publications, which, smuggled 
out of the Soviet bloc as manuscripts, were spread in printed form both in the West and, as 
smuggle goods from the West, behind the Iron Curtain.
1326
 
In the present study, the transnational angle introduced a greatly enriching complementary 
approach to the still mostly nationally framed historiography of the Cold War around the 
Baltic rim. The heuristic results of the research project presented here reveal valuable insights 
not only for Sweden’s post-war history, but also for the understanding of the political and 
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societal development on the communist-ruled opposite coasts. Moreover, the focus on 
encounters and interaction instead of demarcation and disintegration has demonstrated the 
possibility to illustrate the closely intertwined post-war history of divided Europe as a whole 
by the example of a specific European sub-region. This might be a careful first step towards 
the attempt to write a transnationally framed synthesis of a European Cold War history 
between the poles of conflict and cooperation.  
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